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Major Findings  
 
The Treaty of Nice’s Declaration No. 23 on the future of the European Union has regur-
gitated a fundamental issue of supranational policy-making: National parliaments and 
the European Parliament face a growing number of challenges which call their position 
as the directly legitimate and representative aggregates of the European Union’s citi-
zenry into question: They constantly have to adapt and adjust the possibilities and a r-
rangements for parliamentary involvement in response to Community legislation and 
Union action. The major question of this volume is how national parliaments (re)-act in 
and adapt to a dynamic i nstitutional and procedural set-up. How do parliamentary actors 
in  different national and socio-political settings, and coined by different national tradi-
tions, ‘acclimatise’ to  common challenges, constraints and opportunities for which they 
are mainly responsible themselves, since they have ratified the fundamental set-up of 
these institutional and procedural structures?  
The last four Treaty reforms (The Single European Act of 1987, the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, and the Treaty of Nice of March 2001) marked 
significant efforts to strengthen parliamentary democracy in the European Union. How-
ever, there is still the question if these improvements provide new grounds for enhanc-
ing the legitimacy and the proximity of European governance to the citizens of the U n-
ion. The European Parliament is but one e ssential mean to democratise the European 
Union. In this book, we address the other side of the  - parliamentary  - coin: How do 
national parliaments contribute to EC/EU policy-making?  Are they still the losers of 
integration, are they latecomers and slow adapters, or are they re-orienting institutional 
capacities in order to appear as national and/or multi-level players? 
An international team of political scientists and lawyers explores the institutional and 
procedural development of both the EU and the member states’ parliamentary level. 
Each contribution analyses the structural potential for parliamentary participation in 
EC/EU policy-making (the ‘legal constitution’), the effective use of relevant provisions 
and constitutional rules (the ‘living constitution’), and in particular the negotiation and 
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty and the relevant debates in the national parlia-
ments.  
 
I. The Approach  
 
It belongs to the conventional wisdom that national parliaments have increasingly lost 
in overall importance due to the evolution of the EU’s political system. By passing con-
sequent Treaty amendments and revisions they accepted a shift of competencies to the 
European level, which reduced their final say over major areas of traditional legislative 
powers and the political control over governments. But why have those national institu-  18
tions, which are seen as major cornerstones of their respective polities, eroded their own 
constitutional rights by ratifying the making of a supranational quasi-constitution in 
recurrent steps? How can we explain that these key actors seem to be weak in adapting 
to a political constellation which they created at least partially themselves, whereas 
other groups of actors like interest groups, NGO’s and regional governments seem to be 
more successful in influencing the output of the EU system?  
Our interest in the role of national parliaments exceeds immediate procedural arrange-
ments of the EU. Given the growing salience of the EU system and its daily output, 
participation and involvement are vital issues for the overall weight and role of parlia-
ments. The way parliaments are and will be involved or not is a significant indicator for 
the fundamental trends the n ational systems and the EU take. It is of major importance 
for the legitimacy of the constitutional set-ups of the EU member states and of the U n-
ion itself. Any reform of the participation of national parliament in EC/EU affairs will 
affect the capabilities of all political institutions on both levels to deal with the chal-
lenges of public policies. Whatever institutional arrangements will be taken it will tell 
us something about the future shape of the European polity in the broader sense.  
In this regard,  the findings of the country reports in this volume indicate ‘realistic’ lines 
for reform, underlying motives for different reform proposals and limits of furthering 
the role of national parliaments within the institutional framework of the EC/EU. In 
order  to identify the challenges for the parliaments of the member states, we point at a 
set of fundamental trends of the Brussels arenas. We consider their evolution towards a 
fusion of actors, instruments and procedures according to the following indicators:  
-  the dynamic evolution of new and refined treaty provisions - an ever increasing set of 
communitarised frameworks for joint policy-making;  
-  the subsequent widening of the functional scope of the EU  - a sectoral differentiation 
of an increasing variety of policy fields involving more and more national actors;  
-  the creation of new institutions by subsequent treaty amendments  - institutional dif-
ferentiation, which increases the number of interaction styles and modes of govern-
ance;  
-  the set-up and cross-institutional combination of different kinds of procedures  - pro-
cedural differentiation, which causes a growing complexity of the EU’s multi-level 
system; 
-  the increase in scope and density of legal obligations  - the doubling of the a cquis 
communautaire from the early 1980’s to 1998 indicates both the rise of the para-
constitutional set-up as well as the ‘invasion’ of the legal space of member states. 
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II. Findings 
 
1. From Slow Adapters to National Players? 
 
The Maastricht Treaty’s Declaration No. 13 and the Amsterdam Treaty’s Protocol on 
the role of the national parliaments in the European Union generated some added pow-
ers for national parliaments within the framework of their national constitutions. The 
two documents contain some key indicators for measuring and  comparing the participa-
tion of national parliaments in the EU. Accordingly, our r esearch design focused on the 
following indicators:  
-  the institutionalisation of parliamentary structures, instruments and procedures for 
dealing with EU policy-making at the national level, 
-  the substantial scope of parliamentary control resulting from the extent of documents 
forwarded to parliaments by their governments, 
-  the basic orientation and methods of national parliaments with regard to the organisa-
tion of filtering documents within the parliamentary bodies, 
-  the timing and management of parliamentary scrutiny, and 
-  the potential and real impact of parliamentary scrutiny on the government’s room of 
manoeuvre within the EU Council of Ministers.  
Following this research design, the empirical studies in this volume explore the post-
Maastricht changes with regard to parliamentary participation established in the ‘legal 
constitution’ of the member states and with regard to their impact on the real patterns of 
involvement in the ‘living constitution’ of political life. 
The results point at a considerable legal constitutionalisation and institutional adapta-
tion, and at a modest impact with regard to the real patterns of participation. 
National parliamentarians wish to get involved i n the EU policy-cycle. To facilitate the 
digestion of incoming EC/EU draft acts, they have created specific bodies, which are 
entitled to sift documents, to elaborate reports and to prepare resolutions for the plenary. 
The activity of these EC/EU Committees varies not only according to the amount of 
documents forwarded by the respective governments, but also depending on the general 
orientation of their work and the intra-parliamentary focus on committee and plenary 
meetings. EU Committees in Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ireland and the UK House of 
Commons deal with incoming EC/EU documentation as  the Committee-in-charge of the 
whole scrutiny process. Other EU Committees (D, NL, S, I) are simply regarded as the 
first  - sifting  - institution within parliament i n order to facilitate the further considera-
tion of the relevant documents within specialised Standing Committees. The EU Com-
mittees in these countries specialise themselves on some  - ‘horizontal’  - European i s-
sues like Intergovernmental Conferences, Enlargement and other themes of the EU’s 
long-term agenda, whereas the first group of EU Committees-in-charge need to digest   20
each incoming EU dossier on behalf of their parliament. Necessarily, they meet more 
frequently than EU Committees of the second group.  
The basic orientation of parliaments in EU affairs also differs with regard to the  - ide-
ally constructed  - nature of the scrutiny process. Hence, the parliaments of Denmark, 
Austria, Sweden, and France focus their EU-related activity on the formulation and 
issuing of voting instructions for their respective government members in the Council of 
Ministers. These parliaments build on an ideal bipolar legislature-government scenario. 
Other parliaments follow a more open and consensual (NL, D, SF), or deliberately sup-
portive (IR, I, B, LUX, P, E, GR) approach vis-à-vis their governments. Their rationale 
is to ensure that interested parliamentarians can track the EU policy-cycles according to 
the constitutional rules.  
Finally, the consideration of the different steps in the EU policy cycle also generates 
different time constraints for parliamentarians and their EU Committees. If parliaments 
anticipate EC/EU legislation at the rather early stages of the EU policy- cycles, their 
scrutiny process starts earlier and the involved committees meet more frequently. If 
parliaments adopt a more reactive stand by focusing on already adopted EU legislation, 
their timing and management of EU scrutiny processes is less intensive and frequent. 
The country reports in this volume reveal that the overall majority of national parlia-
ments have been slow and retarding adapters. The empirical studies indicate that the real 
patterns of access and influence were below the potential participation offered by the 
EU’s and the national ‘legal c onstitutions’: Only the Maastricht Treaty generated a revi-
sion of participation rights in the majority of parliaments. The Amsterdam Treaty and 
its Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union did not engender 
a similar effect. Overall, we identify some real patterns for our model types:  
The Danish case of the mandating procedure remains a unique archetype of a parlia-
ment, which is able to formulate its own political assumptions about the daily EU busi-
ness effectively. The parliaments of Finland, Austria and Sweden followed this line, 
although their scrutiny systems are less binding for their governments. These parlia-
ments certainly fulfil the criteria of strong policy-making and ‘national players’.  
The EU-related policy-making strength of the parliaments of Germany and the Nether-
lands is similar to the first group. However, the consensual policy-making style and the 
- still existing  - pro-European consensus among the political parties in these countries 
prevents parliamentarians from  a systematic confrontation with their governments. They 
thus perform as potential or latent ‘national players’.  
The French and the UK Parliament are both cases of modest policy-making legislatures, 
who wish to act the games of the ‘national players’. Both parliaments are able to com-
ment on incoming EC/EU information and to voice their opinions by reports, resolu-
tions and the so-called parliamentary scrutiny reserves. But they are not able to change a 
governmental draft reaction to EC/EU input effectively.    21
The remaining parliaments (IR, B, LUX, I, E, P, GR) can be categorised as ‘slow adapt-
ing’ parliaments, which are not willing or able to affect their government’s stance in EU 
negotiations.  
Overall, the effective use of parliamentary provisions with regard to the participation in 
EU affairs have not converged into one uniform model. Moreover, the ongoing interpar-
liamentary screening in view of ‘best practices’ is not pursued on a systematic level. 
Thus, it is extremely difficult to make any serious and valid statements on who is more 
or less successful, and blue prints for an optimal model are risky. Best practices should 
always be carefully evaluated in terms of the respective constitutional, institutional and 
political features as well as to the characteristics of the EU’s fusion dynamics. This i n-
sight might also be considered by the parliaments of the incoming  - new  - member 
states. 
  
2. Slow Adapters on their Ways towards Multi-Level Players? 
 
Since the beginning of the European construction national parliamentarians were o f-
fered opportunity structures to get access to the EC/EU institutions. Though several and 
different procedures were tested over the last 40 years, none of them has led to a suffi-
ciently intensive and efficient working network: The 1990’s Conference of parliaments 
(Assizes) in Rome remained a one-event ‘institution’. I nstead, the 1999 convention to 
draft the charter for fundamental rights was generally assessed as a more successful link 
between parliamentarians of several levels. Other activities of national parliaments and 
the European Parliament - like COSAC, the regular meetings of their Speakers and joint 
sessions of specialised committees - seem to attract greater interest and participation.  
The Conference of Speakers and Presidents of parliaments in the European Union faces 
a problem of representativity. The Conference also suffers from having very limited 
powers in substantive and political questions. It is hardly a suitable vehicle for the effi-
cient assertion of the joint interests of national parliaments and the European Parlia-
ment. 
Also COSAC has not developed into a real institution for ‘multi-level-scrutiny’. The 
emphasis of COSAC still concentrates on general political topics and some kind of an 
introspection with regard to the roles of national parliaments in the EC/EU system. The 
conference thus continues to face major problems with the exchange of practical infor-
mation on specific policy areas in addition to discussing general issues: Firstly, the 
MP’s are members of the ‘horizontal’ EC/EU a ffairs committees, i.e. committees that 
consider general policy matters. Secondly, the EC/EU affairs committees differ signifi-
cantly as regards their importance and function in the overall work process in the vari-
ous parliaments, as do their powers compared with those of the specialised committees. 
Finally, the composition of C OSAC is not representative; COSAC delegates do not 
systematically speak in the name of their parliaments. If we look at the daily EC/EU 
business of national parliaments and the EP, i.e. the control of or the participation in   22
policy-making, the two COSAC sessions per year do neither really affect the day-to-day 
work of national parliaments nor that of the EP. COSAC facilitates informal e xchange, 
but the overall majority of parliaments oppose any further institutionalisation. 
The involvement of the national parliaments’ standing specialised committees repre-
sents another instrument of  - a more policy-oriented  - interparliamentary co-operation. 
The EP took numerous initiatives in the context of the establishment and implementa-
tion of the EU’s annual legislative programme. Compared with COSAC and the Con-
ference of Speakers, these types of informal co-operation are geared to specific areas of 
public policies rather than institutional questions. Hence, more than a half of the joint 
committee meetings are organised by only six of the EP’s Committees dealing with 
socio-economic and monetary issues. 
Joint committee meetings certainly represent a more practical implementation strategy 
for reducing the democratic deficit and making Community legislation more effective. 
Compared with COSAC and the Conference of Speakers, i nformal co-operation is more 
closely geared to the preparation and implementation of the EC/EU’s daily business.  
 
3. Reconsidering the Tension between the Parliament-Government Logics and the EU’s 
Fusion Dynamics 
 
If we take our initial paradox regarding on the one hand the self-made losses of parlia-
ments and the demands for parliamentary involvement on the other, the  record of the 
slow adapters and reluctant multi-level players needs further explanation. We offer a 
reflection based on the issue of role attributions normally given to national parliaments 
as major actors by themselves. Hence, the demand for participation of the parliament as 
such does presuppose that parliaments are more than an arena but an autonomous insti-
tution in its own right. But if we take the ‘real’ parliamentary evolution over the last two 
centuries seriously, then the slow and weak adaptation of national parliaments in EC/EU 
affairs is not just the product of b enign neglect of governments or mismanagement of 
the involved MP’s, but the u navoidable consequence of the fundamental trends in our 
parliamentary systems: The parliamentary majorities feel represented by their govern-
ment of the day - and not by some of their delegates to COSAC or even by some of their 
party members in the EP. Accordingly, parliamentary scrutiny is a matter of participa-
tion and getting or remaining involved without developing a systematic and structural 
anti-governmental stance.  
To turn the argument around: Given the increased importance of EC/EU affairs any 
stronger and direct participation of national parliaments on the EU level would affect 
the basic way national governments and parliaments function in general. A stronger  - 
more direct and less delegated  - involvement of national parliaments would thus erode 
traditional patterns of policy-making in our polities  - for better or for worse. Such a 
causal link between the virtues of the political system in general and EU activities in 
specific could be derived from the empirical studies in our work: The more a national   23
system belongs to the category of a close unity between majority party and government 
the less its parliament  is directly and independently engaged both on the EU as on the 
national level. Our assessment that many parliaments are slow adapters or weak per-
formers is thus a depending variable on the roles which national systems implicitly a t-
tribute to their parliaments. A second fundamental reason is based on the EU’s own 
fusion dynamics: Institutional and procedural differentiation, the continuous trend of 
merging public policy i nstruments and actors at the European, national and sub-national 
levels of governance urges each actor to generate effective and efficient means for par-
ticipation and influence.  
Unless national parliaments turn into efficient multi-level players they remain structur-
ally handicapped to become competitive. Both factors  - the parliament-government l o-
gics and the EU’s fusion dynamics  - create an antagonist environment for national par-
liaments and reinforce a significant tension between the aim to participate in EU policy-
making and the realities of the EU’s multi-level and multi-actor nature! 
 
III. Strategies and Future Options 
 
1. National Parliaments beyond Nice - More Access or Illusions? 
 
The role of national parliaments in the European architecture is one of the main themes 
of the Declaration No. 23 of the Treay of Nice on the future of the European Union. The 
actual  - 2001  - post-Nice reflection on the role of national parliaments concentrates on 
two options: The creation of another parliamentary chamber at the EU level, and the 
organisation of interparliamentary exchanges at a larger scale t han the already existing 
regimes of COSAC and committee meetings.  
A ‘new’ European Parliament?: The most spectacular proposal aims at the ‘re-creation’ 
of a ‘European Parliament’ as a bicameral body  - one of which would be composed by 
elected national parliamentarians. The second chamber would then be composed either 
by directly-elected senators from the member states (US Senate model), or by delegated 
‘senators-MEP’s’ from each member state with weighted voting rights (German 
Bundesrat model).  We argue against this model, because its realisation would result in a 
new Brussels-based institution not directly and uniformly elected by the citizens (like 
the actual EP), and not indirectly elected (like the Council). Instead, the actual legiti-
macy of the directly elected European Parliament would be replaced by a body, whose 
legitimacy would be rooted in a purely national oriented selection procedure, where the 
electorate should choose candidates on an entirely national dimension. Even if the com-
petences of the S enate were confined to the Second and Third Pillars, the institutional 
architecture of Europe would be further complicated. Ultimately this would not be the 
answer to the frustrations and tensions currently felt by the national parliaments.    24
A Permanent Conference of Parliaments?: The suggestion to create a ‘permanent con-
ference of parliaments or a congress’ also raises a number of questions which should be 
dealt with in greater depth. We also argue against this model, b ecause it would render 
the EU's decision-making procedures more complicated. The addition of other bodies 
whose members represent similar interests in more than one EC/EU body does not help 
to organise the Union more transparent. Any institutionalised form of interparliamentary 
‘Assizes’ would delay institutional relations and procedures, i ncrease their intricacy 
and, possibly develop a momentum of their own, leading to conflicts between national 
and European parliamentarians to the benefit of the institutional position of the Com-
mission and C ouncil. Yet, we think that interparliamentary congresses could be organ-
ised when EC/EU legal acts require ratification and the approval by national parlia-
ments. Such kind of conferences could be held for the purposes of a larger parliamen-
tary deliberation  before the ratification procedures begin in the national parliaments and 
- if required by the Treaty - the European Parliament takes its decisions. 
A Chamber of Subsidiarity? Also this option faces some serious difficulties: If this 
Chamber of national parliamentarians should examine Commission proposals to check 
that they are within the EU’s field of competence, this would be too soon in the overall 
decision-making process. Questions about ‘invasive legislation’ are about the final out-
come of legislation,  rather than the initial proposal. If the chamber should intervene at 
the end of the EU’s legislative process, it would be invited to voice a ‘second guess’ to 
the position adopted by the ministers in the Council, each of whom enjoys the confi-
dence of a majority in his/her national Parliament. Accordingly, the Chamber of Sub-
sidiarity would simply endorse the ministers’ actions, or there would be a European 
level repetition of national political conflicts. 
A Joint Body to control CFSP and ESDP Policies? Another concept is that a new cham-
ber could be charged with scrutiny of Second Pillar matters only, taking over the ‘com-
petencies’ from the WEU assembly regarding security matters. If we look at the real 
business of national parliaments in these areas, we must  note that the overall majority 
does not take decisions regarding foreign policy and security. I nstead, they question, 
debate and scrutinise the decisions of their governments. Consequently, a new interpar-
liamentary body restricted to these issues would be open to the charge of being an ex-
pensive ‘talking shop’, since CFSP and ESDP matters will in any case continue to be 
debated in the national parliaments and in the European Parliament.  
A Convention on the Future of the European Union? Another option considers the role 
of national parliaments with regard to the further development of the EU’s para-
constitutional nature and the very process towards the IGC in 2004. One needs to take 
into account the fact that the task of this Convention would be different from that of 
drawing up the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover Article 48 TEU necessitates a 
‘traditional’ conference of representatives of the governments of the member states in 
order to adopt a definitive revision of the existing EC/EU Treaties. In t his context, the 
Convention could be seen as a move towards assigning to the national parliaments and   25
the European Parliament a specific kind of joint ‘para-constituent authority’  - a task to 
be shared with the n ational governments. This development would  mark a new chapter 
in the role of parliaments in European integration following the fusion dynamics.  
 
2. A New Challenge: Building Links between Multi-Level Scrutiny and the Citizens 
 
In such a perspective, it might not be wrong to call upon national parliaments to 
strengthen their role as multi-level players in the European Union, to strengthen 
COSAC according its own proposals and to invite national parliaments to open ‘their’ 
offices in the EP buildings. However, the right attribution of roles and functions must be 
made: The fusion trend points at a typical merging of powers and responsibilities, which 
is also valid for shaping the ‘interparliamentary sphere’ or European governance. In this 
context, ‘joint parliamentary bodies’ for sectoral i ssues might take up the heritage of the 
already existing network of joint parliamentary committee meetings. This renewed net-
work could parallel the Council of Ministers in its various formats; the former WEU 
assembly and the EP’s Committee for Foreign Affairs might mutate into a specific case. 
COSAC would remain the main locus for interparliamentary co-operation with regard to 
institutional issues. Finally, a para-constitutional assembly might generate the parlia-
mentary backbone of the Union’s further evolution with regard to Treaty developments.  
The realisation of such a multi-dimensional web of interparliamentary contacts might 
help to reduce the democratic deficit in institutional  - parliamentary  - terms. Neverthe-
less, one should bear in mind that institutional mechanics are not self-evident for the 
‘end-users’  - the Union’s citizens  - of public policy outcomes. Evidently, it remains in 
the hands of the actors involved to offer appropriate means for the participation of the 
European Union’s Demoi in shaping the conditions for their way of living. The greater 
involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s policy-cycles may help to render gov-
ernments more accountable for what they decide in the Council of Ministers and its 
subordinated working mechanisms. However, the  simple formalisation of COSAC or 
any other joint body incorporating MEP’s and MP’s within the realm of a new Treaty or 
constitution also renders the EU more complex and less understandable. A future Con-
vention on the future of the EU as well as the 2004 Treaty reform should therefore also 
deliberate a ppropriate ways for a more coherent and clear-cut organisation of interest 
representation and mediation in an enlarged European Union. More parliamentarisation 
does not automatically increase the legitimacy of its political system. 27  
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I. European Integration: A Challenge for Parliamentary Democracy  
 
Does the European Union erode parliamentary democracy? The question needs to be 
addressed by focussing on two facets of European integration: The very nature of the 
European Union as a multi-level system of governance, and  - as a consequence  - the 
opportunities and challenges for shaping a specific kind of parliamentary governance 
within the Union’s institutional design and its dynamics. Taking the concept of multi-
level and multi-actor governance seriously urges us to consider both the European Par-
liament and the national parliaments as two ‘echelons’ of legislatures, which try to fill 
the parliamentary gap in EC/EU governance.  
This chapter of the book deals with the democratic deficit of European integration in so 
far as the European Parliament and the national parliaments are concerned. First, I will 
present the study’s puzzle: By ratifying para-constitutional treaty amendments, parlia-
ments affect themselves. Do para-constitutional revisions like the Treaty of Amsterdam 
matter - and in how far do they matter - for the set-up and the functioning of parliamen-
tary involvement on the national level of EU governance? How can we grasp the proc-
ess European integration and the loss of original legislative powers of national parlia-
ments? I will look at the academic debate on how to conceptualise the institutional fac-
ets of the EU’s democratic deficit. We then move on to identify the main streams of the 
analysis. The major question of this volume is how national parliaments (re)-act in and 
adapt to a d ynamic institutional and procedural set up. How do parliamentary actors in 
different national and socio-political settings, and coined by different national traditions, 
adapt to  common challenges, constraints and opportunities for which they are mainly 
responsible themselves, since they have ratified the fundamental set-up of these oppor-
tunity structures? 
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ject’s 2000 workshop, the delegates of the COSAC 2001 working group meeting and the participants 
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The interest into the role of national parliaments exceeds immediate procedural a r-
rangements of the EU. Given the growing salience of the EU system and its daily out-
put, participation and involvement are vital issues for the overall weight and role of 
parliaments. The degree of parliamentary involvement is a significant indicator for the 
fundamental trends of the national systems and of the EU system. It is of major impor-
tance for both the legitimacy of the constitutional set-ups of the EU member states as of 
the Union itself. It will affect the capabilities of all political institutions on both levels to 
deal with the challenges of public policies. Whatever institutional arrangements will be 
taken i t will tell us something about the future shape of the European polity in the 
broader sense. 
 
2. The Conventional Wisdom: Self-Mutilation by Parliaments? 
 
The European Union is increasingly considered as a central arena for transnational co-
operation and s upranational problem-solving. Its institutions regulate policies with a 
wide range of policy instruments and differenciated procedures on an ever wider scope 
of policy fields.  
When discussing the role of national parliaments in the EU, it belongs to the c onven-
tional wisdoms that national parliaments have increasingly lost in overall importance 
due to the evolution of this political system.
1 This assessment starts from one funda-
mental question which has been put forward since the beginning of the European i nte-
gration process and has since then re-emerged in certain intervals during the ‘constitu-
tional debates’ on the finalité européenne: Why have those national institutions, which 
are seen as major cornerstones of their respective polities, weakened their own constitu-
tional rights by ratifying in recurrent steps the making of a supranational quasi-
constitution? How can they regain some of their lost powers? 
The argument needs some further consideration. Irrespective of the specific constitu-
tional prerogatives in each member state the dominant conventional doctrine is clear and 
similar: Parliaments are regarded as the highest representative bodies of their polities, 
they are the core institutions for legitimising political power. Legislative and constitu-
tional  powers are therefore natural and vital prerogatives of parliamentarians. The d e-
gree of parliamentary sovereignty might differ among the member states. However, 
everywhere in Europe these bodies are considered as symbols and shapers of national 
history and identity.
2  
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However, national parliaments are seen to lose legal rights and - perhaps even more - de 
facto powers vis-à-vis governments and administrations since the first treaties of the 
European Communities. By passing consequent treaty amendments and revisions they 
accepted a shift of competencies to the European level, which reduced their final say 
over major areas of traditional legislative powers and the political control over govern-
ments.
1  
As such an assessment is neither new
2 nor really disputed it is surprising that n ational 
parliaments are quite often identified as passive, self-indulging victims of an erosion 
process they promote and/or support themselves. Though national parliaments - over the 
last two decades - were given four times the opportunity to upgrade their powers in the 
‘legal constitution’ of the EU
3, the steps they took to regain or just to keep their tradi-
tional positions look rather minimal.  
If we observe such a self-restriction our academic curiosity becomes clear: How can we 
explain that these key actors seem to be weak in adapting to a political constellation 
which they at least partially created themselves, whereas other groups of actors like 
interest groups
4, NGO’s and regional governments
5 seem to be more successful in influ-
encing the output of the EU system?
6  
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3. Getting Out of the Trap: A Renewed and Intensified Debate 
 
Given the gap between the orthodox parliamentary doctrine and the conventional analy-
sis which identifies parliaments as losers of the integration process, it is not surprising 
that the role of national parliaments in the EU system has been revived in the last years.
1 
Formally it has been put again on the agenda of the post- Nice process on the future of 
the Union.
2 Thus it will be a subject of the next Intergovernmental Conference leading 
to a new Treaty reform or even a constitution.
3 In this regard, the findings of the country 
reports in this volume might indicate ‘realistic’ lines for reform, underlying motives for 
different reform proposals and limits of strengthening the role of national parliaments 
within the institutional framework of the EC/EU.  
In the cosmos of political visions and programmes on the future of the EU many politi-
cal contributions have suggested new and additional ways of involving national parlia-
mentarians.
4 A key term is coming up: Several protagonists of the debate on the EU’s 
future reflect on some kind of a bicameral system in which national parliaments play a 
major role at least for certain EU issues. Those i nputs into the debate seem to open a 
new phase of discussing the role of national parliaments in the EU construction.  
A more traditional line of argumentation has been to call national parliaments to steer 
their unilateral scrutiny powers in EC/EU affairs vis-à-vis their governments. During 
the last ten years, this claim gained ground. Two Declarations appended to the Maas-
tricht Treaty and one Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty are the outcome of 
these attempts.
1  
The Declarations and the Protocol allow new a rrangements for  national parliaments in 
order to ensure a better access to EU information, a better timing with regard to parlia-
ment-government interaction in the course of EU decision-making, and - with COSAC - 
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for What Kind of polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, Florence 2000. See also the ‘TEPSA Europe 
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péenne après Nice’, Florence, 9 avril 2001; Prodi, Romano: ‘Pour une Europe forte, dotée d’un 
grand projet et de moyens d’actions’, discours prononcé à l’Institut des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 29 
mai 2001; Johannes Rau, Plaidoyer pour une Constitution européenne, discours prononcé devant le 
PE, le 4 avril 2001; SPD, Projet de résolution sur l’Union européenne publié le 30 avril 2001 en vue 
du congrès du SPD en novembre; Verhofstadt, Guy, Discours ‘la présidence belge de l’Union euro-
péenne: lignes de force et défis’, Bruxelles, 29 mai 2001.    31
a permanent forum for national parliaments and the European  Parliament to exchange 
and express views on EU integration vis-à-vis the Brussels/Strasbourg based institu-
tions.  
The Amsterdam Treaty’s Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union (PNP)
2 provides any formal role for national parliaments in the EU decision-
making cycle. The parliaments are not placed into the legal constitution of the EU. I n-
stead, the PNP concedes that the transfer of information from the European to the n a-
tional level, must be improved. The Protocol recalls that unilateral scrutiny by national 
parliaments of their own government in relation to the activities of the EU should r e-
main a matter for the particular constitutional organisation and practice of each member 
state. The PNP was shaped by national parliaments and the European Parliament within 
the framework of COSAC. In the EP’s resolution on the relations between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments
3 of June 1997, MEP’s suggested a treaty amend-
ment similar to the content of the PNP. The ‘introductory c onsiderations’ recapitulate 
the EP’s and the majority of national parliaments’ general view on the relationship b e-
tween two kinds and levels of parliaments: First, the EP and national parliaments play 
distinctive and complementary roles in securing and strengthening democracy in the 
Union. The resolution affirmed that the former has the role of controlling the actions of 
the other EU institutions and bodies while the latter should control their own national 
governments acting in their EU capacity. Second, the resolution argued that the case for 
interparliamentary co-operation between the European and n ational parliaments should 
not further complicate the institutional structure of the European Union.
4 These two 
preconditions construct a widely shared ‘set of common b eliefs’ among MEP’s and 
MP’s. However, since the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, several attempts made 
by British, French and Danish governmental and parliamentary actors shaped a debate 
on the inclusion of national parliaments in the EU’s  institutional and procedural set-up. 
The debate culminated in the Amsterdam PNP. The Protocol should be understood as 
another peak in the debate about adequate parliamentary participation in European inte-
gration. It thus serves as a starting point for the empirical research on the national sys-
tems level. As the post-Nice process on the future of the European Union clearly indi-
cates, this debate has not stopped and we might witness another upsurge with regard to 
the next IGC in 2004. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document Nos. 1.1, 1.2 and 2. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 2. 
3   See European Parliament, Report on the relations between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments, Doc. No. A4-0179/97, 22 May 1997.  
4   See Attina, Fulvio: ‘Strategies for Democratising Multi-State Systems and the European Union’, in: 
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3. On the Political Relevance: The Nice Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union 
 
The role of national parliaments in the European architecture is one of the main themes 
of the post-Nice reflection process on the future of the European Union. The respective 
Nice declaration did directly address the national parliaments.
1  
Hence, one could have also imagined a broader theme such as the role of parliaments or 
of parliamentary democracy in an enlarged Union. The reason for the focus on one level 
of the EU’s system is to be f ound in the debate during the “printemps constitutionnel”
2 
of 2000: J oschka Fischer, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair
3 refreshed a debate
4 which 
started during the Maastricht IGC on how to link national legislatures into a continuous 
process of compounded
5 problem-solving beyond the nation-state. These speeches did 
not directly affect the rolling agenda of the Nice negotiations. But they certainly pro-
vided a shadow under which member states’ governments deliberated and decided on 
how and when to deal with an i ssue, which will again affect the entry of new member 
states and relatively ‘young democracies’. Hence, EU enlargement is certainly not only 
about the votes of each country in the Council of Ministers and the seats in the Euro-
pean Parliament. The enlargement towards an ‘EU XXL’ of 27 members also addresses 
a more general issue: The question of how to organise the democratic aggregation, rep-
resentation and mediation of interests, wishes, concerns, and fears within the EU system 
of governance.  
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II. Parliaments in the Multi-level Game: The Analytical and Theoretical Framework 
 
1. On the Analytical Approach: A Closer Look at the Multi-level Game 
 
I adopt the definition of multi-level governance
1 as the pattern of interactions and deci-
sions by which actors from several and distinct arenas
2 allocate values
3 through joint 
problem-solving and taking of collective decisions which are supposed to be binding on 
governments and other actors.
4 In this perspective, the EU polity is seen as a “post-
sovereign, polycentric, and incongruent” arrangement of authority which supersedes the 
limits of the nation-state.
5 Assuming a non-hierarchical decision-making process, the 
EU’s Brussels/Strasbourg arenas do matter but only as one realm of collective decision-
making and implementation. European multi-level governance thus contributes to a 
“decrease in the unilateral steering by government”
  6, and an increase in the self-
governance of various actors and arenas.  
Multi-level  - as federal  - systems use different means to regulate inter-institutional rela-
tions, to give legitimacy to their institutions and to make democratic decisions. Certain 
instruments like elections and inter-governmental procedures work only on the condi-
tion that non-institutional and collective political actors  - like governments and admini-
strations, parliaments, political groups, political parties and intermediary actors  - coop-
erate well within an open net of cross-level interaction arenas. Hence, the Council of 
Ministers and its politico-administrative substructure are evident examples for a multi-
ple  - Proteus-like
7  - body, which is able to change its institutional faces and procedural 
tools according to a flexible and growing set of policy-making levels and demands.  
                                                 
1  Jachtenfuchs, Markus: ‘Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance’, in: European Law Jour-
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works see also Heinelt, Hubert and Smith, Randall (eds.): Policy Networks and European Structural 
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Making: A sceptical View’, in: West European Politics No. 4/1994, pp. 85-101. 
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Members of the Council intervene across the t rans-European policy spectrum according 
to the actual needs of the EC/EU’s running agenda and the constitutional procedures of 
the policy cycle.  
It is common ground that the decisions on the EU level are prepared, made, imple-
mented and controlled by actors which work on both the EU as on the national level.
1 
To exclude one arena from observation reduces our analytical capacities for explaining 
and evaluating this policy-cycle. Especially in the case of national parliaments it is tell-
ing to describe their activities and impacts in both set-ups. For a closer look it is useful 
to locate actors of this ‘game’ for power on both levels.  
 
Figure 1: Ideal Types for Actors in a Two-Level Game 
  Participation in the National Arena 
  Strong        ￿￿￿￿￿￿       Weak 
 
 
Multi-level players 
With highest perform-
ance on both levels 
(1) 
 
 
 
European players 
with high performance 
on the EU level 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Participation in 
the Brussels / 
Strasbourg Arena 
 
 
 
Strong 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
Weak 
 
 
National players 
with relatively high 
performance on the 
national level 
(3) 
 
 
Slow adapters 
with lowest performance 
at both levels 
(4) 
 
 
 
I use this matrix in order to locate the empirical findings of the country reports within 
four model cases. These models are in some way heuristic and ideal archetypes. How-
ever, to classify parliaments and parliamentarians within the context of the EU’s multi-
level nature, these focussed models might prove helpful. Forms of participation are r e-
lated to the formal provisions of national constitutions and the EU treaty. However, 
                                                 
1   Maurer, Andreas/Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘The EU matters: Structuring Self-made Offers and Demands’, 
in: Wessels, Wolfgang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds): Fifteen into One? The European 
Union and its Member States (Manchester: MUP, forthcoming); Maurer, Andreas/Wessels, Wolf-
gang: ‘Europeanisation in and of the EU system: Trends, Offers and Constraints’, in: Kohler-Koch, 
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beyond the “legal constitution”
1 we need to explore the real patterns of how actors use 
the EU’s “opportunity structures”
2 and develop additional or even competing channels 
of influence. Especially in view of research r esults which stress the informal and non-
hierarchical nature of policy networks
3 a closer look at this part of the policy-cycle is 
highly relevant. 
More concretely we aim at identifying forms of participation and involvement with 
regard to actors’ access and influence in the EU policy-cycle. We look at each level 
separately but also analyse how far actors are able to link their position on one level 
with that of the other level.  
‘Multi-level players’ (square 1) are therefore taken as the most performing ones, since 
they are able to work across the levels of the EU and the member states. Taking the 
logic of multi-level governance seriously means that actors need to allot personal and 
financial resources to different levels and loci of interaction (such as the Council’s 
Working groups, COREPER etc.). Adaptation to the EU’s evolution is translated into 
effective re-orientations of policy instruments and r esources. Multi-level players are 
able to instrumentalise the access on one level for increasing their influence on the other 
level. Their investments allow to mobilise a virtuous circle of involvement. 
‘European players’ (square 2) could be defined as bodies, which are primarily located in 
and focused on the Brussels/Strasbourg arenas. Given a rather low  rate of direct access 
to the national arenas of EU governance they are not as competitive as the ‘Multi-level 
players’. They adapt to the EU’s system by revising and focusing their instruments vis-
à-vis the other EU actors at this level without explicitly  considering the roles of national 
or sub-national actors. Hence, if we turn our view to the European Parliament, we must 
acknowledge that the potential realm of its activity is restricted: As a ‘European player’, 
the EP’s parliamentary groups, committees a nd the plenary meet in one virtual room  - 
the Brussels/Strasbourg arena. Unlike the members of the Council, MEP’s are not called 
to permanently reorient their actor-addressee relationship from one context to a nother. 
Whether they perform as ‘constituency-representatives’ at home, as ‘co-legislators’ in 
the conciliation committee of the co-decision procedure, or as ‘international communi-
cators’ within one of the EP’s interparliamentary delegations, their role-attribution r e-
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mains the same: They represent the  aggregated interests of the peoples of the European 
Union.  
A ‘National player’ (square 3) would be a body with efficient and effective ‘arms’ to 
voice its interests within the national arenas at hand. Adaptation would be f ocused at the 
national level without considering the possibility of shifting or pooling the existing r e-
sources in relation to the EU level. Within the EU policy cycle these actors are present 
during the preparation and implementation phases, but not in the crucial arenas of EU 
joint decision-making. In this regard, the role-attribution of national parliamentarians 
seems to be similar to that of MEP’s: They are elected in one - a national - context; re-
election is a matter of success and failure at one - the national  - level of policy-making. 
Like the EP  - and unlike the members of the Council’s structure  - their main locus of 
interaction and focus of attention is ‘one-dimensional’. 
The ‘Slow adapter’ (square 4) would then be considered as a body with the same - na-
tional  - orientation. But i t would differ from the National player in that the - n ational  - 
adaptation to new EU contexts remains low. This actor is not capable to keep the status 
quo ante of its prerogatives at the domestic - EU-linked - level. In a vicious cycle, the 
losers of multi-level games suffer from a contineous fall in influence. A low investment 
in resources leads to a decreasing rate of participation.   
 
2. On the Theoretical Approach: Assuming a Fusion Process  
 
A widely shared analytical scheme for grasping changes of p olitical systems within the 
realm of the European Union concentrates on the process of ‘Europeanisation’ by which 
governmental, parliamentary and non-governmental actors shift their a ttention to the 
Brussels arena, involve their resources and invest ‘time’:
1 The key assumption of ‘Eu-
ropeanisation’ is that EU policy-making triggers institutional adaptation in the member 
states, alters domestic rules and the inter-institutional distribution of means for comply-
ing with the requirements for an effective participation in European governance. ‘Euro-
peanisation’ as a key variable for measuring the dynamic nature of European integration 
then means “the incremental process of reorienting the shape of politics to the degree 
that EC/EU political and economic dynamics become integral parts of the organisational 
logic of national politics and policy-making”.
2 Taking up this approach, any analysis on 
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the EU member states involvement in European policy-making should not only screen 
the governmental but also the parliamentary structures and procedures of institutional 
adaptation.
1  
In line with some conventional arguments about self-inflicted losses of competencies by 
national parliaments we observe that the representatives of member states as ‘masters of 
the Treaty’
2 have transferred parts of their powers to the EU level, allocated policy i n-
struments to EU institutions and extended the scope of the EU policy domains in all 
pillars. To give some quantitative indications they have increased the policy empower-
ments of the EC from 86 (in the EEC Treaty of 1958) to 254 in the Nice version of the 
Union Treaty. EU institutions have doubled the legislation in force  - the acquis com-
munautaire, from the early eighties to the late nineties thus ‘invading’ to an increasing 
degree the national legal space.
3 The overall evolution of the EU system can thus be 
described as a process of fusion
4 by which national and European actors increasingly 
merge policy instruments and use them by an ever growing set of differentiated institu-
tional arrangements and procedures.
5 Accordingly, we assume that not only the Euro-
pean Parliament, but also national parliaments must constantly adjust and (re-)orientate 
the possibilities and arrangements for parliamentary activity in response to an ever i n-
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creasing  challenge  - to new European Community legislation and other activities related 
to the European Union.  
In view of the analytical framework this theoretical concept identifies significant trends 
towards the emergence and dominance of multi-level players. The strong position of the 
Council as a multi-level player is the product of fundamental features of the integration 
process. A ‘one-level player only’ is less competitive than those actors which are able to 
pool and link resources from both levels to mutually reinforce their access and influ-
ence. The fusion process and its institutional-procedural translation devices urge actors 
to look for an optimal mix of investments in terms of attention, time and personal on 
both levels, and for adequate links between levels and arenas.  
 
3. Consequences for National Parliaments: From Losers to Latecomers? 
 
If we follow the logic of the fusion process, we would expect a strong centripetal dy-
namic, which also affects national parliaments with some time delays. In this respect, 
we supposed to witness a process of de-parliamentarisation on both the EU and the na-
tional levels of policy-making, which might be followed by a re-parliamentarisation in 
the later stages of the EU’s integration process. Confronted with the risk of the vicious 
cycle of losing access and influence, we expect the parliamentary late-comers to move 
towards the position of a national player, and then - in a second step - or even in parallel 
towards the position of a multi-level player.   
If the fusion process is supposed to characterise the fundamental trend in the evolution 
of the EU system, then the loss of ‘real’ - i.e. direct and unlimited - participation of na-
tional parliaments in the EU’s law-making policy cycles is a logical consequence, which 
is likely to continue unless parliamentarians decide to make an investment to become 
real multi-level players.  
Hence, the increasing scope of EU activities and the differentiation of institutional and 
procedural outlines affects and undermines the traditional l egislative function of n a-
tional parliaments.
1 The functions of national parliaments in the EC/EU decision-
making process are reduced to three major tasks: ensuring the accountability of gov-
ernments with regard to their activity in European affairs, ratifying EU Treaty amend-
ments, and implementing EC/EU legislation.
2  
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Since empirical findings point at the e stablishment and the dominant role of trans-
national core networks of ministers and high civil servants
1 we need to discuss even 
more, where parliaments and parliamentarians come into the game.  
 
III. The Structure of De-nationalized Governance in Europe 
 
1. The Dynamics of the EU’s Political System 
 
The European Union brings together democratic nation-states. The structures, proce-
dures and institutions vary and EU membership does not simply lead to a uniform 
model of western post-war society and state structures. Lijphart still distinguishes dif-
ferent forms of democracy between the EU members using a set of indicators on the 
executives-parties as well as o n the federal-unity dimension.
2 And even if he models a 
binary distinction between ‘majority’- and ‘consensus’-democracies, the very fact that 
these two are understood as ideal archetypes u nderlines that variations exist between 
each group of states under  consideration. Hence, each state designs its constitutional 
system according to different histories, political cultures and basic beliefs about the 
roles of institutions in organising the society. Models of democracy do not necessarly 
match with the ‘living constitution’ of the states under review. Each EU democracy 
might build on some kind of institutional checks and balances according to an ideal 
division of competencies and powers. But institutions do not simply behave according 
to an assigned model: As  ‘actor’ a parliament has the assigned mission to legislate and 
to control the Government. However, in Western democracies parliaments function 
rather as ‘arenas’ for political battles between government and opposition. The simple 
dichotomy between the executive and the legislative branches of political systems does 
not exist in reality.    
The EU’s states share a number of structural features. One of the key elements of Euro-
pean democratic systems is that directly elected parliaments represent the citizens, a g-
gregate and publicise their views, fears and opinions and act on their b ehalf. Whether 
post-1945 West-European and post-1989 East-European political systems are based on 
the general frames of parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential democracy, t hey 
all have a common basis: Democracy is mainly understood as representative democracy, 
where a (s)elected part of the citizenry acts for a given period of time within a parlia-
                                                 
1   Wessels, 2000, op.cit.; Bach, Maurizio: ‘Eine leise Revolution durch Verwaltungsverfahren. Büro-
kratische Integrationsprozesse in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, No. 
1/1992, pp. 16-30; Bach, Maurizio: ‘Ist die europäische Einigung irreversibel? Integrationspolitik als 
Institutionenbildung in der Europäischen Union’, in: Nedelmann, Birgitte (ed.): Politische Institutio-
nen im Wandel, Opladen 1995, pp. 368-391. 
2   See Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1999.   40
mentary assembly to participate in policy-making and authority-building by a  -  constitu-
tion-based - set of instruments.  
To a greater extent than any other international organisation, the EU has crossed the 
boundary from horizontal and single issue based, interstate co-operation to both hori-
zontal and vertical policy-making in a dynamic multi-level structure, in which member 
states are but one level of an emerging polity.
1 In so far, one can conceive the EU as a 
dynamic system, which exercises quasi-governmental power without being based on a 
single government but on various  - unstable or fluid  - kinds of government structures 
and governance procedures. Of course, the process of European integration does not 
feature the establishment of government structures, which are designed according to a 
master plan of successful or as a lesson of unsuccessful national constitutions. In the 
contrary, the main idea of and driving force behind European integration was and still is 
the continuous search for problem-solving capacities in specific policy areas without 
explicitly considering the mode of  appropriate government structures. In this perspec-
tive, the EU may be regarded as some kind of a regulatory regime
2 or a “special purpose 
organisation”,
3 which is less dependent on its parliamentary democracy than on effi-
ciently oriented policies  - authorized in the name of and for the people(s). This “output-
legitimacy” of the Union then “depends on its capacity to achieve the citizen’s goals and 
solve their problems effectively and efficiently: The higher this capacity, the more l e-
gitimate the system”.
4 H owever, the EU’s development does not only feature an increas-
ing and dynamic quest for effective policy production, but also an ongoing and collec-
tive search for efficient, transparent and democratic ‘frames’, which enable policy out-
comes to be interpreted as legitimate.  
The very nature of the European Union’s structure is process, not constitutional finality. 
A more intensive look at the EU development from the early 1950’s onwards reveals an 
ongoing process of institutional, procedural and functional differentiation,
5 which has 
not yet reached its final stage and may not do so in the near future. The nature of the EU 
is characterised by a continuing extension of its responsibilities and authorities, which 
have enlarged the total range of policy areas Community-wide. Simultaneously, more 
and more competencies have been partly transferred from the exclusive national level to 
                                                 
1   See Jachtenfuchs, Markus: ‘Democracy and Governance in the European Union’, in: Follesdal, 
Andreas/Koslowski, Peter (eds.): Democracy and the European Union, Berlin/New York/Tokyo 
1998, pp. 37-64. 
2   See Majone, Giandomenico: ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’. West European Politics, 
No. 3/1994, pp. 78-102; Majone, Giandomenico: ‘European regulatory state?’, in: Richardson, Jere-
my (ed.): European Union. Power and Policy-Making, London: Routhledge 1996, pp. 263-277. 
3   Dehousse, Renaud: European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or 
Regulatory Structure? RSC No. 98/11, EUI Working papers, Florence 1998. 
4   Schimmelpfennig, Frank: ‘Legitimate Rule in the European Union. The Academic Debate’, Tübin-
ger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung No. 27, Tübingen 1996. 
5   Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘The Modern West European State and the European Union: Democratic Ero-
sion or a New Kind of polity?’ in: Andersen/Eliassen, 1996 op.cit.   41
a supranational one. Even if the majority of EC/EU competencies does not just provide 
an exclusive set of ‘ to do’s’ for its institutions, the growing shift of policy-making o p-
portunities from an exclusive national to a non-exclusive EU level mirrors the dyna-
mism of a polyarchic system. To successfully reconcile the management of growing 
responsibilities with the demands for real and functional participation of the political 
actors involved, new institutions have been established and the already existing institu-
tional framework has been altered.
1  
The procedural and functional differentiation becomes visible by looking at some key 
aspects o f the Union’s structure: We observe that the total number of Treaty articles 
dealing with specific competencies and decision-making rules  - the  enumerative e m-
powerments  -  in an increasing amount of specific policy fields has considerably grown 
from 86 (EEC Treaty 1957) to 254 (Treaty of Nice 2001) cases.  
Further illustrations of the broad functional scope are being given by the expansion of 
the number of Commission DG’s (from 9 in 1958 to 24 in 1999) and of autonomous 
executive agencies (from two in 1975 to 11 in 1998)
2, the agendas of the European Par-
liament, its committees at its plenary sessions and the presidency conclusions published 
after each session of the European Council.
3 The respective composition of the sectoral 
Council formats (from 4 in 1958 to 23 in 1998)
4 as well as the extension of the adminis-
trative substructure of the Council indicate that governmental actors have become more 
and more i nvolved in using ‘their’ Brussels network extensively and intensively.
5 
Moreover, the heads of state and government have learned to instrumentalise the Euro-
pean Council for pre-legislative activities: Hence, the number of ‘demands’ issued by 
the European Council to the European Commission has increased from 33 requests in 
1995 to 83 in 2000.
6 
The overall complexity of the EU’s polycentric and polyarchic system is a result of the 
huge number of its duties, legislative processes and implementation procedures and, at 
times, the unfathomable nature of the procedures and the roles of the actors i nvolved. 
Apart from five principle procedures  - ‘Simple procedure’ without any European Par-
liament involvement, Consultation, Co-operation, Assent, Co-decision  -, the Treaties 
and other inter-institutional agreements offer further decision-making courses depend-
ing on the voting rules of the Council and the participation of other institutions like the 
                                                 
1   See  ibid. and Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on 
Integration Processes’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, No. 2/1997. 
2   See Kreher, Alexander (ed.): The EC agencies between Community institutions and constituents: 
autonomy, control and accountability, conference report, Florence: European University Institute 
1998. 
3   See e.g. the Presidency conclusions of the Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) 
summits: http://ue.eu.int.  
4   See Westlake, Martin: The Council of the European Union, London: Cartermill 1995, pp. 164-167. 
5   See Wessels, 2000, op.cit., pp. 195-260. 
6   See Milkoreit, Manjana, Study for the White Paper on European Governance: Some quantitative 
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Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Committee, or the European Cen-
tral Bank.  
Table 1: Decision-Making Modes in the Council and the EP after the Entry into Force of the 
Treaty of Nice (+/- 2002)  
Participation 
of the EP 
Unanimity  QMV  Simple 
Majority  
Specific Majori-
ties > QMV 
Sum 
    %    %    %    %    % 
Consultation  38 EC 
4 EU 
18,0 
9,30 
29 EC 
1 EU 
13,74 
2,32 
2 EC 
1 EU 
0,95 
2,32 
2 EC 
1 EU 
0,95 
2,32 
71 EC 
7 EU 
33,65 
16,28 
Co-operation  0  0  4 EC  1,89  0  0  0  0  4 EC  1,89 
Co-decision  4 EC  1,89  41 EC  19,43  0  0  0  0  45 EC  21,33 
Assent  6 EC 
1 EU 
2,84 
2,32 
4 EC  1,89  0  0  0 EC 
5 EU 
O EC 
11,63 
10 EC 
6 EU 
4,74 
13,95 
Information  0  0  9 EC  4,26  0  0  1 EC 
3 EU 
0,47 
6,97 
10 EC 
3 EU 
4,74 
6,98 
No participa-
tion 
20 EC 
9 EU 
9,47 
20,93 
41 EC 
8 EU 
19,43 
18,6 
5 EC 
4 EU 
2,37 
9,30 
7 EC 
6 EU 
3,32 
13,95 
71 EC 
27 EU 
33,65 
62,79 
Sum  68 EC 
14 EU 
32,23 
32,56 
128 EC 
9 EU 
60,66 
20,93 
7 EC 
5 EU 
3,32 
11,63 
8 EC 
15 EU 
3,79 
34,88 
211 EC 
43 EU 
 
Calculation based on the final version of the Treaty ; OJEC, C 80/1, 10 March 2001. 
 
The structure of the Union becomes visible in this variety of procedures and institutions. 
Decision-making methods differ both across the areas of application and a cross the i n-
stitutions and bodies involved.
1 The Maastricht Treaty introduced new institutions 
(Committee of the Regions, the European Monetary Institute which has been trans-
formed into a European Central Bank with the beginning of the third phase to the 
EMU). This development  - repeated in the Amsterdam Treaty
2 by the creation of new 
institutions (Employment Committee, Mr./Mrs. CFSP, Policy Planning and Early Warn-
ing Unit), and in the Treaty of Nice by the ‘recreation’ of EUROJUST and the creation 
of a specific committee dealing with social security issues  - is an expression of the dy-
namic of growth and differentiation of European integration.  
Of course, new institutions, rules and procedures are not established in order to i nflate 
the institutional structure of the EU even further. They are deemed to be necessary in 
order to deal with new monetary or social policy demands and duties of the Union, or to 
give the EU a single voice or interface for dealing e.g. with third countries and organisa-
                                                 
1   For example, the EC Treaty chapter on EMU contains nine different decision-making procedures: 
assent of Parliament and unanimity of the Council: two times; co-operation procedure: four times; 
consultation of Parliament and unanimity of the Council: seven times; consultation of Parliament and 
qualified majority voting of the Council: seven times; information of Parliament and qualified major-
ity voting of the Council: six times; information of Parliament and unanimity of the Council: two 
times; unanimity in the Council without any participation of Parliament: three times; qualified 
majority voting in the Council without the Parliament’s participation: nine times; two thirds majority 
of weighted votes of the Council without the Parliament’s participation: once. 
2   Dehousse, Franklin/Vandamme, Jacques/Le Hardy de Beaulieu, Louis (eds.): Union e uropéenne: 
quels défis pour l’an 2000?, Bruxelles, PIE 1998; Télo, Mario/Magnette, Paul (eds): De Maastricht à 
Amsterdam. L’Europe et son nouveau traité, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe 1998; Westlake, Martin 
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tions. With regard to the Committee of the Regions they are also needed to generate an 
institutional feedback for the regional and local level of governance.  
 
Institutions  - “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embed-
ded in the organizational s tructure of the polity or political economy”
1 - do not operate 
in a political vacuum but in a closely connected system of power distribution in which 
the architects of the Treaty have implemented them. “Institutions constrain and refract 
politics, but they are never the only cause of outcomes.”
2 Whenever new institutions 
gain specific tasks, they do not use them in isolation but in a framework of already es-
tablished rules and bodies of political power. Concomitantly this process of institutional 
growth automatically attains a higher degree of complexity. This is obvious for the a c-
tors involved in this decision-making process, but for the citizens of the EU, it is not. 
In how far does the EU’s institutional structure affect policy outcomes? If we just take a 
look at the overall production of legal acts, we observe that the day-to-day output of 
EC/EU decision-making  - taking various forms of regulations and directives towards 
legislative program decisions and non-binding recommendations  - has evolved over the 
last decades towards 56.610 in December 2000 (Graph 1). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(ed.): L’Union Européenne au-déla d’Amsterdam. Nouveaux concepts d’intégration européenne, 
Bruxelles: PIE 1998. 
1   Hall, Peter A./Taylor, Rosemary C.R.: ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, in: 
Political Studies, No. 5/1996, p. 938. 
2   Thelen, Kathleen/Steinmo, Sven: ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’, in: Steinmo, 
Sven/Thelen, Kathleen /Longstreth, Frank (eds.): Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in 
comparative analysis, Cambridge 1992, p. 13.   44
Graph 1: Legal Output of EU Institutions 1952-2000 
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European Commission’s Secretariat General. Sums represent every legal event as counted by CELEX. 
Apart from ‘real’ secondary legislation, CELEX also refers to executive acts either by the Commission or 
the Council. Note that from November 1993 onwards, Council legislation also comprises legislative acts 
by the European Parliament and the Council (co-decision procedure). 
 
A high amount of these decisions is set for relatively short time-periods or regularly 
replaced by new legislation.  
 
Graph 2: European Legislation in Force 1983-1998 
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Source: Directory of Community Legislation in Force, Luxembourg, 1984-1999 (December issues). See 
Maurer/Wessels 2001. 
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However, during the last decade, the acquis communautaire - the legislation in force at a 
given moment  - more than doubled from 4.566 in 1983 towards 9.767 legal acts in 
1998. In other terms, the EU member states have exploited the incentives created by 
themselves in the treaties and their policy provisions. In turn, the EC/EU increasingly 
entered into the legal space of the member states.  
  
2. The Democratic Deficit Revisited 
 
2.1. A European Demos: Prerequisite or Outcome of European Integration? 
 
The EU system takes binding decisions, which influence the citizens’ ways of living 
and constrains their individual freedom. As to the theme of our book, the EU system 
affects national legislatures and the linkage between the citizens and the governing bod-
ies of the member states. Overall, the EU’s institutional design faces a multitude of 
questions as to how representative this system of multi-level governance is, in which 
way its quasi-executive branches - the Council and the Commission  - are accountable to 
the citizens via a directly legitimated body and how d emocratic the decision-making 
procedures between the Union’s legislative authorities are. Of course, arguing about 
parliaments and their potential to provide the European ‘ Demoi’  - functionally, nation-
ally or ideologically different realms of identity a nd interest formation, mediation and 
communication  - a set of representative voices in the Union’s policy cycle does not 
mean that de-nationalised, supra-national parliamentarism is the only way of bridging 
the gap between the citizens and the Union. One c an easily assume that even after the 
Nice Treaty has come to force,
1 many scholars and practitioners of European integration 
will continue to argue that focusing on the ‘input’ structures of the Union is only one of 
several ways how governance “beyond the state”
2 might gain legitimacy.  
In this respect, one could also imagine a ‘renaissance’ of the German Constitutional 
Court’s 1993 Maastricht ruling, which lead to a general critique of the EU’s parliamen-
tary model. The basic assumption of the Court and later on its protagonist commentators 
was that a polity presupposes a  demos in ethno-national or ethno-cultural terms (the 
“Volk” instead of the “Gesellschaft” or “Gemeinschaft”). Thus, without a single Euro-
                                                 
1   See on the debate regarding the Nice IGC: Lehne, Stefan: ‘Institutionenreform 2000’, in: Integration, 
No. 4/1999, pp. 221-230; Kohler-Koch, Beate: ‘Regieren in der Europäischen Union. Auf der Suche 
nach demokratischer Legitimität’, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. B 6/2000, pp. 30-38; Best, 
Edward/Gray, Mark/Stubb, Alexander (eds.): Rethinking the European Union. IGC 2000 and 
Beyond, Maastricht 2000; the special edition of the journal ‘Integration’ on Nice, No. 2/2001, Wes-
sels, Wolfgang: ‘Nice results. The IGC in the EU’s evolution’, in: Journal of Common Market Stu-
dies, No. 2/2001; Ludlow, Peter: ‘The European Council at Nice: Neither Triumph nor Disaster’, in: 
CEPS (ed.), A View from Brussels, No. 10/2001; Whyte, Nicholas: ‘The Final Shape of the Union: 
Taking the Nice Treaty to its logic conclusion’, in: CEPS Commentary, 25 January 2001. 
2   Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate: ‘Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem’, in: 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.): Europäische Integration, Opladen 1996.   46
pean people sharing heritage, language, culture and  ethnic background, and without a 
European public space of communication that could shape the wills and opinion of the 
population, no European statehood could be founded. For those who adopt this view,
1 it 
is apparent to simply deny the pre-constitutional c onditions for further integration and 
therefore to conclude that in the absence of a single European  demos there cannot be 
‘real’ democracy at the European level.
2  
Assume that a socio-political entity, which is willing to produce democratic forms of 
governance, can not simply dictate structural prerequisites and pre-constitutional ele-
ments of the future polity. One could then d evelop these arguments further to conclude 
that any attempt of institutional and procedural reform is unreasonable unless the differ-
ent European  Demoi are not identifying themselves as part of an emerging European 
Demos. Consequently, if one adopts this perspective, the European Parliament remains 
an artefact of elitist integration and cannot be considered as a “Vollparlament” (a fully 
fledged parliament).
3 Strengthening the European Parliament by means of institutional 
and procedural reforms would not lead to any kind of a democratic system. Instead, one 
should concentrate on the legitimising function of national assemblies, which in  turn 
would then get substantial participation powers back from the European Parliament. 
Against this line of analysis, I argue that the EU’s story is not only about territory and 
identity or  - in the language of the German Constitutional Court, about culture, shared 
heritage, language and ethnic belonging. Accordingly I assume that any kind of a supra- 
or even super-national governance structure without a d irectly elected parliamentary 
backbone beyond the one-dimensional structure of national assemblies would pervert 
the Union into a technocratic regime
4 or executive oligarchy. This would mean a system 
                                                 
1   Kielmansegg, Peter Graf: ‚Integration und Demokratie’, in: Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch, Beate, 1996, 
op.cit., pp. 47-72; Grimm, Dieter: ‘Mit einer Aufwertung des Europa-Parlaments ist es nicht getan - 
Das Demokratiedefizit der EG hat strukturelle Ursachen’, in: Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltung-
swissenschaft 1992/93, Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 13-18; Grimm, Dieter: ‘Does Europe need a consti-
tution?’, in: European Law Journal, No. 3/1995, pp. 282-302. 
2   For critical views on these interpretations see Weiler, Joseph: ‘After Maastricht: Community Legiti-
macy in Post-1992 Europe’, in: Adams, W.J. (ed.): Singular Europe: Economy and polity of the Eu-
ropean Community after 1992, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1992, pp.11-41; Weiler, 
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Beyond. London: Pinter 1996; Weiler, Joseph/Haltern, Ulrich/Mayer, F.: ‘European Democracy and 
Its Critique’. West European Politics, No.4/1995, pp. 24-33. Craig, Paul: ‘Democracy and Rulema-
king within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment’. European Law Journal No. 3/1997, 
pp. 105-130; Craig, Paul: ‘The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy’, 
in: Craig, Paul/De Búrca, Crainne (eds.): The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: University Press 1999. 
3   See Lübbe, Hermann: Abschied vom Superstaat. Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa wird es nicht 
geben, Berlin: Siedler 1994, p. 147; Schröder, Meinhart: ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Hüter 
des Staates im Prozeß der europäischen Integration’, in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, No. 6/1994, p. 
318. 
4   See Majone, Giandomenico: ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’. West European Politics, 
No. 3/1994, pp. 78-102; Majone, Giandomenico: ‘European regulatory state?’, in: Richardson, Jere-
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apt to allocate values and able to deliver common goods, but not subject to any kind of 
continuous control and never able to guarantee that the ways decisions are taken respect 
general norms with regard to the rule of law. Therefore, I conceive the ‘parliamentarisa-
tion’ of the Union’s decision-making system through both the European and the n a-
tional parliaments as only one tool, but an essential and necessary o ne, for building a 
legitimate European order. The missing ‘ demos’ is then not a prerequisite, but an ideal 
product of successful integration and institutional design. In this respect, I refer to 
Habermas’ analysis on the relationship between institution building and citizenship 
formation. He argues that “the ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a d e-
mocratic community must not be taken as a historical-cultural  a priori that makes d e-
mocratic will-formation possible, but rather as the flowing contents of a circulatory 
process that is generated through the legal institutionalisation of citizens’ communica-
tion. This is precisely how national identities were formed in modern Europe. Therefore 
it is to be expected that the political institutions to be created by a European constitution 
would have an inducing effect.”
1 In other terms, the “ demos is constructed via democ-
ratic ‘praxis’. [...] Instead of ‘no EU democracy without a European  demos’, we have 
‘no European  demos  without EU democracy’”.
2 Taking this perspective seriously, I 
consider the very process of European integration as an ongoing search for opportunity 
structures, which allow the institutions of the EU’s multi-level system to combine sev-
eral demands for democracy-building beyond, but still with the nation state. Whether 
this process leads to the self-identification and further stabilisation of various ‘demoi’ or 
of one single European ‘demos’ remains an open question.  
 
2.2. Majority-Voting in the Council of Ministers: Consequences for National Parlia-
ments 
 
The EU provides an increasing set of procedures for majoritarian decision-making. 
Graph 3 shows the absolute proportion of the Council’s internal decision-making modi 
between 1952 and 1999. It is obvious that the total number of rules providing for una-
nimity and qualified majority voting (QMV) has considerably increased over time.  
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Graph 3: Decision-Making Modi in the Council 1952-2001 (ECT area) in Absolute Numbers 
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2001: The Treaty of Nice). 
 
However, the organisation of consensus remains an important means of taking decisions 
even in areas where majority voting is possible according to  the Treaties.
1 The rather 
small share of ‘real voting’ indicates this underlying “culture of consensus”
2 of the 
Council and its component members. Used as a ‘sword of D amocles’,
3 majority rules 
facilitate concessions and the common search for consensual decisions. Therefore, one 
could conceive the EU according to the consociation theory first developed by Lijphart,
1 
which emphasises the importance of non-majority mechanisms of decision-making in 
polities that experience a number of important cleavages, and  yet are able to produce 
common policies and institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   See Devuyst, Youri: ‘Treaty reform in the European Union: the Amsterdam process’, Journal of 
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3. The Process of De- and Re-Parliamentarisation in the EU 
 
In this chapter, the alliteration of the ‘democratic deficit’
2 focuses mainly on the roles 
and functions of institutions which are d esigned to represent the different interests of the 
citizens and to establish different forms of linkage in and for a given polity. I refer to a 
definition of democracy within the original framework of EU governance: the “institu-
tionalisation of a set of p rocedures for the control of governance which guarantees the 
participation of those who are governed in the adoption of collectively binding deci-
sions”.
3 This definition does not automatically induce democracy to be synonymous 
with parliamentary involvement. At least theoretically, there are many ways of securing 
the participation of the citizenry in governing a given polity. But if we turn to the evolu-
tion of the EU over the last decades, we observe a clear trend: the search for establish-
ing some kind of r epresentative governance structures, in which institutions aggregate 
participation needs and try to fulfil their general function as arenas for making binding 
decisions, and for structuring the relationship between individuals in various units of the 
polity and economy.
4  
On that basis, I focus my analysis on the ‘democratic deficit’ as a gap between the insti-
tution-linked powers transferred to the EU level on the one hand and the control of the 
EP and the national parliaments of them on the other hand: It  is clear that legislative 
competencies have constantly been shifted from a national parliamentary level towards 
the Council of Ministers without immediately including the European Parliament as an 
equal partner in the EC/EU legislative process at the same time.
5   
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York/Tokyo: Springer 1998, pp. 1-10. 
3   Jachtenfuchs, 1998, op.cit., p. 47. 
4   Hall, Peter: Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, New 
York 1986. 
5   For the original definition of the democratic deficit see the so-called Vedel-report of the European 
Commission 1972, p. 4; and the Toussaint report by Michel Toussaint, PE DOC A 2276/87 of 1 Feb-
ruary 1988.   50
In this sense, the lack of control of governments on the national and of the Council of 
Ministers on the European level originates a “double democratic deficit”.
1  
Of course, those scholars and political actors stressing that national sovereignty  resists 
European integration would argue that decision-making in the EU rests primarily upon 
the member states and the Council of Ministers and, since Maastricht and Amsterdam, 
upon the European Council. Thus they would ascribe only a minor role to the European 
Parliament. However, since Maastricht the real distribution of powers goes far beyond 
this simple conceptualisation of the Union. Hence, the cumulative process of functional, 
special-purpose or single-policy oriented integration affects the institutional design and 
the decision-making process between institutions on European and national  - and to a 
growing extent even sub-national  - levels of governance. Accordingly, the process of 
multi-actor and multi-level co-operation and integration leads to an o ngoing “fusion” of 
national and Community instruments where major actors of the EU member states try to 
achieve an increase in the effectiveness of preparing, taking and implementing decisions 
through and with European institutions.
2 Subsequent ‘constitutionalisations’ of this 
process - the SEA, the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice versions of the TEU  - created 
new opportunities for an original kind of parliamentary democracy in the EC/EU, but 
they left considerable gaps in parliamentary involvement and control in many policy 
areas which directly affect the way of living of the Union’s citizens.  
Developments after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty have led to a loss of public 
support and made the project of integration more contested than ever within the member 
states: The post-Maastricht discourse on democracy and d emocratic governance in the 
Union seems to have weakened the legitimacy of the U nion.
3 Moreover, the decline in 
turnout of European elections indicates that the parliamentarization of the EU’s institu-
tional terrain does not automatically lead to a higher profile of the European Parliament.  
 
4. Characteristics of a Problematic Democracy 
 
The partial or complete transfer of national competencies towards the EC/EU implies an 
immediate loss of the national parliaments’ legislative powers t owards the Council of 
Ministers, the European Commission and - to a lower degree and at a later stage -, to-
wards the European Parliament. Only after the introduction of the so-called co-operation 
procedure and the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament gained important 
rights in the field of EC legislation. But still after Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, the 
                                                 
1   See  Lodge, Juliet: ‘The European Parliament’, in: Andersen, Svein S./Eliassen, Kjell (eds.): The 
European Union. How democratic is it?, London 1996, pp. 190-191; Laprat, Gérard: ‘Reforme des 
Traités: Le Risque du double déficit démocratique’, in: Revue du Marché Commun, No. 351/1991, 
p. 721. 
2   See Wessels, 1996, op.cit. 
3   See Telò, Mario: ‘ Démocratie internationale et démocratie supranationale’, in: Télo, Mario (ed.): 
Démocratie et Construction Européenne, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles 1995, p. 18.   51
transfer of national parliamentary powers to the European level has not entailed a com-
plete and direct transfer of these originally legislative powers to the European Parlia-
ment.  
As regards the national level of policy-making in EC/EU politics, this loss of legislative 
powers in the upstream process of policy-making may be compensated by an increase in 
the national parliament's control function vis-à-vis their governments.
1 Hence, since the 
German Bundesrat's decision of 1957 to create a special EC affairs committee, national 
parliaments established institutions, general norms and procedures in order to scrutinise 
their governments in the EC decision-making process more effectively. Nevertheless, 
the degree of parliamentary scrutiny might vary a lot. Given different concepts and 
meanings of ‘control’, ‘participation’, and ‘scrutiny’, it  ranges from simple ex-post i n-
formation rules to mandatory procedures.
2 Although some parliaments are provided 
with a high and comprehensive amount of EC documents, they do not necessarily influ-
ence their governments' stance in the Council of Ministers: Their effective i mpact on the 
formation of n ational views did not only depend on the amount and type of documents, 
but also on the timing, institutional capacities and personal resources available to delib-
erate efficiently and effectively on a given document.  
 
5. Bringing National Parliaments Back into the Process: Institutional Reform from 
Maastricht to Amsterdam 
 
In view of the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the referenda 
held in Denmark, Ireland and France, the results of the Maastricht IGC in some cases 
led to extensive constitutional reforms amending the role of national parliaments in 
European Union affairs.
3 These changes occurred in a situation when public opinion in 
Europe became more critical vis-à-vis the integration process  and its achievements. 
National parliaments faced problems which cast more and more doubts on their institu-
                                                 
1   Schüttemeyer, Suzanne: ‘Funktionsverluste des Bundestages durch die europäische Integration?’, in: 
Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No. 2/1979, p. 261. 
2   See the contribution by Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels in this volume. For earlier findings, 
see Laprat, Gérard: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Community Legislation: An Evolving Idea’, in: Laur-
sen, Finn/Pappas, Spyros (eds.): The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union, Maas-
tricht: European Institute of Public Administration 1995, pp. 4-10; Norton, Philip (ed.): National Par-
liaments and the European Union, Special Issue of The Journal of Legislative Studies, No. 3/1995. 
3   See the chapters on the constitutional provisions in the contributions by the authors of the country 
studies in this volume. For earlier findings, see also: Masclet, Jean-Claude/Maus, Didier (eds.): Les 
Constitutions nationales à l’épreuve de l’Europe, Paris, 1993; Battis, Ulrich/Tsatsos, Dimitris/ Stefa-
nou, Dimitris (eds.): Europäische Integration und nationales Verfassungsrecht, Baden-Baden , 1995; 
De Berranger, Thibaut: Constitutions nationales et construction communautaire, Paris 1995; Duina, 
Francesco G./Hall, John A.: Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common Market, New 
York 1999; Hanf, Kenneth/Soetendorp Ben (eds.): Adapting to European integration. Small States 
and the European Union, London 1998; Ismayr, Wolfgang (ed.): Die Politischen Systeme Westeuro-
pas, Second Edition, Opladen 1999.   52
tional position and procedural function. This was a new development, since national 
parliaments were not actually granted a significant role when the Treaty of Rome was 
signed in 1957. Following proposals e xpressed by the United Kingdom and France, the 
Maastricht Treaty included a declaration on the role of national parliaments in the EU.
1 
Accordingly, the governments were asked to ensure “that national parliaments receive 
Commission proposals for legislation in good time for information or possible examina-
tion”. This declaration constituted a discretionary provision without any binding legal 
effect but a welcomed source for further political debate and conflict between govern-
ments and parliaments. Moreover, the declaration was used for intensified debates b e-
tween national parliaments and the European Parliament on the effectiveness of differ-
ent parliamentary levels in EU affairs. As graph 4 shows, the Maastricht Treaty’s decla-
ration provided a fresh momentum for restructuring interparliamentary co-operation on 
the level of committees and civil servants. 
 
 
Graph 4: Interparliamentary Co-operation 1987-2000 
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Source: Maurer, Andreas: Parlamentarische Demokratie in Europa, Gießen 2001; calculation on 
the basis of the internal databases of the EP’s Directorate for relations with national parliaments. 
 
 
                                                 
1   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 1.1. See also Corbett, 
Richard, The Treaty of Maastricht, London 1993, pp. 61-62; Maurer, Andreas: ‘Demokratie in der 
Europäischen Union nach Amsterdam’, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 4/1997, pp. 
425-442.   53
6. The Amsterdam IGC Process in Retro-Perspective 
 
The  1996/1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the revision of the Treaty on 
the European Union attracted greater attention, interest and expectations in the national 
parliaments of the EU member states than any of the revisions and extensions of the 
Treaties establishing the EC's carried out hitherto. This was closely tied to the question 
of what institutional role the European Parliament and the national parliaments should 
play in the Union.  
 
6.1. National Political Parties’ Attitudes: Polarisation as a Background Factor?  
 
The ‘devolution’ of the ‘permissive consensus’ in public opinion goes hand in hand 
with a differentiation of party positions concerning the institutional and procedural d e-
sign of the EC/EU system. As mass aggregators, political parties are slow adapters to 
new political circumstances.
1 If we compare the evolution of party positions with regard 
to European integration between 1986/1988 (SEA period) and 1995/1998 (Amsterdam 
period), we identify a certain polarisation of parties with regard to the positioning on the 
institutional structure of the EU. During the SEA-period institutional reflections were 
based on rather general questions: Should the European Community move to some kind 
of a Political Union? Should the EP and the European Commission be granted with new 
powers and/or more influence vis-à-vis the Council and the Member States? Should 
unanimity be replaced by qualified majority decisions? Positions favouring the Euro-
pean Parliament as  the EU’s democratic backbone were put forward in the majority of 
the founding member states and in the countries of the Southern Enlargement. On the 
other hand, most of the parties in France, the UK, and Denmark defended a more inter-
governmental approach, according to which national parliaments should have a greater 
say in European decision-making.  
                                                 
1   See Schmidt, Manfred G.: ‘When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan 
influence on public policy’, in: European Journal of Political Research, No. 2/1996, pp. 155-183; 
Müller, Manfred: ‘Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountabi-
lity work’, in: European Journal of Political Research, No. 3/2000, pp. 309-333; .   54
Table 2: Party Orientations with Regard to the EU’s Institutional System: Roles of Parliaments  
 
SEA period 1986/1988 
  B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IR  IT  LUX  NL  UK 
TCS  PSC    SPD, CDU, 
FDP 
        DC, PCI       
EP+  CVP, 
PSC, 
PS 
Venstre  SPD, CDU, 
FDP,  
PASOK, 
ND 
PSOE, AP, 
PDP, CDS, 
PNV, CIU 
PS, 
MRG, 
PRS, 
CDS  
PD  DC, PCI, 
PSI, PRI, 
PSDI, PR 
PSC/-
CSV, 
LSAP 
PvdA, 
VVD, 
D66 
LD 
EP-    SD  Greens                CON 
NP+    SD, KF        RPR, 
UDF 
      SGP   
Amsterdam period 1995/1998 
  B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IR  IT  LUX  NL  A  SF  S  UK 
TCS  PS    CDU, FDP, 
SPD, 
B90/G 
PASOK, 
ND 
CIU, EA, 
ERC, PA, 
UV, HB 
  FG, 
PD 
PPI    GL, D 66   SPÖ, 
LIF 
  KDS  LD 
EP+  PSC, 
PS, 
CVP 
SD  CDU, SPD, 
B90/G, 
FDP 
PASOK, 
ND 
PSOE, CIU, 
EA,  
PS, FD, 
MRG 
PD, 
LP 
PPI, PDS, 
PRI  
LSAP, 
PCS/-
CSV, 
DP 
PvdA, 
CDA, D 
66, GL 
ÖVP, 
SPÖ, 
Grüne
, LIF 
SSP  SD, 
FPL, 
KDS 
LP, 
LD 
EP-    SF                         
NP+  PSC  SD, KF, 
SF, 
Venstre 
SPD, 
B90/G 
  PSOE, PP  RPR, 
UDF, 
FD, PS 
  PRC  PCS/-
CSV, 
LSAP, 
DP 
SGP/ 
RPF/ 
GPV, 
VVD, D 
66 
ÖVP, 
FPÖ 
SSP, 
KK, 
VF 
SD, 
M, 
MP, 
KDS 
CON, 
LP, 
SNP 
CNP            RPR, 
UDF 
    DP        MP   
Legend: Construction of a EU bicameral system with EP and Council of Ministers (TCS); Strengthening of the EP (EP+); Against a strengthened role of the 
EP (EP-); More control powers to national parliaments: (NP+); In favour of a Chamber of NP: (CNP). Source: Maurer 1998, pp. 329-337.   55
Since the beginning of the Maastricht IGC, parties started to differentiate their profiles 
with regard to the institutional design of European integration. The pro-supranational 
stance was still defended by those parties, which were in the boat before. Additionally, 
the French Socialists now also asked for a rather unconditional strengthening of the EP. 
The Austrian SPÖ, ÖVP and the LIF, the Finnish SSP, and parts of the Swedish SD, 
FPL and KDS, and the British Labour Party shifted towards a more positive view of 
supranational institutions. Interestingly, smaller opposition parties also started to favour 
the EP. Especially the Greens, which in the first period belonged to a camp of general 
Euro-scepticism, started to focus on the EP, because they realised their influence  - 
through the rapporteur-based legislative work of the EP  - in policy-making. However, 
the post-Maastricht period is also marked by a growing group of parties that reflect i n-
stitutional-procedural elements for ‘compensating’ the assumed strength of suprana-
tional i nstitutions: Hence, all parties except the Greek and Irish asked for a stronger role 
of national parliaments in order to control European policy at the national level. Parties 
in the UK, France and Denmark substantialised their critical opinions on the EP by u n-
derlining the missing linkage between the EU citizenry and the EP and the validity of 
national legislatures for legitimising EC/EU lawmaking. On the other hand, parties in 
Germany, Austria, and the Benelux countries intensified their discourse in favour of the 
EP while underlining that national parliaments should strengthen their positions unilat-
erally, i.e. via constitutional reforms in the member states.  
Summing up, the vast majority of national parties still support to a large degree the 
European integration process. Political parties of governing majorities ground their 
European policies basically on a broad pro-integration attitude.  Changes in government 
had only limited impacts on the basic perceptions of European policies of the member 
states and on the structure for running the EU machinery. Thus, the growing degree of 
public mistrust did affect the elite driven machinery only to a  limited extent. New for-
mations of government have led in no case to a completely new formulation of the ‘na-
tional strategy’ on the EU construction.
1 Apart from France and the UK, both govern-
mental and opposition parties approve the integration process sharing an overall consen-
sus. However, we witness a small number of parties opposing further integration and  - 
more important  - in some cases an i ncreasing internal party factionalism on the strategy 
towards European integration. The Maastricht Treaty and the negotiations on the A m-
sterdam Treaty thus i nduced some kind of a pro- versus anti-European ‘cleavage’ in 
national party systems. The salience of the EU and critical voices have led to an addi-
tional dividing line between (UK, F) or within parties (F, S and DK). However, the 
                                                 
1   See also van der Eijk, Cees/Franklin, Mark: ‘European Community Politics and Electoral Represen-
tation: evidence from the 1989 European Election Study’, in: European Journal of Political Research, 
No. 19/1991, pp. 111-123; Andeweg, Rudy: ‘The Reshaping of National Party Systems’, in: West 
European Politics, Special Issue on: The Crisis of Representation in Europe, No. 3/1995, pp. 58-78.    56
strict distinction b etween ‘left’ or ‘right’ oriented parties is not availing.
1 Only far right 
(D, A, DK, S, F) and left wing parties (DK, S), or religious parties (NL) as well as con-
servative parties (UK, I) favour a re-nationalisation  in particular policy fields in combi-
nation with a strengthened role for national parliaments.
2  
 
6.2. Concepts and Proposals with regard to the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
What was Amsterdam about in terms of parliamentary democracy? Comparing relevant 
documents produced during the IGC process,
3 the proposals made under the headings of 
‘democratisation’ and ‘parliamentarisation’ can be classified as follows: 
The first option was based on the assumption that the European Parliament performs as 
the general feedback of  EU citizens in European governance. Assuming the European 
Parliament to perfom as the main parliamentary European player (see square 2 in  Figure 
1) in EU policy-making, this option focused on its legislative roles without considering 
national parliaments. Accordingly, key actors in the IGC concentrated on democratisa-
tion by reforming the decision-making procedures through an extension of the areas 
covered by the co-decision procedure. The strategies to be employed were: 
-  A systematic conjunction of the different types of decision-making procedures 
and the institutions to be involved on the one hand and the nature of the different 
legal acts at the EC/EU’s disposal on the other. This approach would have sug-
gested some kind of a hierarchy of norms like it might be derived from the legal 
definition of the Council acting as legislator.
4 During the negotiations, the Com-
                                                 
1   See Hix, Simon: ‘The emerging EC party system? The European party federations in the intergo-
vernmental conferences’, in: Politics, No. 2/1993, pp. 38-49; Hix, Simon: ‘The transnational party 
federations’, in: Gaffney, John (ed.): Political Parties in the European Union, London 1996, pp. 308-
331; Niedermayer, Oskar: Europäische P arteien? Zur grenzüberschreitenden Interaktion politischer 
Parteien im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt am Main/New York 1983; Ladrech, 
Robert: Europeanisation and Political Parties: Towards a Framework of Analysis, Queen’s Papers on 
Europeanisation, No. 2/2001. 
2   See Maurer, Andreas: ‘Der Wandel europapolitischer Grundorientierungen nationaler Parteien in der 
Europäischen Union’, in: Jopp, Mathias/Maurer, Andreas/Schneider, Heinrich (eds.): Europapolitis-
che Grundverständnisse im Wandel, Analysen und Konsequenzen für die politische Bildung, Bonn 
1998, pp. 301-364.  
3   See Jopp, Mathias/Maurer, Andreas/Schmuck, Otto (eds.): Die Europäische Union nach Amsterdam. 
Analysen und Stellungnahmen zum neuen EU-Vertrag, Bonn 1998; Jörg/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): 
The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, London: Continuum 2001; McDonagh, Bobby: 
Original Sin in a Brave New World, An Account of the Negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Dublin, Institute of European Affairs 1998; Moravcsik, Andrew/Nicolaïdis, Kalypso:  ‘Federal Ideals 
and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Annual Review, Vol. 36/1/1998,  pp. 13-38; M oravcsik, Andrew/Nicolaidis, Kalypso: ‘Explaining 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, Interests, Influence, Institutions’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
No. 1/1999, pp. 59-85; Pollack, Mark A.: ‘Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’, in: European Integration online Papers EIoP Vol. 3/1999 No. 6. 
4   See Rules o f Procedure of the Council of Ministers, Annex, OJ L304/7 of 10th December 1993. 
Originally, the joint declaration of the then German and Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers Kinkel and 
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mission published a comprehensive report on the method of extending the cover-
age of co-decision based on the definition of EC legislation.
1  
-  A systematic association of decision-making mechanisms in the Council of Minis-
ters and decision-making procedures between the Council and the European Par-
liament. Protagonists of this approach suggested the introduction of co-decision in 
all cases where the Council decides by qualified majority.
2  
-  The simple transfer of the existing co-operation procedures into co-decision pro-
cedures.
3  
-  A policy oriented and single (national) interest guided re-ordering of decision-
making procedures. Protagonists of such an  approach regarded the European Par-
liament as a potential coalition partner in order to enforce or to block decisions in 
specific policy areas.
4  
The second strategy for the democratization of EC/EU decision-making procedures was 
discussed with regard to the roles of the national parliaments. These proposals assumed 
that national parliaments could move from their position of a ‘Slow adapter’ (square 4 
in Figure 1) to a position of a ‘National player’ (square 3 in Figure 1).  
                                                                                                                                               
Agnelli were strongly in favour of classifying the decision-making system of the Union according to 
this approach. 
1   See Europäische Kommission, Bericht gemäß Artikel 189 Absatz 8 des EGVs: Anwendungsbereich 
der Mitentscheidung, Europäische Kommission, Dok. SEC(96)1225 final, 3 July 1996. The Euro-
pean Parliament, in its Bourlanges/De Giovanni report of 7th November 1996, largely welcomed this 
approach but suggested a more coherent way of separating ‘legislative” from ‘non-legislative” acts. 
The main variable for identifying an area as subject to co-decision was the legal nature of legislation, 
its scope and its implications. However, apart from Germany, Greece and Italy, the member states 
delegations did not develop further this approach. 
2   Consequently, the success of this strategy largely depended on the reform of the Council’s own 
decision-making regime. The fact that after Maastricht the Council still had to decide unanimously in 
57 ECT cases in the field of the EC’s binding secondary legislation seemed to be characteristic for 
the incapability of acting as one Union of fifteen member states. The unanimity requirement in the 
Council of Ministers serves as a serious obstacle to efficient policy-making. The refusal strategy of 
the British government in the ‘BSE/mad-cow disease conflict’ in the preliminary stage of the Flo-
rence European Council highlighted this problem to a remarkable extent. However, negotiations on 
the reform of the Council’s voting mechanisms and on the extension of the areas governed by the 
Damocles-sword of majority voting were not successful. Since no compromise could be found bet-
ween the larger and the smaller member states, the IGC postponed the whole issue of adjusting these 
representative aspects of institutional reform to the next enlargement round.  
3   Right from the beginning of the preparatory ‘reflection’ phase on the IGC, Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal argued strongly in favour of deleting the co-
operation procedure and its replacement by the co-decision procedure. During the negotiations bet-
ween the member states delegations, this approach attracted the highest degree of sympathy. Howe-
ver, since an early agreement could be found not to reopen the Treaty provisions on EMU, it was li-
kely that four co-operation procedures would be retained. 
4   Given their general attitude of reforming the procedural set-up of the Union on a case-by-case basis, 
the governments of Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden preferred this approach. Especially Swe-
den, where a majority of the political parties in government were reluctant vis-à-vis a general streng-
thening of the European Parliament, linked its ‘parliamentarisation’-suggestions to proposals on the 
improvement of policy areas such as environmental and social affairs.   58
During the IGC negotiations, the national delegations of France
1, the United Kingdom
2 
and Denmark
3 tabled concrete proposals calling for a strengthened role of national par-
liaments in the EC/EU decision-making process. The proposals varied between  
-  those who opted for the introduction of direct participatory or control powers for 
national parliaments within the legal framework of the EC/EU. These options 
tempted to provide national parliaments with key opportunities to perform as 
‘Multi-level players’ (square 1 in Figure 1);  
-  the introduction of a provision within the EC/EU Treaty framework guaranteeing 
national parliaments some unilateral control mechanisms vis-à-vis their r espective 
governments, and  
-  the formal upgrading of existing multilateral scrutiny regimes bringing t ogether 
members from both the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
4  
In addition to these ‘official’ proposals, several ideas had been suggested by parliamen-
tary actors to institutionalize the roles of national parliaments in the European policy 
process.  
The former President of the French National Assembly, Séguin, proposed the estab-
lishment of a second chamber.
5 In this body, national parliaments would play the role of 
a lower chamber and the European Parliament that of an upper chamber. Sir Leon Brit-
tan's proposal for the establishment of a Council of National Parliaments was similarly 
designed to directly involve national parliaments in the Community decision-making 
process. This Council of National Parliaments was supposed to discuss t he Commis-
                                                 
1  See France: ‘Pour une implication renforcée des parlements nationaux dans la construcition euro-
péenne’, 5 June 1996. A more concrete proposal for an amended Protocol on the application of the 
principle of subsidarity was presented on 26 November 1996: France: ‘Principle of subsidarity’, 
CONF/3990/96. A new Article 6 of the Protocol institutionalised COSAC as the body to ‘be consul-
ted on each Presidency’s broad guidelines and on the Commission’s work programme. It shall sub-
mit its opinion to the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission.’ Finally, the French 
delegation proposal on the reform of the Third Pillar also made reference to the role of national par-
liaments in the subject area. See France: ‘Third Pillar’, CONF/3824/97, 19 February 1997. 
2  See United Kingdom proposal on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 
CONF/3961/96, October 1996. As to the draft protocol on the role of national parliaments, the UK 
delegation submitted some amendments on 11 April 1997. See United Kingdom: ‘National Parlia-
ments’, CONF/3871/97, 11 April 1997. 
3  See Denmark: Memorandum on the fight against fraud, Consumer Protection, Subsidiarity and Na-
tional Parliaments, 1 November 1996. The official proposals were submitted on 13 November 1996: 
Denmark: ‘Subsidiarity and national parliaments’, CONF/3982/96. The paper suggested to include a 
new article into the TEU, which would then mandate the EP, the Commission and the Council for a 
joint agreement on the ‘conditions governing information, involvement and Co-operation in respect 
of national parliaments.” In addition, the Danish delegation proposed a declaration on national par-
liaments in the Final act of the IGC, which would encourage the EU institutions to conclude the joint 
agreement before 31 December 1998.  
4   For an overview about the different approaches see the Presidency Introductory Note on the role of 
national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process, CONF/3902/96, 9 September 1996, and the Pre-
sidency Suggested Approach with regard to the subject matter: CONF/3948/96, 15 October 1996. 
5   See Le Figaro, 7 December 1994.   59
sion's draft legislative program and directives at first reading stage.
1 In a report submit-
ted by the French Senator Guèna (RPR), the Senate's Delegation for European Union 
Affairs also proposed the creation of a Second chamber of national parliaments for the 
European Union's CFSP and justice and home affairs policies. The report moreover 
advocated that this chamber should have an overall competence in the areas of the own 
resources system in the Community budget, the enlargement of the Union, the  associa-
tion agreements and the monitoring of compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
2 In its 
report adopted on 7  February 1995, the French National Assembly's Delegation for the 
European Union advocated a stronger role for national parliaments by involving them 
collectively in the EC’s decision-making process prior to any final decision by the 
Council.
3 Therefore, the report proposed to set up an  Interparliamentary committee 
comprising a small but equal number of representatives of each national parliament. The 
committee should hold monthly meetings to vote for or against given texts, without 
having the power to amend them. Its sphere of competence was proposed to cover major 
decisions facing the European Union  - revision of the Treaties, international a gree-
ments, enlargement, budgetary affairs as well as home and legal affairs  - together with 
monetary and defense matters. In addition, the interparliamentary committee should 
scrutinize EC draft legislation with regard to the subsidiarity principle.  
The p osition of the French Parliament changed slightly after the Madrid COSAC meet-
ing of 7 and 8 November 1995. Dropping the idea of a Second chamber and amending 
that of an  Inter-parliamentary committee, the Parliament now proposed to institutional-
ize COSAC by giving it, in particular, the possibility of stating a position, in a consulta-
tive capacity, on EC projects that are the subject of an exception from subsidiarity 
raised either by a national parliament or by the Committee of the Regions. Finally, the 
constitutional reform adopted by the French Congress (Assembly and Senate) in July 
1995 does not include any of the proposals which had been put forward to strengthen 
parliamentary scrutiny of EC/EU legislation. However, the report of the French N a-
tional Assembly's Delegation for European Union Affairs also called for the direct par-
ticipation of the national parliaments in the decision-making process before the Council 
takes its decisions. The setting up of an interparliamentary committee composed of a 
limited, equal number of representatives of each Member State was aimed to ensure this 
direct involvement of national parliaments within the institutional realm of the Union. 
                                                 
1   See Sir Leon Brittan: Europe: The Europe We Need, London: Hamish Hamilton 1994, p. 227. 
2   See Sénat, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la délégation du Sénat pour l’Union européenne sur 
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février 1995. 
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According to the report, this committee was designed to approve or oppose certain texts 
at monthly meetings of limited duration without being able to amend them.
1  
The other national parliaments were at least critical if not negative in their attitude t o-
wards the creation of a separate body for national parliaments. Their argument held that 
the introduction alongside the EC/EU bodies of an institution representing  - in theory 
and by derivation from Community law  - the same, or broadly the same, interests as the 
Council would threaten not only the European Parliament's institutional position but 
also the institutional balance required by the EC Treaty and the whole institutional 
structure of the Community.
2 Given the strong reluctance of the majority of the member 
states’ parliaments and governments as well as of the EU institutions, the concept  of 
institutionalizing COSAC seemed unlikely to perpetuate interparliamentary co-
operation. The mainstream argument against such an i ncreased role held that the further 
institutionalization of COSAC would have had the contradictory effect of distorting the 
democratic foundations for the legitimization of parliamentary control and law-making 
activities in the Community. 
In turn, proposals to strengthen the unilateral supervisory powers of national parlia-
ments vis-à-vis their governments flourished in all EU m ember states. The Danish 
Folketing advocated an increase in influence of the national parliaments' European a f-
fairs committees: In concrete terms, the Folketing suggested to a ppoint an official to 
represent each parliament in Brussels, and to establish closer but informal co-operation 
within COSAC as well as closer multilateral co-operation between equivalent parlia-
mentary committees in all the parliaments of the Union.
3 The Danish Government put 
forward further proposals: the incorporation of a specific reference to the role of n a-
tional parliaments in the TEU, and the provision of an opportunity for national parlia-
ments to deliver an opinion during the preliminary legislative phase on Commission 
proposals before they are officially submitted to the other EU institutions.  
The German Bundestag called for a stronger role of the European Parliament and the 
national parliaments in intergovernmental activities, but strongly opposed any kind of 
formalization of COSAC. The Finnish Parliament pointed out that national parliaments 
should have access to Commission proposals and to the documents of Commission pre-
paratory working parties. The Finnish Government underlined the necessity of making 
co-operation between the European Parliament and national parliaments more e fficient 
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2   For an overview on the positions of all national parliaments see European Parliament, DG 
II/Division for relations with the Parliaments of the member states: Stage reached in discussions wi-
thin the national parliaments on the IGC in 1996, Brussels, 8 December 1995. See also: Assemblée 
nationale (30.3.1995): Rapport d’information déposé par la délégation de l’Assemblée nationale pour 
l’Union européenne sur la XIIe COSAC, tenue à Paris les 27 et 28 février 1995, par Robert Pan-
draud. 
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within the existing framework of declaration No. 13 of the TEU. For the Luxembourg 
Government, MEP Charles Goerens wrote an extensive report on strengthening the uni-
lateral control functions of national parliaments. He believed that with respect t o par-
liamentary scrutiny of Community affairs a kind of 'charter' should be considered to 
guarantee “minimum obligations which all governments would be likely to accept vis-à-
vis their parliaments”.
1  In his view, the best method would be to incorporate the “mini-
mum obligations of governments vis-à-vis the national parliaments” in the EU Treaty’s 
corpus and “to strengthen the Community institutions' obligations  - already set out in 
the Treaty  - vis-à-vis the European Parliament.”
2 He therefore proposed more extensive 
powers of scrutiny, specified in the Treaties, for the national parliaments in respect of 
their government's action. The United Kingdom took a view similar to that of Denmark. 
The White Paper on the Government’s approach to the IGC of 12 March 1995, stressed 
that the Maastricht Declaration No. 13 should become legally binding through integrat-
ing it into the Treaty. In addition, a minimum period for national parliaments should be 
introduced in order to scrutinize Community documents and draft legislation.  
The European Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs authorized Anne-Marie 
Neyts-Uyttebroeck for a report on the relations between the European Parliament and 
the national parliaments. This report synthesized a broad range of activities of the EP in 
order to voice the demands of both national parliaments and of the EP vis-à-vis the IGC. 
Hence, during the course of 1995-1996, the two EP observers at the IGC, Elisabeth 
Guigou and Elmar Brok, as well as the EP’s President, Klaus Hänsch, held several bi-
lateral meetings with delegations of each national parliament. Moreover, the EP’s 
Committee on Institutional affairs organized two specific hearings with all EU affairs 
committees. The Neyts-Uyttebroek draft report was debated at 17 occasions in t he 
Committee, which invited all national parliaments to participate actively in these meet-
ings.  
The EP’s draft report needs to be considered as its direct reaction to the Dublin COSAC 
meeting of 16 October 1996, which for the first time adopted conclusions on the rein-
forcement of Declaration No. 13 of the TEU. Hence, the COSAC delegations unani-
mously agreed to propose a minimum period of at least four weeks for the examination 
of EC and EU documents before the Council’s meetings.
3 The EP tried to cope with this 
initiative by formulating a comprehensive contribution on the subject matter for the 
Amsterdam IGC. By adopting the report on 12 June 1997, the EP identified general 
problems of parliamentary scrutiny in a number of specific areas: CFSP, CJHA, EMU, 
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2   Ibid. 
3   See XV. COSAC, Dublin, 15-16 October 1996, Conclusions, http://www.cosac.org. For the overall 
minutes of the meeting, see Houses of the Oireachtas: Report on the XVth COSAC meeting, Ireland, 
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agricultural policy, international trade agreements and amendments to the Treaties. It 
also considered that the advent of “enhanced co-operation” between certain member 
states would create new problems with regard to an effective parliamentary oversight. 
Given the COSAC’s own demands for a strengthened role of national parliaments, the 
EP considered that minimum time limits should be imposed for the examination of EU 
legislative documents. It also suggested to resolve various practical problems such as 
the p roposed four-week notice for legislative and non-legislative documents, the defini-
tion of what should be qualified as ‘legislative’, the conditions governing urgent d e-
mands and the assurance of maximum openness in relation to conciliation u ndertaken 
under  the co-decision procedure. Finally, the EP called for an i ncreased co-operation 
between the parliaments of the European Union and the European Parliament at various 
levels, especially within the framework of joint meetings of national parliamentary 
committees and the committees of the European Parliament with responsibilities in the 
same area, bilateral committee meetings and meetings between rapporteurs and repre-
sentatives of the corresponding political groups. 
 
6.3. The Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments 
 
The negotiations on these proposals lead to the insertion of the “Protocol on the role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union” (PNP) into the Amsterdam Treaty.
1  
The PNP addresses both the issues of the scope of information for parliaments, the tim-
ing of parliamentary scrutiny, and the institutional provisions for locking interparlia-
mentary co-operation into the inter-institutional framework of the EU. Following the 
proposal of the governments of France, the United Kingdom and Denmark, the Dublin 
COSAC as well as the EP’s report on the subject matter, the PNP holds the following:  
Firstly, national parliaments shall receive all pre-legislative Commission documents 
such as green and white papers or communications. These documents shall promptly be 
forwarded to national parliaments. However, the Protocol does not answer the question 
whether the governments of the member states, the European Commission or any other 
European institution will provide the parliaments with these documents. Instead, it sim-
ply stipulates each Member State may ensure that its own parliament receives the pro-
posals 'as appropriate'. Thus the PNP does not oblige the governments to send all legis-
lative proposals to their parliaments, or if this duty should be ‘scapegoated’ to another 
body. Secondly, the PNP implicitly excludes several types of documents of the general 
provision from the transmission of legislative proposals to national parliaments: all 
documents falling under the second pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), all documents concerning the entry into enhanced co-operation, all documents 
prepared by member states for the European Council, and all documents falling under 
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the procedure of the ‘Protocol on the integration of the Schengen acquis into the frame-
work of the European Union’.  
The PNP also includes a commitment on the management of how parliaments are to be 
informed about the EU’s rolling agenda. At first, the Commission shall e nsure that any 
legislative proposal is ‘made available in good t ime’. Then, a six week period between 
issuing a “legislative proposal or a measure to be adopted under Title VI” (Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) TEU and its discussion or adoption by the 
Council has to elapse. These two provisions are geared to allow the governments to 
inform their parliaments about the proposal and leave time for discussion. However, the 
protocol does not constrain the governments to really use the time provided by the 
Community institutions for i nforming their parliaments. Thus, it is up to the parliaments 
and their governments to negotiate on the content and the procedures to be applied for 
the implementation of the PNP.  
Besides the provisions on the improvement of unilateral parliamentary scrutiny mecha-
nisms, the PNP also recognized COSAC as a contribution to a more effective participa-
tion of national parliaments in EC and EU Affairs. The PNP specified three areas for 
deliberation within the COSAC framework: COSAC may examine “any legislative pro-
posal or initiative  in relation to the establishment of an area of freedom, security and 
justice”, “legislative activities of the Union, notably in relation to the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity” and “questions r egarding fundamental rights”. Thus, the PNP 
directly leads to the question whether COSAC may become the appropriate body for 
these issues. The fact that the PNP’s Chapter II focuses on the area of freedom, security 
and justice and on the fundamental rights policies reflects the political and legal sensi-
bility of these issues in the EU member states. If we add this specification to the consul-
tative role of the EP in the relevant policy area, we observe the introduction of a certain 
kind of ‘three-level-scrutiny-mechanism’: Firstly, the EP is to monitor the  European 
level of decision-making in the First and the Third Pillar. Secondly, provided that they 
organize their scrutiny mechanisms effectively, the national parliaments may unilater-
ally monitor their governments on matters falling under this policy area. Thirdly, 
COSAC is enabled to deliberate these issues between the EP and the national parlia-
ments.  
There are at least three shortcomings with regard to the implementation of the PNP: 
First, the PNP does not improve the lack of parliamentary control with r egard to the 
CFSP/ESDP pillar. The European Union's Foreign and Security policy may not be sim-
ply conceived as a ‘domaine réservé’ of the Council and its administrative substructure. 
Democratic control of these policy fields is completely excluded. Secondly, neither the 
EP nor the national parliaments or COSAC can monitor the process of transferring the 
‘Schengen acquis’ into the EC/EU area. If this lack of democratic control may be r e-
duced due to further negotiations on both the European and the national l evel, a third 
structural problem will certainly not be r esolved in the next years: COSAC Delegations 
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not of the Committees on civil liberties, justice and/or home affairs. Therefore, it is 
hardly conceivable how MP's who mainly deal with horizontal EU issues will be apt to 
deliberate effectively on matters falling under the area of freedom, security and justice. 
COSAC’s problems are of a structural nature. The focus of the second part of the PNP 
on COSAC indicates the limits of institutionalising a mutation of national parliaments 
into ‘multi-level players’: Parliaments might be able to use more i nformal instruments 
of multi-level parliamentary interaction (such as joint and b ilateral meetings between 
specialised standing committees of national parliaments and the EP).  Given the struc-
tural shortcomings of COSAC, at which aspects of specific policy areas are discussed to 
only a limited extent, the involvement of the national p arliaments’ specialized commit-
tees represents a more flexible option for the achievement of interparliamentary co-
operation. Moreover, these informal modes of interparliamentary co-operation might 
generate some multi-level features within the relevant bodies of the national parlia-
ments.  
 
IV. Conceptualising Parliamentary Involvement in EC/EU Affairs 
 
1. Towards a Scheme for Measuring Parliamentary Participation in EC/EU Affairs 
 
In view of these structural problems, this book addresses the question of how  national 
parliaments adapt to the EU’s multi-level and multi-actor system of governance. In ana-
lysing the degree of parliamentary involvement within the framework of European deci-
sionmaking, I resort to the theoretical model of European integration as an o ngoing 
process of institutional as well as procedural and functional differentiation.
1 I assume 
that this process affects institutions on both European and national (and subnational) 
level of governance. According to this model, the process of co-operation and integra-
tion leads to a ‘fusion’ of national and Community institutions, instruments and policy 
devices. Actors of different policy-making levels try increase their effectiveness with 
regard to the preparation, making and implementation of d ecisions through and with 
European institutions while keeping a major say by “a broad and intensive participa-
tion”.
2 Accordingly, I suppose that not only the European Parliament, but also national 
parliaments adjust and calibrate the possibilities and a rrangements for parliamentary 
activity in response to EC legislation and other activities related to the European Union.  
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The increasing scope of EU activities affects and undermines the traditional legislative 
function of national parliaments.
1 European legislation through the Council of Ministers 
and the establishment of a directly elected European Parliament reduced the function of 
national parliaments in the EC decision-making process to three major tasks: making 
ministers accountable for their activity in European a ffairs and ratifying fundamental 
amendments to the Treaties, the a pproval of legal acts in the Community and (since 
Maastricht) in the Union framework.
2 Provided national parliaments are understood as 
the “national a uthorities” to which Article 249 ECT leaves the choice of form and 
methods in order to achieve the results of a EC directive, national parliaments have a 
growing role in the transposition of Community secondary legislation.  
Moreover, with the Maastricht Treaty, national parliaments were granted new a pproval 
rights in the field of CJHA: Conventions and the so-called “passarelle”-clause in ex-
Article K.9 were subject to ratification in the member states. However, the task of ratifi-
cation and approval is a very restricted one, because it only leaves to parliaments the 
choice to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ without being able to influence the content of the act in ques-
tion. But given the fact that the majority of EU decisions subject to approval by national 
parliaments are matters of prolonged intergovernmental negotiations whose outcomes 
are taken by unanimity, members of parliaments may influence their governments prior 
to the final decision on the EU level. This should be possible if they get the draft texts at 
an early stage and if parliamentary scrutiny is  of political if not of legal importance for 
the relationship between parliaments and governments. 
I start from an observation on empirically grounded attempts to establish frameworks 
for understanding and assessing the role of national parliaments in the E uropean Com-
munity. These frameworks focus on the effects of institutional and procedural innova-
tions introduced through major steps in European integration. In this context, much 
attention has been paid not only to the effects of the shift of competences f rom the n a-
tional level of governance towards the EC level (and later, since 1993, towards the 
European Union), but also to the effects of introducing qualified majority voting for 
decisions in the Council of Ministers instead of unanimity. This innovation  “limited 
even further the scope for indirect influence by national parliaments”
3 because since 
Maastricht member states can be overruled by a decision of about 71% of the weighted 
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votes in the Council.
1 Thus, even in cases where parliaments may affect the position of 
their government in the Council of Ministers effectively (e.g. through the adoption of 
binding mandates), qualified majority voting generates a decrease of the capacity for 
national parliaments to influence the outcome of European decision-making.
2 Moreover, 
until 1994, the Council was not compelled to publish the results of qualified m ajority 
voting.
3 Consequently, parliaments did not have the opportunity to verify how their 
government's representative negotiated and voted in the Council. Accordingly, it could 
be argued that unanimity instead of majority-voting would lead to a higher degree of 
parliamentary participation if not influence because each Member Government is r e-
sponsible for the Council decisions and, “as such, accountable for them t o its national 
parliament.”
4  
As we have already noticed, the Maastricht Treaty led to a limited range of new provi-
sions affecting the possibilities of national parliaments for monitoring their govern-
ments' activity in EC/EU affairs. According to Declaration No. 13 of the Maastricht 
TEU version, the governments of the member states agreed that “it is important to en-
courage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European 
Union”.
5 In this context, they committed themselves to “ensure, inter alia, that national 
parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time for i nformation 
or possible examination”. During the Maastricht ratification process, a number of gov-
ernments provided their parliaments with some communication, information and 
consultation mechanisms. In the course of these constitutional reforms, national parlia-
ments amended their rules of procedure. Overall, the post-Maastricht period can be 
characterised as a fresh attempt by major actors to calibrate  institutional provisions for 
guaranteeing parliamentary back-up in EU policy-making. 
However, institutional adjustments with regard to the structure and the exercise of par-
liamentary scrutiny constitute no guarantee for effective and efficient monitoring o f 
national representatives in the Council of Ministers and its substructures. In order to 
identify and explain variations in the participation of national parliaments in EU policy-
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making,
1 we also need to take some basic indicators into account. Political  systems dif-
fer with regard to the established relationships between government and parliament, 
party systems and the ideological spectrum mirrored by parties and other societal 
groups. One has to take a look at the internal organisation of parliaments, as well as at 
the roles, functions, styles of parliamentary d emocracy in the different national settings. 
In addition, we should look at the relationships between standing committees, special or 
select committees, the plenary and cross-party working groups. T heir impact on the 
potential behaviour of individual members, political groups and parliamentary commit-
tees must then be taken into consideration, too. Country differences might be signifi-
cant: the types of executive-legislative relations and the subsequent differences in type 
and structure of parliamentarism vary between floor-centered ‘talking parliaments’ and 
committee-centered ‘working parliaments’.
2 Pahre identifies three necessary conditions 
for strong parliamentary oversight: “there must be a significant portion of the public, 
and at least one party represented in parliament, that prefers the status quo to further 
integration. Second, a country must have frequent minority governments. Third, there 
must be some party that would rather enjoy a policy veto through an oversight commit-
tee than join a majority government.”
3  
With regard to European integration, specific factors have to be considered: public opin-
ion on European integration in general, on democracy and the loci of democratic legiti-
misation of  policy-making, on institutions and the distribution of institutional roles, on 
the functional scope of EC/EU politics and the allocation of powers differs widely b e-
tween the EU member states.
4 Public opinion may generate political traction between 
political parties. However, these ‘pushed’ demands for debating ‘Europe’ do not auto-
matically determine specific forms of parliamentary scrutiny: political systems which 
favour polarisation in parliament would necessarily produce other forms of scrutiny 
than systems which are largely characterised by a consensual mode of party politics. 
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Moreover, the salience of EU integration as a source for p olitical conflict varies across 
the EU member states. Consequently, we need to analyse the relationship between the 
contentious orientation of parliamentary involvement in EU politics and the traditional 
working styles of parliaments in national politics.  
Finally, we also have to look at the MP’s own evaluations of the EU system and the 
roles they wish to fulfil. In this context, Katz’ 1996 survey shows that the m ajority of 
MP’s think that national parliamentary scrutiny of EU decision-making is too weak and 
should be strengthened.
1 Those who were satisfied with the way democracy works in 
their own country were also more comfortable with parliamentary involvement in EU 
matters. Finally, the average of MP’s thought that the EP should have more influence in 
EU policy-making than national legislatures. Only the Swedish MP’s ranked the two 
institutions in the opposite order. How did these self-perceptions evolve over time? Did 
the revision of the Treaties have any impact on the attitudes of parliaments? The country 
studies will provide evidence to answer these questions. 
Apart from these underlying factors, I refer to the criteria originally proposed by L aprat
2 
and Scoffoni.
3  
Figure 2: A Scheme for Measuring Parliamentary Participation in EC/EU Affairs 
Scrutiny Variables  
Scope  Timing and Man-
agement 
Impact 
 
 
Raw Categories of Parliaments 
 
 
Weak parliaments 
 
Rather low  Reactive and Acci-
dental 
None 
 
Modest policy influencing parliaments 
able to modify or to reject government 
proposals 
Low - High  Reactive but For-
malised 
Low 
 
Strong policy-making parliaments able 
to substitute government proposals 
 
High 
Anticipative, Pro-
active and Institu-
tionalised 
High 
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According to their framework for analysis, the efficiency and effectiveness of parlia-
mentary scrutiny in European affairs should be evaluated by addressing the following 
three criteria:
1 
A. The scope of parliamentary control which firstly results from the extent of docu-
ments forwarded to parliaments by their governments: to what extent do national par-
liaments receive draft proposals of legislative acts and other acts, i.e. white and green 
papers, recommendations, declarations, documents produced by COREPER, the 
Council working groups, the European Parliament and its committees? The scope of 
parliamentary scrutiny concerns not only the type and number of documents, which 
governments transmit to their legislatures. Hence the methods national systems i n-
corporate of organising an efficient and functionally oriented sift of documents vary 
and induce different d egrees of the scope of available information at different stages 
and in different parliamentary bodies. The  general orientation of ideas associated 
with a parliament’s control function as well as the financial, personal and managerial 
resources of a parliament may cause the exclusion of various types of EC/EU docu-
ments (legislative draft proposals, Commission's  white papers or communications, 
draft proposals related to the Second and Third Pillars of the TEU etc.) from the sub-
sequent phases of the scrutiny process: How do national parliaments select and sift 
documents forwarded by their respective executives?  
The Maastricht Treaty contained amendments to the Treaties establishing the (supra-
national) EC on the one hand and provisions for the foundation of two intergovern-
mental areas within the realm of the European Union (Titles V and VI) on the other. 
Given that  until Maastricht, national provisions on the scope of parliamentary scru-
tiny focused on the participation of parliaments in the fields of EC legislation, the i n-
troduction of two new policy fields in a separate international treaty may have led to 
a legal r estriction of the potential scope of parliamentary involvement. Thus, our 
third question is: to what extent do parliaments supervise governmental action in 
matters regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Co-operation in Justice 
and Home Affairs a nd European Monetary Union? Do national parliaments consider 
‘new’ forms of governance such as the open method for co-ordination in Economic 
and Employment policies? 
B. The timing and management of parliamentary scrutiny: effective scrutiny presup-
poses that p arliaments receive draft proposals for EC/EU legislation in good time and 
that they have enough time for examining it. Timing and management of parliamen-
tary scrutiny varies according to its implications on the Government's European pol-
icy. Timing as a criterion to measure the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny in 
the framework of EC/EU affairs therefore depends on the constitutional and legal 
provisions concerning the transmission of relevant documents to parliaments. In this 
                                                 
1   See Laprat, 1995, op.cit., pp. 4-8.   70
context, some rules governing the parliamentary monitoring process for handling 
European affairs may oblige the governments to transmit the relevant documents at 
the ‘earliest possible date’, ‘in advance on the preparation of meetings of the Council 
of Ministers’ or within a certain time limit such as ‘after receipt of a document by the 
Government’.  
The timing of scrutiny may also vary according to the internal management of Euro-
pean Affairs on the governmental and the parliamentary level and depending on the 
implications of parliamentary scrutiny powers for the Government's European policy. 
If ministers are bound by decisions of their parliament, governments are politically 
obliged to forward the relevant documents within a certain period of time allowing 
national parliaments an e xamination before the meeting of the Council of Ministers. 
Finally, the timing of parliamentary scrutiny also varies according to the frequency 
of meetings of the legislative actors involved. In this regard, parliaments are required 
to adapt their own organisation of meetings to the rolling agenda of the EU institu-
tions. National officials work closely together in preparing decisions of the Council 
in approximately 350 working groups under the Council and the Committee of Per-
manent Representatives.
1 These i nteraction patterns involve many sectors and levels 
of the national administration hierarchy. The working groups have a significant i m-
pact on the decision-making arena. Around 90 per cent of EC legislation is ‘pre-
cooked’ at this stage.
2 Furthermore, the B russels-based infrastructure is surrounded 
by consultative and advisory committees  - almost private, i.e. non-governmental and 
sectoral specialists providing expertise for both phases of decision-preparation and  -
implementation. As a mirror of the EC/EU’s  external policy activities, one can also 
find joint committees bringing together administrations from the EU institutions, the 
member states and third parties. The potential influence of committees differs largely 
according to the phase and the policy sector. The involvement of national civil ser-
vants in the EU policy-cycles is not just a ‘watch-dog exercise’. Both for the Com-
mission and the national institutions the “engrenage”-like
3 interlocking of a ctors is an 
important component for a calculable joint m anagement of the policy-making proc-
ess. If any major element is to be made responsible for the criticised bureaucratisa-
                                                 
1   The German Presidency of the Council January-June 1999 listed 351 operating working groups.  
2   See Van der Knaap, Peter: ‘Government by Committee Legal Typology, Quantitative Assessment 
and Institutional Repercussions of Committees in the European Union’, in: Pedler, Robert/Schäfer, 
Günther (eds.): Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the 
Political Process, Maastricht 1996, pp. 83-116, here p. 114. The Council itself notes that some two 
thirds of its rolling agenda is closed by COREPER, out of which 70 % are agreed at the working 
groups level. See Rat der EG, Der Rat der EG, Luxembourg 1990, p. 22; see also Wessels 2000, 
op.cit., pp. 228-229.  
3   See S asse, Christoph/Poullet, Edouard/Coombes, David/Deprez, Gérard: Decision-Making in the 
European Community, New York, London, Praeger, 1977.   71
tion
1 in ‘Brussels’, it is this quite intrinsical network of multi-level administrative 
interpenetration. Assuming that this bureaucracy  is not just an accidental product of 
personal mismanagement, national parliaments are confronted with an ever-growing 
realm of policy-making infrastructures, which is less open to parliamentary oversight 
than bodies bringing together politicians. If governments, administrations and inter-
mediary groups such as industrial loobies o ptimise their multi-level games, how do 
national parliaments react? At which stage of the EU’s arenas’ decision-making 
process do parliaments start the monitoring process vis-à-vis  their governments? Are 
the necessary procedures established for monitoring the Government's policy con-
strained by time limits? 
C. The impact of parliamentary scrutiny on the Government’s room of manoeuvre dif-
fers in every parliament of the EU. We can roughly  distinguish between formal and 
informal arrangements between parliament and government, b etween procedures 
aimed at substantially influencing the position of the Government in the Council and 
those simply aimed at tactically delimiting the relative independence of governmen-
tal representatives’ actions in the Council. The impact may differ between those par-
liaments that are able to mandate their government's representative before a Council 
decision takes place and those without any formal means for influencing their gov-
ernment's standpoint in the Council. In between these two extremes we might find 
parliaments that are able to e xpress their views on a certain proposal, however still 
dependant on whether governments incorporate them or not. Apart from the mandate, 
several parliaments may refer to the so-called “parliamentary scrutiny reserve” 
mechanism. In close relation to the criterion of the impact of parliamentary scrutiny, 
the basic interests and ideas behind parliamentary involvement in European decision-
making also need to be addressed. Moreover, one should not forget that a given, at 
first sight quite impressive set of parliamentary scrutiny rights may be instrumental-
ised by their respective governments to block Council decisions. Hence, only the 
well-known Danish mandatory procedure works in close connection with the fact of 
minority governments. Therefore, the criterion of the impact of parliamentary scru-
tiny should also include the issue of the level and of the minimum number of depu-
ties required for effective parliamentary intervention.  
At first glance, criterion ‘A’ presupposes the other two criteria: if parliaments do not get 
any information about relevant activities in European affairs, possible findings and con-
clusions on timing, time limits and t he impact of parliamentary scrutiny are irrelevant. 
                                                 
1   See Peters, Guy: ‘Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community’, in: Sbra-
gia, Alberta (ed.): Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European Community 
Washington: Brookings, 1992, pp. 75-122; Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘The Growth and Differentiation of 
Multi-Level Networks: A Corporatist Mega-Bureaucracy or an Open City?’, in: Wallace, H e-
len/Young, Alasdair R. (eds.): Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1997, pp. 17-41.   72
However, if parliaments are legally provided with a right to engage themselves in gath-
ering and treating information independently from what they get from their govern-
ments, their parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms may be more effective.  
The criteria for measuring effective and efficient parliamentary control in European 
affairs lead us to the problem of classifying national parliaments according to the appli-
cation of scrutiny powers in the policy processes. One model that has been devised for 
this purpose derives from earlier studies by Mezey
1 and has subsequently been modified 
by Norton.
2 Both authors developed frameworks for classifying legislatures in various 
countries. They are based on two basic indicators: the policy-making strength and the 
support for the legislature. Mezey defined the policy-making strength as “the constraint 
that the legislature is capable of placing on the policy-making activities of the execu-
tive”.
3 On the basis of the first criterion (policy-making strength), Mezey distinguished 
between three categories of parliaments:  
-  parliaments possessing strong policy-making power based on the veto power and 
the possibilities of making modifications or of finding compromises in the course 
of the policy process, 
-  parliaments with modest policy-making power characterised by the right to mod-
ify (but not to reject) policy proposals and 
-  parliaments having little or no policy-making power and thus not being able to 
modify or reject proposals issued by the executive. 
Norton's work concentrated on the first two categories. He underlines the fact that the 
having a right to reject policy proposals does not automatically entail a real i.e. proac-
tive policy-making power of parliaments.
4 Accordingly, the category of parliaments 
possessing strong policy-making power should encompass “policy-making” legislatures 
that can modify, reject or substitute policies of their own, while the category of parlia-
ments with modest policy-making power should only include “policy influencing” 
legislatures capable to modify and to reject but not to substitute policy proposals.
5 The 
difference between these two categories lies in the qualification of parliaments as legis-
lative bodies which are able to generate their own sets of  proposals that may substitute 
                                                 
1   See Mezey, Michael L.: Comparative Legislatures, Durham, N.C. 1979, pp. 21-44. 
2   See Norton, Philip: ‘Parliament and Policy in Britain: The House of Commons as a Policy Influen-
cer”, in: Teaching Politics, No. 2/1984, pp. 198-221.  
3   Mezey, Michael: ‘Classifying Legislatures’, in: Comparative Legislatures, 1979. Since  we focus 
only on the role parliaments play in the European decision-making process, we neglect Mezey’s sec-
ond criteria wich is oriented towards the general profile of legislatures. 
4   In ‘Comparative Legislatures’, Mezey acknowledged the missing of the combination ‘parliaments 
possessing the power to reject but not to modify’. For him, it was ‘inconceivable that a legislature 
could have the power to reject proposed legislation but not have the power to modify it’. Mezey, 
1979, p. 43 Footnote 1.  
5   Norton 1990, op.cit., p. 5 and 1984, op.cit., p. 201.   73
the original government position.
1 In this context, our substantial criteria of ‘scope’, 
‘timing’ and ‘impact’ of parliamentary scrutiny serve as the main variables. They form 
the basis for a classification of parliaments in o ne of the three aforementioned catego-
ries of “strong policy-making parliaments”, “modest policy-influencing parliaments” 
and “weak parliaments” possessing neither a policymaking nor a policy-influencing 
power. 
 
2. The Focus on Institutions and Institutional Adaptation 
 
The starting point of the country-by-country analysis on parliamentary activities in 
European affairs is an institutional one. I assume institutional change in the national 
parliaments according to the revision of the TEU, i.e. the general opportunity structures 
of national and European actors. Treaty amendments attempt to address institutional and 
procedural weaknesses identified during the implementation of previous adjustments to 
the rules of the EU’s institutional design. Treaty revisions  are thus endemic parts of a 
process; they are not only independent variables affecting the nature and the evolution 
of the participating systems but also become dependent variables themselves. Institu-
tions and procedures  - “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity 
and economy”
2 - are creations and creators at the same time. In this regard, one specific 
feature should be addressed: In ratifying treaty amendments, national parliaments chal-
lenge their political systems and their own powers. Any consideration about the capac-
ity of parliaments to cope with EC/EU policies needs to take the Treaties as serious as 
national constitutions and the underlying  factors of parliamentary involvement in poli-
tics. Thus, the question whether n ational parliaments introduce new methods, rules 
and/or institutions in order to scrutinise EC/EU policy is of crucial importance: As the 
European Union constitutes an organisational machinery in process, parliaments may 
alter their scrutiny methods according to new developments of the institutional and pro-
cedural framework of the European Union. Therefore the country studies in this book 
concentrate on the evolution and real performance of EU affairs committees with regard 
to the EU system. We thus take the Amsterdam PNP as a heuristic model for under-
standing the ‘real’ impact of Treaty and institutional change in the member states. 
 
                                                 
1   The question would be: Are parliaments able to substitute policy against the original government 
proposals on the so-called ‘common positions’ for the Council of Ministers?  
2   Hall, Peter: Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Cam-
bridge 1986, p. 19. David R. North offers a similar definition. Institutions are ‘the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
See: North, David R., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
1990, p. 3. See also: March, James G./Olsen, Johan P., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisatio-
nal Basis of Politics, New York 1989, p. 167.   74
Figure 3: The Ideal Process of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EC/EU Affairs
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Special thanks to Tapio Raunio for the concept of this model.75  
 
V. What to Expect?  
 
Assessing the overall development of the EU from the Rome Treaties until A msterdam 
with regard to its institutional and procedural democratisation  leads to an ambiguous 
picture. On the one hand, the EP’s potential of influence on the preparation, adoption, 
implementation and control of binding legislative acts has been considerably strength-
ened in the sphere of the EC. In this perspective, the Amsterdam Treaty marked a sig-
nificant effort to strengthen the accountability of the executive with regard to the Com-
mission. Moreover, the EP’s involvement in Justice and Home Affairs has been rela-
tively increased. On the other hand, the fact that unanimity in  the Council and consulta-
tion of the European Parliament still dominates the matters of justice and home affairs 
falling under Title VI TEU and under Title IV ECT reflects that a majority of member 
states are rather r eserved concerning a wider recourse to g enuinely supranational means 
of decision-making in these sensitive but  - to the population living inside the Union  - 
important spheres.  
The Amsterdam Treaty marked another step forward in the EU development from an 
economic problem-solving arena to an original polity. However, the institutional and 
procedural arrangements of the EU remained complex, fragmented and opaque. A m-
sterdam provided new and important offers for strengthening parliamentary democracy 
in the Union. The process of “EU-parliamentarisation” is i mpressive in its continuity. 
Since the SEA, the EP has developed considerably - both with regard to the formal revi-
sions as well as to the implementation of the subsequent Treaty reforms - from a rather 
“decorative”
1 to a truly co-legislative and c o-elective institution. However, there r e-
mains the question if these improvements provide new grounds for enhancing the l e-
gitimacy and the proximity of European governance to the citizens of the Union. The 
European Parliament is but one essential mean to d emocratise the European Union. In 
this book, we address the other side of the - parliamentary - coin: How do national par-
liaments contribute to EC/EU policy-making? Are they still the losers of integration, are 
there latecomers and slow adapters, or do we  witness a process of re-orienting institu-
tional capacities in order to perform as national and/or multi-level players? 
Empirical evidence about the real use of the EU system at the Brussels level points at an 
non-linear relation between the para-constitutional developments and the e xploitation of 
treaties.
2 We witness a dynamic process of treaty modification and change brought to 
the institutional and procedural set-up of the Union  - a regular pattern of remodelling 
                                                 
1   Wallace, Helen: ‘Politics and Policy in the EU:  The challenge of governance’, in: Wallace, H e-
len/Wallace, William (eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 3rd edition, Oxford 1996, p. 63. 
2   See Maurer/Wessels, 2001, op.cit.  
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institutions, procedures and competencies.
1 A closer look also indicates that new treaty 
provisions have been used across the board. The increasing role of the European Par-
liament confirms the expectation of a dual legitimacy of European decision-making and 
the execution of sectoral authority in  the name of the citizenry. The creation of COSAC 
in 1989 and its formal recognition by the Amsterdam Treaty, the instalment of n ational 
parliament liaison officers within the buildings of the European Parliament and the a m-
plification of meetings between corresponding committees of both the national parlia-
ments and the European Parliament indicate a possible trend towards an embryonic kind 
of multi-level parliamentarism.  
We thus need to explore whether the EU induce needs for parliamentary adaptation and 
further institutional calibration on the national level? Do new or modified policy areas, 
altered instruments and reformed institutions mobilise the national actors and lead to a 
specific adaptation? In the following chapters we will scrutinise the roles and behaviour 
of national parliaments. Given the features and the dynamics of the EC/EU evolution, 
we expect to find generally discernible trends in the ways how parliaments react and 
adapt to the challenges of the EC/EU. We are curious in how we will witness conver-
gent patterns and variation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   In the words of the Report of Richard von Weizäcker, Jean-Luc Dehaene and David Simon to the 
European Commission on ‘the institutional implications of enlargement’: ‘The present (1999) situa-
tion is typical: the treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1st, and, on June 4th, the Cologne 
European Council called for a new intergovernmental conference”. See this report of 18th October 
1999, p. 12. 77  
The Federal Parliament of Belgium: Between Wishes, Rules and Practice 
 
Claire Vandevivere 
 
I. Introduction: Political Culture and Societal Background 
 
1. Belgian Interests and Views in EU Affairs 
 
Belgium had convincing reasons to get fully committed to European integration. After 
the compulsory neutrality commanded by the European powers from 1830 until 1914 
and the unsuccessful neutrality policy decided in 1936, Belgium saw in Atlantic and 
European multilateralism a  better way to guarantee peace and exert more influence on 
international affairs. Moreover, Belgium's economic interests, as a little economic e n-
tity, also headed in the direction of European integration. Although at the beginning 
there was a slight tension between the concept of sovereignty and the European Com-
munity, the idea that what is good for Europe is good for Belgium was largely accepted 
in the national political arena. This is why Belgium has always defended the idea of a 
federal Europe. 
Political parties in general are in favour of a federal Europe but are more critical on its 
actual developments. The EU should be more democratic, more social and more effi-
cient. That is the reason why the Green party has voted against the Treaty of Amster-
dam and t he federal Parliament has adopted a resolution to back up the Belgian Gov-
ernment in its proposal for institutional reforms. Social-Christians, Socialists and Liber-
als voted in favour of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Green party against it. Volksunie 
(People Union), a party for Flemish autonomy, and the Vlaams Blok, separatist and 
extreme-right, voted against it as well. 
Public opinion has moved in the same way. From a general permissive consensus the 
attitude of the population has become more fragmented depending on policy issues. 
Two major events have put Europe on the agenda: the bankruptcy of the Clabecq forges 
and the closing of the Renault-Vilvorde firm. Europe became the scapegoat for 
strengthening the  - perceived  - underdeveloped social policy. The Maastricht criteria 
have been perceived as synonym of restrictions but have nevertheless been accepted. 
However, from 1980 to 1996, people who thought that belonging to the Union is a good 
thing have become a minority according to Eurobarometer. 
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2. The Institutional Framework - The Nature of Federalism and Decentralisation  
 
The major Belgian institutional feature that influences Belgian European policy is its 
federal structure completed after the Treaty of Maastricht. The specificity of Belgian 
federalism l ies in the coexistence of two different kinds of constituent units: regions and 
communities. There are three regions
1 created essentially as a response to aspirations of 
socio-economic autonomy and there are also three communities predicted by aspirations 
of cultural autonomy.
2  
Those constituent units have been more and more involved in the EC decision-making 
process, at the beginning with regard to the preparation of EC decisions, and since the 
Maastricht Treaty, with regard even to decision-making resulting from the change of 
article 146 ECT. The EC Council is no more strictly formed by members of the national 
Government, but it is composed of representatives of each member state at 'ministerial 
level', entitled to make decisions for the Government of that member state. This frame-
work explains why regional and Community parliamentary assemblies are also involved 
in European Community affairs , though to a lesser e xtent than the federal assemblies, 
which we will focus on.
3 
Despite the constitutional feature that entitles the king to manage international relations, 
the nature and the growing scope of European law required a closer parliamentary asso-
ciation to European affairs. The parliamentary assemblies, mainly the federal Parlia-
ment and to a lesser extent  the regional and Community Councils, have consequently 
striven to strengthen their control over European integration.  
For example, since April 1985, within the Chamber of Representatives, there has been 
an Advisory Committee on European Questions. In March 1990 the Senate set up in its 
turn an Advisory Committee on European Questions. The two Committees have oper-
ated an ad hoc fusion to become the Federal Advisory Committee on European Ques-
tions. It is composed of ten deputies, ten senators and ten Belgian members of the Euro-
pean Parliament. The main tasks of this Committee are to i nform the Parliament on 
Community Affairs and to control Government actions at the European level as regards 
to the preparation and the implementation of Community law. Reports a nd non-binding 
recommendations follow. 
Some federated Councils have set up similar Committees but their members do not meet 
very often, leaving the place for traditional parliamentary scrutiny and a minimal role in 
transposition of EC directives. 
                                                 
1   The Walloon Region, the Flemish Region and the Brussels-Capital Region. 
2   The French Community, the Flemish Community and the German Community. 
3   To have a global view on the role of regional or Community Councils in European affairs, see C. 
Vandevivere: ‘Le rôle des assemblées parlementaires’, in: La participation de la Belgique à 
l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre du droit européen. Aspects organisationnels et procéduraux (Y. 
Lejeune, ed.), Brussels: Bruylant 1999, pp. 289-346.  
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These initiatives accurately reflect the reactions of most national parliaments in the face 
of what is called the ‘European Democratic Deficit’. They have had however only little 
influence on the Belgian Administration. 
Legal provisions have been adopted since the last Belgian State reform in 1993, the year 
when the Maastricht treaty entered into force. Article 168.6 of the Constitution provides 
that 
“the Chambers shall be informed of any revisions to the treaties instituting the European 
Communities, or to the treaties and acts amending or supplementing them, as of the moment 
that the negotiations concerned are opened. They shall be fully aware of the draft Treaty be-
fore its signature.”  
Article 16.2 of the Special Act on Institutional Reforms gives the regional and Commu-
nity Councils the same prerogative. 
For secondary law, the Special Act on Institutional Reforms comprises also a section 
dealing with the “[i]nformation of the Chambers and the Councils on the proposals for 
acts with a normative character of the Commission of the European Communities”. 
Article 92quater provides that 
“as soon as they are sent to the Council of the European Communities, the proposals for 
regulations or directives and, if necessary, other acts with a normative character of the 
Commission of the European Communities are communicated to the federal legislative 
Chambers and to the regional or Community Councils, depending on the subject matter.” 
The attempt to control to some extent those proposals is a very sporadic practice in the 
Councils. However, there is a specific procedure in the federal Parliament. Indeed the 
Federal Advisory Committee on European Questions regularly examines the weekly list 
of European Commission’s proposals and chooses proposals that should be dealt with as 
a priority for scrutiny.  
Those efforts to exert this control in the preparatory phase of the EU’s policy c ycle 
come from the understanding that Belgian deputies had lost control on European Affairs 
even with regard to the implementation of European rules. Most o f the implementation 
acts are carried out by executive orders and laws for transposition and do not give rise 
to important changes.  
 
II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EC/EU Affairs 
 
1. The Nature of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The n ature of parliamentary scrutiny is very well summarised in a text by the Secretariat 
of the Federal Advisory Committee on European Questions:
  Accordingly, the very task 
of parliamentary scrutiny is to 
“développer une procédure parlementaire permettant de remédier […] au déficit démoc-
ratique européen. […] Les parlements nationaux ont donc un rôle à jouer en ce qui concerne  
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le contrôle ex ante de la prise de décision au niveau européen, même s'ils ne peuvent jamais 
exercer leur contrôle que sur leur propre gouvernement, c'est-à-dire sur un seul des quinze 
membres que compte le Conseil des ministres européens.”  
On the other hand, the task is not to  
“lier le Gouvernement belge par un mandat de négociations ou d'imposer une ‘réserve par-
lementaire’ qui l’empêcherait de prendre position au sein du Conseil avant que le Parlement 
n'ait eu l'occasion de se prononcer.”
 1 
The alleged democratic deficit from the Belgian parliamentary point of view is the fol-
lowing: The transfer of competencies from member states to the  European U nion has 
not been on a par with the transfer of parliamentary control to the European Parliament 
(EP). National parliamentary intervention is therefore necessary to compensate the defi-
cit but not in the way of taking direct action in the European decision-making process. 
Whether this intervention should be secondary and temporarily or permanent is still an 
unanswered question in Belgium. Except for Constitutional a ffairs, some parliamentary 
circles argue that the federal Parliament should not intervene anymore once the EP is an 
equal partner to the Council regarding legislative powers. 
There is no way however to instruct the Government for negotiations and impose a ‘par-
liamentary reserve’  - like in Denmark  - that would prevent the Government from taking 
a position within the Council before the federal Parliament gives its opinion. 
Besides, Belgian MP’s have understood progressively and in parallel to the transfer of 
competencies that there was only one way to influence the decision-making process: 
getting involved in the making of the European law. Parliamentary intervention should 
be consequently re-oriented from implementation to preparation of Community policies. 
This could only be possible through the control of Belgian Government's action in the 
Council of the European Union. 
This control takes place in different places at the federal level. First of all, any member 
of parliament (MP) can formulate written or oral questions on European matters in the 
commissions or in the plenary session. Although only the Chamber of Representatives 
executes political control vis-à-vis the Government since the Constitutional reform of 
1993, those questions hardly endanger the existence of the Government. The latter i n-
forms and listens to the Parliament, takes notice of the claims but is not subject to i m-
perative agency when negotiating. 
The federal Advisory Committee on European questions is commissioned to stimulate 
and foster parliamentary control on European decision-making, upwards and down-
wards . It keeps an o verview on European affairs and takes initiatives that permanent 
commissions do not have time or the reflex to take. It gives advisory opinions, carries 
out initiative reports and adopts resolutions transmitted to the plenary session. The 
                                                 
1   ‘Examen des propositions d’actes normatifs et d’autres documents de la Commission européenne’, 
Senate, Brussels, 4 April 2000.  
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meetings take place once or twice a month. The Committe is backed up by a Secretariat 
related to the Chamber and the Senate that comprises two full-time and one half-time 
official. 
The Advisory Committee focuses its work on: 
-  Co-ordination of European dimension in the Parliament 
-  European institutional affairs, 
-  important European debates (enlargement, European Councils), and 
-  general documents (annual legislative program, green or white papers, communi-
cations of the Commission).
1 
Permanent commissions focus their activities on legislative work by elaborating, 
amending and voting bills that are afterwards transmitted to the plenary session for 
adoption. It is their duty to undertake legislative work to transpose directives. The Gov-
ernment generally initiates those bills. As De C roo notes, permanent commissions are 
competent for technical and specific politics implemented by the European Union. Dif-
ferent resolutions of the Parliament recommended pro-active participation of the com-
missions, though without significant success, as we will see hereafter.  
The relations between the Parliament and the Federal Administration are rather limited, 
at least compared to countries like the United Kingdom where officials carry out reports 
on European affairs for Westminster. This is due to the administrative culture of discre-
tion. Belgian Administration considers that it is the minister’s duty to answer and be 
accountable in front of the Parliament. The administration is not involved in politics. 
One of the important features in Belgium about the scrutiny of European affairs is the 
participation of Belgian Euro-deputies in the Advisory Committee. At the b eginning of 
the European integration process, those Euro-deputies where keen on attending Belgian 
parliamentary meetings to have a say. Nowadays  they rarely participate since they have 
the right of co-decision at the European level. 
 
                                                 
1   De Croo, Herré/Hans, Federal Advisory Committee on European Questions: ‘Note d’information’ 
sur l’ ‘Examen des propositions d’actes normatifs et d’autres documents de la Commission euro-
péenne’, February 2000 : ‘Force est de constater qu’il est devenu impossible pour le Comité d’avis 
d’examiner chaque document de la Commission ou de contrôler chaque domaine de la politique de 
l’UE. Il a plutôt un rôle de coordination et il se limitera donc aux aspects institutionnels (la Confé-
rence intergouvernementale), aux grands débats européens (l’élargissement, les Conseils européens) 
et aux documents qui revêtent un caractère général (programme législatif annuel, livres verts, livres 
blancs, communications de la Commission). Dans cet ordre d’idées, les documents techniques et les 
politiques spécifiques mises en œuvre par l’UE relèvent de  la compétence des commissions perma-
nentes.’  
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2. The Scope of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
2.1 Parliamentary Intervention during Intergovernmental Conferences  
 
MP’s have their say in the elaboration of European primary law. With the new A rticle 
168 of the Constitution, participation of the Chambers is divided in two phases: before 
and after signing a Treaty. However, under the leadership of the Advisory Committee, 
the Parliament had not waited for the reform to get involved and informed by the Gov-
ernment. 
In the first phase, the Parliament gets ‘informed’ as soon as negotiations start. This 
phase goes beyond information: it is the beginning of an exchange of views b etween 
Parliament and Government for the time of the w hole Intergovernmental Conference. 
An exchange of views, written and oral questions, hearings, memoranda, resolutions, 
and recommendations are the means that describe the role of the Parliament: informa-
tion and communication of its opinion. The unique parliamentary ‘weapon’ should be 
tabling a motion of censure in the Chamber of the Representatives. 
An exchange of views with the Government  - the Prime Minister, the Minister for For-
eign Affairs or a representative  - may start during the preparatory phase, as it was the 
case with the Westendorp Group for the Treaty of Amsterdam. Those meetings find 
their climax just before and after the meeting of the European Council where all the 
topics of the agenda are discussed. It is normally part of the functions of the Advisory 
Committee to organise those meetings, most of the time with the participation of the 
commissions concerned with the agenda  - like the Commission for International Rela-
tions or the Commission for Economic affairs  - in the Chamber of Representatives and 
the Senate.  
Hearings may be organised, as it was to a large degree the case for the Treaty of A m-
sterdam that had a rather open agenda, contrary to the IGC 2000. A memorandum is 
supposed to guide the action of the Government in the course of the negotiations. Rec-
ommendations and resolutions are more concise but have a political scope as well. 
There is no question of any agency, any obligation or constraint. Deputies can also ask 
short formal questions, written or oral during the plenary session or more detailed ones 
concerning specific matters. For Amsterdam, the Government for instance had to a n-
swer in detail about questions on the equality of men and women, the social dimension 
and closer co-operation. 
The role of the Parliament just before the signature of a Treaty is even less limited as 
the text is not supposed to change anymore. Communications of transitional texts of the 
Presidency on the contrary are more useful to the deputies. 
The second phase starts after the signature of a draft Treaty. The assent of the federal 
Parliament is given by a law. As mentioned in the introduction, the regional and com-
munity councils have to do the same with a legislative decree as their competencies are 
touched by the European Treaties and their reforms. It is a key moment within this  
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process similar to a great debate during which each political party exposes its position 
about the reform and the European integration in general. The Parliament is confronted 
with a dilemma: it has to adopt or reject the entire Treaty. Rejecting the Treaty means 
also rejecting any progress but adopting it means the approval ofunsatisfactory provi-
sions as well.  
The real scope of the consent lies more in the threat (though very unlikely) of non-
consent that the Government has to take into account. For sensitive matters, the Belgian 
Government knows how far it can go and makes compromises. This is the case (in Bel-
gium) for subsidiarity (important for the regions and communities), the use of languages 
(very important for the Flemish Community), culture, asylum rights.  
 
2.2 Parliamentary Scrutiny on EC Secondary Law 
 
Following Article 92quater of the Special Act on Institutional Reforms and the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the Advisory Committee has between 1996 and 1999 experienced a new 
procedure t o scrutinise “proposals for acts with a normative character of the (European) 
Commission”. The Committee monthly selects draft proposals, which the European 
Commission has transmitted to the Council and the European Parliament. The criteria 
for selection a re the political, economic or social impacts and the significance of the 
draft proposal for Belgium. Selection by political parties is dealt with in priority. In 
practice, two to three topics can be chosen. Parliamentary assistants often take the 
initiative. After the selection, the Secretariat (under the responsibility of a deputy) 
began to elaborate a technical sheet for each selected document. It included information 
on the content of the document and possible consequences for Belgium. There was then 
a d iscussion in the Advisory Committee to decide the work to be undertaken for each 
document. The Committee had different possibilities related to the relevance of the 
matter:  -  the procedure could either be brought to an end or subject to later scrutiny, 
-  the d ossier could be dealt by a permanent commission (which have hardly never 
taken time to study the matter because they are overloaded), 
-  a report on the subject could be elaborated by collecting information and organis-
ing hearings and could lead to a resolution. 
From January 1996 to April 1999, 136 documents have been selected from a total of 
around 2000 incoming drafts from the European Commission. The following list classi-
fies the issues of all of them.  
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Table 3: Issues of Technical Sheets in the Belgian Parliament
1 
Period 
 
Number of 
technical 
Sheets 
No further 
inquiry 
Latter 
scrutiny 
Transmission 
to a permanent 
commission 
Request for 
information 
to the Govern-
ment 
Initiative 
report 
Jan - June 96  9  4  1  1  2  1 
July - Sept 96  9  4  -  2  2  1 
Oct - Nov 96  6  3  1  2  -  - 
Dec. 96  7  4  -  1  1  1 
Jan 97  6  3  -  3  -  - 
Feb - March 97  14  7  -  7  -  - 
April - May 97  8  1  1  4  -  2 
June - July 97  7  5  -  1  -  1 
Aug - Sept 97  7  1  -  6  -  - 
Oct - Nov 97  8  3  -  5  -  - 
Dec 97- Jan 98  10  3  -  6  -  1 
Feb - March 98  10  3  -  7  -  - 
April - May 98  9  4  -  4  1  - 
June 98  8  3  -  5  -  - 
July - Sept 98  10  4  -  5  -  1 
Oct - Dec 98  8  3  -  5  -  - 
Total  136  55  3  64  6  8 
 
Given the lack of interest of deputies and senators in intensive scrutiny of EC/EU pro-
posals, the procedure had become  ‘administrative’. Hence Permanent Committees have 
never used the important work of the Advisory Committee. Most of the time, no further 
scrutiny was considered as relevant. The technical sheets collected in a parliamentary 
document were a source of information for all the deputies anyway who could use them 
for ‘classic’ control through questions and interpellations.  
When the work of the Advisory Committee led to a resolution - like it was the case with 
the directive on chocolate
2  - the Government took notice but was not obliged to follow 
the parliamentary guidelines.  
Some adaptation of the scrutiny procedure consequently entered into force in the year 
2000.
3 
As far as implementation of European law is concerned, the federal Parliament has two 
functions: it acts as the lawgiver and as the body controlling the Government. Most of 
the measures to transpose directives do not require important legislative participation of 
                                                 
1   Source : ‘Tableau récapitulatif du nombre de fiches techniques établies suite à l’examen des proposi-
tions d’actes normatifs et d’autres documents de la Commission européenne par le Comité d’avis fé-
déral chargé des questions européennes’. Information given by the Secretariat of the Comité d’avis 
fédéral chargé des questions européennes, Chambre des représentants et Sénat de Belgique.  
2   Rapport de Nelis Van Liedekerke concernant la proposition de directive de la Commission euro-
péenne relative aux produits dérivés de cacao et de chocolat, Document parlementaire, Chambre des 
représentants, session 1997-1998, n° 1581/1. The Parliament supported in its resolution the position 
of the Government that defended Belgium chocolate.  
3   See infra, part IV : ‘Federal Parliament and federated Councils after Amsterdam’.  
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the Parliament. The room of manoeuvre for amending a text is narrow. Directives are 
usually precise and the initiative for implementation comes from the Government. 
The control is exercised in different ways. First, there is the duty of the Government to 
present an annual report on the implementation of the European Treaties to the Parlia-
ment. S ince 1958, the Government has complied five times with that duty despite regu-
lar demands from deputies. In September 2000, the Minister for Foreign Affairs com-
mitted himself to present the annual report. 
The Parliament itself can also carries out reports o n the implementation of European 
law  - especially on delay in Belgium  -, problems and procedures, implementation on 
specific areas (like the internal market). Resolutions addressed to the Government can 
follow without any constraint however. Annual reports of the European Commission, 
quarterly reports from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and media coverage on Euro-
pean issues are occasions to call upon the Government. Eventually, control is also car-
ried out by classical parliamentary techniques like written and oral questions either on 
specific issues or on the general delay of transposition in Belgium. 
 
3. Evaluation: A Limited Control 
 
In order to get an idea of the work carried out by the Advisory Committee from the 
1993-1994 legislative year to the 1996-1997 one, there were: 
-  eight reports on COSAC activities, 
-  one report on the implementation of Community law and another on implementa-
tion of Schengen Agreement, 
-  three reports and one memorandum on 1996 IGC, 
-  seven reports on the examination of European Commission’s proposals, 
-  one report on children’s rights in the European Union, 
-  one report on the partnership between the European Union and Mediterranean 
countries, and 
-  one report on the control of financial flows between the EU and Belgium.  
Most of these reports were followed by resolutions addressed to the Government. 
However, if the parliamentary work is important and positively appreciated by the A d-
visory Committee, the results are rather tiny . Parliament exerts a punctual control but it 
is not able to follow in a systematic way the whole European decision-making process.
1 
                                                 
1   That is the reason why the new procedure for the control of European legislative emphasises the 
importance of the examination of the agenda of the Council of the Union: La nouvelle procédure ini-
tiée en janvier 2000 ‘ne concerne qu’un premier contrôle à la source. Il est également important 
d’assurer le contrôle parlementaire tout au long du processus décisionnel et dans la phase 
d’exécution. Dès lors, l’ordre du jour de chaque Conseil des ministres de l’Union européenne est dif-
fusé à tous les membres du Comité d’avis et les présidents de commissions reçoivent l’ordre du jour 
des Conseils qui les concernent’ : (Senate, Document, 4th April 2000, op.cit.).  
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Many factors contribute to this situation: the relative consensus on European a ffairs in 
Belgium, the already loaded agenda of deputies regarding internal affairs, the lack of 
“European r eflex”, the complexity of European legislation, the feeling of lacking power 
on European matters and the weak electoral feedbackon European affairs.  
As a conclusion, one could say that the Parliament exerts a limited function of control. 
This is a general evolution in the Belgian political system and for European questions in 
particular. Belgian Parliament and legislative Councils are not part of the European 
decision-making process and do not want to be part of it. There is no imperative agency 
or mandate to assign to the Government. The MP’s can only try to influence and control 
their Government which again is only one among fifteen. As far as implementation of 
European legislation is concerned, it is very difficult to examine the added value of par-
liamentary work but it is often the occasion for deputies to get aware of European mat-
ters and ask questions after the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat.
1 
 
III. The Belgian Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
In its memorandum for the 1996 IGC addressed to the federal Parliament
2, the Govern-
ment stated that more democratic legitimacy was directly linked to the i ncrease of the 
role of the European Parliament. The Government did not share the opinion of other 
partners that “legitimacy lies in the national parliaments, in the Council of Ministers or 
in the European Council”
3. According to the Belgian Gorvernment the work of the EP 
should be improved in different ways: 
-  simplification and limitation of the procedures: co-decision, consultation and a s-
sent, 
-  generalisation of co-decision to all the cases subject to qualified majority in the 
Council of Ministers, 
-  elimination of unanimity where co-decision exists, 
-  the assent procedure that has been multiplied with Maastricht should be avoided 
(in legislative  matters) because it is inadequate. Approval of the revision of the 
European Treaties is an exception.  
Besides, 
                                                 
1   The opinion of the Conseil d’État is sought when the signing of the introductory order requires no 
further formality or consultation. The laws on the Conseil d’État (co-ordinated on 12 January 1973) 
do not provide for any special system for consulting this body on the bills for the transposition of di-
rectives. 
2   Note de politique du Gouvernement au Parlement concernant la Conférence intergouvernementale de 
1996, Document parlementaire, Chambre des représentants, session 1995-1996, No. 146/1 and Se-
nate, No. 129/1. 
3   Ibid., p. 24.  
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“the Government estimates that one should carefully examine if one should not apply the 
principle of generalised co-decision to budgetary procedure, replacing the distinction be-
tween obligatory and non-obligatory expenditures(…) The role of the EP in the definition 
of guidelines concerning the economic activity has to be examined.”
1 
Those examples show how far the Government fosters the EP. It is much more cautious 
about the role of national parliaments. In its memorandum, the Government wished to 
hear the opinion of the Parliament regarding the reinforcement of n ational parliaments. 
It only made a few statements: 
-  National parliaments already exert some influence in the European decision-
making process, among others by the control of their respective ministers within 
the Council. The Advisory Committee is mentioned as an example to be followed 
in other states, 
-  the renunciation of sovereignty concerns parliaments as well as governments and 
do not ipso facto lead to a deficit neither to bad control, 
-  an increased association of national parliaments is a question of internal organisa-
tion in each member state and not a question of supplementary structures at the 
European level. 
To conclude, the memorandum mentioned that the Government would ensure that d e-
mocratic control via the EP would be reinforced, which was the best way to fight the 
democratic deficit. 
Given the general point of view of the Federal Parliament’s majority on the democratic 
deficit,
2 one can understand the objectives of the provisions on national parliaments and 
the European Parliament in the memorandum on the 1996 IGC of the federal Parlia-
ment.
3 As a guideline, the memorandum explained that the way of working of the Euro-
pean Union was still characterised by a democratic deficit on two levels: 
-  the functioning of the European institutions themselves, 
-  the relations between the EU on the one hand, and the member states and their 
populations on the other hand. 
Democracy therefore had to be improved. There were no antinomy positions b etween 
the Government and the Parliament but different sensitivities and accents. In the pre-
paratory work of the federal Parliament to adopt its own memorandum, the parliamen-
tary report
1 gave interesting nuances and information on the discussion among MP’s on 
the role of national parliaments. The report mentioned indeed that the Advisory Com-
mittee wished the role of the national parliaments to be recognised but nevertheless not 
                                                 
1   Ibid., p. 25. 
2   See supra, part II, ‘The nature of parliamentary scrutiny’. 
3   Mémorandum sur la conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, Document parlementaire, Sénat, 
session 1995-1996, No. 140/10 and Document parlementaire, Chambre des représentants, session 
1995-1996, No. 190/5.  
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in the Treaty. This role would be strictly limited to activity of national ministers within 
the Council. A direct participation via representation within the institutional framework 
of the EU in a second Chamber was not proposed. 
In general, the Committee refused to make any proposal that would endanger the posi-
tion of the EP. Note that the amendment on the designation of a certain number of 
members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) by national parliaments or the participa-
tion of MP’s to national Delegations within the Council, as well as the amendment on 
the entitlement for national parliaments to a right of initiative in European legislative 
matters to protest against projects of European regulation that should be contrary to vital 
interests or subsidiarity had been refused. 
In its memorandum, the Parliament explained that national parliaments were the holders 
of national sovereignty and should therefore be recognised. The intervention of national 
parliaments in the legislative procedure had however to be limited to the communica-
tion to its Government of its position on proposals discussed in the Council. If a second 
Chamber was not desirable, “contacts between the EP and national parliaments should 
continue to be developed according to existing modalities as the COSAC”
2. 
Moreover the Parliament suggested to democratise the European decision-making proc-
ess by: 
-  co-decision to all legislative matters including justice and home affairs, 
-  elimination of unanimity where co-decision exists, 
-  assent of the EP extended to the revision of Treaties as well as all international 
conventions, 
-  better control of the EP in Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
-  simplification of budgetary procedure, 
-  extended right of legislative initiative, 
-  extended role in the hearings of Commissioners.  
The memorandum of the Parliament advocated the acknowledgment of competencies of 
the national parliaments, “especially of their function of control of national ministers 
within the European Councils of Ministers, among other intergovernmental a spects”. 
The ratio under this statement was that those matters do not benefit from the EP’s effec-
tive control. 
Concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EP should acquire a right 
of control “without endangering however the efficiency of the monitored policy”
3. 
Strengthening of CFSP induced also that the EP, in collaboration with the national par-
                                                                                                                                               
1   Rapport complémentaire fait au nom de la délégation du Sénat au sein du Comité d’avis fédéral 
chargé de questions européennes par M. Hatry, Document parlementaire, Sénat, session 1995-1996, 
No. 140/3. 
2   Mémorandum sur la conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, op.cit., p. 13. 
3   Ibid. p. 10.  
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liaments, could exercise a democratic control on the decisions of the European Council 
and the functioning of the European defence structure.  
In the memorandum of the Government, the role of the EP was only mentioned, con-
trary to the European Commission. In fact, parliamentary assemblies were totally absent 
of the executive memorandum in the height pages dedicated to e xternal relations and 
defence.
1 Concerning the Third Pillar, the Parliament advocated co-decision to all legis-
lative matters including justice and home affairs. In its memorandum adopted by the 
Senate
2 (which was slightly different from the final memorandum adopted by the 
Chamber of Representatives), there were more detailed provisions on the subject matter. 
According to the memorandum, EC-like procedures should be the rule. The EP had to 
obtain co-decision. According to the Parliament the lack of transparency and complex-
ity that characterise both the elaboration and the content of the Third Pillar increase the 
existing democratic deficit. Moreover, the absence of systematic information of national 
parliaments on discussions under way at the European level could constitute one of  the 
causes of current paralysis of European integration in the Third Pillar. Regular informa-
tion of the Belgian Parliament on all the debates in progress in European institutions, 
via an institutional reform, like the system of «réserve parlementaire» applied among 
others in the Netherlands and in France. The agenda of the meetings at the European 
level and related documents had to be transmitted on time to the Belgian Government, 
which in turn gave the information to the Parliament without delay. 
The Senate’s memorandum explained afterwards that it was not clear enough how cur-
rent European co-operation in justice and home affairs took place and to what results it 
led. There was no system of access to texts elaborated within the framework of the 
Third Pillar.  
After many questions on the way of working of the Third Pillar, the Senate declared that 
transfer of competencies on the subject had to be carried out very cautiously because 
“justice (was) an essential part of a democratic legal state”
3. Any transfer of competen-
cies in this matter had to be linked to the respect of the Rule of Law and to the imple-
mentation of a serious democratic control, which had to be both political and juridical. 
In addition, the Senate formulated proposals for better ex-ante control: “to ameliorate 
political control, it (was) necessary that the Parliament (was) more closely associated to 
the preparation of European decision”
4. More concretely, before each European Summit 
dealing with justice and home affairs, a previous debate had t o be organised, with the 
view of a likely report. More generally, governments should care for giving to the n a-
                                                 
1   Note de politique du gouvernement au Parlement concernant la Conférence intergouvernementale de 
1996, op.cit., pp. 16-23: ‘Une Union dotée d’une seule voix et d’un poids décisif dans le monde’ and 
‘une politique de défense européenne commune’. 
2   Mémorandum sur la conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, Senate, op.cit., pp. 10-13. 
3   Ibid. 
4   Ibid.  
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tional parliament enough information on questions debated in the European arena and 
they should report on the matter.  
Faithful to its political g uidelines, the Senate expressed its views that the EP should also 
have a control complementary to the one exercised by the national parliaments. More-
over, both sides of parliaments should establish co-operation and exchanges of informa-
tion. 
Did the Senate  forget that a procedure of scrutiny was established when consenting to 
the Schengen Agreement? Hence, the Government was already supposed to carry out 
information duties vis-à-vis the Parliament. Those provisions have not been carried out 
successfully. Negligence of the Government was one part of the reason. Parliament 
could have been more proactive as well. The question is: Is it useful to add provisions 
for the control of the Parliament if current ones are not properly applied yet? 
In the part of its IGC  memorandum dedicated to “a Union of Law and Security”
1, the 
Belgian Government did not leave a single word on national parliaments, while 
advocating Community methods and the role of the EP: “All the possibilities to apply 
Community method have to be used.
2” It was in particular the case for matters linked to 
Community competencies, namely asylum and visas’ policies (linked to the free circula-
tion of persons), customs co-operation and fight against drugs (linked to the free circu-
lation of goods).  
More efficient methods inspired with the Community methods should be applied to the 
left-overs (of the third pillar) which meant among others “intensifying the role of the EP 
(certainly when the Council took decisions of a legislative nature and/or adopts deci-
sions by qualified majority)”. 
As we noted before, there is a general consensus in Belgium on a pro-European position 
except for the extremist right-wing party Vlaams Blok and the party for more Flemish 
autonomy, Volskunie.  
Vlaams Blok is a racist party advocating a “Flemish Nation”. The European U nion is 
seen as an undemocratic, illegitimate and centralist power. The Europe of N ations is 
their objective. They pay much attention to the power of the Flemish Community and 
the Flemish Council in the European Union. The Committee of the Regions is conse-
quently more essential than COSAC for instance. During the debate in the Chamber of 
Representatives about the IGC memorandum of the Government
3, Mr. Lowie, member 
of the Vlaams Blok, was very critical. He explained that the Advisory Committee for 
European questions was a purely consultative organ that did not play any role in the 
European decision-making process. National parliaments were powerless as well as 
                                                 
1   Note de politique du gouvernement au Parlement concernant la Conférence intergouvernementale de 
1996, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 
2   Ibid., p.15. 
3   Analytical Report, Chambre des représentants, session 1995-1996, No. 45, 26th March 1996, pp. 
1031-1052.  
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members of the Advisory Committee. Europe had to respect the identity of all its citi-
zens, the genuine principle of subsidiarity and sovereignty. Flanders had to be fully 
integrated in the EU within a confederate framework. Volksunie is less e xtremist, more 
legalist, but nevertheless points out the necessary accentuated power for national par-
liaments (especially regional and Community Councils in Belgium) in the European 
Union that should not tie nations. Although regions and communities have acquired a 
decisive role in European affairs in federal Belgium, the centralist evolution of the 
European Union is bothering. During the same debate, Mr. Borginon, member of Volk-
sunie, pointed out that there was no democratic control. The European Commission did 
not justify itself in front of the EP, he explained. It was a “politburo”
1. This situation 
could not go on like this, he said. The European Council d eliberated secretly. The EP 
did not have the “Government-making power”
2. Volksunie would like a Commission 
politically accountable. The party, according to him, was also in f avour of two real par-
liamentary Chambers: the EP and the Committee of the Regions. 
 
IV. The Federal Parliament and the Federated Councils after Amsterdam 
 
Many MP’s did not expect much for national parliaments and COSAC. The report of 
the Advisory Committee
3 devoted to the appreciation of Amsterdam paid surprisingly 
not very much on those institutional aspects. It mentioned that the involvement of n a-
tional parliaments was already present in a Maastricht declaration. The Amsterdam Pro-
tocol just specified information modalities for national parliaments but left again to the 
member states total Constitutional liberty to implement the provisions. There was no 
judgment in this declaration of the report but just a remark in total conformity with Bel-
gian Parliament’s vision. The report reminded that the federal Parliament was testing a 
procedure to examine proposals coming from the Commission and that an evaluation 
would have to be done. It ended its paragraph with a question: “Do we pay enough at-
tention to European affairs?”
4 The report seemed to express more preoccupations of the 
internal procedure to control European legislation than new likely possibilities offered 
by Amsterdam to deepen it. This was not a coincidence, as we will see. 
The report emphasised the more direct role of COSAC thanks to the Amsterdam Treaty 
in matters that touched closely the citizens and that did not enough benefit from a d e-
mocratic control: liberty, security and justice, “matters that (had) a direct incidence on 
                                                 
1   Ibid., p. 1038. 
2   Ibid. 
3   Document parlementaire, Chambre des r eprésentants, session 1997-1998, No. 1573/1 and Senate, 
No. 1001/1. 
4   Ibid., p. 45.  
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rights and duties of individuals, questions related to fundamental rights”
1. The EP had 
indeed not recovered all the powers lost by national parliaments, the report explained.  
In the part of the report especially devoted to institutions  - and not citizens  - n ational 
parliaments  were not even mentioned. Instead, democracy, the report said, had been 
improved thanks to the EP, among others: “The EP is confirmed in its function of the 
legitimate representative of European citizens and sees its legislative role appreciably 
reinforced.”
2.Further in the report: “against all odds”, the EP was surprisingly the win-
ner in the IGC. Although it did not have general co-decision powers, the procedure had 
been extended to existing matters or new ones; that would allow the EP to make citi-
zens’ voice heard, citizens that it more largely represents. 
 
1. No Immediate Interest in the New Role Given by Amsterdam to COSAC  
 
Belgian federalist views about European integration and debates in the Parliament dur-
ing the 1996 IGC explain and show clearly that there was no real demand on important 
increase of powers for COSAC (see above). Accordingly, the Parliament did not take 
the initiative in making any proposal in that matter. For i nstance, new matters like a new 
IGC before enlargement or the work of the Convention to establish a Charter of funda-
mental rights attracted much more attention.  
The composition of the Belgian Delegation of COSAC has always been based on pro-
portional representation of the political forces in the Parliament. This proportion is con-
sequently the same in the Advisory Committee. At each COSAC, there is a political 
balance considering the last Belgian COSAC Delegations. If the composition has 
changed, it derives from the results of the Belgian elections in 1999 and not from the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The French-speaking Greens for i nstance, at the opposite of Social-
Christian, had made a major political breakthrough. The French-speaking Social-
Christian party had to give up its full membership in the Advisory Committee to the 
French-speaking Greens that had previously an observatory status.  
As a general rule indeed, the Belgian Parliament did not wait for European provisions in 
Maastricht and Amsterdam to start closer parliamentary scrutiny. The e xamination of 
parliamentary documents shows clearly that matter of facts.  
The question of the democratic deficit is not a new one.
3 Hence, the institution of the 
Advisory Committee for European questions in the Chamber of Representatives in 1985 
could be considered as a corner stone. The deficit question has continued however to 
preoccupy MP’s as regards the implementation of European legislation but also, as r e-
gards the ex-ante process (see introduction). In 1990 the Chamber initiated a bill relat-
                                                 
1   Ibid., p. 45. 
2   Ibid., p. 4. 
3   For a historic evaluation based on parliamentary documents and activities, see Vandevivere 1997, 
op.cit., pp. 291-299.  
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ing to the implementation and execution of European Community Law in the domestic 
legal order.
1 Besides executive duties in the implementation phase, the bill r equired that 
the Government had to inform the Parliament of all proposals for acts with a normative 
character of the Commission of the European Communities.  
This proposal has been “telescoped” by the fourth Belgian state reform in 1993. A c-
cording to Article 92quater of the Special Act for Institutional Reforms:  
“ […] the proposals for regulations or directives and […] other acts with a normative char-
acter of the Commission of the European Communities are communicated to the federal 
legislative Chambers and to the regional or Community Councils […].”
2  
Those provisions are inspired by the above mentioned bill and coincide with the Decla-
ration annexed to  the European Union Treaty on the role of the national parliaments in 
the EU. 
In parallel to those processes, on 9 July 1993 the Chamber of Representatives voted a 
resolution relative to a reinforcement of the control of the national parliaments on the 
European process of decision-making.
3 The rapporteur of the resolution e xplained
4 that 
Declaration N° 13 did not bring anything new concerning the transmission of legislative 
proposals of the Commission; the Parliament got those proposals from the Official 
Journal of the European Communities! The second corner stone of deputies’ attempts to 
control ex-ante European Law lied in point 9 of the resolution: it should be examined  
“in which conditions and with what (financial and staff) means it would be possible to carry 
out a systematic analysis of the proposals for acts with a normative character of the Euro-
pean Communities.” 
The 1993 resolution has appeared to be the starting block for the ex-ante parliamentary 
scrutiny of European legislation
5. In the regular reports on European legislation, three 
legal references were systematically mentioned: 
-  The Belgian Special Act of 5 May 1993 on international relations, 
-  the Parliament resolution on 9 July 1993 relative to the control of national parlia-
ments, 
-  the Declaration No.13 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The experiment of ex-ante control was foreseen for the legislature starting in 1995. An 
evaluation was undertaken in 1999, independently of the Amsterdam Treaty that entered 
into force the same year. However, in the Parliament document explaining the new ver-
                                                 
1   Document parlementaire, Chambre des représentants, session 1989-1990, No. 1230/1. 
2   See introduction. 
3   Document parlementaire, Chambre des représentants, session 1992-1993, No. 1032/1. 
4   Document parlementaire, Chambre des représentants, session 1992-1993, No. 1032/2. 
5   See supra, part II: The way and scope of parliamentary scrutiny.  
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sion of control
1, declaration No. 13 was replaced by the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol on 
the role of the national parliaments. 
The entering into force of the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty coincided with the 
implementation of the two reforms of the Belgian parliamentary scrutiny on European 
affairs. However, we can just point out that European provisions on the role of national 
parliaments back and legitimate Belgian initiatives that are already in the pipeline. 
In the n ew scrutiny version carried out in 2000, it was officially confirmed that it b e-
longs to the three officials from the Secretariat (Chamber and Senate) of the Advisory 
Committee to choose and elaborate “information sheets”. As it is described in an inter-
nal  parliamentary document
2, they make proposals for further parliamentary work for 
each topic. Fewer topics are to be chosen (three instead of five) but the selection is car-
ried out twice a month on the basis of the documents published by the Commission dur-
ing former weeks. The information sheets and the proposals for further action are then 
transmitted to the members of the Advisory Committee. They have one week to pick up 
other proposals from the Commission’s list or to propose other issues for the topic that 
the Secretariat has to take into account. Otherwise, further action is pursued as proposed 
by the Secretariat: likely later scrutiny (no further action at that moment), transmission 
to permanent commissions, exam by the Advisory Committee. 
Twice a year,  the Advisory Committee makes a report with all the information sheets 
and the activities that follow.
3  
                                                 
1   Senate, Document, 4 April 2000, op.cit. 
2   Senate, Document, 4 April 2000, op.cit.: ‘Deux fois par mois, le secrétariat du Comité d’avis établit 
une liste qui comprend tous les nouveaux documents publiés par la Commission pendant les semai-
nes précédentes. Sur base de cette liste, le secrétariat sélectionne les documents qu’il estime impor-
tants. Il prépare pour chaque document ainsi sélectionné une fiche (avec des informations sur le 
contenu du document, éventuellement les conséquences pour la Belgique), assortie d’une proposition 
de conclusion (pas de suite, envoi à la commission compétente, examen par le Comité d’avis). Deux 
fois par mois, les membres du Comité d’avis reçoivent un document qui comprend les fiches et les 
propositions de conclusions établies par le secrétariat ainsi que la liste complète des documents pu-
bliés par la Commission. Les membres du Comité d’avis disposent d’une semaine pour communi-
quer au secrétariat leurs observations sur la sélection et/ou les conclusions proposées. Au cas d’une 
réaction d’un membre, un document est ajouté à la première sélection (et une fiche assortie d’une 
conclusion sera établie par le secrétariat) et/ou une conclusion proposée est adaptée. Les conclusions 
adoptées seront exécutées (envoi d’un document par le Président du Comité d’avis au(x) Président(s) 
de commission(s); examen d’un document par le Comité d’avis). Deux fois par an, les sélections 
mensuelles du Comité d’avis, les fiches, les conclusions et la suite qui leur a été donnée seront pu-
bliés dans un document parlementaire.’ 
3   The topics chosen are very diversified as the selection for parliamentary scrutiny of the Advisory 
Committee for January 2000 shows: Employment and work conditions; Tobacco: manufacture, pre-
sentation and sale of products; Immigration policy: Third-country nationals, right to family 
reunification;Guidelines for employment policy of the Member States in 2000; Food safety: action 
plan, European food Authority; F inancial sector: information with third countries; Training, 
education: teaching and learning, towards the learning society; Common agricultural policy and 
environment. Source : Federal Advisory Committee on European Questions: ‘Examen des 
propositions d’actes normatifs et d’autres documents de la Commission européenne’, 3.-28.1.2000.   
 
95
Permanent commissions designate also “Euro-promoters” responsible to foster the 
European dimension in their commissions as well as members of the Advisory Commit-
tee. They have to ensure that their commission follows topics considered as important 
by the Advisory Committee. The Euro-promoters have also to ensure the examination of 
the agenda of the Council of the European Union and the COREPER (in their respective 
matters). This last activity was already subject to a provision of the rules of procedure 
of the Chamber of Representatives. The Euro-promoters have one month to make a 
report on the activities of their commissions on European topics. The Senate d oes not 
use the system of Euro-promoters, so that it is the duty of the permanent commissions’ 
presidents to keep the Euro-dimension in mind. The actual President of the Senate, A. 
De Decker, pays much attention to this European awareness. 
The action of the Euro-promoters and the new version of scrutiny procedure following 
the evaluation in 1999 started in 2000. The changes in the Advisory Committee did not 
require an increase of meetings as it is essentially a written procedure. The frequency 
remains around once to twice a month depending on the European agenda. 
 
 
2. The Legal Obligation to Inform the Chambers and Councils
1 
 
It is worthwhile to mention how legal obligations are translated in practice. Since the 
1999 Belgian elections, the Parliament (via the Secretariat of the Advisory Committee) 
has not received any documents of the European Commission by the Government. R e-
gional and Community Councils has nearly never. However, the Advisory Committee 
has not urged for that for different reasons: 
-  the staff  in the cabinet of the federal Government has changed as well as the offi-
cials of the administration dealing with European affairs in the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs (‘P11 Service’), 
-  the documents anyway used to be sent too late as regard, 
-  the rather efficient parliamentary procedure of the Advisory Committee. The S e-
cretariat can easily obtain COM documents on the Internet. 
-  Most of the documents arrived without comments or explanations. If they did, it 
appeared not to be useful. 
As a consequence, the Advisory Committee used to take COM-documents published on 
weekly lists in the Official Journal of the European Communities. However, President 
De Croo asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs Louis Michel to add to the agenda of the 
Councils of the European Union comments and analytical reports of the meetings
2. In 
its answer on 8 September 2000, the Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that the 
                                                 
1   Article 92quarter of the Special Act on Institutional Reforms. 
2   Via two letters on 11 April 2000 and 31 July 2000.  
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request would ask more work for services already very overloaded and even more in the 
perspective of the Belgian Presidency (second half of 2001). Progressive measures are 
going to be carried out. Louis Michel proposed as a first step to concentrate on the work 
of the General Affairs Council of Ministers (under his responsability). That would i m-
ply an information sheet before and after the Council especially concentrated on the 
Belgian position. 
 
V. Conclusions:Maintaining the EU’s Multi-Level Momentum  
 
The Amsterdam Protocol on the role of the national parliaments and COSAC has not 
fundamentally changed the involvement o f Belgian Parliament in European affairs. U n-
easiness about lack of democracy was foreseen since the beginning. A first permanent 
commission for European affairs in the Chamber of Representatives tried to compensate 
the lack of control but failed. In 1985 a  second attempt succeeded with the establish-
ment of the Advisory Committee on European affairs within the Chamber of Represen-
tatives and in 1995 with the creation of the federal Advisory Committee. 
The results of parliamentary control on European affairs m ay appear to be amazing con-
sidering parliamentary documents. Concrete influence of the Parliament on European 
affairs is however very limited for many reasons, among others: 
-  Constitutional limits: it falls to the Government to negotiate in the Council of t he 
EU, without any agency from the Parliament. 
-  Ideological limits: the federal vision of the main political trends in Belgium sup-
poses a strong EP and no direct interference of national parliaments in the Euro-
pean decision-making process. The general consensus on European integration 
makes this situation easier. 
-  Technical limits: lack of time and expertise are major obstacles to systematic con-
trol of European legislation. 
For Belgium, COSAC is stuck between a minimum of efficiency and no further institu-
tional development that would endanger European integration and the EP in particular. 
Those fundamental factors have not changed with the Amsterdam Treaty. Parliamentary 
scrutiny was already under way before Amsterdam. An evaluation of the Advisory 
Committee w as under way independently of the Amsterdam process, which has not 
been a trigger for much more involvement. It is true however that Amsterdam, and be-
fore, Maastricht, back and legitimate the involvement of the Belgian Parliament and the 
role of the Advisory Committee. 
Comparison with the role of other national parliaments is not easy as we have to com-
pare not only the rules established by each country but, above all, the way they are i m-
plemented. The Belgian system features relevant mechanisms of control,  which are 
however not used sufficiently. MP’s mainly trust the European policy of the Govern-
ment; there is consequently no necessity to increase the legal participation of deputies.  
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Besides, there is no demand to be entitled to commission the Government. T his would 
considerably diminish the Government’s scope of action while negotiating. In this con-
text the six-week period is no major challenge in Belgium. Above all, the Belgian Par-
liament searches for EC documents itself. This proactive behaviour is absent in the r e-
gional and Community Councils where their respective Governments do not conform 
themselves with European and Belgian provisions; even if several parliamentary com-
plaints emerge here and there. 
Other national parliaments work more closely with their governments and/or admini-
strations. They even provide sometimes reports that allow the national parliaments to 
adopt a position. The question is: how far can national parliaments adopt a specific posi-
tion if all their information is based on governmental ones? The Belgian federal Parlia-
ment prefers to work more independently.  
For important debates in Belgium like the chocolate directive or the elaboration of a 
Charter of fundamental rights, the Advisory Committee for European affairs o rganised 
hearings  of associations and professors or major actors dealing with the challenges at 
stake. This system enables the Parliament to formulate its own opinion based on the 
different proposals by these actors. Is this way of working the pre-figuration of the new 
arbitration role of parliaments in an increasingly complex world? 
Indeed our western democracies have to deal with a major phenomenon: the more and 
more complex and transnational dimension of political, economical and social realities 
in a global environment.  In this regard, the Belgian Parliament faces the question of a 
multi-polar governance. Political decisions require scientific and technical expertise. 
Loci of decision-making are everywhere and more and more especially in remote and 
specialised circles that could be political, administrative, economical or civil. The future 
role of our parliaments has to take those evolutions into account. 
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The Danish Folketing and its European Affairs Committee: Strong Players 
in the National Policy Cycle  
 
Finn Laursen 
 
I. Introduction: The Political System and Culture of Denmark 
 
The Danish Parliament, the Folketing, has developed a rather unique system of control 
and legitimation of the Government’s EU policy. A Market Committee, since 1994 
called the European Affairs C ommittee, was established when Denmark decided to join 
the then existing EC in 1972.
1 This paper will outline the role of the European Affairs 
Committee in Danish EU policy-making. This role is in many ways stronger than that of 
similar Committees in other national parliaments in the EU. EU affairs are serious busi-
ness in the domestic politics of Denmark, and the Parliament has tried from the very 
beginning of Denmark’s EC membership to control the Government rather tightly. The 
Danes see that as a way of i ncreasing the democratic legitimacy of European integra-
tion. Indeed, when Europeans talk about a ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU the Danes tend 
to think of the role of national parliaments. 
On the other hand, the Danes have usually hesitated when it came to strengthening the 
European Parliament. That avenue to more democracy has been seen as ‘more Union’, 
something the sceptical Danes have not been enthusiastic about. Recently, however, the 
idea that the European Parliament (EP) could be an ally for Denmark  in the quest for 
more ‘progressive’ environmental, social and consumer protection policies has played a 
certain role. 
Denmark has been a Constitutional monarchy since 1849. Since 1901 the practice d e-
veloped that the King (or Queen) appoints a cabinet which does not have a m ajority in 
the Folketing against it. This kind of ‘negative’ parliamentarism was i ncluded in the 
current Constitution from 1953. There is no formal investiture. The King consults the 
party leaders and decides who is most likely to be able to form a government that will 
have the confidence of the Folketing. As long as a government is not met with a vote of 
no-confidence it can remain in office. But it can also call an election any time. 
Since 1953 Denmark has been unicameral. Denmark is also a unitary state, a lthough 
rather decentralised.
2 Lijphart has characterised Denmark as having weak judicial r e-
                                                 
1   Actually the Committee’s existence goes back to the first Danish application for membership in 
1961. 
2   See Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy, New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1999, p. 
189. Fiscal decentralisation in Denmark is higher than in some federal states. See Gallagher, Mi-
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view.
1 Indeed, apart from the Constitution there is no one above the Danish Folketing. 
Denmark is, however, a very corporatist state.
2 Interest groups actively take part in the 
preparation of EC legislation through 35 EC Special Committees established within the 
administration.
3 
Another important element of the Danish political system is the fact that there are usu-
ally several political parties represented in the Folketing. The party system is highly 
fragmented, or has been so at least since 1973. No single party has ever had a majority 
since the beginning of the 20
th century. Denmark therefore usually has coalition gov-
ernments, but these often not have the majority of votes in parliament. They are thus 
minority governments, which are obliged to build further coalitions to get legislation 
passed by the Parliament. Indeed, Denmark has only had one majority coalition gov-
ernment since Denmark joined the EC in 1973, i.e. the Government formed by Poul 
Nyrop Rasmussen in January 1993, which was a coalition of the S ocial Democratic 
Party, the Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre), the Center-Democrats and the Chris-
tian People’s Party. But at the elections in September 1994 the Christian People’s Party 
did not get the required two percent of the votes and Poul Nyrop Rasmussen’s second 
government was a minority government of the three remaining parties.
4 Later the Center 
Democrats dropped out, so the current government is a coalition between the Social 
Democrats and the Social Liberals. 
Among the political parties four are known as the ‘old’ parties. Three of them date back 
to the late 19
th century, i.e. the Liberal Party (Venstre), the Conservative Party and the 
Social Democratic Party. The Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) dates back to the 
beginning of the 20
th century. The latter has often formed governments with the Social 
Democrats, but also sometimes with the Liberals and Conservatives. Being in t his mid-
dle swing position has given the party influence out of proportion with its size. 
Fragmentation of the party system increased dramatically at the elections in 1973, the 
first election after accession, when representation in the Folketing increased f rom five to 
eleven parties.
5 The five parties represented in the Parliament before were the four so-
called old parties and the Socialist People’s Party. Of these only the Socialist People’s 
Party had officially been against membership, although the Social  Democrats and Social 
Liberals were internally split on the issue of membership. Two small anti-EC parties, 
                                                                                                                                               
chael/Laver, M ichael/ Mair, Peter: Representative Government in Modern Europe, 3rd ed. ,New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 2001, p. 167.  
1   See Lijphart, op.cit., p.226. 
2   Ibid., p. 177. 
3   More on this in Laursen, Finn: ‘Denmark: In Pursuit of Influence and Legitimacy’, in: Wessels, 
Wolfgang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds.): Fifteen into One?: The European Union and the 
Member States, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2001, forthcoming). 
4   See Arter, David: ‘The Folketing and Denmark’s ‘European Policy’: The Case of an ‘Authorising 
Assembly?’, in: Norton, Philip (ed.): National Parliaments and the European Union, London, Frank 
Cass, 1996, pp. 110-123, at p. 121.  
5   See Arter, op.cit., pp. 117-118.  
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which had been represented before, now entered the Parliament again, i.e. the Commu-
nists and the Justice Party. Also a new anti-EC party, the Left Socialists, got enough 
votes to enter the Parliament. The final two parties that entered the Parliament in 1973 
were the Center-Democrats, who had split from the Social Democrats six weeks before 
the election, and Glistrup’s Progressive Party. The Center-Democrats were - and remain 
- strongly pro-integration. The Progressive Party was elected on an anti-tax and anti-
bureaucracy platform.  
The current Folketing was elected on 11 March 1998. No less than ten parties got more 
votes than the two per cent threshold. Biggest was the Social Democratic Party with 36 
per cent of the vote, followed by the Liberal Party, which got 24 per cent of the vote. 
Then followed the Conservative Party with 8.9 per cent, the Socialist People’s Party 
with 7.5 per cent and the Danish People’s Party with 7.4 per cent. Further down the list 
were the Center-Democrats, the Social Liberal Party, the Red-Green Alliance (Unity 
List), the Christian People’s Party and the Progress Party (see Table 4).  
The current government is formed by the S ocial Democrats and the Social Liberals. 
Respectively they have 63 and seven seats. With a total of only 70 seats out of 179 it is 
clearly a minority government. On the left they have two parties which are rather inte-
gration-sceptical, i.e. the Socialist P eople’s Party and the Unity List (Red-Green Alli-
ance). Although the leading opposition parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, are pro-
integration, there are two parties on the right side that are anti-integration, i.e. the Dan-
ish People’s Party and the Progress Party. Given the scepticism of the Danish voters the 
old established parties have to be attentive to the anti-integration sentiment of the elec-
torate. 
For comparison Table 4 also includes the results of the election to the European Parlia-
ment on 10 June 1999. Two anti-integration groups, the June Movement and the Peo-
ple’s Movement against the EC Union, take part in EP elections. In 1999 they received 
more than 20 per cent of the votes and 25 per cent of the Danish seats in the EP. These 
two groups, however, do not take part in national elections.  
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Table 4: Parliamentary Representation of Danish Parties and Groups 
  Folketing election 
11 March 1998 
European Parliament 
election 
10 June 1999 
Seats won in the election and % of the total 
votes in Denmark 
 
Seats 
% 
of vote 
 
Seats 
% 
of vote 
Social Democrats 
Liberal Party 
Conservative Party 
Socialist People’s Party 
Danish People’s Party 
Center Democrats 
Social-Liberal Party 
Red-Green Alliance 
Christian People’s Party 
Progress Party 
June Movement 
People’s Movement against the EC Union 
 63 
 42 
 16 
 13 
 13 
  8 
  7 
  5 
  4 
  4 
  - 
 
  - 
36.0 
24.0 
8.9 
7.5 
7.4 
4.3 
3.9  
2.7 
2.5 
2.4 
 
 
 
 3 
 5 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 0 
 1 
 NP  
 0 
 0 
 3 
 
 1 
16.5 
23.4 
8.5 
7.1 
8.0 
3.5 
9.1 
 
2.0 
0.7 
10.1  
 
7.3 
Greenland* 
Faroe Islands* 
  2 
  2 
 
 
   
Total number of seats  179  16 
NP: did not participate. * Greenland and the Faroe Islands have home rule and are not members of the Euro-
pean Union. Source:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Political Parties in Denmark”, 
<http://www.um.dk/english/danmark/om_danmark/partier/>, and “The referendum in Denmark on 28 May 
1998 on the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty”, < http://www.um.dk/english/udenrigs-
politik/europa/vurderinguk> “Europa-Parlamentsvalget den 10. juni 1999”, <http://www.im.dk/evl1999/ev-
land.htm>. 
 
Denmark’s relationship to the EU is further complicated by the frequent use of refer-
enda in connection w ith major EU decisions. One could argue that Denmark has two 
political systems, representative democracy in respect to on-going legislation and direct 
democracy in connection with decisions affecting Denmark’s ‘constitutional’ relations 
with the EU. The use of referenda is first of all due to article 20 of the Danish Constitu-
tion which requires a 5/6
th majority in the Folketing to transfer competences to suprana-
tional institutions or a simple majority plus a confirming referendum. However, in 1972 
when a referendum was used to confirm Denmark’s accession to the EC the then Prime 
Minister Jens Otto Krag (Soc. Dem.) had decided beforehand that there would be a ref-
erendum even if there were to be a 5/6
th majority in the Folketing. The party was split 
on the issue, so Krag decided that the people would in any case have the last say. Later 
the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty have all been 
ratified after referenda. Indeed, in the case of the Maastricht Treaty a narrow majority 
first rejected the Treaty in 1992, only to accept it in 1993 after Denmark secured various 
special arrangements at the Edinburgh meeting of the European Council in December 
1992. These concerned the third phase of the EMU, defence policy, Justice and Home 
Affairs co-operation and citizenship of the Union. Due to the stipulation in the Amster-
dam Treaty that citizenship in the Union is a supplement to national citizenship and 
does not replace it, the latter Danish exemption is now an integral part of the Treaty.  
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According to promises by the politicians the remaining three exemptions can only be 
changed through referenda. Recently, on 28 September 2000, the Danish people voted 
‘no’ in a referendum about Danish participation in the Euro despite the advice of the 
Government and leading opposition parties, the Liberals and Conservatives as well as 
the Center-Democrats, to vote ‘yes’. 
Table 5: Danish Referenda on EC/EU Questions 
Date  Topic  Participation in %  Yes in %  No in % 
2 October 1972  Danish membership  90.1  63.3  36.7 
17 February 1986  Single European Act  75.8  56.2  43.8 
2 June 1992  The Maastricht Treaty  83.1  49.3  50.7 
18 May 1993  The Maastricht Treaty and 
The Edinburgh Agreement 
86.5  56.7  43.3 
28 May 1998  The Amsterdam Treaty  74.8  55.1  44.9 
28 September 2000   Adherence to the Euro  87.5  46.9  53.1 
Source: Branner, Hans/Kelstrup, Morton, ‘Denmark’s Policy towards Europe in a Historical and Theoretical 
Perspective’, in: Branner, Hans/Kelstrup, Morten (eds.), Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945, 
Odense University Press, 2000, p. 17, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 30 September 2000, 2nd section, p. 5. 
 
The political elite in Denmark faces a sceptical public. Opinion polls show that Danes 
support economic integration, but are sceptical of political integration. Prior to the 
Maastricht referendum in 1992, 69 per cent of the Danes supported abolition of trade 
barriers and 74 per cent supported the internal market, but only 38 per cent supported a 
common foreign policy, 30 per cent a common defence policy and 34 per cent a single 
currency.
1 The latest Eurobarometer shows that two thirds of the Danish electorate do 
not want the EU to gain more influence in their everyday lives. However, 53 per cent of 
the Danes believe that the EU is “a good thing”.
2 
Returning to the Parliament: Since the very beginning of Danish membership of the 
European Communities in 1973 the Folketing has exercised more control over European 
policy than any other national parliament in the EC/EU. A Market Relations Committee 
(markedsudvalg) was established to implement the Accession Act of 1972. According 
to article 6 of the Accession Act the Government was obliged to inform a Committee of 
the Folketing about EC decisions that were directly applicable in Denmark or required 
the action of the Folketing.
3 From the spring of 1973 a system developed which in real-
ity included the issuing of binding mandates to ministers negotiating within the Council 
of Ministers. This happened in r esponse to a political crisis. The minister of agriculture 
returned from Brussels with a negotiation result concerning agricultural prices that 
                                                 
1   See Laursen, Finn: ‘Denmark and the Ratification of the Maastricht  Treaty’, in: Laursen, 
Finn/Vanhoonacker, Sophie (eds.): The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 61-86. 
2   Reported in Jyllands-Posten, 27 October 2000. 
3   See Jensen, Jørgen Albæk: ‘Prior Parliamentary Consent to Danish EU Policies’, in: Smith, Eivind 
(ed.): National Parliaments as Cornerstones or European Integration, London: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 1996, pp. 39-48.  
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shocked the Folketing. When it further turned out that he could not explain the result the 
Liberals and Conservatives forced the Government to accept the mandate-giving proce-
dure in March 1973.
1  
The original name, the Market Committee, corresponded to the original concept of inte-
gration in Denmark. Integration was seen as a relatively limited economic matter. In 
1994 the Committee changed its name to the European Affairs Committee (Europaud-
valget) which, after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, seemed more appro-
priate, although it would have been more correct to call it the EU Committee since its 
remit is limited to the EU and not to all of Europe. 
 
II. Parliamentary Involvement in EC/EU Affairs 1993-1999
2 
 
Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty the Government has continued to 
seek a mandate for important matters falling under the EU’s First Pillar. For Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters the Government informs the European A f-
fairs Committee, but the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee is also informed about 
these matters. Similarly, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters are dealt with both by 
the European Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliament. 
Whenever a mandate for negotiation is needed it will have to be given by the European 
Affairs Committee, though.
3  
The European Affairs Committee has 17 members (and eleven deputies) chosen propor-
tionally among the parties represented in the Folketing. Politically the Committee thus 
mirrors the Chamber. In many ways it has become a kind of mini-parliament. Indeed, in 
a parliamentary debate in October 1974 the leader of the S ocial Democratic Party, 
Anker Jørgensen, referred to it as a minifolketing.
4 It plays a central role in accepting 
EU legislation in Denmark. This legislation  - regulations and directives  - is as binding 
as normal Danish legislation, but it does not go through the normal legislative process 
with three readings in the plenary of the Parliament and deliberations in specialised 
standing Committees in between. So a lthough the European Affairs Committee is one of 
24 standing Committees it has a special role. A special kind of ‘mini-parliamentarism’ 
                                                 
1   See Skou, Kaare R.: Folkestyret i arbejde, Forlaget Ventues 1995, p. 143. 
2   The first part of this section relies on Laursen, Finn: ‘Parliamentary Bodies Specializing in European 
Union Affairs: Denmark and the Europe Committee of the Folketing’ in: Laursen, Finn/Pappas, Spy-
ros A. (eds.): The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union, Maastricht, European Insti-
tute of Public Administration, 1995, pp. 43-54. 
3   See Nedergaard, Peter: Organiseringen af Den Europæiske Union, Århus, Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 
1994, p. 302; Information brochure from the secretariat of the European Affairs Committee: ‘The 
European Affairs Committee’, Copenhagen, October 1996, p. 10. 
4   Quoted in Jensen, Jens Albæk: Parlamentarismens statsretslige betydning: Det parlamentariske pri n-
cips betydning for forholdet mellem Folketing og regering, Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbun-
dets Forlag, 1997, p. 134.  
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has developed for EU policy-making in Denmark. Given party discipline in Denmark, 
and the fact the parties tend to send their more influential members to the European 
Affairs Committee, a government wanting to survive politically knows that it will have 
to listen to the Committee. 
 
Figure 4: Structure of the Danish EU-Policy-Making Process 
 
 
Source: Adapted from presentation by Hoffmeyer, Niels at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), 
Maastricht, June 1994, in: Pappas 1995, p. 14. 
 
The European Affairs Committee normally meets on Fridays. Ministers will a ppear 
before the Committee and present their proposals verbally. ”If there is no majority 
against the mandate, the Government negotiates on this basis.”
1 The practice is thus to 
apply the same kind of ‘negative’ parliamentarism as applies to the formation of gov-
ernments. Since 1973 the practice has developed that the chairman counts the votes 
represented by the members of the European Affairs Committee. It takes 90 votes or 
                                                 
1   Report of the Market Relations Committee on 29 March, 1973, English translation quoted from ‘The 
European Affairs Committee,’ Copenhagen, October 1996, p. 3. 
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more against to refuse a mandate for negotiation (i.e. more than half of the 179 mem-
bers of the Folketing).  
 
Table 6: Membership of the Danish European Affairs Committee on 2 October 2000 
Party  Number of members 
Social Democratic Party  5 
Liberal Party  4 
Conservative Party  3 
Socialist People’s Party  1 
Danish People’s Party  1 
Center Democrats  1 
Social Liberals  1 
Red-Green Alliance (Unity List)  1 
Total  17 
Source: Compiled by the author. List of current members can be downloaded from the 
homepage of the Danish parliament under <http://www.folketinget.dk>. 
 
The European Affairs Committee has extensive access to EC documents. Documents 
that touch on the security of other member states can be read in the office of the Chair-
man of the Committee. For this reason members have to accept an obligation of secrecy. 
The Government has the obligation to keep members i nformed about current proposals 
for EC legislation. The Committee can request a written orientation from the G overn-
ment about the negotiation situation related to any i ssue and it can request a meeting 
with the competent minister at any time.
1 
Usually two to four ministers come to a meeting, each going through ten to 20 points, 
including proposals on the agenda of the Council meetings in Brussels the following 
week. Ministers are accompanied by civil servants. The Prime Minister’s Office and the 
Foreign Ministry have civil servants present permanently.
2  
Apart from presenting the negotiation positions the Government also informs the Euro-
pean Affairs Committee about proposals under consideration. It is usually only during 
the last part of the legislative process in the EU that the Government presents a negotia-
tion position. At this point in the process the possibilities for influence are of course 
rather restricted. But the Committee does have the option of r equiring the Government 
to change its negotiation position even then. 
By starting the discussion in the European Affairs Committee as soon as the Commis-
sion starts considering proposals or puts forward its proposals the Government can try 
to be sure that it knows the feelings and attitudes of the parliamentarians. It is estimated 
that by the time a negotiation position is put forward, it is accepted in more than 90 per 
cent of the cases.
3  
                                                 
1   See Nedergaard, Organiseringen af Den Europæiske Union, 1st ed., pp. 305-306. 
2   See also Fich, Ove: ‘Markedsudvalget - dets styrke og svagheder,’ Udenrigs, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1993), 
pp. 63-64.  
3   See Nedergaard, Organiseringen af Den Europæiske Union, 1st ed., pp. 307 -308.   
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However, 
“it does not happen infrequently that the Government changes its original mandate for ne-
gotiation during the talks with the Committee - or at least adapts it to meet the points of 
view which are likely to attract a majority in the Committee.”  
The same source goes on to say that  
”the Danish civil servants who take part in the negotiations at an early stage - often before 
the Commission submits its proposal - take into consideration the fact that the Government 
shall at a  given hour have the result approved by the political forum constituted by the 
European Affairs Committee.”
1  
Put differently, anticipated reactions are important in the policy-making process. Civil 
servants try to anticipate reactions from the European Affairs Committee to protect the 
Government against political problems.  
It should be mentioned that the European Affairs Committee receives deputations as do 
other standing Committees of the Folketing. This gives interest organisations an addi-
tional access point to the policy-making system. 
The ‘No’ in the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992 led to a dis-
cussion about transparency in the EU. This discussion also affected the Danish system 
to some extent. In a report of 19 March 1993 it was decided to have a press briefing 
after each meeting of the Committee. At this briefing the Chairman of the Committee 
informs the press about the cases where the Government has had its negotiation position 
accepted, and normally also gives the main lines of that position. Information also i n-
cludes the cases where there is a majority against the Government position. Furthermore 
it includes information about the position taken by the political parties, whose represen-
tatives can take part in the press meeting a nd explain their positions. In cases where 
there is a decision about s ecrecy the Chairman will simply state that the Government 
has received a negotiation mandate but that it is confidential until a final decision has 
been made. When a final decision is made the stances taken by the different parties to 
the negotiation mandate are made public.
2  
Meetings of the European Affairs Committee still take place behind closed doors. 
Shorthand minutes have been taken since 1984, but they only go to the Chairman and 
one representative of each party represented. 
The lack of openness of the meetings of the European Affairs Committee has been regu-
larly criticised, especially by the Socialist People’s Party. Another type of criticism has 
come from the other side of the political spectrum, with the Progress Party saying that 
the Committee is the only parliamentary control of hundreds of changes in Danish law, 
which cannot even be changed later by the Folketing. 
The Danish system has not answered the question whether EU policy is foreign or do-
mestic policy. A particular issue that rises from this tension is the question of which role 
                                                 
1   See ‘The European Affairs Committee’, October 1996, p. 4. 
2   See Laursen, 1994, op.cit., p. 76.  
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the specialist Committees (fagudvalg) of the Folketing should play. These Committees 
will usually have more technical expertise than the more ‘generalist’ European Affairs 
Committee. A first response to this problem was sharing of information. A practice was 
started whereby the agenda of the European Affairs Committee was sent to the chair-
men on the other standing Committees. In the case of the Environment and Regional 
Planning Committee a practice of systematically asking for an opinion on proposals for 
environmental legislation d eveloped in the 1980’s during the years of a ‘green’ majority 
of Social Democrats, Social Liberals and People’s Socialists under the Conservative-
Liberal Government of Poul Schlütter.
1 
In the report of 19 March 1993 it was also decided to draw in the specialist Committees 
to a greater extent. 
A report from the European Affairs Committee of 20 May 1994 continued this trend 
and sought further association of specialist Committees with the process of considering 
EU legislative matters.
2 A system of parallel information was put in place for new 
Commission proposals affecting the level of protection in Denmark in the areas of 
health, environment, labour market and consumer policy. According to the 1994 a r-
rangement, basic notes, prepared by the administration and outlining the implications of 
the proposal for Danish law, were to be sent concurrently to the European Affairs 
Committee and to one or several relevant specialist Committees as soon as possible 
after the Commission had put forward a new proposal. Similarly, information from the 
Foreign Ministry later in the process, including the topical notes, usually sent at least a 
week before the meeting of the European A ffairs Committee prior to the deciding 
Council meeting, would be forwarded to relevant specialist Committees. 
This system was evaluated two years later and some further changes were introduced by 
a report from the European Affairs Committee of 27 September 1996.
3 The 1996 a r-
rangement agreed between the Government and the European Affairs Committee e x-
tended the parallel information system to all new proposals for d irectives. Basic notes 
(grundnotater) are prepared for all new directives as well as Green and White Papers. 
Basic notes should be ready at the latest 10 weeks after the Commission proposal 
reaches the Council. A topical note (aktuel notat) is still due a week before the meeting 
of the European Affairs Committee  giving the minister a mandate. Basic notes and topi-
cal notes are all factual. They do not reveal the Government’s stand, which is only re-
vealed orally at the meeting giving the Government a mandate. 
                                                 
1   See Fich, 1993, op.cit., p. 66. 
2   See Ameline, Nicole: ‘Les Parlements et l’Europe: Les leçons de l’experience danoise’, Rapport 
d’information, No. 1437, Paris, Assemblée Nationale, Délégation pour l’Union européenne, 1994, p. 
22; text of report as appendix in: Laursen: ‘Parliamentary Bodies’.  
3   See Europaudvalget: ‘Beretning om Folketingets behandling af EU-sager’, Beretning nr. 6, 27 Sep-
tember 1996, Folketinget 1995-96.  
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95 per cent of the notes received by the European Affairs Committee are now accessible 
to the general public. 
The European Affairs Committee also decided to introduce public hearings in 1996. 
Hearings and ensuing readings can be conducted in co-operation with the specialist 
Committee in question.
1 
Concerning implementation the 1996 report mentioned the problem that much imple-
mentation of EU directives in Denmark takes place through administrative decrees 
(bekendtgørelser), i.e. not legislation. This is possible because basic legislation empow-
ers the Government to do so. The European Affairs Committee has been kept informed 
about implementation through short notes. There was now also a need to send these 
notes to the specialist Committees and the Government agreed to do this.  
The main purpose of the 1996 reform thus was to get information as early as possible 
and get it to the specialist Committees, too. It was not a radical reform. Indeed the re-
port had minority views which indicated some problems that still exist. The S ocialist 
People’s Party suggested that all C ommission proposals immediately should be dealt 
with by relevant specialist Committees. The Unity List and the Danish People’s Party 
went further and suggested that the Folketing should have a full public first reading of 
EU legislative acts in the plenary. Specialist Committees should be drawn informally 
and the meetings of the European Affairs Committee should be open.  
The Unity List (Red-Green Alliance) also criticised the arrangement concerning imple-
mentation whereby the specialist Committees are only  informed after the implementa-
tion has taken place. For directives where the Government had needed a negotiation 
mandate from the European Affairs Committee, it should be possible for a political 
party to demand that implementation be dealt with by the Parliament. Of 127 directives 
during the period 1994-95 only 27 resulted in laws adopted by the Parliament. No less 
than 141 administrative acts were issued to implement these directives. 
Two other changes have taken place recently. One concerns WTO matters and the other 
Schengen matters. According to a report of 14 March 1997 the Government will pro-
vide the European Affairs Committee with half-yearly reports on developments inside 
the WTO, especially developments that affect the Danish level of protection in h ealth, 
environment, labour market and consumer policy. The Government will also provide 
continuous information about the work in the WTO when important decisions of a po-
litical character are prepared. The European A ffairs Committee will be informed if the 
Commission needs a negotiation mandate for WTO negotiations. The same procedures 
as for normal EU cases will be followed.
2 
                                                 
1   See ‘The European Affairs Committee’, October 1996, p. 6. 
2   See Europaudvalget: ‘Beretning om Folketingets behandling af WTO-sager’, Beretning nr. 7, 14 
March 1997, Folketinget 1996-97.  
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Denmark’s decision to accede to the Schengen Convention was confirmed by the 
Folketing on 10 June 1997. On 27 November 1997 the Minister of Justice suggested a 
procedure for informing the European Affairs Committee and Legal A ffairs Committee 
prior to meetings in the Schengen Executive Committee. The procedure agreed with the 
Parliament includes first of all a commitment to send a note  concerning the points that 
are expected to be dealt with, as far as possible a week before the meeting of the Euro-
pean Affairs Committee that takes place prior to the meeting in the Schengen Executive 
Committee. At the meetings in the L egal Affairs Committee (usually Thursday) and 
European Affairs Committee (usually Friday) the Minister of Interior and/or Justice will 
make oral accounts of the essential cases according to the same procedures as for EU 
matters. After the meeting in the Executive Committee the Government will send a 
written account of the meeting to the two Committees.
1 This procedure for Schengen 
matters is comparable to the procedure already adopted for Pillar Three JHA co-
operation. Prior to Denmark’s accession to Schengen being fully ratified by the other 
parties to the Convention, however, the Government was not seeking a negotiation man-
date, since Denmark was only an observer. 
Before getting to the Parliament JHA cases have gone through the Preparatory Commit-
tee concerning Legal and Police Co-operation of civil servants (Forberedelsesudvalget 
vedr. Rets- og politisamarbejde), the Foreign and Security Committee of civil servants 
(Udenrigs- og Sikkerhedpolitisk Udvalg) and the Government’s Foreign Policy Com-
mittee (II) (Udenrigspolitisk Udvalg). 
2 
 
III. The Danish Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty
3 
 
Denmark went into the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations with certain ‘lessons’ from the 
problems of getting the Maastricht Treaty ratified. These ‘lessons’ led to an increased 
emphasis on policies that could make the whole integration process more legitimate. 
This led to more emphasis on environment, consumer protection, social and employ-
ment policy as well as openness and nearness. Indeed, the trauma from 1992 affected 
the way the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations were prepared in Denmark. 
Institutionally the Maastricht Treaty’s two new pillars had required some adaptations of 
the Danish policy-making system, involving the Foreign Affairs and L egal Affairs 
Committees of the Folketing i n CFSP and JHA matters respectively. Similarly there has 
                                                 
1   See Europaudvalget: ”Beretning om Folketingets behandling af Schengensager”, Beretning nr. 2, 7 
May 1998, Folketinget 1997-98 (2. samling). 
2   See Justitsministeriet, Civil- og Politiafdelingen, Det Internationale Kontor: ‘Notits’, 27 November 
1997. 
3   A more detailed treatment will be available in Laursen, Finn: ‘Denmark: The  Battle for a Better 
Treaty’, in: Laursen, Finn (ed.): The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference Formation, Interstate 
Bargaining and Outcome, Odense: Odense University Press 2001, forthcoming.  
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been an effort to involve the functionally specialised Committees in the Parliament ear-
lier and to a greater extent in First Pillar legislation. 
In connection with the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations a  special mechanism was estab-
lished for preparation of Danish policy. All interested ministries were represented in the 
‘EC Committee in special session’ (EF-udvalget i særlig samling) at the level of head of 
office (kontorchef) and chaired by the Head of t he Northern division in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Above this was the Summit Committee (Topmødeudvalget) in which 
all interested ministries were represented by the Head of Department (departe-
mentschef). The interesting thing was that this Committee w as chaired by the Head of 
Department from the Prime Minister’s Office, which meant a somewhat weakened posi-
tion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About half the ministers took part in the Gov-
ernment’s own Summit Committee (Regeringens topmødeudvalg).
1 All in all this meant 
a broader involvement compared with the 1991 IGC which negotiated the Maastricht 
Treaty. The purpose was to capture as many of the domestic implications as possible 
and avoid the problems of the Maastricht Treaty ratification. Prime Minister Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen’s personal interest may also help explain the greater involvement by the 
Prime Minister and his Office (Petersen, 1998). 
The Government’s interest in central control is clear. It wants to control the politically 
sensitive aspects of the EU decision-making process. Since even technical details, like 
which food additives are allowed or prohibited, can become political issues, getting 
input from experts and affected interests is important. An elaborate system of co-
ordination has been set up to assure these relevant inputs. The central role normally 
played by the Foreign Ministry can be explained by Denmark’s efforts to get as much 
influence in Brussels as possible. So there are both legitimacy and efficiency considera-
tions behind the established co-ordination mechanisms. 
The Government’s main priorities for the 1996 IGC were debated by the Folketing on 
12 December 1995. The Government first of all sought achievements concerning 
enlargement, employment, environment and openness. 
According to the Government the superior goal of the IGC was to create the basis for an 
enlargement of the EU with Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). This 
required certain changes, including institutional adaptations. It was important that an 
enlarged EU remains efficient, it was stated. 
The parliamentary debate finished with the adoption of a resolution (motiveret dagsor-
den) where the Parliament accepted the proposed priorities as basis for the IGC negotia-
tions. The Danish exemptions from 1993 could only be changed through a referendum. 
                                                 
1   Foreign Ministry: ‘Den danske beslutningsprocedure i EU-sager’, Copenhagen, August 1997 gives 
the following group of participants: Prime Minister (chairman), and Ministers of Economy, Finance, 
Foreign Affairs, Environment and Energy, Business and Industry, Justice, and Food, Agriculture and 
Fisheries.  
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The Parliament also expected to be informed continuously of the progress of the nego-
tiations.
1 
Denmark made seven formal proposals during the IGC. They dealt with employment, 
environment, openness, consumer protection, fraud, subsidiarity and national parlia-
ments, and the role of national parliaments in relation to co-operation on JHA.
2 
The Danish proposal on openness had four points: (1) Incorporation in the Treaty of the 
principle of openness, (2) incorporation in the Treaty of right of access to documents, 
(3) holding of open Council meetings when the Council deals with legislation for the 
first time as well as the last time and publication of voting results, and (4) publication of 
all proposals and adopted acts within JHA. 
The Danish proposal to the IGC concerning subsidiarity and the role of national parlia-
ments proposed a provision in the Treaty which would create the foundation for an 
agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on n a-
tional parliaments’ access to information on EU and Commission proposals. A declara-
tion should make the content of the agreement more precise. National parliaments 
should be heard more and be given longer time limits to respond to proposed legislation. 
The  agreement should include more systematic use of green and white papers with the 
objective of getting the views of national parliaments before important legislation is 
proposed (CONF/3982/96 of 13 November 1996). 
The Danish proposal concerning the role of n ational parliaments in relation to co-
operation on JHA was put forward late in the negotiations. It referred to the earlier Dan-
ish proposal on subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments and noted that the sec-
tion in the Irish Draft Treaty of December 1996 included a section that would 
strengthen the role of national parliaments. Denmark now said that “a number of special 
conditions apply to the role of national parliaments in relation to co-operation on justice 
and home affairs.” So, “in parallel with the development and strengthening of co-
operation on justice and home affairs … it is necessary to establish a better framework 
for the involvement of national parliaments to ensure the democratic supervision of 
cooperative efforts.” Referring to proposals from France and the UK, Denmark pro-
posed the establishment of a special Committee for JHA comprising representatives 
from national parliaments. This Committee should inter alia be kept informed of devel-
opments and be offered an opportunity to present its opinion on JHA proposals 
(CONF/3915/97 of 16 May 1997). In the end the thrust of the Danish proposals fared 
well at the IGC. 
                                                 
1   See Isaksen, Susanne/Toft, Ole/Bødtcher-Hansen, Jens: En traktat bliver til. Amsterdam-traktaten: 
Forberedelse, forhandling og resultat, Copenhagen: Schultz 1998, p. 32. 
2   Danish versions of the proposals were made available on the Foreign Ministry’s web site: 
www.um.dk. Six of them were also published in the brochure ‘Tæt på det åbne Europa” (Fo reign 
Ministry, March 1997). The seventh proposal on national parliaments and JHA co-peration was 
made in May 1997 (CONF/3915/97).  
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Concerning the role of national parliaments the Amsterdam Treaty includes the Protocol 
on National Parliaments in the European Union, which, along the lines of the Danish 
proposal, stipulated that “All Commission consultation documents (green and white 
papers and communications) shall be promptly forwarded to n ational parliaments of the 
Member states” and that “Commission proposals  for legislation … shall be made avail-
able in good time so that the Government of each Member State may ensure that its own 
national parliament receives them as appropriate.”
1 The Protocol also foresaw a six-
week period between proposals being made available in all official languages and the 
placing of the proposal on the Council agenda. In a second part the Protocol singled out 
the Conference of European Affairs Committess (COSAC), giving it the right to make 
“any contribution it deems appropriate”, and more specifically, to “examine any legisla-
tive proposal or initiative in relation to the establishment of an area of freedom, security 
and justice which might have a direct bearing on the rights and freedoms of individu-
als”. Instead of establishing a special  Committee as proposed by Denmark the IGC thus 
decided to assign a special role to the existing COSAC.  
Three members of the Danish Delegation to the IGC who wrote a book about the nego-
tiations afterwards do not go into these negotiations. They only conclude that the Dan-
ish wish to include national parliaments more was fulfilled by the Treaty.
2 
In an interview in May 1998 the then chairman of the European Affairs Committee 
Jacob Buksti saw a risk in making COSAC a body that can speak on behalf of the na-
tional parliaments. It will be difficult for the Committees to speak meaningfully on b e-
half of the Committees. And should COSAC become the place where national parlia-
ments are heard the real hearing of parliaments by national governments may suffer. 
But COSAC can play a role as a forum for exchange of opinions and dialogue between 
MP’s from national parliaments. Information about ‘best practice’ could lead to pres-
sure on governments to take to the spirit of the Amsterdam Protocol seriously.
3 
 
                                                 
1   Quoted from Duff, Andrew (ed.): The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary, London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1997, p. 302. 
2   See Isaksen, Susanne/Toft, Ole/Bodtcher-Hansen, Jens: En Traktat bliver til Amsterdam-traktaten: 
Forberedelse, forhandling og resultat Copenhagen: Schultz 1998, p. 164. 
3   See Nielsen, Stine Carsten: Europaudvalgets rolle i den danske EU-beslutningsproces. Thesis, De-
partment of Political Science, Copenhagen University, July 1998, pp. 95-96.  
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IV. The Folketing after Amsterdam  
 
In November 1998 the European Affairs Committee put forward a draft report concern-
ing greater openness in Danish EU decision-making.
1 The main proposals were to i n-
crease further the involvement of the specialised Committees of the Folketing at an 
early stage, to open some meetings of the European Affairs Committee to the public, 
and to invite Danish MEP’s to some meetings of the European Affairs Committee. 
According to press reports the Prime Minister decided after the Supreme Court case 
about the Maastricht Treaty to try to make the decision-making process more democ-
ratic. Some EU legislation concerning food additives, where the otherwise environ-
mental and consumer friendly EP did not ask for high levels of protection, had also i n-
spired the proposals. Getting the Parliament’s expertise involved early and creating a 
stronger link to the EP was seen as a way to improve EU legislation. Further it was ar-
gued that a public debate on important proposals should take place. The Government 
would be  asked to present such proposals to open meetings of the European Affairs 
Committee as soon as possible after the proposals are put forward by the Commission.
2 
The Amsterdam Treaty influenced thinking in Copenhagen in respect to the role of the 
Danish members of the EP. Because of the increased use of the co-decision procedure 
the role of the EP would increase. The Government therefore started regular meetings 
with the Danish MEP’s in the summer of 1998. The proposal from the European Affairs 
Committee would give MEP’s access to open meetings of the Committee in the future 
with a right to speak. These open meetings, however, would not take decisions. Deci-
sions, including mandates for negotiations to the Government, would still be taken in 
closed meetings. 
On  19 February 1999 the European Affairs Committee issued its report on greater 
openness in the Danish EU-decision-making process.
3 The Government had agreed to 
the parts that affected its involvement. The general lines of the draft proposal from No-
vember 1988 were confirmed. Since 1 March 1999, when the report entered into force, 
it has become possible to have open meetings in the European Affairs Committee i n-
cluding the presence of Danish MEP’s. MEP’s can also send proposals to the other 
standing Committees  of the Folketing, and the efforts to involve these specialised par-
liamentary Committees early in the process are reinforced.  
The integration of the Schengen acquis and the movement of some JHA matters to the 
First Pillar under the Amsterdam Treaty seems n ow to be starting to put pressure on the 
                                                 
1   See Folketingets Europaudvalg: ‘Udkast til beretning fra Europaudvalget om større åbenhed i den 
danske EU-beslutningsproces m.v.,’ Alm. del - bilag 225, 26. November 1998. 
2   See Bostrup. Jens/Andersen, Nina Vinther: ‘Folketinget vil tage magt fra regeringen’, in: Politiken, 
31 December 1998, p. 6. 
3   See  Folketinget, European Affairs Committee: ‘Beretning om større åbenhed i den danske EU -
beslutningsproces m.v.’, Beretning afgivet af Europaudvalget den 19. Februar 1999.  
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Danish system, but no institutional adaptation has taken place yet. The need for a new 
referendum to abolish the Danish JHA exemption has come up in the Danish debate, but 
initiatives in that direction have probably been postponed due to the ‘no’ in the Euro 
referendum in September 2000. 
 
V. Conclusions: Continuous Lesson Drawing from Maastricht  
 
Danish policy-makers have drawn certain lessons from the Maastricht debacle.
1 They 
tried actively to avoid a repetition o f the 1992 referendum by trying to influence the 
Amsterdam Treaty in certain directions while at the same time retaining the Danish 
exemptions from 1993.  
Domestically more openness and earlier debate in connection with the Amsterdam 
process was sought. Also, the Prime Minister played a very active role in the process. 
This led to some adaptations in the long established policy co-ordination system that 
usually allows Denmark to speak with one voice in Brussels. In general the Danish scru-
tiny system allows for a fair amount of democratic control of EU policy in Denmark.  
The European Affairs Committee has become an important actor in the making of Dan-
ish EU policy. 
The domestic politics of EU policy in Denmark has occasionally made Denmark a diffi-
cult partner in the EU. At the same time, however, the Danish system of co-ordination 
and parliamentary control has made Denmark good at implementing EU legislation. The 
early involvement of interest organisations and administrative agencies that have to 
implement legislation has made this part of the process a success story. And the man-
date-giving part of the process assures that post-decision political problems can usually 
be avoided even under minority governments. 
 
                                                 
1   See Laursen, Finn: ‘The Lessons of Maastricht’, in: Edwards, Geoffrey/Pijpers, Alfred (eds.): The 
Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond, London: 
Pinter 1997, pp. 59-73. 117  
The German Bundestag: From Benevolent ‘Weakness’ Towards Supportive 
Scrutiny 
 
Sven Hölscheidt 
 
I. The Constitutionalised Relevance of European Integration for the German Bundestag 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany, as one of the six founding members of the European 
Communities, is firmly anchored in the  European Union. Co-operation between the 
German Bundestag and the Federal Government in matters concerning the European 
Union is well established on a sound legal basis.  
 
1. European Integration and German Public Opinion 
 
Support for membership of the European Union and further European integration is 
uneven, however: the official political position is more positive than that of the public in 
general. The official political position is represented by the Federal Government, the 
Bundestag and its parliamentary groups, and the Bundesrat. These political players a l-
most invariably view European integration in positive terms, which is reflected in n u-
merous statements. If there is criticism this solely relates to individual aspects, but never 
to the principle of  European integration per se. In the Federal Republic, there is not a 
single significant political party or movement which can be described as fundamentally 
hostile to European integration. This was demonstrated by the debates in the Bundestag 
on the ratification of the Maastricht
1 and the Amsterdam
2 Treaty. 
If we look at the general public, on the other hand, a different picture emerges. Accord-
ing to surveys carried out by the European Commission,
3 on average, 49 per cent of 
Europeans regard their country’s membership of the EU as a “good thing”; 27 per cent 
think it is “neither good nor bad”, and 12 per cent see it as a “bad thing”. The surveys 
show that in the Federal Republic, 44 per cent of people regard their country’s member-
ship as a “good thing”, 32 per cent think it is “neither good nor bad”, and 11 per cent 
view it as a “bad thing”. German public opinion is therefore broadly in line with the EU 
average: slightly less than half the population views Germany’s EU membership in 
                                                 
1   For more detail, see Hölscheidt, Sven/Schotten, Thomas: Von Maastricht nach Karlsruhe, Rhein-
breitbach 1993, pp. 64 ff. 
2   For more detail, see Section III below. 
3   See European Commission, Eurobarometer/Public Opinion in the European Union, Report No. 51; 
Fieldwork: March-April 1999.  
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positive terms, one third is neutral, and more than one tenth is opposed to it. It is diffi-
cult to judge how realistic these findings are. However, figures on voter participation in 
the direct elections to the European Parliament suggest that the general public in the EU 
is actually more sceptical  - or at least more indifferent  - to European integration. In 
these elections, turnout has drastically declined since 1979: from a starting point of 62.5 
per cent, it dropped to 60.6 per cent in 1984, 58.5 per cent in 1989, and 56.8 per cent in 
1994, reaching an all-time low in 1999 with 52.8 per cent. In the Federal Republic, 
turnout fell by 20 per cent between 1979 (65.7 per cent) and 1999 (45.2 per cent). Yet at 
the last three Bundestag elections it was around 80 per cent.
1 In general, it seems that 
the German people support the European Union in principle, but also feel that they can-
not follow, or cannot understand, the processes in Europe.
2 
 
2. The Co-operation between the Bundestag and the Federal Government in Matters 
Concerning the European Union 
 
The treatment of European issues in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat was already in 
need of improvement when the Treaties of Rome were concluded. It could not keep 
pace with European integration and thus required radical reform. The legislative activity 
of the Council, i.e. the governments, was increasing. This gradual shift away from the 
parliaments reinforced the democratic deficit and therefore had to be counterbalanced. 
For this reason, two new articles relating specifically to the Bundestag were included in 
the Basic Law as part of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1992. 
Article 23 of the Basic Law now stipulates that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall 
participate in matters concerning the European Union. The second n ew provision is 
article 45 of the Basic Law. This states that the Bundestag shall appoint a Committee on 
the Affairs of the European Union, which it may authorize to exercise the rights of the 
Bundestag under Article 23 vis-à-vis the Federal Government. The Bundestag has thus 
acquired the capacity to respond rapidly on matters relating to Europe.
3 There is still no 
ministry with a specific European affairs portfolio within the Federal Government; a l-
though the establishment of a Ministry for Europe has been  under discussion for some 
time, there are no plans to set one up at present.  
In functional terms, the German Bundestag is the forum for the formation of the politi-
cal will of the Federal Republic of Germany. In practice, its work is dominated by its 
political and practical subdivisions, i.e. the parliamentary groups and the committees 
                                                 
1   See Hölscheidt, Sven: ‘Commentary on Article 190 ECT’, in: Grabitz, Eberhard/Hilf, Meinhard 
(Eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Munich 2000.  
2   See Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth/Petersen, Thomas: ‘Die Bürger in Deutschland’, in: Weidenfeld, 
Werner (ed.), Europa-Handbuch, Gütersloh 1999, pp. 585, 599.  
3   See Hölscheidt, Sven: ‘Der Unionsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages’, in: Das Parlament, 
12.9.1997.  
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respectively. The Bundestag can thus be defined as a parliamentary group/committee-
based Parliament. It is also a mixed Parliament, which performs its functions with the 
aid  of public and non-public debates. In this context, a distinction must be made b e-
tween its legislative, control, electoral and public functions. 
The Bundestag is part of Germany’s federal political system. Far from being “parlia-
mentary absolutism”, it leans towards a system of major coalitions. Germany invariably 
has coalition governments comprising at least two parliamentary groups. No govern-
ment supported by a single parliamentary group has succeeded in implementing its p o-
litical agenda. The Federal Chancellor is as the head of government elected by the 
Bundestag and must have Parliament’s confidence. The political direction taken by the 
executive and the majority of the legislature must therefore agree, at least in principle. It 
is also significant that the Bundesrat, as the second Chamber, also participates in 
legislation. In EU matters, which particularly affect the interests of the Länder, the 
Bundesrat has considerable rights of participation.
1 The leaning towards major 
coalitions is especially apparent at times when the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have 
different party-political majorities, which has been the case in around a third of the 
Federal Republic’s history. The Federal Constitutional Court’s strong position within 
the German constitutional system should also be underlined. The Court has handed 
down numerous decisions stipulating the legal conditions for European policy action, 
which are binding on the other constitutional bodies. 
 
II. The Treatment of European Affairs in the German Bundestag 
 
1. The Bundestag’s Participation in European Affairs as a ‘Democratic Necessity’ 
 
The German Bundestag’s participation in European Union affairs
2 derives from “de-
mocratic necessity”. The democratic principle is anchored explicitly in the Preamble of 
                                                 
1   See Article 23.4 of the Basic Law. 
2   On this point, see the very informative work by Kabel, Rudolf: ‘Die Mitwirkung des Deutschen 
Bundestages in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union’, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Gra-
bitz, Munich: Beck 1995, pp. 114 ff; Rath, Christian: ‘Die ‘unionswärtige G ewalt’ des Deutschen 
Bundestages’, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen (special volume), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 
1995, pp. 124 ff.; Weber-Panariello, Philipp A.: Nationale Parlamente in der Europäischen Union, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995, pp. 197 ff.; Schloten, Dieter/Bruckmann, Wolfgang: ‘Wie demokratie-
fähig ist die Europäische Union?’, in: Maurer, Andreas/Thiele, Burkhard (eds.): Legitimation der 
Europäischen Union, Marburg: Schüren 1996, pp. 39 ff.; Wieczorek, Norbert: ‘Mitwirkung des 
Deutschen Bundestages in der E uropäischen Union’, in: Waigel, Theo (ed.): Unsere Zukunft heißt 
Europa, Düsseldorf 1996, pp. 315 ff.; Kamann, Hans-Georg: Die Mitwirkung der Parlamente der 
Mitgliedstaaten an der europäischen Gesetzgebung, Frankfurt/Main 1997, pp. 67 ff.; Hölscheidt, 
Sven: ‘Mitwirkungsrechte des Deutschen Bundestages in Angelegenheiten der EU’, in: Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, No. B 28/2000, pp. 31 ff.  
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the Treaty on European Union.
1 It is of fundamental importance both for the European 
Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. This is reaffirmed not only by the Treaty 
on the European Union but also by the Basic Law and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court. The democratic principle must 
therefore be translated into practical policies. The President of the European Parliament 
summed this up neatly in his inaugural speech in 1994: “The European U nion does not 
need more p owers: it needs more parliamentary democracy”.
2 His words still hold good 
today.  
In a modern democracy, citizens can only exercise power with the help of elected repre-
sentatives who meet in parliamentary assemblies. Thus the issue of democratic stan-
dards  within any given polity is always linked with the issue of the parliaments’ influ-
ence. The European Union’s democratic standards can only be satisfactory if the Euro-
pean Parliament or the national parliaments - or both  - exert real influence over the for-
tunes of the European polity. The Federal Constitutional Court pronounced on these 
issues in its decision on the Maastricht Treaty:
3 In line with its self-perception as a u n-
ion of European nations, the EU is seen as an association of democratic states of which 
its dynamic development is an integral part. If this union of democratic states performs 
sovereign tasks through the exercise of sovereign authority, it is “first and foremost the 
citizens of the member states who must legitimise such action through a d emocratic 
process via their national parliaments. Thus democratic legitimisation is achieved by 
referring the activities of European bodies back to the parliaments of the member states 
[…]”.
4 Legitimisation of European politics through the European Parliament is merely 
assigned a supplementary role. The Federal Constitutional Court thus attributes the 
main role in the democratic legitimisation of the European Union to the national parlia-
ments  - i.e. the German Bundestag  - as long as the EU is a union of sovereign states. 
Accordingly, the German Bundestag must “be left with substantial tasks and author-
ity”.
5 The Court has thus led to a remarkable strengthening of the position of the Ger-
man Bundestag and the other member states’ parliaments, without ruling out the possi-
bility that the European Parliament will play a more significant role in future. The Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’s decision has substantially influenced the integration d ebate 
in the Federal Republic.
6 
 
                                                 
1   For a comprehensive discussion, see Kluth, Winfried: Die demokratische Legitimation der Europäis-
chen Union, Berlin: Duncker&Humbloth 1995. 
2   Speech by Klaus Hänsch MEP, Proceedings of the European Parliament, 20.7.1994, Official Journal, 
Appendix No. 4-449, p. 16. 
3   Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 89, p. 155 ff. 
4   Ibid., p. 155, 184 ff. 
5   Ibid., p. 155, 156. 
6  See Hölscheidt, Sven/Schotten, Thomas: ‘Demokratie in Europa nach der Maastricht-Entscheidung 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in: Verwaltungsrundschau, No. 5/6/1994, pp. 183-189.  
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2. Institutions and Instruments for the Treatment of EU Issues in the Bundestag 
 
2.1 The Legal Framework 
 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, prior to the entry into force of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the legal basis for the Bundestag’s participation in the European legislative 
process was provided by Article 2 of the law of ratification of the treaties establishing 
the EEC (European Economic Community) and EURATOM (European Atomic Energy 
Community).
1 This merely stipulated that the Federal Government is obliged “to notify 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on developments in the Council of the EEC and 
EURATOM on a continuous basis.” Moreover, “if a Council decision makes the enact-
ment of national legislation necessary or establishes law which is directly applicable in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, this notification should take place prior to the adop-
tion of a decision by the Council”.
2 At sub-legislative level, too, very few specific pro-
visions existed compared with the current, post-Maastricht situation.
3 In the long term, 
this handful of provisions and associated procedures proved inadequate in light of the 
growing importance of European legislation. 
The German Bundestag strengthened its position vis-à-vis the Federal Government by 
incorporating Article 23 and Article 45 on the Committee on the European U nion into 
the Basic Law as part of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
4 Article 23 
imposes an obligation on the Federal Government to provide information; it grants the 
Bundestag the right to state its position. Details of this constitutional obligation are 
regulated in the Act on Co-operation between the Federal Government and the German 
Bundestag in Matters concerning the European Union (EUZBBG).
5 These provisions 
have been defined more precisely by the executive in an Interministerial Agreement 
between the Federal Ministries.
6 On the Bundestag’s side, Sections 93 and 93a of the 
Rules of procedure of the German Bundestag apply. Overall, the legislation is very de-
tailed and poorly coordinated.
7 
                                                 
1  See Law of 27 July 1957 (Federal Law Gazette II, p. 753). 
2   For a comprehensive discussion of this point, see Oetting, Ulf: Bundestag und Bundesrat im Wil-
lensbildungsprozess der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Berlin, 1973. 
3   On this point, see Kabel, 1995, op.cit., p. 241, 248 ff.; Ferdinand, Horst: ‘EG-Vorlagen im Plenum’, 
in: Roll, Hans-Achim (Ed.), Plenarsitzungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Berlin, 1982, pp. 145, 157 
ff. 
4  See Federal Law Gazette 1992 I, p. 2086. 
5  See Federal Law Gazette 1993 I, p. 311. 
6  See Interministerial Agreement between the State Secretaries for Europe (the Federal Government 
departments responsible for European matters) on Section 3 ff. EUZBBG of 26.1.1994 as amended 
on 10.11.1995. Reprinted in Läufer, Thomas (Ed.), Vertrag von Amsterdam. Texte des EU-Vertrages 
und des EG-Vertrages mit den deutschen Begleitgesetzen, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag 1999, p. 372 
ff. In some cases, the practice diverges from the Interministerial Agreement.  
7  See Lang, Ruth: Die Mitwirkungsrechte des Bundesrates und des Bundestages in Angelegenheiten 
der Europäischen Union gemäß Artikel 23 Abs. 2 bis 7 GG, Berlin 1997, p. 378 f.   
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According to Article 23 of the Basic  Law, the Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, 
the Länder shall participate “in matters concerning the European U nion”. This is the key 
term for all issues relating to the key provision of the German Constitution.
1 The term is 
not restricted in the standard-setting text and should therefore be interpreted compre-
hensively in line with the purpose and objectives of the standard-setting provisions.
2 
What is guaranteed, “[…] in essence, is a comprehensive right ensuring active participa-
tion  - also in policy-making terms  - in the Federal Government’s European policy…”
3 
Matters concerning the European Union thus encompass not only EC directives and 
regulations, but also agreements between the Community and third countries (Article 
300 ECT) and measures and agreements adopted in respect of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (Article 
29 TEU), for example.
4 This interpretation of “matters concerning the European U nion” 
forms the basis of participation in practice. 
The Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, com-
prehensively and at the earliest possible time “of all initiatives launched within the 
framework of the European Union which could be of interest to the Federal Republic of 
Germany”.
5 This restrictive option in ordinary law contradicts the constitutional r e-
quirement for “comprehensive” information and plays little or no role in practice. The 
Federal Government  - including Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels  - 
must provide notification immediately, as soon as it receives relevant information, offi-
cially or informally.
6 Responsibility for many fundamental matters concerning the 
European Union, such as the revision of the treaties, lies with the Federal Foreign O f-
fice, which is therefore obliged to furnish information. The general obligation to pro-
vide information, i.e. the transmission of the day-to-day EC/EU items of the Council of 
Ministers to the Bundestag, is undertaken by the Federal Ministry of Finance. It has 
been entrusted with this task  - previously the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics - since the start of the 14
th electoral term in 1998. In addition, each Federal 
Ministry with specialised responsibility for the relevant EC/EU item  is obliged to sup-
ply the Bundestag with all the specific information it needs. Thus the Federal Ministry 
of Transport deals with items concerning transport policy, the Federal Ministry of S o-
cial Affairs handles social policy items, etc.  
                                                 
1  See Scholz, Rupert: ‘Commentary on Article 23’, in: Maunz, Theodor/Dürig, Günter (eds.), Grund-
gesetz, München: Beck 2000.  
2  See Rojahn, Ondalf: ‘Commentary on Article 23’, in: Von Münch, Ingo/Kunig, Philip (eds.), Grund-
gesetz-Kommentar, Vol. 2, 3rd edition, Munich: Beck 1995; Scholz, 2000, op.cit. Note 93. 
3  See Scholz, 2000, op.cit., Note 111. 
4   See Pernice, Ingolf: ‘Commentary on Article 23’, in: Dreier, Horst (ed.): Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 
Vol. II, Tübingen: Mohr 1998, Note 98. 
5   See Section 3 of the EUZBBG. 
6   See Pernice, 1998, op.cit., Note 102.  
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In particular, the Federal Government sends draft European directives and regulations to 
the Bundestag and informs the Bundestag at the same time about their substance and 
purpose, the procedure to be applied in enacting the planned legislation, and the time set 
for the Council to deliberate - and, to decide on - the item. It must inform the Bundestag 
without delay of the decisions it intends to take, the progress of deliberations, the opin-
ions and amendments of the European Parliament and the European Commission, the 
opinions of the other member states, and the decisions taken. However, the Federal 
Government retains its general competence with r egard to integration politics as such: it 
is not obliged to divulge full details of its internal opinion-forming process.
1 The Fed-
eral Government also provides regular information to the EU Committee about the cur-
rent situation regarding the adoption and implementation of European directives.  
Based on the information supplied by the Federal Government, the EU Committee S e-
cretariat prepares two lists. The first - as from 1 July 1996 - contains a catalogue of all 
the European directives adopted, as well as information about r equirements for their 
incorporation into national law, the Federal Ministry responsible for i ncorporation, and 
the details of its completion. The second list contains a catalogue of the European direc-
tives whose time limit for incorporation has been exceeded by more than six months. 
Both lists are updated twice a year. 
Both Article 23 of the Basic Law and the Co-operation Law (EUZBBG) state that be-
fore participating in legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal Government 
shall provide the Bundestag with an opportunity to state its opinion. In this context, the 
term “legislative acts” should be interpreted in the broad sense defined above. Under 
Section 5 of the EUZBBG, the period within which the opinion is to be stated shall be 
such that the Bundestag has sufficient opportunity to consider the item concerned: “The 
Federal Government shall take the position o f the Bundestag into account during the 
negotiations”.
2 According to the regulation in ordinary law, the Federal Government 
shall use the opinion “as a basis for its negotiations”;
3 however, this provision is not 
authoritative on account of its derogation  from the constitutional text.
4 These positions 
by the Bundestag can be classed as simple parliamentary decisions. They contain politi-
cal statements, which, however, are not legally binding on the Federal Government.
5 In 
the Federal Republic’s parliamentary system, the Federal Government takes account of 
the Bundestag’s position as a matter of course. The Government must consider and de-
bate the Bundestag’s position when forming its opinion, and must give reasons if it de-
viates - or wishes to deviate - from the position.
6 However, the right of decision remains 
                                                 
1   See Scholz, 2000, op.cit., Notes 112 and 115. 
2   See Article 23, § 3, sentence 2 of the Basic Law. 
3   See Section 5, sentence 3 of the EUZBBG. 
4   In individual cases, this is an extremely controversial issue; see, for example, Lang, p. 308 ff. 
5   Scholz, 2000, op.cit., Note 117. 
6   Ibid.; Pernice, 1998, op.cit., Note 105.  
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with the Federal Government; the Bundestag’s loss of legislative competence is merely 
mitigated slightly.
1 Theoretically and legally, the Bundestag can d etermine the Federal 
Government’s decision on the  basis of a formal mandatory law in line with its compe-
tencies arising from Article 73 of the Basic Law. However, this has no political rele-
vance in practice.
2 Nonetheless, it was considered as an option on one occasion: the 
Bundestag had debated whether an Article 1(a) should be included in the law to ratify 
the Maastricht Treaty  - as proposed by the Bundesrat - stating that the “consent” of the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat would be required in respect of the Federal Government’s 
vote on entry to the third s tage of monetary union (Article 121 ECT). Until its repeal, 
this regulation would have been legally binding on every government. Ultimately, how-
ever, this option was dismissed, also in order to avoid giving the i mpression that the 
Federal Republic - like D enmark and the United Kingdom  - wanted to reserve the right 
to “opt out” of the transition to the third stage of economic and monetary union. The 
Bundestag therefore did not bind the Federal Government in law, and merely stipulated 
that the transition to t he third stage should require a “vote in favour”, i.e. a simple par-
liamentary decision.
3  
 
2.2. The Appointment of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union 
 
The appointment of the Committee of the European Union is thus prescribed by the 
German C onstitution, along with the establishment of Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committees and a Petitions Committee. These committees thus have a guaranteed right 
to be appointed in every electoral term. The Bundestag may authorize the Committee on 
the Affairs o f the European Union to exercise the Bundestag’s rights under Article 23 
vis-à-vis the Federal Government. After false starts during the 12
th electoral term, the 
committee was finally set up - and the necessary amendments to the Rules of procedure
4 
agreed upon  - at the start of the 13
th electoral term in December 1994. Section 93 a of 
the Bundestag Rules of procedure contains more d etailed provisions concerning this 
committee. On 25 October 1995, in line with the Rules of procedure, the EU Committee 
drew up principles governing the treatment of EU items sent to it pursuant to Section 
93.
1 
 
                                                 
1   See Lang, 1997, op.cit., pp. 330 f. and 371 f. 
2   See Scholz, 2000, op.cit., Note 118. 
3   See Hölscheidt, Sven/Schotten, Thomas: ‘Zur Rolle des Deutschen Bundestags beim Eintritt in die 
dritte Stufe der Währungsunion’, in: Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, No. 12/1997, pp. 479, 480, and 
483. 
4   See Bundestag Printed Paper (hereinafter BPP) 13/89, 14.12.1994; Bundestag Minutes Plenary Pro-
tocol (hereinafter BMPP) 13/9, 15.12.1994, p. 440 (B) ff.; Federal Law Gazette 1995 I, p. 11; see al-
so Hölscheidt, Sven/Schotten, Thomas: ‘Die künftige Gestalt des Unionsausschusses des Deutschen 
Bundestages’, in: Integration, No. 4/1994, pp. 230 ff.  
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2.2.1. Forerunners of the EU Committee, and Subcommittees on European Affairs  
 
In order to consolidate the link between the Bundestag and the European Parliament, the 
German Bundestag’s Council of Elders set up a Commission in 1979  - obviously in 
conjunction with the first direct elections to the European Parliament  - to deal with i s-
sues relating to the co-operation between the German Bundestag and the European Par-
liament.
2 On the basis of a proposal of this Commission in 1983, the ‘Europa-
Kommission of the German Bundestag’ was set up under Section 56 of the Rules of 
procedure.
3 For the first time, German members of the European Parliament who were 
not members of the Bundestag were entitled to participate. As the Commission did not 
have the right to submit recommendations for decisions to the plenary of the German 
Bundestag, it relied on one of the Bundestag’s specialised permanent committees taking 
up its proposals. As a r esult of this institutional i mpediment, the Commission had little 
impact.
4 At the start of the 11
th electoral term, the Foreign Affairs Committee set up a 
Subcommittee on EC Affairs, which had 26 members; members of the European Par-
liament also belonged to the Subcommittee but without the right to vote. The truly sub-
ordinate status of this body meant that its influence was limited.
5 Since the 6
th electoral 
term, the Budget Committee too had regularly appointed a Subcommittee on EC - now 
EU  - Affairs.
6 Other specialised committees have also set up subcommittees to deal 
primarily with EU items.
7 In the current 14
th electoral term, for example, the Legal A f-
fairs Committee has set up a Subcommittee on European Law. It was only in the 12
th 
electoral term that the Bundestag agreed to set up an EC committee as the 24
th perma-
nent committee.
8 Its members comprised 33 members of the Bundestag; 11 German 
members and o bservers of the European Parliament were given the right to take part in 
the committee’s deliberations b ut not to vote. In accordance with the decision to set up 
the committee, it was responsible for considering amendments to the EC treaties, insti-
tutional matters relating to the EC, co-operation between the EP and national parlia-
                                                                                                                                               
1   Reprinted in Läufer 1999, op.cit., pp. 366 ff. 
2  See Hölscheidt, Sven: ‘Parlamentarische Mitwirkung bei der europäischen Rechtssetzung’, in: Kri-
tische Vierteljahresschrift für Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung, No. 2/1994, pp. 405 and 417. 
3  See Bundestag BPP 10/161, 15.6.1983; BMPP 10/14, 16.6.1983, p. 850 (A) f. See also Pöhle, Klaus: 
‘Die Europa-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages. Ein politisches und geschäftsordnungsmäßi-
ges Novum’, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No. 2/1984, pp. 352 ff. 
4  See Mehl, Peter: Die Europa-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages, Kehl/Strasbourg 1987, p. 92 
f.; similarly, Seider, Rainer: Die Zusammenarbeit von deutschen Mitgliedern des Europäischen Par-
laments und des Deutschen Bundestages und ihr Beitrag zum Abbau des parlamentarischen Defizits 
in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt/Main: Lang 1990, p. 248. 
5  See Brück, Alwin: ‘Europäische Integration und Entmachtung des Deutschen Bundestages: Ein 
Unterausschuss ist nicht genug’, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No.3/1988, p. 220 ff. 
6  See Walther, Rudi: ‘Haushaltsfragen’, in: Hellwig, Renate (ed.): Der Deutsche Bundestag und Euro-
pa, Bonn: Olzog 1993, p. 102 and 109 f. 
7  See e.g. Eylmann, Horst: ‘Die Umsetzung von EG-Recht in nationales Recht und die Mitwirkung 
des Rechtsausschusses’, in: Hellwig, 1993, op.cit., pp. 114 and 115 f. 
8  See Bundestag BPP 12/739, 12.6.1991; BMPP 12/31, 13.6.1991, p. 2441 (D).  
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ments and for dealing with E C items  - “unless this is within the remit of other special-
ised committees”.  
 
3. The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union  
 
The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (EU Committee) was appointed in 
line with Article 45 of the Basic Law  for the first time at the beginning of the 13
th elec-
toral term.
1 
 
3.1. Composition, Organisation and Working Methods 
 
The EU Committee set up in the 14
th electoral term has 36 members and the same num-
ber of substitute members (its predecessor had 39 in each case). It is thus one of the 
largest of the Bundestag’s 23 specialised committees.
2 Pursuant to Section 12 of the 
Rules of procedure, the composition of the committee - like that of all the committees - 
must be in proportion to the strengths of the parliamentary groups in the German 
Bundestag. The SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) has appointed 16 members, 
and there are 13 from the parliamentary group of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic 
Union/Christian Social Union), 3 from Alliance 90/Greens, and 2 members from the 
parliamentary groups of the FDP (Free Democratic Party) and PDS (Party of Democ-
ratic Socialism) respectively. The chairman is Friedbert Pflüger, who belongs to the 
Opposition parliamentary group, the CDU/CSU; his deputy, Jürgen Meyer, i s a member 
of the governing parliamentary group, the SPD. The committee is thus an “Opposition” 
committee in this electoral term, as it was in the previous electoral term. It is customary 
in a specialised committee - and therefore also the EU Committee - that the members of 
the parliamentary groups elect spokespersons who act as leaders or representatives of 
their parliamentary groups in the committee. They voice the interests of their parliamen-
tary groups and also represent them in committee work.
3 Within  the parliamentary 
group administrations, parliamentary group staff working in specific units (e.g. Euro-
pean Union working groups) are responsible for handling the parliamentary groups’ 
policy work on Europe.  
In common with the other specialised committees of the German Bundestag and many 
other bodies, the EU Committee has its own secretariat. This is a unit within the 
Bundestag Administration, which  - in the case of the EU Committee  - consists of a 
Head of Secretariat, two other civil servants from the higher service, clerical officers 
                                                 
1  See Bundestag BPP 13/35, 23.11.1994; BMPP 13/6, 24.11.1994, p. 157 (B) f. 
2  See Bundestag BPP 14/22, 9.11.1998; BMPP 14/4, 11.11.1998, p. 131 (C) f. 
3   The current  - 1998-2002  - spokespersons are: Günter Gloser (SPD); Peter Hintze (CDU/CSU); 
Christian Sterzing (Alliance 90/Greens); Dr Helmut Hausmann (FDP); Manfred Müller (Berlin) 
(PDS).  
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and secretarial staff. The secretariat prepares committee meetings by e.g. compiling 
documents for deliberation, takes the minutes, advises committee members, drafts rec-
ommendations for decisions and reports for the Bundestag plenary, and deals with the 
committee’s correspondence. Various research sections employing specialist research-
ers and corresponding to the committee secretariats also exist within the Bundestag 
Administration. The Research Section Europe (RSE) was set up in 1990. The research 
sections are staffed on broadly similar lines to the committee secretariats. They are r e-
sponsible for answering members’ enquiries on i ssues relating to their specialist areas. 
The resources available to them for this purpose include the library and the central point 
for accessing information from external databases. In addition, the RSE maintains its 
own archive of EU-related material from European and national sources (e.g. directives, 
draft laws, essays from academic journals, etc.) classified by subject area. It also uses 
the on-line CEP database (CEP  - Concordance of EC items with parliamentary materi-
als) operated by the Bundesrat. The database contains all the referred EU items listed in 
the order received, with their original COM number, Council document number and 
title. Each item is given at least one keyword based on its title, which makes it easier to 
locate unknown items. 
According to the Bundestag’s Rules of procedure, German members of the European 
Parliament shall have access to the meetings of the EU Committee; additional German 
members of the EP shall be entitled to attend as substitutes. The members of the Euro-
pean Parliament entitled to participate in the deliberations are appointed to the commit-
tee by the President of the German Bundestag on the basis of nominations submitted by 
the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag from which the German members have been 
elected to the European Parliament.
1 After the fifth direct elections to the European 
Parliament, the parliamentary groups agreed on a total of 14 committee members from 
the European Parliament. Seven are from the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, five from 
the SPD, and one member from both Alliance 90/Greens and the PDS.
2 This reflects the 
relative strengths of these p arties in the European Parliament. The appointed MEP’s 
may attend committee meetings, suggest that certain items be considered, provide i n-
formation and state opinions. However, only the members of the German Bundestag on 
the EU Committee have the right to  vote. In practice, German MEP’s rarely attend the 
meetings of the EU Committee as they usually take place on a Wednesday, when 
MEP’s have a full programme in Brussels or Strasbourg. Their right to attend the meet-
ings of the EU Committee might have greater  impact if they were able to attend regu-
larly.  
The committee’s meetings take place regularly on Wednesday afternoon during each 
week of parliamentary sittings, whereas the other committees convene on Wednesday 
                                                 
1  See Section 93 a, § 6, sentence 2 of the Bundestag’s Rules of procedure. 
2  See BMPP 14/50, 1.7.1999, p. 4321 (A).  
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morning. Scheduling the meetings for Wednesday afternoon means that committee 
members, who usually sit on other specialised committees too, are able to attend both 
meetings. During the period under review, the EU Committee held 132 meetings. The 
committee convened 84 times during the 13
th electoral term. During this period (1994-
1998) 901 items - so-called Bundestag printed papers and EU items - were referred to 
the committee for deliberation; of these, 174 were referred to it as the committee r e-
sponsible. On average, meetings last four hours.  
As a rule, the Bundestag’s committee meetings  - including the EU Committee meetings 
- are not open to the public. However, a committee may decide to admit the public dur-
ing the discussion of a particular item of business or parts thereof.
1 Out of the EU 
Committee’s 132 meetings, 19, i.e. 14.4 % were fully or partly open to the public; in 
this context, the EU enlargement debate played a major role. For the purpose of obtain-
ing information on a subject under debate, a committee may hold public hearings of 
experts, r epresentatives of interest groups and other persons who can furnish informa-
tion. The EU Committee arranged a public hearing in collaboration with the EU Com-
mittee of the Bundesrat on 8 May 1996 to examine the issue of subsidiarity. The EU 
Committee also held a hearing with the Bundestag’s Environment Committee on 11 
November 1996 to discuss whether an ‘environmental union’ should be anchored in the 
EU treaties. The committee’s third public hearing was held jointly with the Finance 
Committee on 3 April 1998  and focussed on economic and monetary union. The fourth 
hearing  - on fraud and corruption in the EU - was organized by the EU Committee alone 
on 21 April 1999. 
 
3.2. Powers and Potential Voice Opportunities 
 
In essence, the EU Committee is a normal specialised committee. Its task is to deal 
“with EU items in accordance with the Rules of procedure and the decisions of the 
Bundestag”.
2 In particular, such items include initiatives launched within the framework 
of the EC/EU which could be of interest to the Federal Republic  - e.g. Commission 
communications, green and white papers  -, as well as draft directives and regulations; 
bulletins about developments within the Council; and communications from the Euro-
pean Parliament.
3 No clear distinction can be made between the terms “EU item” and 
“EU document”, which is also used. I shall refer to “EU items” as this is the most com-
mon term, although it describes EC rather than EU items. 
Compared to the other Bundestag committees, however, the EU Committee has a spe-
cial l egal position on account of the Bundestag’s right to authorize the committee to 
                                                 
1  See Section 69, § 1, sentences 1 and 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
2   As defined in Section 93 a, § 1 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
3  See Section 93, § 1 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure in conjunction with the Committee’s Proce-
dural Principles.  
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exercise the rights of the Bundestag under Article 23 vis-à-vis the Federal Government.
1 
The details are regulated in Section 93 a, para. 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure: 
“Upon the motion of a parliamentary group or five per cent of the members of the 
Bundestag, the Bundestag may empower the Committee on the Affairs of the European Un-
ion, in respect of specifically designated EU items, to exercise the rights of the Bundestag 
in relation to the Federal Government in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law. The 
Bundestag’s right at any time to take a decision itself on a matter concerning the European 
Union shall remain unaffected.” 
In the case of its empowerment, the committee must, before stating its opinion to the 
Federal Government, request an opinion on the EU item from the specialised commit-
tees concerned. Empowerment grants the EU Committee its own right to state its posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Federal Government, and the Federal Government must therefore take 
the committee’s position into account to the same extent as a position of the Bundestag.
2 
If the committee is empowered, it must deal with the item in a session open to the pub-
lic in accordance with Article 42 of the Basic Law.
3 The Bundestag can revoke such 
empowerment at any time.
4 The possibility of empowerment was created to give the 
Bundestag the chance to state its position on matters concerning the European Union to 
the Federal Government at any time, irrespective of its somewhat i nflexible timetable of 
plenary sittings.
5 The Bundestag has not yet made use of this e mpowerment option, 
however. There are two reasons why it is unlikely to do so in future: Firstly, the e m-
powerment procedure is rather complicated and contradicts the aim of empowerment, 
which is to accelerate the formation of opinion within Parliament. Secondly, empower-
ing the EU Committee would enhance its status, not only in legal but also in practical 
terms, compared to the other committees, which  would conflict with the principle that 
all committees are equal. This applies especially if the chairman of the EU Committee 
belongs to the Opposition parliamentary group, as it has been the case in every electoral 
term to date. The empowerment option is t herefore an interesting and unique form of 
Delegation in constitutional law, but is largely meaningless in practice.
6  
The committee is generally empowered to state its opinion on an EU item to the Federal 
Government unless one of the specialised committees concerned objects.
7 This power 
has been exercised on four separate occasions. The EU Committee must submit a report 
on the content of, and the reasons for, the opinion. The report must be distributed as a 
Bundestag printed-paper and placed on the agenda of the plenary within three weeks of 
                                                 
1  See Article 45 of the Basic Law; and Section 2 of the EUZBBG. 
2  See Rojahn, 1995, op.cit., Note 8. 
3  See Pernice, 1998, op.cit., Note 11. 
4  See Rojahn, 1995, op.cit., Note 9. 
5  See Ibid., Note 7. 
6  See Pernice 1998, op.cit., Note 9. 
7  See Section 93 a, § 3, sentence 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure.  
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sittings of its distribution.
1 However, a debate takes place only if a parliamentary group 
or five per cent of the members of the Bundestag so demand.
2 So far, only the report on 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has been discussed, as it featured on the agenda 
together with other items of business.
3 This empowerment therefore also has little sig-
nificance in practice. 
Under certain circumstances the committee may convene outside the Bundestag’s time-
table or not at the permanent seat of the Bundestag, if the schedule of the relevant or-
gans of the European Union so requires and the President of the Bundestag has given 
his consent. During the period under review only two such meetings have been con-
vened. They took place during the Bundestag’s 1996 summer recess
4 in connection with 
the discussions in the Council of Ministers on the European Police Office (Europol) and 
the European Commission’s policy on EU assistance in Eastern Germany (Subsidies for 
Volkswagen in Saxony). 
Finally, the EU Committee may, in respect of an EU item, which has been referred to it 
as a committee asked for an opinion, move motions for amendments to the recommen-
dation for a resolution submitted by the committee responsible.
1 The EU Committee is 
the  only specialised committee to be granted this right, whose purpose is to ensure that 
the Bundestag’s decisions reflect the current European policy situation. If a specialised 
committee responsible for dealing with an EU item fails to take into account the opinion 
submitted by the EU Committee, the latter can press for its position to be taken into 
account in the plenary’s deliberations by moving an amendment to the recommendation 
for a resolution. However, as motions for amendments to recommendations for a resolu-
tion can be tabled by the parliamentary groups and members anyway, this power also 
has little significance in practice. 
 
3.3. Characteristics of ‘Committee Scrutiny’ in EU Affairs 
 
The EU Committee is the focal point of the German Bundestag’s work in the field of 
European policy; it is the central decision-making body in this area and can thus be de-
scribed as a “European integration Committee”. This is borne out, in particular, by the 
                                                 
1   In the 13th electoral term, the EU Committee submitted three opinions as the committee responsible; 
in the 14th electoral term, it submitted one such opinion. In all cases, the Bundestag voted to take 
note. The reports are listed in chronological order below; the BMPP state where the decision to take 
note can be found: Bundestag BPP 13/5209, 3.7.1996 (Combating fraud); BMPP 13/128, 
10.10.1996, p. 11475 (B); Bundestag BPP 1 3/6638, 18.12.1996 (European Centre for Monitoring 
Racism and Xenophobia); BMPP 13/154, 31.1.1997, p. 13848 (A); Bundestag BPP 13/6891, 
3.2.1997 (COSAC/Intergovernmental Conference on the Review of the Maastricht Treaty); BMPP 
13/160, 27.2.1997, p. 14421 ( D); Bundestag BPP 14/1819, 19.10.1999 (EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights); BMPP 14/77, 3.12.1999, p. 7097 (B). 
2  See Section 93 a, § 4, sentence 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
3  See Bundestag BPP 14/1819; BMPP 14/77, p. 7059 (D) ff. 
4   The 37th meeting on 9.7.1996 and 38th meeting on 29.8.1996.  
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fact that the EU Committee was the committee responsible for considering the draft law 
ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty.
2 The EU Committee is also a “horizontal committee”,
3 
i.e. it deals with European matters which cut across several different policy fields mak-
ing it inappropriate to refer such items to a specialised committee.  
Due to this horizontal function, the EU Committee was responsible for deliberating the 
Agenda 2000, for e xample. This item of business demonstrates the close link between 
the committee’s horizontal and integration functions. Finally, as its third function, the 
EU Committee acts as a kind of “specialised committee for European affairs”. In this 
capacity, it is generally requested to submit opinions on items relating to draft directives 
and regulations which have particular significance for the process of integration. For 
example, while the main responsibility for considering items relating to the BSE issue 
lay with the Health Committee, the EU Committee was requested to comment on insti-
tutional aspects, including possible failings on the part of EU bodies and member states.  
The EU Committee is not involved in the implementation of EC directives in German 
law, as this task is generally undertaken on the basis of bills presented by the Federal 
Government. These bills are considered by the relevant specialised committees as part 
of the normal legislative process under Article 77 of the Basic Law and Section 75 of 
the Bundestag Rules of procedure. The EU Committee  - like the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee - is therefore not a legislative committee. 
The EU Committee’s powers highlight its role as a committee, which exercises control.
4 
In essence, its task is to examine draft Community legislative acts or EU law, which has 
not been implemented, rather than Community legislation, which is already in force.
5 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Section 93 a, § 5 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
2  See Section III below. 
3  See Pernice, 1998, op.cit. Note 9. 
4  See Ibid., Note 7. 
5  See Secretariat of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union of the German Bundestag 
(ed.): The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union of the German Bundestag, Jacqueline 
Bila/Uwe Gehlen/Hartmut Groos/Beate Hasenjäger, Bonn 1998, pp. 17 ff. 132  
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4. General Instruments of Control 
 
The Bundestag’s general instruments of parliamentary control  - above all, the parlia-
mentary right to put questions  - are of secondary importance in the treatment of Euro-
pean affairs. In the German parliamentary system of government, these instruments of 
control are primarily the instruments of the Opposition, and are utilized to a far lesser 
degree by the Bundestag  - i.e. the parliamentary m ajority  - as a whole. As there is fun-
damental consensus between the Government and O pposition parliamentary groups on 
European policy, the parliamentary groups forming the Opposition rarely have recourse 
to the instruments of control available to them. 
The most important types of questions are the major and the minor interpellations a d-
dressed to the Federal Government. The essential distinction between them is that a 
major interpellation or the Federal Government’s reply may be debated in the plenary. 
During the period under review, 2883 minor interpellations were addressed to the Fed-
eral Government; 72 (2.5 %) related exclusively to the European Union. Out of 195 
major interpellations, 13 (6.7 %) directly concerned the EU. A substantial proportion of 
all the interpellations addressed to the Federal Government focussed on some aspect of 
EU affairs. 
The Bundestag holds general debates on European policy at irregular intervals. During 
the period under review, the EU Committee submitted 23 recommendations for deci-
sions to the Bundestag, which were adopted by the plenary during its European policy 
debates.
1 
                                                 
1   These are as follows: BPP 12/6256, 26.11.1993 (Implementing the subsidiarity principle); BMPP 
12/197, 3.12.1993, p. 17155 (A); BPP 12/6257, 26.11.1993 (Free movement of persons); BMPP 
12/197, 3.12.1993, p. 17155 (A); BPP 12/6258, 26.11.1993 (The Commission’s work programme 
1993-1994); BMPP 12/197, 3.12.1993, p. 1 7155 (A); BPP 12/6653, 21.1.1994 (EU enlargement); 
BMPP 12/216, 10.3.1994, p. 18609 (C); BPP 12/8104, 24.6.1994 (Strengthening the legislative po-
wers of the European Parliament); BMPP 12/237, 29.6.1994, p. 20781 (A); BPP 13/1957, 6.7.1995 
(Integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the European Union); BMPP 13/55, 21.9.1995, 
p. 4637 (D); BPP 13/3247, 6.12.1995 (The 1996 reform of the Maastricht Treaty and European poli-
cy; European Council on 26-27 June 1995; The Federal Government’s European policy); BMPP 
13/77, 7.12.1995, p. 6710 (A); BPP 13/3248, 6.12.1995 (Promoting women in the European Union); 
BMPP 13/77, 7.12.1995, p. 6710 (D), 6761 (C); BPP 13/3692, 6.2.1996 (European U nion action 
plan to combat drugs (1995-1999)); BMPP 13/92, 7.3.1996, p. 8159 (A); BPP 13/4470, 26.4.1996 
(Infringement of the EURATOM Treaty by France; Muroroa); Minutes Plenary Proceedings 13/105, 
10.5.1996, p. 9255 (D); BPP 13/4534, 7.5.1996 (Possible application of Article K. 9 of the Treaty on 
European Union); BMPP 13/107, 2 3.5.1996, p. 9438 (A); BPP 13/4922, 17.6.1996 (Intergovernmen-
tal Conference 1996; Common employment and social policy for the European Union); BMPP 
13/128, 10.10.1996, p. 11418 (A); BPP 13/7129, 4.3.1997 (Preparing the associated CEEC for mem-
bership of the European Union); BMPP 13/166, 20.3.1997, p. 14962 (B); BPP 13/7488, 22.4.1997 
(Dublin European Council, 13-14 December 1996); BMPP 13/181, 12.6.1997, p. 16275 (B); BPP 
13/7566, 28.4.1997 (Area of application of the co-decision procedure); BMPP 13/178, 5.6.1997, p. 
16010 (D); BPP 13/8428, 28.8.1997 (EP resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference); BMPP 
13/200, 30.10.1997, p. 18046 (C); BPP 13/9332, 2.12.1997 (A referendum on the F ederal Republic 
of Germany’s participation in European monetary union and the ratification of the conclusions of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on the review and revision of the Treaty on European Union); BMPP 
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4.1. Procedures for the Ttreatment of European Affairs in the Bundestag 
 
Under Article 48 TEU, any amendment to the treaties on which the European U nion is 
based shall only enter into force “after being ratified by all the member states in accor-
dance with their respective Constitutional requirements”. This also applies if a Treaty 
amendment is required for the conclusion of an international agreement (Article 300.5 
ECT). Article 49 TEU stipulates that a European state’s admission to the EU requires 
such ratification as well. The member states must also adopt a Council decision on po-
lice and judicial co-operation in accordance with their respective constitutional  re-
quirements (Article 42 TEU). The same is envisaged for the uniform electoral procedure 
(Article 190.4 ECT). Article 269 ECT states that without prejudice to other revenue, the 
budget of the European Community shall be financed wholly from own resources.  Un-
der Article 269 ECT, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the European Parliament, shall lay down provisions relating to 
the system of own resources of the Community, which it shall recommend to the mem-
ber states for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
Various other matters concerning the European Union, such as the protocol on the privi-
leges and immunities of Europol officers, have necessitated adoption by the member 
states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
1 All these norms 
identify the member states as the “masters” of the treaties.
2 
The constitutional provisions to which EC law refers are Article 23 and Article 59 of the 
Basic Law. They stipulate that the adoption or ratification required by Community law 
must take place through a federal law. In such cases, a normal legislative procedure 
under Article 76 of the Basic Law and Section 76 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure 
is carried out, although this does not absolve the Federal Government of its obligation to 
furnish information.
3 Amendments to the treaties on which the European Union is 
based, and to other comparable regulations, therefore cannot take place without the con-
sent of the B undestag. So when does the adoption of the law require a two-thirds major-
                                                                                                                                               
13/210, 11.12.1997, p. 19109 (A); BPP 13/9418, 10.12.1997 (EU enlargement); BMPP 13/210, 
11.12.1997, p. 19109 (C); BPP  13/9913, 13.2.1998 (Draft law on the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 Oc-
tober 1997); BMPP 13/222, 5.3.1998, p. 20240 (C); BPP 14/685, 29.3.1999 (Preparation of a draft 
electoral procedure, based on common principles, for the election of the members of the European 
Parliament); BMPP 14/77, 3.12.1999, p. 7059 (B); BPP 14/845, 23.4.1999 (Consolidating and deve-
loping the European Union during the German Presidency in the first half-year of 1999); BMPP 
14/77, 3.12.1999, p. 7060 (C); BPP 14/1288, 28.6.1999 (The current s ituation in Kosovo after 
NATO intervention: Outcomes of the extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Berlin); 
BMPP 14/77, 3.12.1999, p. 7060 (B); BPP 14/1819, 19.10.1999 (Draft EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights); BMPP 14/77, 3.12.1999, p. 7060 (A). 
1   For a detailed discussion, see Hölscheidt, Sven/Schotten, Thomas: ‘Immunität für Europol-
Bedienstete  - Normalfall oder Sündenfall?’, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, No. 39/1999, pp. 
2851 ff. 
2  See Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 89, p. 155, 190. 
3  See Section II.2.1. above.  
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ity in the Bundestag? This is still a controversial issue.
1 The Bundestag sets the basic 
course for integration as it decides on Germany’s membership of the European Union, 
and its development and financing in line with the provisions of the Basic Law, the 
TEU and the ECT. It thus safeguards the legitimisation of the European Union per se 
and also the legitimisation of legislative activity by the European Community. 
 
4.2. Other Matters Relating to the European Union 
 
The procedure for deliberating the vast majority of EU items in the Bundestag begins in 
the EU Commission. This body has an almost unlimited monopoly on initiating Com-
munity legislation, i.e. as a rule, the Council adopts the EC legislative act in response to 
a proposal by the Commission. It submits its legislative proposal to the Council. The 
Council consists of representatives of each member State, who furnish information to 
their respective governments. The transmission o f EU items to the Bundestag’s EU 
Committee is undertaken by the Federal Ministry of Finance. The number of EC/EU 
documents officially transmitted to the Bundestag has developed as follows:
2 
Table 7: EC/EU Documents Transmitted to the Bundestag 1957-1999 
 3
rd electoral term  (1957-1961):  13 
 4
th electoral term  (1961-1965):  224 
 5
th electoral term  (1965-1969):  745 
 6
th electoral term  (1969-1972):  946 
 7
th electoral term   (1972-1976):  1759 
 8
th electoral term  (1976-1980):  1706 
 9
th electoral term  (1980-1983):  1355 
10
th electoral term  (1983-1987):  1828 
11
th electoral term  (1987-1990):  2413 
12
th electoral term  (1990-1994):  2070 
13
th electoral term  (1994-1998):  2387 
14
th electoral term  (1998-1999):  661 
 
In addition to these items, around 15000 to 20000 accompanying and follow-up docu-
ments are sent to the German Bundestag every year. They include notes, communica-
tions, corrigenda, etc. 
The following table shows the number of EU items referred to the committees from 1 
November 1993  up to 31 December 1999, and the committees’ recommendations for 
decisions by the Bundestag plenary. 
                                                 
1  See Rojahn, 1995, op.cit., Note 49. 
2   Source: Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages II, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999, 
p. 2590; author’s own calculations.  
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Table 8: EU Items Dealt with in the Committees of the Bundestag 
Electoral 
Term 
Total 
number 
of EU 
items 
Treatment in 
plenary 
The following 
committees’ rec-
ommendations for a 
decision 
No. of 
EP res. 
Treatment in 
plenary 
The following 
committees’ 
recommendations 
for a decision 
  In %          In %     
9,1      68  4  5,9     
16  CERTA  1  FC 
11  CTBH  1  CERTA 
4  FC  1  IAC 
4  BC  1  FAC 
1993- 1994  404 
40 
 
4  CENCNS 
     
   
4,4      390  14  3,6     
29  CTBH  4  CAEU 
16  FC  2  FC 
12  CENCNS  1  SC 
10  BC  1  LAC 
10  CFAF  1  BC 
7  CLSA  1  CEAT 
6  LAC  1  CFASCW
Y 
6  CFASCW
Y 
1  CTBH 
5  CAEU  1  CTBH 
4  CEAT  1  CT 
2  IAC     
2  CERTA     
1  CPT     
1  CT     
1994-1998 
 
2387  106 
 
   
     
   
3,6      154  5  3,2     
12  CAEU  4  CAEU 
6  CTBH  1  CENCNS 
5  CENCNS     
1  CFAF     
1998-31.12.99  661  24 
 
   
     
   
Total  3452  170  4,9  170    612  23  3,8  23   
Committee names:
1 CTBH: Committee on Transport, Building and Housing; FC: Finance Committee; BC: Budget 
Committee; CENCNS: Committee on the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety; CEAT: Commit-
tee on Economic Affairs and Technology; IAC: Internal Affairs Committee; FAC: Foreign Affairs Committee; 
CFAF: Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry; CLSA: Committee on Labour and Social Affairs; LAC: 
Legal Affairs Committee; CFASCWY: Committee on Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth; CAEU: 
Committee on European Union Affairs; CERTA: Committee on Education, Research and Technology Assessment; 
CPT: Committee on Posts and Telecommunications; CT: Committee on Tourism; SC: Sports Committee. 
 
Experience has shown that between two and  - at most  - four weeks generally elapse 
from the time the item is received by the Council to its receipt by the German 
Bundestag. The letter of transmission merely contains the item’s official title and a brief 
outline of its contents. The EU Committee’s Procedural Principles require the Federal  
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Government regularly to submit a written explanatory r eport, within five sitting days, 
on the EU items transmitted to the committee. Exceptions are possible, but the full writ-
ten report must be submitted, at the latest, five sitting days before it is due to be consid-
ered by the committee. The report must include reasons why a European regulation is 
necessary (subsidiarity principle), the main content of the proposed legislation,  Ger-
many’s specific interest, financial implications, and the timetable for deliberation of the 
item. In general, the Federal Government fulfils its reporting obligation, although it is 
not always performed satisfactorily by all ministries. The Bundestag is notified of Euro-
pean Parliament resolutions in a letter from the Secretary-General of the European Par-
liament to the Secretary-General of the German Bundestag. 
As soon as he receives the item, the chairman of the EU Committee asks the other 
committees to state which items they wish to discuss, and on what basis. The committee 
secretariat assists him in this task. The secretariat draws up a list of all the EU items 
recently received. The Bundestag deals with all the items transmitted to it; no selection 
process takes place. The secretariat prepares a proposal for the referral of the items to 
one committee responsible and, in most cases, several committees asked for an opinion. 
The list is circulated to the members and substitute members of the EU Committee, the 
other committees, and the relevant units of the parliamentary groups. If no other pro-
posals have been put forward by a certain date - usually eight days after the list has been 
drawn up  - there is assumed to be general consent to the secretariat’s proposals. The 
chairman of the EU Committee notifies the Council of Elders
2 of the committees’ 
wishes to discuss the item. On this basis, a draft summary list of the referrals is drawn 
up.
3 
In consultation with the Council of Elders, the President of the Bundestag refers the EU 
items to one committee as the committee responsible and to other committees as com-
mittees asked for an opinion.
4 The titles of the referred items are i ncluded in a 
Bundestag Printed Paper. This summary list indicates to which committees  the items 
have been referred.
5 During the period under review, a total of 128 summary lists were 
drawn up.
6 
                                                                                                                                               
1   The names of the committees are subject to change. The list relates to committees established in the 
14th electoral term, where such committees exist. 
2  See Section 6 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
3  See Section 93, § 3, sentence 1 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
4  See Section 93, § 3, sentence 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
5  See Section 93, § 4 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
6   The first is Bundestag BPP 12/6155, 12.11.1993 ‘Notification of items referred to the committees in 
accordance with Section 80, § 3, and Sections 92 and 93 of the Rules of procedure (Period of receipt 
27 October-9 November 1993)’; the last is Bundestag BPP 14/2414, 17.12.1999, ‘Notification of 
items referred to the committees in accordance with Section 93 of the Rules of procedure (Period of 
receipt 1-14 December 1999)’.   
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The procedure can be illustrated using the example of the Directive on electronic com-
merce: The Commission proposal was submitted on 23 December 1998
1 and referred to 
the Council with a letter dated 7 January 1999. Transmission to the Bundestag took 
place with a letter from the Federal Ministry of Finance dated 20 January 1999. The 
committee secretariat’s proposal for referral is dated 26 January 1999; the draft Direc-
tive was referred to the Legal Affairs Committee, as the committee responsible, on 5 
March 1999,
2 which noted the item on 17 March 1999.
3 The European Parliament gave 
its opinion on 6 May 1999, the Council’s common position is dated 28 February 2000, 
and the European Parliament resolution is dated 4 May 2000. The Directive was pub-
lished in the Official Journal on 17 July 2000.
4 
EU items are only distributed as a Bundestag printed paper if the EU Committee so 
requests and the Council of Elders consents
5, if it is agreed in the Council of Elders, or - 
as it is usually the case  - if the committee responsible submits a recommendation for a 
resolution, going beyond acknowledgement, on the item to the plenary.
6 During the 
period under review, less than 5 per cent of the EU items were the subject of a recom-
mendation for a resolution and included as such on the Bundestag agenda. The plenary 
deals with them in accordance with the procedure applied to recommendations for a 
decision on national items.
7 In the majority of cases, the committees simply note the EU 
items without lengthy debate, or do not debate the item at all; such an item will not ap-
pear in a printed-paper. In the specialised committees and the EU Committee itself, 20 
or more items may be  noted without d ebate, even if they have been referred to the 
committee as the committee responsible. The committee chairman informs the President 
of the Bundestag that the committee has noted the item. It is then published as “Notifi-
cation for members”, without a reading, in an annex to the Minutes of Plenary Proceed-
ings.
1 
 
5. Practical Outcomes for the Federal Government 
 
The Bundestag’s treatment of European matters can only have an impact if it is clearly 
manifested to the Federal Government. This is the case if members of the Federal Gov-
ernment attend plenary sittings or committee meetings dealing with European matters 
and hear the parliamentarians’ views on these issues. European matters are frequently 
                                                 
1  See Official Journal EC 1999 C 30/4. 
2  See Bundestag BPP 14/488, 5.3.1999. 
3  See BMPP 14 /31, 26.3.1999, p. 2618 (A). 
4  See Official Journal EC 2000, L 178/1. 
5   Agenda 2000 was published on this basis; Bundestag BPP 13/8391, 13.8.1997. 
6  See Section 93, § 4, sentence 2 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
7  See Section 62, § 1, sentence 2 and Section 78, § 1, sentence 1 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure.  
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discussed in the Bundestag, both on a broad basis i n the plenary or EU Committee and 
in specific terms in the specialised committees. However, the consequence of this 
treatment is simply that the Federal Government is informed about the Bundestag’s 
position. This informal awareness does not impose any obligation on the Federal Gov-
ernment to take the Bundestag’s position into account in line with Article 23 of the B a-
sic Law. To this end, a position for the purpose of this provision is r equired. The 
Bundestag very rarely makes use of its opportunity to impose a binding political obliga-
tion on the Federal Government through a position on European matters. The ex-post 
control procedure set out in the Federal Government’s Interministerial Agreement
2 
plays a significant role in practice and is now well-established: the EU Committee e x-
pects the Federal Government, after completion of the decision-making process on the 
EU initiative in question, to report to the committee informing it as to how the 
Bundestag’s decisions were taken into account and whether, and to what extent, the 
Federal Government complied with corresponding decisions of the Bundesrat in these 
cases. The report is submitted by the ministry responsible as part of its reporting on 
Council meetings. 
A legally binding consequence for the Federal Government arises only if the Bundestag 
stipulates such a consequence through a formal law. This applies, for example, in i n-
stances when Community law requires member states to adopt or ratify a legislative act 
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Until now, the 
Bundestag has always adopted such laws and will continue to do so as long as European 
internal policy is formulated and completed on the basis of international law, i.e. as long 
as the governments at the level of Community law achieve outcomes in their negotia-
tions which can only be amended through complex follow-up negotiations  - which is 
generally impossible in practice. In this situation, the Bundestag  - like the other parlia-
ments  - faces a dilemma if it does not agree with the outcomes in at least one key re-
spect: if the Bundestag ratifies them, it signals its agreement; if it does not ratify them, it 
nullifies the entire result (which is binding not only on the Federal Government but on 
all the other member states as well), and faces accusations that it has undermined the 
integration process. A lthough the Bundestag invariably chooses the former option, this 
does not always serve the interests of integration as defined in the Treaties (e.g. Article 
6 TEU). For example, the granting of immunity to Europol officers does not serve the 
rule of law in the Community.
3 Moreover, the Bundestag’s opportunity to bind the Fed-
eral Government with a mandatory law is also likely to remain a theoretical option.
4 The 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See, for example, BMPP 12/226, 29.4.1994, p. 19063 (C) f.; 13/13, 20.1.1995, p. 822 (C); 13/117, 
28.6.1996, p. 10631 (D), 13/158, 21.2.1997, p. 14275 (C) f.; 14/12, 4.12.1998, p. 742 (C) f.; 14/23, 
26.2.1999, p. 1806 (B) f. 
2  See Section II.2.1. above. 
3  See Hölscheidt/Schotten, 1999, op.cit. pp. 2851 and 2854 f. 
4  See Section II.2.1. above.  
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Bundestag is in a relatively strong position in all cases where the Council must adopt an 
unanimous decision, as with key issues such as tax harmonization (Article 93 ECT). 
The Bundestag can set out its position and demand that the minister r esponsible put 
forward its views in the Council and, under certain circumstances, can lodge a parlia-
mentary proviso, which means that he states a provisional position in a dvance of the 
final consent of the Bundestag. However, this merely enables the Bundestag to prevent 
a decision from being adopted. It cannot bring about a decision; it simply has “preven-
tive powers”. The veto enjoyed by every member State rules out the possibility of 
Council representatives claiming to their own parliaments that a positive decision was 
adopted by a majority in the Council despite their objection. The other side of the coin 
is better known: any member State can block a decision and thus delay the integration 
process. Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that the shift to majority voting and/or 
the restriction of unanimity further curtails national parliaments’ opportunities for par-
ticipation. 
Thus the Federal Government’s European policy scope is largely unrestricted by the 
Bundestag. In addition to the factors mentioned, this is because the Federal Government 
is generally able to rely on a solid coalition majority in Parliament, which supports its 
European policy line. It should also be borne in mind that the general consensus on 
European policy
1, to which reference has already been made, ensures that fundamen-
tally divergent positions are rarely represented in the Bundestag, at least by the major 
Opposition parliamentary groups. 
In terms of European policy, the Bundestag thus finds itself in the role of a supportive 
scrutinizer. Its political line is essentially i dentical to the Federal Government’s, which 
means that the Federal Government’s negotiating position at European level is safe-
guarded by Parliament. However, it has also ensured that the parliaments play a signifi-
cant role in the Convention preparing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Finally, the Bundestag also examines European Parliament resolutions. Whether it is 
useful for a national parliament to state its position on a decision, which has already 
been adopted by the European Parliament, is a moot  point. Nonetheless, by doing so, 
the Bundestag can reaffirm or contradict the European Parliament’s position and thus 
adopt a position of its own vis-à-vis the Federal Government at the same time. 
 
                                                 
1  See Section I.1. above.  
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III. The Treatment of the Amsterdam Treaty in the German Bundestag 
 
The ratification debate had already begun in the EU Committee before the Federal Gov-
ernment’s draft law ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty
1 was referred to it as the committee 
responsible in December 1997.
2 This procedure is possible because the committees can 
take up questions on their own initiative.
3 The EU Committee had informed itself about 
the work of the Reflection Group since June 1995 and examined the issues relating to 
the Treaty revision in great detail. In response to its recommendation f or a decision,
4 a 
motion entitled “Making the European Union viable for the future”
5 tabled by the then 
parliamentary majority i.e. the CDU/CSU and FDP, was adopted in December 1995.
6 In 
this decision, the Bundestag e xpressed its general expectations of the Treaty revision. In 
October 1996, at the EU Committee’s recommendation, the Bundestag then adopted a 
“Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference ’96 as the way forward towards s o-
cial and ecological reform of the European Union”.
7 In February 1997, the committee 
stated its opinion on the Intergovernmental Conference/COSAC. On the central issue of 
whether the European Parliament’s co-decision rights should be expanded, the 
Bundestag adopted a resolution in June 1997, at the recommendation of the committee, 
in which the Federal Government was called upon to work actively for the strengthen-
ing of the European Parliament.
8 On 12 June 1997, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on its relations with the national parliaments.
9  The resolution was received by 
the EU Committee on 2 July 1997 and was referred to it for deliberation as the commit-
tee responsible on 29 September 1997.
10 At its meeting on 11 February 1998, the EU 
Committee unanimously declared the item disposed of.
11  
As soon as the Treaty negotiations were concluded at the Amsterdam European Council 
on 16 and 17 June 1997, the committee continued its deliberations with the participation 
                                                 
1  See Draft law presented by the Federal Government: ‘Draft law on the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 
October 1997’, Bundestag BPP 13/9339, 3.12.1997. 
2  See BMPP 13/210, 11.12.1997, p. 19109 (A). 9 committees were asked for an opinion. 
3   The right of committees to take up an issue on their own initiative is based on Section 62, § 1, sen-
tence 3 of the Bundestag Rules of procedure. 
4  See Bundestag BPP 13/3247, 6.12.1995. 
5  See Bundestag BPP 13/3040, 21.11.1995. 
6  See BMPP 13/77, 7.12.1995, p. 6710 (A). 
7  See Bundestag BPP 13/4922, 17.6.1996; BMPP 13/128, 10.10.1996; p. 11418 (A). 
8   Bundestag BPP 13/7566, 28.4.1997; BMPP 13/178, 15.6.1997, p. 16010 (D). 
9  See European Parliament, Neyts-Uyttebroeck Report (A4-0179/97), Official Journal C 200/153, 
30.6.1997. 
10  See Bundestag BPP 13/8615, 29.9.1997. The committees asked for an opinion were the Committee 
for the Scrutiny of Elections, Immunity and the Rules of procedure, the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the Internal Affairs Committee, the Legal Affairs Committee, the Committee on Food, Agriculture 
and Forestry, and the Budget Committee. 
11  See BMPP 13/225, 27.3.1998, p. 20707 (B).  
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of the Federal Government.
1 It discussed policy issues such as justice and home affairs, 
and individual issues  such as consumer protection, transparency, subsidiarity, employ-
ment, environmental protection and health, and the provisions on CFSP. At one meet-
ing, the committee debated the role of the national parliaments and the Treaty’s Proto-
col on this issue.
2 The i nstitutional reforms were an ongoing subject of discussion. The 
EU Committee devised substantive amendments to the Amsterdam Treaty vis-à-vis the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Netherlands’ most recent Treaty draft prior to the June sum-
mit in Amsterdam. Key assessment criteria for the Amsterdam Treaty were the demands 
addressed to the Federal Government by the parliamentary groups in the German 
Bundestag before and during the Treaty negotiations. The parliamentary majority as 
well as the SPD as the major Opposition parliamentary group especially welcomed the 
progress achieved in bringing justice and home affairs into the Community framework, 
and the introduction of an option to impose sanctions against states with serious and 
persistent breaches of fundamental rights. The plans to establish the ECJ’s responsibil-
ity for scrutinizing the observance of fundamental rights and to include a general ban on 
discrimination in the Treaty were also viewed as landmarks. The parliamentary groups 
regretted the fact that the follow-up conference did not commission the drafting of a 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP parliamentary groups in the EU Committee voted in 
favour of the recommendation for a decision on 11 February 1998. The Alliance 
90/Greens parliamentary group abstained; the PDS voted against the recommendation. 
In line with the recommendation, the draft law ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty, together 
with a resolution, was adopted by the Bundestag on 5 March 1998 with 561 votes in 
favour and 34 votes  against. There were 50 abstentions.
3 The Bundesrat voted for the 
law on 27 March 1998.
4 The instrument of ratification was deposited in Rome on 7 May 
1998 following the execution of the law ratifying the Treaty on 8 April and its promul-
gation in the Federal Law Gazette on 16 April 1998. The Federal Republic was thus the 
first member State to complete its ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty.
5 
The resolution states:  
“The Treaty of Amsterdam is an important step towards the completion of political union. 
It enables the enlargement process to begin, and provides European answers to global chal-
lenges. It strengthens the European Parliament and therefore democracy in Europe, and en-
hances closeness to citizens, especially through greater transparency and subsidiarity.” 
                                                 
1   For details, see Bundestag BPP 13/9913, 13.2.1998, p. 9 ff; Läufer, Thomas/Bila, Jacqueline (eds.): 
Vertrag von Amsterdam, Die parlamentarische Debatte 1997/98, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag 1998, 
p. 27 ff. 
2  See Section IV.1 below. 
3  See Bundestag BPP 13/9931, 13.2.1998, p. 1 ff.; BMPP 13/222, 5.3.1998, p. 20291. 
4  See Bundesrat BPP 196/98 (Decision). 
5  See Läufer/Bila, 1998, op.cit., p. 35 ff.  
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It notes that the Treaty brings substantial areas of justice and home affairs into the 
Community framework, and facilitates the fight against crime. It observes that in the 
field of foreign and security policy the European Union’s profile is sharpened and its 
capacity to act increased. However, the resolution also states that despite the progress 
achieved, the outcomes of the negotiations do not fulfil all the expectations placed in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
As regards justice and home affairs, the German Bundestag welcomed the European 
Union’s strengthened commitment to the basic principles of freedom, d emocracy and 
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. It noted with regret 
that no agreement could be reached on the drafting  of a Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
A section entitled “The European Union and its Citizens” states that the Bundestag 
views the fight against unemployment in member states as the most important social 
challenge, and thus welcomes the inclusion of a chapter on employment in the EC 
Treaty. The Bundestag also welcomed the more precise definition of the goals and tasks 
of the common foreign and security policy, as well as the improvements in its proce-
dures and instruments. 
The resolution states that the reform of the European institutions is one of the key goals 
of the Intergovernmental Conference; regrettably, despite some progress, it had failed in 
its efforts to push ahead with reform in a more consistent manner. The Bundestag wel-
comed the strengthening of t he European Parliament through the substantial expansion 
of its co-decision rights, and also noted that this process was not yet concluded. “It calls 
for the European Parliament to be granted co-decision rights in all areas in which the 
Council, as the legislator, will in future decide on the basis of majority voting.” The 
Bundestag supported the call for the European Parliament to devise a draft for general 
and direct elections on the basis of a uniform procedure in all member states or in ac-
cordance with  the principles common to all member states. At the same time, the just 
distribution of seats must also be guaranteed. Setting an upper limit of 700 members of 
the European Parliament is an important step in maintaining the Parliament’s capacity 
to act. The Bundestag welcomed the fact that the Treaty also addresses the role of the 
national parliaments. “It notes that the rights of information already apply to the Ger-
man Bundestag”. It took the view that the new provisions on COSAC
1 are a pragmatic 
approach t o an exchange of opinions and experience. Informal exchange is important, 
but “the Bundestag opposes any further institutionalisation of COSAC”. F inally, the 
Bundestag welcomed the provisions on strengthened co-operation, which will promote 
further integration. 
 
                                                 
1   For more detail, see Section IV.2. below.  
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IV. The Bundestag after the Amsterdam Treaty’s Entry into Force 
 
In connection with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the legal bases for the 
treatment of European affairs in the German Bundestag were reshaped and e xpanded. 
This has substantially improved the Bundestag’s opportunities for participation.
1 The 
Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force has thus had no effect in this respect, as the 
Bundestag sees no need for further amendments to the provisions currently in force. 
This also applies to the EU Committee which  - after a lengthy experimental phase
2 - has 
now identified its role in the treatment of European matters in the Bundestag.
3 The Pro-
tocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union
4 did not prompt any 
major reaction in the Bundestag. 
 
1. The Bundestag and the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union 
 
The Protocol is legally binding and thus goes beyond Declaration No. 13 contained in 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Protocol aims to ensure that all Commission consultation 
documents (green and white papers and communications) are forwarded promptly to the 
national parliaments of the member states. It is also intended to guarantee that the par-
liaments have a minimum period of six weeks between the time a legislative proposal is 
made available and the date when it is placed on a Council agenda for decision. This 
provision is largely irrelevant for the Bundestag, as the Basic Law already obliges the 
Federal Government to keep the Bundestag informed, comprehensively and at the earli-
est possible time, about all matters concerning the European Union.
5 
 
2. The Bundestag and the Conference of European Affairs Committees 
 
The Protocol of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union also states that, with respect to the legislative activities of the EU, 
COSAC may make any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and that these contributions shall in 
no way  prejudge the position of the national parliaments. The Bundestag has described 
the new provisions on COSAC as a pragmatic approach to an exchange of opinions and 
                                                 
1  See Section II.2.1. above. 
2  See Section II.2.2. above. 
3  See Section II.2.3. above. 
4   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 2. 
5  See Section II.1 and 2 above.  
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experience without cumbersome new institutional regulations. At the same time, how-
ever, it has also opposed any further institutionalisation of COSAC.
1 
The sceptical attitude towards COSAC is currently justified on the grounds that there is 
an imbalance between the time and effort expended in connection with COSAC’s a c-
tivities and its tangible outcomes. Its suitability as a forum for an e xchange of opinions 
and information is limited, as the limited size of Delegations provided for in COSAC’s 
Rules of procedure (6 representatives per member State) means that not all the political 
movements within the national parliaments can be represented in COSAC. This prob-
lem has been exacerbated by the new provisions laid down in the Protocol. In view of 
COSAC’s unrepresentative nature, it is unclear how its contributions can be given l e-
gitimisation, as provided  for under the Protocol. It is also unclear why the Treaty grants 
COSAC the right to address contributions to the European institutions, a right which not 
even the national parliaments enjoy. Nor is it immediately apparent what purpose is 
served by permitting COSAC to address contributions to the European Parliament, since 
six of its members participate in COSAC and the link between their opinion-forming 
processes therefore already exists. 
 
V. Conclusions: A Supportive Scrutiniser and Protagonist of the European Parliament 
 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the treatment of European matters in the 
German Bundestag has been regulated in numerous legal norms. Article 23 of the Basic 
Law is particularly important in this context. It obliges the Federal Government to keep 
the Bundestag informed about all matters concerning the European Union comprehen-
sively and at the earliest possible time. The provisions contained in the Protocol on the 
Role of National Parliaments in the European U nion fall far s hort of this requirement. 
This is why the Protocol’s significance in the Federal Republic is very limited. Since the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the establishment of an EU Committee has also 
been guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 45 of the Basic Law). The Bundestag rules 
of procedure (Section 93) equip it with special rights and functions compared with the 
other specialised committees; however, these rights and functions are not particularly 
important for the treatment of European matters. T he e ssential point is therefore that 
Maastricht  - not Amsterdam  - changed the Bundestag’s role in European affairs. Above 
all, the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the Maastricht Treaty underlined the 
Bundestag’s importance for the process of European integration. The official p olitical 
position
2, too, has not significantly been modified by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
                                                 
1  See Bundestag BPP 13/9913, 13.2.1998; BMPP 13/222 of 5.3.1998, p. 20291 (D); see also Bundes-
tag BPP 13/6891 (Section II.3.c), bb) (2) above). 
2  See Section I.1. above.  
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Altogether, the German Bundestag is well informed about European matters, if the 
quantity of information is taken as a basis. Members  are no longer critical of the situa-
tion now that the procedure for the treatment of EU items, based on the new regulations, 
is operating effectively. The problem at present is that there is too much information, 
which distracts attention from important issues. The Bundestag receives and processes a 
large number of EU items, but examines only a few of them in detail. It states its posi-
tion, through the plenary, on less than five per cent of the EU items transmitted to it. 
The Bundestag devotes a significant  proportion of its resources to dealing with EU 
items, yet in very few cases do the outcomes of its work have any external impact with 
the help of the plenary. Nonetheless, there are currently no specific plans to redefine the 
Bundestag’s role in European matters. 
The Bundestag cannot be described as a key player in the European decision-making 
process. It is a ‘supportive scrutinizer’ of the actions of the Federal Government, which 
dominates European policy. In this sense, European policy is still foreign p olicy, a l-
though in substantive terms, it has now evolved into (European) internal policy. 
Within the Federal Republic’s parliamentary system, the Bundestag can only exert sub-
stantial influence in European matters within narrow limits. Firstly, due to the r elatively 
stable majorities, which have traditionally existed in Parliament, the political consensus 
between the Federal Government, which acts, and the Parliament, which scrutinizes its 
actions through its majority, is safeguarded on a broad basis. Moreover, in European 
policy in particular, there is little potential for conflict with the minority/opposition. 
Secondly, the Bundesrat is vigilant in its efforts to ensure that it is always able to exer-
cise its rights of participation. 
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The Parliament of Greece:  Slow but Constant Moves Towards European 
Integration?  
 
Peter Zervakis and Nikos Yannis 
 
I. Political Culture and Parliamentary Democracy in Greece 
 
Greece has a fully functioning parliamentary democracy only since 1974.
1 Unlike in 
Spain and Portugal, however, the end of the military dictatorship did not decisively a f-
fect the traditional functioning of the Greek Parliament (Voulí ton Ellínon) as a single 
legislative body, which currently comprises 300 members.
2 Two factors may explain 
this:  The regime of the colonels (1967-1974) did only last for seven years. "Parliamen-
tary democracy", as stated in article 1 of the Constitution of 1975, has a long tradition of 
over 130 years.
3 Therefore, the established client-oriented networks (‘rous-
féti’/favouritism) among deputies and electors and the charisma of party leaders resisted 
successfully the authoritarian military rule. On the other hand, this also applies for the 
problematic habits, which survived beneath all institutional innovations of the third 
Greek Republic. U ntameable party patronage, nepotism, clientelism, and charismatic 
leadership still characterise Greek political culture.
4 Despite these lasting structural fea-
tures in the political culture of the country, the Greek political system has changed dra-
matically after the restoration of democracy in 1974. At least five factors contributed to 
its smooth democratisation:
5 
                                                 
1   See Pridham, Geoffrey: ‘Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A 
Model of Regime Transition?”, in: Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.): The New Mediterranean Democracies: 
Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal, London 1984, pp.1-29; Featherstone, K e-
vin/Katsoudas, Dimitrios K. (eds.): Political Change in Greece before and after the Colonels, London 
1987; Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev (ed.), Handbook on South Eastern Europe, vol. III, Greece, Göttin-
gen 1980. 
2   Greek constitutions only twice provided for exceptions to the rule: Between 1844 and 1864 and 1924 
and 1935 central authority was completed by regional and functional (by occupational groups) repre-
sentation in an upper house (Senate) which respected the fact that the weak central state was founded 
on strong regions. Legg, Keith R./Roberts, John M.: Modern Greece, A Civilization on the Periphe-
ry, Boulder 1997, p. 119.  
3   Zervakis, Peter: ‘Das griechische Parlament. Kontinuität und Wandel seit 1974’, in: Steffani, Win-
fried/Thaysen, Uwe (eds.): Demokratie in Europa: Zur Rolle der Parlamente, Opladen 1995, pp. 232-
261. 
4   These deficiencies create a fertile soil even for political terrorism, in so far as it pretends to act in the 
Greek public as a credible counterforce to the state. See Kassimeris, George: ‘Greece: Twenty Years 
of Political Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7/2, 1995, pp. 74-92. 
5   Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos: ‘The Political System in Post-authoritarian Greece (1974-1996): O u-
tline and Interpretations’, in: Ignazi, Piero/Ysmal, Colette (eds.): The Organisation of Political Par-
ties in Southern Europe, Westport/London 1998, pp. 181-201.  
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-  the definite solving of the historical dispute with regard to the constitutional form 
of the state by organising a consensual plebiscite which led to the abolition of the 
monarchy,
1  
-  the abolition of discriminatory legislation of the  - post-civil war  - authoritative 
governments (1944-1967) ensuring political equality for all citizens. The r esult 
was the effective integration of  the Communist and left wing losers of the civil 
war into the new Greek democratic system, 
-  the transition of the dominate post-war Greek Right into a moderate, center-right 
political force (ND/Néa Dimokratía: New Democracy) supporting democracy,
2 
and the establishment of a new political movement. PASOK (Panellínio Sosial-
istikó Kínima: Panhellenic Socialist Movement) was transformed into a socialist 
mass party covering the left-of-center of the Greek political spectrum, which was 
hitherto excluded from political representation by the post-civil war “parakrátos” 
system,
3 
-  the modernisation of the Greek party system resulting in the emergence of two  
mass parties that represent the overwhelming majority of the electorate at the ex-
pense of the smaller parties.
4 This trend, on the other hand, triggered a fierce bi-
partisan competition leading to middle-of-the-way politics avoiding any particular 
trends and cleavages, 
-  the slow but gradual modernisation of the Greek State and its politics towards 
‘mainstream’ West-European political culture. 
There is no doubt that the most enduring feature in Greek politics is the transformation 
of the main political parties. They developed from traditional parties of ‘notables’ to 
modern mass parties. This development was induced by the election system that favours 
- in its strict majoritarian logic  - a one-party government. It influenced decisively the 
emergence of a polarised but stable ‘two-party-system’ in Greece.
5 
                                                 
1   Here it is interesting to note that the plebiscite as the only mechanism of direct democracy in Greece 
is fully controlled by the Greek Government. No Prime Minister has ever used it again since 1974. 
2   See Kalyvas, Stathis N.: ‘The Greek Right: Between Transition and Reform’, in: Wilson, Frank L. 
(ed.): The European Center-Right at the End of the Twentieth Century, London 1999, pp. 87-115. 
3   See Moschonas, Gerassimos: ‘The Panhellenic Socialist Movement’, in: Ladrech, Robert/Marliére, 
Philippe (eds.): Social Democratic Parties in the European Union, History, Organization, Policies, 
London 1999, pp. 110-122. 
4   Papadopoulos, Yannis: ‘The Decline of Small Parties and the Emergence of Two-Partyism  in 
Greece’, in: Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand/Pridham, Geoffrey (eds.): Small Parties in Western Europe, 
Comparative and National Perspectives, London 1991, pp. 174-202. 
5   Papadopoulos, Parties, p. 200. See also Clogg, Richard: Parties and Elections in Greece, The Search 
for Legitimacy, London 1987.  
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1. Greece in View of European Unification 
 
Greek post-war governments had agreed to all initiatives by the Council of Europe, 
NATO and the European Communities for a co-operation framework in Western 
Europe to immunise the country against Communist influence. Therefore and because 
of the perspective of economic prosperity, consecutive governments had been willing to 
include the country into the European Union. However, the Greek society considered 
these developments rather passively. At least those parts, which identified themselves 
with the winners of the civil war supported almost blindly any options of their leader-
ship. Besides, those who had come out as winners of the civil war were convinced that 
they ought a lot to the western support. Consequently, they aimed at more help from the 
‘West’.  
The Greek European movement did play a role in these developments. It is clear that 
European integration has been an issue of political and economic elites in all EU mem-
ber states. This was also the case of Greece: In the 1950’s just two or three non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) made their appearance with the aim to promote the 
European idea, using the limited resources allocated to this purpose through the Marshal 
plan. But their impact on government and society was slim to none. Several Greeks, 
MP’s and others, participated in the Hague Conference in 1948 as well as in subsequent 
meetings of the early European movement. However, it remains a dispute whether the 
European founding countries included Greece into their plans. It was mainly due to the 
financial milieu, which expressed its reservations with regard to the ‘immature circum-
stances’ that led the Greek Government to ignore a possible participation of the country 
in the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, Greece sub-
mitted its application for an association agreement with the EEC in 1961. The agree-
ment was signed in 1962. The Greek economic circles now supported the country’s 
European perspective with more enthusiasm. However, the society f ocused onto the 
domestic political controversies that led to the coup in 1967. During the years of the 
dictatorship the country’s European course was officially suspended. Nevertheless, the 
European idea was identified - at least to a certain degree - with the perspective to rein-
stall democracy. Accordingly, European  co-operation and integration acquired more 
attention within the society. 
The restoration of democracy was marked by the simultaneous and decisive promotion 
of democratic institutions as well as Greece’s accession to the EC under the leadership 
of Constantine Karamanlis and his party New Democracy. Since then the party became 
closely identified with the ‘European option’ of Greece. However, a large part of the 
society wanted to manifest its anti-American feelings and repulsions to the ‘West’ due  
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to the Turkish invasion in Cyprus.
1 The European idea lost its attractiveness for an addi-
tional reason: Hence, the popular reaction to dictatorship induced a shift of the Greek 
electorate towards the left-wing  - at that time rather Euro-sceptic - parties. The conflict 
between capitalism and s ocialism caused the refusal of public opinion and the societal 
organisations to support Greece’s European aspirations.
2 In the 1977 elections, the then 
‘anti-European’ party of PASOK became the major opposition party, rendering parlia-
mentary acceptance of accession even more difficult. The legitimacy of the European 
Community became an intensely debated issue in society. The trade u nions and local 
governments, mostly under the control of the left, were fighting the a ccession fierce 
fully. At the same time the pro-European NGO's
3 made their appearance once again and 
promoted the European idea. However, they did not substantially influence the acces-
sion process.  
The 1980’s - the first EC decade for Greece - are considered as rather sterile with regard 
to the potential effects of Europeanisation, the official policy and the mobilisation of the 
societal powers and the non-governmental organisations. Nevertheless during the mid-
1980’s the ‘societal soil’ was turning fertile for a spectacular turn. At the level of public 
opinion, the EU’s bi-annual ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys reported a growing Greek support 
for integration.
4 In the 1990’s all political parties supported their country’s European 
direction  - with the sole exception of the Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (KKE), the 
Communist Party of Greece (CPG). Social movements, universities, mass media - tradi-
tional and new private channels - as well as local governments changed their stance vis-
à-vis the European idea and gradually rephrased their strategy with respect the EC real-
ity. A set of new - rather pro-European - NGO's appeared covering various themes and a 
wider geographic distribution across the country, larger membership and greater open-
ness towards the society.
5 
However, during the negotiations of the Single European Act (SEA, 1985-1986), the 
participation of civil society and public opinion did almost not exist. In all parliamen-
tary elections since 1974 as well as in the elections to the EP since 1984 European i s-
                                                 
1   See Bahcheli, Tozun: ‘Domestic Political Developments’, in: Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev/Steffani, 
Winfried/Zervakis, Peter (eds.), Handbook on South Eastern Europe, vol. 8, Cyprus, Göttingen 1998, 
pp. 91-125. 
2   Concerning this period see Kazakos, Panos: ‘The historical choice of Greece’s integration and the 
‘adjustment gap’’, in: Ekfrasi, Evropaiki, 32, Winter 1999, pp. 20. (in Greek) 
3   For instance ‘Association Européenne des Enseignants’, ‘Young European Federalists’, ‘European 
Union of Journalists’, and ‘House of Europe’. 
4   Verney, Susannah: ‘Dual Vision: Divided Perceptions of Europe in the Political Party Debate on 
European Integration’, in: Heppner, Harald/Katsiardi-Hering, Olga (eds.): Die Griechen und Europa, 
Außen- und Innenansichten im Wandel der Zeit, Köln/Weimar 1998, pp. 225. 
5   Today it is estimated that in Greece there are more than 15 NGO’s that have a character of direct 
promotion of the European idea; some 20-30, which contribute indirectly to the promotion of the Eu-
ropean idea. Of course, the European dimension has also penetrated most of the civil society organi-
sations. Civil society, which was substantially weak, has been developed particularly during the last 
years.  
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sues had never played a n important role: Hence, all elections in Greece - with an aver-
age voter turnout of 79 percent due to compulsory voting  - are mainly an arena for the 
two competing national mass parties and their leaders.
1  
On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) generated heated 
debates, especially after its ratification by the Greek Parliament.  
 
2. The Relationship between Parliament and Government  
 
By recognising the crucial role of political parties in article 29 of the Greek Constitution 
of 1 975, their party leaders (Art. 37.II) and the dependence of any government on the 
parliamentary majority (Art. 84), the Greek Chamber of Deputies b ecame the central 
forum for the political battles between majority and opposition for the first time in mod-
ern Greek history.
2 In reality, the Voulí is more or less instrumental to the Prime Minis-
ter and his government. This counts even more when a single party received the major-
ity of votes and provides an absolute majority of deputies in parliament. This has been 
the case in post-dictatorial Greece with only two exceptions in 1989/90.
3  
Therefore, since 1975 the Voulí resembled more to a "talking" than to a "working" par-
liament.
4 Like in the pre-dictatorial past, the Parliament features ideological conflicts 
and obstructive disputes rather than constructive or informative d eliberation. Their only 
aim seems to score points vis-à-vis the electorate. This attitude does not help to form 
consensual solutions. Most activities in parliament therefore have an adversarial rather 
than a consensual function. Each parliamentarian majority simply enacts legislation 
proposed by its leader (like Karamanlis, Papandreou or Simitis) who usually presides 
over his party and the Government. Therefore, the parliamentarian minority simply 
tends to restrict itself to generally opposing, delaying and disrupting government. A b-
stentions and parliamentary withdrawals are a common rule. The major actors in the 
chamber are the parties and not its individual members. The latter are dependent on 
                                                 
1   Zervakis, Peter: ‘Das politische System Griechenlands’, in: Ismayr, Wolfgang (ed.): Die politischen 
Systeme Westeuropas, second edition, Opladen 1999, pp. 637-672, p. 654. For basic empirical data 
on voters turnout at elections to the European Parliament see Wenturis, Nikolaos: Griechenland und 
die EG, Die soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen griechischer Europapolitiken, Tübingen 1990. Al-
though PASOK was a mass party since its beginnings in 1974, the N.D./Conservatives became a 
mass party only gradually between 1982-1989, while the party was for the first time and for a longer 
period out of government. See Frangakis, Nikos/ Papayannides, Antonis D.: ‘Greece: a never-ending 
story of mutual attraction and estrangement’, in: Wessels, Wolfgang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen 
(eds.): Fifteen into One?, Manchester 2001. 
2   Zervakis, Peter: ‘Republik Griechenland’, in: Steffani, Winfried (ed.): Regierungsmehrheit und 
Opposition in den Staaten der EG, Opladen 1991, pp. 195-219.  
3   Zervakis, Parlament, p. 243. 
4   Legg/Roberts, Greece, pp. 120-122. See also Zervakis, Griechenland, p. 641 and Alivizatos, Nikos: 
‘The Difficulties of ‘Rationalization’ in a Polarized Political System: the Greek Chamber of Depu-
ties’, in: Liebert, Ulrike/Cotta, Maurizio (eds.): Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Sou-
thern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, London 1990, pp. 131-153.  
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party whips, which ensure voting and party discipline according to government’s 
wishes. If a MP resigns during the legislative period because of disagreement with the 
party, s/he gets immediately replaced by another member of the party list who is loyal 
to the leadership. Therefore, MP’s tend to break away from their main party by making 
a statement of independence and then remain in parliament without exerting much i n-
fluence inside the legislative process. The small parties are virtually ignored.
1  
Although the Constitution gives both single deputies and government the same right to 
propose legislation, it is the Greek Government that virtually monopolises this function. 
In practice, all legislative tasks are increasingly delegated to ministers who tend to  in-
troduce ‘catch-all’ bills. The minister of finance plays a special role in the Constitution. 
This is due to the restrictions that are placed on the act of introducing the annual budget, 
which is regarded as the most important piece of legislation. Additionally, there is no 
mechanism for parliamentary oversight with regard to the budget and its implementa-
tion. A further weakening of parliamentary power is that all Greek governments rely on 
an increasing use of ‘urgent’ provisions to avoid critical discussions, which might e n-
danger the ministers’ public stand. If the plenary meeting fails to discuss and vote 
within just a few sessions such a ‘urgent’ bill is automatically passed without parlia-
mentary vote.  
The Committee stage of the legislative process is r ather formal and the parliamentary 
organs generally debate on legislation for only about a week. In the Greek Parliament 
there are only six permanent standing committees in operation.
2 Proposed legislation is 
not discussed thoroughly by the committees. Public hearings that might draw attention 
on proposed legislation and its consequences are not often provided for. The committees 
are only allowed to prepare non-binding reports on a pending bill. This report has to be 
ignored by the plenary if the proposing  minister wishes so; the debate is then restricted 
to the original minister’s bill. Consequently, every proposal introduced in parliament is 
debated and voted on in a few days, because the outcome is quite clear and the Gov-
ernment can rely on its parliamentary majority.  
The number of passed bills has constantly diminished in recent years. Hence, there is an 
increasing tendency to transfer legislative activity from parliament to the a dministration, 
although the Constitution permits such a transfer only in times of emergency (Art. 43 
and 44.2).
3  
Overall, parliamentary control of government provided for by the Constitution is not 
very effective. The deputies’ attendance in parliament is minimal. Motions of confi-
                                                 
1   Papadopoulos, Parties, 192.  
2   There are three more permanent committees (for technology evaluation, the Greek diaspora and 
institutions and transparency) called ‘idikés mónimes epitropés’. But they are not authorised to do 
any legislative work. Then there are the various other select and ad hoc committees as well as the so 
called ‘internal committees’ dealing with the Rules of Chamber. 
3   Alivizatos, Difficulties, p . 139-142, Legg/Roberts, Greece, p.121 and Zervakis, Griechenland, p. 
645.   
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dence and/or censure are uncommon in Greece. The  Government (Prime Minister and 
his cabinet) depends on the formal support of parliament and normally receives this 
from the majority of members within two weeks after taking over office. Despite a nar-
row margin of the voting turn-out - 0.5 percent as in the last elections in April 2000 - , 
the electoral system ensures that only one party operates with an absolute majority of 
seats.
1 As there is no danger of party fragmentation, a government cannot be threatened 
effectively by successful motions of censure o r non-confidence. In addition, many con-
stitutional regulations favour the governmental majority. As a consequence, the average 
MP
2  - who has significant staff of up to five assistants
3 and office facilities at his dis-
posal  - is less i nvolved in the activities of the chamber. Instead s/he tries to meet the 
demands and requests of his/her constituency by concentrating efforts towards the pro-
duction of exceptions and loopholes in the  - national  - legislative process to the benefit 
of particular individual interests.
4 
 
II. The Long Way towards Europeanisation of Greece 
 
The term ‘Europeanisation’ defines an ongoing and time-consuming process, whereby 
various economic, administrative, social and political actors shift the center of gravity 
of decision-making from the traditional, strictly national level to a multi-level focus that 
considers the European Union (EU) as part of the domestic structure.
5 In this perspec-
tive, the EU acts as a co-formulator for national p olitical choices. This approach looks 
at European  policy not as foreign policy but as an integral part of a new, self-sufficient 
whole, which has not reached its final structure.
6 This does not mean that European 
unification is a purely supranational procedure, as its eminent protagonists are the gov-
ernments, and states remain the masters of the Treaties. However, Europeanisation of 
domestic structures points at a new supranational level, which co-exists among the n a-
tion-states on the basis of a “confederal consociation”
7. Besides governments many 
institutional actors (like trade unions, professional and business associations, parties 
                                                 
1   Zervakis, Peter: ‘Griechenland’, in: Weidenfeld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.), Jahrbuch der 
europäischen Integration 1999/2000, Bonn 2000, pp. 340-341.  
2   Women are still a vast minority in the Voulí; between 1981 and 1989 on average only 4,3 percent of 
all MP’s were women. Zervakis, Griechenland, p. 642. 
3   Three civil servants from the public service, of whom only one needs to have an academic back-
ground, one personal aide and one policeman/security staff. 
4   For these particular political patron-client relations see Campbell, John K.: ‘Traditional Values and 
Continuities in Greek Society’, in: Clogg, Richard (ed.): Greece in the 1980’s, New York 1983, pp. 
184-207. 
5   See Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘The Growth and Differentiation of Multi-Level-Networks: A corporatist 
Mega-Bureaucracy or an Open City?”, in: Helen Wallace/Alasdair A. Young (eds.), Participation 
and policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford 1997, p. 36. 
6   See the introduction by Andreas Maurer in this volume. 
7   Chryssochoou, Dimitris: Theorising European Integration, London 2001, p. 2, pp. 26-27.  
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etc.) in the member states increasingly focus their individual demands at the European 
dimension by establishing representative federal structures in Brussels (e.g. European 
parties such as the PSE or EPP, interest groups such as COPA-COGECA). Hence, the 
influence of national interest groups is gradually reinforced by their European federa-
tions, while they organise their presence in these - sometimes rather loose - structures i n 
a way to become the most gaining receptors of the European negotiation process.
1 
Greece became the tenth member of the European Community in 1981 after a lmost 
twenty years of the association agreement with the EC granting a customs union. This 
remarkable development at the international level was initially i ntended to recognise the 
need of stabilising a state with a sensitive geo-political frontline position between the 
two Cold War blocks. In addition, the recourse to classical h umanistic education helped 
contemporary Greece to be romantically regarded by its European partners as a crucial 
contributor to the Western civilisation with a historical privilege to participate in the 
Community.
2 Later, Brussels mainly saw the European integration of Greece as a  r e-
ward for the successful completion of the country’s re-democratisation process after 
dictatorship. Greek actors emphasised their need for external security vis-à-vis Turkey. 
But as the European integration process was itself a by-product of the Cold War it had 
several lasting effects for the Greek society and politics. At the time, the poor Balkan 
country was not prepared to compete with the open economies of the advanced, indus-
trialised and pluralistic societies in Western Europe. A high degree of bureaucratic cen-
tralisation and state control of the private business sector prevented the emergence of an 
independent civil society. Therefore, the two major political parties were - and still are - 
compelled to compete for the effective control of the state i n order to distribute favours 
to their supporters and to secure their electoral success. As a reaction, Greece’s Euro-
pean vocation soon became part of the traditional party struggle for the temporary e x-
ploitation of the state’s benefits. This r esulted in c ontradictory policies, especially with 
regard to economic, regional and social policy.
1  
Beneath the instrumentalisation of the EU for domestic party competition a deeply p o-
larised image of Europe reigns in large segments of the elites and of public opinion. The 
‘Euro-enthusiasts’ understand ‘imported’ Europeanisation and integration as the only 
way to modernise Greece’s democratic institutions according to the needs and with the 
help of the ‘Western’ (European) model. The ‘Euro-sceptics’ represent a "traditional, 
                                                 
1   See Lavdas, Kostas: The Europeanisation of Greece - Interest politics and the crises of integration, 
London 1997.  
2   Though Greeks generally tend to overemphasise ancient Greece’s contribution to European civilisa-
tion because of their strong national identity virtually ignoring other elements of European history. 
Veremis, Thanos/Constas, Dimitris: ‘The Beginning of the D iscussion on European Union in 
Greece’, in: Lipgens, Walter/Loth, Wilfried (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integra-
tion, vol. 3: The Struggle for Political Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western Eu-
ropean Countries, 1945-1950, Berlin, 1988, pp. 801-825.  
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anti-modern orthodox Greekness" (Romiosýni) and are highly suspicious against any 
external (especially catholic-western) threat (Xénos parágontas) to the "sacred n ational 
identity". These competing perceptions of Europe run through the two major parties, the 
Socialists/PASOK and the Conservatives/ND. Both parties became the main actors in 
the EC/EU debate. Due to the lack of participation and interest of public opinion in EU 
politics, they can dominate and direct the debate.  
Karamanlis, the ND’s founder and prime minister took the initiative for Greece’s acces-
sion to the EC/EU because he wanted his country "to belong to the West". Andreas Pa-
pandreou, his long term adversary and founder of PASOK, won the elections in 1981 
with 48 per cent of the votes. His campaign was largely inspired by radical anti-
European slogans, which opposed vehemently Greek membership in the EC. Hence, 
until the early 1980’s the Greek Left largely identified European integration with U.S. 
capitalist and NATO subjugation dreaming of a ‘third way’ between the two cold war 
superpowers. Not surprisingly  - given the populist style of Greek politicians - there was 
little interest of what the European model actually contained and how it functioned. The 
variations in political and social institutions and practices among the Western European 
states have never been deeply discussed.
2 
These opposing attitudes with regard to ‘Brussels’ only changed progressively from 
1985 onwards.
3 After fiercely debating the renegotiation of Greek EC membership a 
majority of PASOK finally accepted the EC as a useful framework within they had to 
operate in order to meet their national goals without risking the end of the financial 
transfers. By the end of the Cold War and after experiencing international isolation be-
cause of its temporary nationalist foreign policy in the Balkans all major parties except 
the traditional Communists (KKE) moved towards an enthusiastic support for European 
integration. Finally, having been a ccepted as the tenth member state of  the Schengen 
Agreement in 2000 - after being rejected twice since 1992 - and as the 12th member of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001, Greece features today an enthusiastic 
and wholehearted party support for the EU.
4 The EU is widely regarded as the main 
catalyst for the modernisation of society  - especially among the economic and political 
elites as well as in the media. Hence, the EU assists the ambitious Greek infrastructure 
projects through both the Cohesion and the Structural funds. Moreover, the EU stabi-
lises Greek foreign policy. However, the Greek society notes bitterly the i gnorance of 
important Greek interests during the Öcalan crisis in 1999 and the absence of EU initia-
                                                                                                                                               
1   See Trombetas, T. P.: ‘The Political Dimensions of Greece’s Accession to the EU: Commitment or 
Regression’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 29, 1983, pp. 63-74. 
2   Verney, Dual Vision, pp. 193-226. See also Wenturis, Nikolaos: Griechenland und die EG, Die 
soziopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen griechischer Europapolitiken, Tübingen 1990. 
3   Ioakimidis, Panayiotis: ‘Contradictions in the Europeanisation process’, in: Featherstone, K e-
vin/Ifantis, Kostas (eds.): Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European integration and Balkan 
disintegration?, Manchester 1996, pp.33-52. 
4   Zervakis, Griechenland, p. 339.  
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tives during the Kosovo war. Europe is therefore not regarded as a reliable partner se-
curing the country’s and the Community’s external borders. On the other hand, the new 
leadership of Prime Minister Simitis and the ruling PASOK have adopted a convincing 
pro-European stance by declaring Greece’s participation to the third stage of EMU as 
the ultimate national policy objective.
1  
One can find resistance to this devoted Europeanisation policy from the KKE and some 
dissenting factions within the ruling PASOK. However, the Communists have become 
relatively marginal in Greek political life. Today, only the state subsidised Orthodox 
Church seems to be the most ‘aggressive’ Euro-sceptic part of the Greek society. 
Church authorities organise mass rallies thereby challenging Greek government’s a c-
tions to adhere to the separation of church and state. Thus, the Greek clergy perceives 
secular Europe as a potential threat to its own state protected privileges.
2  
 
III. The Institutional Framework in EC/EU Affairs from Maastricht to Amsterdam 
 
The Treaty of Accession of Greece to the European  Communities was ratified only by a 
simple majority in the Voulí based on Article 28.3 of the Greek Constitution. During the 
debate on the ratification of the Treaty the then Socialist opposition asked for a two-
thirds majority voting and a constitutional r eferendum to sanction the transfer of sover-
eignty that followed accession. But since 1974 no political i ssue has been dealt through 
a referendum. Hence the Greek Constitution does not foresee such an element of direct 
democracy. The Conservative Government tried to avoid any provocation endangering 
Greek membership. However, once PASOK was in government it virtually ignored all 
future demands for ratification acts via referenda. Due to a weak opposition and tradi-
tionally weak institutions of Greek civil society the Socialists in power did not meet 
much resistance. Finally, the p olitical costs of ignoring anti-governmental views were 
minimal due to the highly centralised forms of policy-making in Greece.
3 
During the 1980’s  - a ‘lost decade’ for Greece’s engagement in the EC/EU, the then 
anti-European PASOK Government only agreed to an intergovernmental a pproach with 
                                                 
1   Papaschinopoulou, Mary (ed.): Griechenland auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Wä-
hrungsunion, Wie kann v on den deutschen Erfahrungen sinnvoll profitiert werden?, Greece on 
Course Towards the European Economic and Monetary Union, Lessons to be learnt from the Ger-
man Experience, Baden-Baden 1999. 
2   See Archbishop Christodoulos’ speech in Pnika: ‘The role of Orthodoxy in the European Union’, in: 
Evropaiki Ekfrassi, 39, 2000, pp. 8 -12 (in Greek) and Zervakis, Peter: ‘Griechenland’, in: Weiden-
feld, Werner/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): Jahrbuch der e uropäischen Integration 2000/2001, Bonn 
2001, pp. 149-154. 
3   See Spanou, Calliope, ‘Greece’, in Kassim, Hussein, B./Peters, Guy/Wright, Vincent (eds.): The 
National Co-ordination of EU Policy, Oxford 2000, p. 177 and Sotiropoulos, Dimitris: The Remains 
of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-authoritarian Greece, Madrid, Juan 
March Institute, Working Paper, 1995/96.  
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regard to European integration. It was only during the negotiations and the ratifications 
of the Maastricht and Amsterdam versions of the TEU that PASOK changed its general 
attitude on the vertical and horizontal organisation of the EU. During the 1990’s a 
unique consensus between government and opposition emerged in favouring increased 
majority-voting in the Council, more powers for the Commission  and a stronger role for 
the European Parliament. When these positions were ‘tested’ in the reality of the EU 
relations with the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) and with Tur-
key, the Greek members in the Council of Ministers either did not respect the EU’s de-
cisions on foreign policy and initiated an important legal dispute, or they tried to block 
all relevant decisions. As single member state the Greek government argued with its 
sovereign rights in sensitive national issues. But once the European Court of Justice 
decided in favour of the EU’s foreign policy towards FYROM, Greece complied with 
the ruling.  
 
1. The Institutional Framework of the Government 
 
The creation of a Ministry for EC/EU affairs has been discussed since 1981. However, 
the relevant proposals have not been realised due to a sharp competition for responsibil-
ity between the affected ministers. Therefore, co-ordination in EU matters has been 
shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for National Economy, 
where a lternate ministers or under-secretaries are in charge of European affairs. The 
most stable form of intra-governmental co-operation is to be found at the level of inter-
ministerial committees. Their meetings frequently take place at the Secretary-General or 
Minister’s assistants level. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Services also have Secretary-Generals for European Affairs. Many other minis-
tries (e.g. Interior and Public Order as well as Industry, Public Works, U rbanism and 
Environment, and Education) have European Affairs Directorates that r eport directly to 
their respective minister. Because of the traditional dominating role of the Prime Minis-
ter in Foreign Affairs and the competition between the aforementioned ministries, co-
ordination is also assumed by his office in matters of national importance.  
The Greek Permanent Representation in Brussels is a formal branch of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and works with a staff of some 100 civil servants (40 diplomats, 60 
détachés from technical ministries). Here the administrators try to co-ordinate European 
affairs as semi-independent actors, but occasionally meet the envy and passive resent-
ment of their mid-career colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens.
1  
                                                 
1   Spanou, Greece, pp. 166-170.  
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2. The Institutional Framework of the Greek Parliament 
 
In the first two decades after Greece’s accession to the Union the Greek Parliament 
played a minimal role in the domestic formation of foreign policy in general, and Euro-
pean policies in particular. The technical nature of delegated legislation for the incorpo-
ration of European legislation sidelines the Voulí and limits its access to information 
and the opportunity of debating EU subjects. Adaptation of Greek law to the ‘Aquis 
Communautaire’ usually takes place by presidential d ecrees. The Greek Constitution 
does not oblige the Government to consult Parliament before accepting these decrees. 
Therefore, the extensive use of ‘legislative authorisations’ has been established. A l-
though there are no systematic research data available on the structure and functions of 
the Greek Voulí either in Greek political science or in the Greek parliament’s research 
unit, occasional studies on the way of incorporating EC legislation into Greek legisla-
tion between 1981 to 1 995 suggest that from 795 legal acts, which incorporated previ-
ous EC legislation, 215 were Presidential Decrees and 381 Ministerial Decisions.
1 Con-
sequently the main burden of incorporating Community directives is shouldered by the 
executive-administrative power. It is clear that this practice is not a real incentive to 
exercise parliamentary scrutiny in the upstream process of EU law-making effectively. 
But even the limited opportunities of parliament to play a role in EC politics have not 
been exploited,  because neither the governmental majority nor the opposition have 
shown any substantive interest in EU affairs. Despite the 1979 law obliging the Gov-
ernment to submit annual reports on EC developments to the Parliament, it was only in 
1989 that the Government submitted a first report of this kind.  
As regards the so-called ‘pre-agenda’ debates  - a special procedure aside the normal 
parliamentary routine strictly limited to party leaders to debate on public n ational issues, 
including EU issues, without real  decision-making function  - only seven items were 
discussed since 1990. Instead, Parliament strongly relied on its traditional indirect ways 
of influencing governmental policies in the process of European integration by promot-
ing structural reforms of the C onstitution and the political system resulting from EU 
membership.
2 
The situation changed slightly after the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. As the 
implementation of the Treaty with regard to the daily business of the EU institutions has 
modified the  characteristics of EC regulations  - rendering them a more legislative d i-
mension  - it allowed the increased involvement of national parliaments. Indeed, the 
                                                 
1   Unpublished Communication with the Hellenic Chamber of Deputies, Directorate for International 
Relations, ‘The follow-up of incorporation and application of community legislation by the Hellenic 
Parliament’, 27 January 1995, pp. 1-4. 
2   Zervakis, System, p. 668, Spanou, Greece, p. 174, fn. 21, Ioakimidis, Panagiotis C.: ‘The EC and the 
Greek Political System: An Overview’, in: Kazakos, Panos/Ioakimidis, Panagiotis (eds.), Greece and 
EC Membership Evaluated, New York 1994, p. 6; Pliakos, Alexandros: ‘The Legislative Production 
of Parliament’, in: Evropiaki Ekfrassi, 20 January 1996, pp. 18-19. (in Greek)  
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directives on the accomplishment of the internal market and the perspective of Mone-
tary Union have r esulted in a more frequent resort to legislative bills at the national 
level. Since Greece’s EC/EU membership 40 legislative bills concerning the incorpora-
tion of EC directives have been adopted step by step. Through these bills the Greek 
legislator induces institutional changes upon a series of the Greek economy’s sectors, 
thus modifying their structure to fulfil the d emands of European integration. However, 
the Greek Parliament is still reluctant to deal with technical EU issues and has restricted 
itself  to ex-post-scrutiny of governmental actions in EU affairs or even to simply fol-
lowing the Government and the administration.
1  
 
3. The Committee for European Affairs 
 
In June 1990, thus right at the beginning of the ND Mitsotakis Government and in view 
of  the upcoming IGC leading to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the President of 
the Chamber decided to establish the first Standing Committee for European Affairs 
(Epitropí Evropaikón Ypothésseon). The attempt was mainly influenced by the IGC 
debates o n democracy and transparency in the European Union. The decision referred 
explicitly to a motion of the EP, which recommended the creation of such an institution 
in each national parliament and which underlined the fact that Greece was the only 
member state without such a committee. In 1993 the Chamber added a new article 32a 
to its Rules of Procedure and confirmed the new parliamentary Committee for European 
Affairs (CEA).
2 Following a further revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber 
(1997) the Government became obliged to notify all EU proposals to all Permanent 
Committees of the Vouli through its President. 
The CEA is composed of 16 MP's and 15 Greek MEP's. The Committee is chaired by a 
- non-elected  - vice-president of the Greek Chamber who presides the meetings as ex 
officio member. The MEP's have the same voting rights like their n ational colleagues. 
The Committee meets only irregularly and considers institutional issues arising from 
EU membership, co-operation between national parliaments and  the EP, the incorpora-
tion of European legislation into Greek law and EU issues arising from the work of 
other national parliamentary committees. It holds seven to eight meetings a year with 
regular presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. All ministers have to brief the 
Committee and answer questions  - the main instrument of parliamentary control. Hence, 
from 1981 to 1993, 743 questions concerning European affairs were posed by Parlia-
                                                 
1   Though one has to take into account the special and technical nature of Community law until the 
entering into force of the Single European Act and the limited cases where the Greek Constitution 
excludes the issue of legislative authorisations (i.e. restriction on personal rights, regulation of issues 
of tax or penal character according to articles 72.1, 78.1 and 78.4 Greek Constitution). 
2   Yannis, Nikos: ‘The Quest for Participation in European Policy’; Ekfrasi, Evropaiki, 20 January 
1996, pp. 20-27. (in Greek)  
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ment to scrutinise government. However, while 427 questions were directed to the Min-
istries of Agriculture and National Economy, only 55 were aimed at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
1 The CEA’s main mission is to evaluate European Union affairs with 
particular attention to actions taken by the Greek authorities. In addition the CEA e x-
presses its opinion in reports which are submitted to the Parliament and the Govern-
ment. Since 1993, it presented two reports per year. The reports can be discussed in the 
plenary sessions of parliament, without being voted on. This procedure was not used 
until 1996.  
The CEA has a mere consultative status and does not operate as a legislative body. 
Government, on the other hand, is required to transmit all documents and legislative 
proposals of the EU to the CEA and to other interested parliamentary committees. In 
addition, the Government has to submit an annual general report on its EC/EU related 
activities on European affairs. As already noted, it made no use of this possibility at all 
until the end of 1996.  
In reality, the initial  - post-1990  - awakening of parliamentary activities in EU affairs 
did not last for long. Effective scrutiny by the CEA has been rather low, although minis-
ters as well as government officials show up to defend or to explain government’s posi-
tions. Hearings are usually a mere formality due to the rather complicated technical 
nature of the issues on the EU’s agenda and the consensual mode of implementation 
between governmental majority and opposition in Parliament. On the other hand, the 
hearings sensitise the members of the Committee who tend to participate more actively 
in the plenary debates and the exercise of parliamentary control than their other col-
leagues. European issues with importance to the general public are dealt with in the 
normal plenary debates, because they are likely to catch the interest of the media.  
However, these exchanges between majority and opposition do not lead to any kind of 
effective scrutiny. The CEA’s demands for more information and involvement in Euro-
pean matters are not taken into account adequately by the Government. If there is no 
media interest on a given EU item, EU affairs are dealt with in the Chamber with long 
delays. Hence, the ministers are responsible for the delayed submission of bills and the 
tactical involvement of domestic p arty politics. Moreover, the Prime Minister’s question 
time is normally used by the opposition to criticise the Government and not to raise 
essential questions with regard to EU issues. Given their complicated and technical n a-
ture, EU draft acts are largely neglected.  
Despite its low political visibility, the CEA helped decisively to promote the ‘Europe-
anisation’ of the Greek Parliament.
2 The reason for the relative failure of effective par-
liamentary scrutiny  - and thus for the ‘democratic deficit’ in the  Greek context  - are 
                                                 
1   Yannis, Parliament, p. 24.  
2   Yannis, Parliament, p. 26, Spanou, Greece, p. 175. See also Papadimitriou, Giorgos: ‘European 
Integration and National Constitution’, in: Maraveyas, Nikos/Tsinisizelis, Michalis (eds.): The Inte-
gration of the European Union, Athens 1995. (in Greek)  
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certainly not the inappropriate or insufficient institutional arrangements. The Voulí sim-
ply does not make enough use of the already existing possibilities, which are offered by 
the Constitution! Moreover, the decision-making at the governmental level still permits 
and prefers traditional client-driven networks and an authoritarian prime minister rather 
than exhausting negotiations. This kind of EU policy-management ‘from above’ ensures 
that no positions are taken that may lead to public or media criticism.  
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Figure 6: The Process of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EC/EU Affairs in Greece 
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IV. The Greek Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
1. The Mobilisation of the Greek Society 
 
The Greek society b ecame mobilised during the process of the 1996/1997 Intergovern-
mental Conference. It was also one of the most intense campaigns at pan-European 
level.
1 The intensified interest can be attributed to the following reasons: 
(A) The remarkable re-orientation o f the major political forces with regard to European 
affairs since the beginning of the 1990’s - mirrored by a large parliamentary majority of 
over 90 per cent on the ratification of both, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.
2 
The parliamentary debate in both cases was more extensive than ever before within both 
the CEA and the plenary. It should be noted that from 1990 until the signing of the Am-
sterdam Treaty in 1997, eleven debates took place in the plenary on the issue of the 
country’s course in the E U. During the first ten years of membership no such debate had 
ever taken place! Following the entry into force of the TEU on 1 November 1993, the 
CEA asserted its claim for participation in the discussions for the revision of the Maas-
tricht Treaty. From S eptember 1994 until May 1997, the Committee held twenty-one 
sessions on issues related to the 1996/1997 IGC and elaborated two reports presenting 
its own views: One before the official start of the IGC in July 1995
3 and another one 
before the conference’s  conclusion in May 1997.
4 It is also noteworthy that the plenary 
held the first public hearing on 8-9 May 1997, in which the Greek social partners con-
vened together with Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Jacques Santer, the then Presi-
dent of the European Commission. 
(B) The public debate on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty lasted in Greece one 
year and a half before its final entry into force. This was due to the fact that the Greek 
Government rushed to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in June 1991 following the anti-
European referendum in Denmark. Therefore, it discontinued Parliament’s summer 
section and summoned up an extraordinary meeting of the plenary, to send out its clear 
pro-European message. The Euro-scepticism that emerged through the negative Danish 
referendum also began to influence the public debate in Greece - after the Treaty’s rati-
fication. The raised awareness of EU issues became visible in the growing interest of 
                                                 
1   For Panayotis K. Ioakimidis, the key advisor of the Greek foreign ministry on the EU who participa-
ted actively in almost all official preparation of the IGC and the new Treaty as well as to the public 
debate, the discussion in Greece was the most intense among all the other EU members. 
2   See more extensively, Kazakos, Panos/Ioakimidis, Panayotis C. (eds.): Greece and EC membership 
evaluated, London 1994. 
3   See Greek Chamber of Deputies (ed.): European Union - IGC ‘96, debate, positions and proposals 
that have been expressed in European Affairs Committee, Athens 1995. (in Greek) 
4   See Greek Chamber of Deputies (ed.): Report of European Affairs Committee on the IGC ‘97, 
Athens 30 May 1997. (in Greek)  
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the Greek media and public opinion with regard to the debate on the EU’s i nstitutional 
reform and the revision of the Maastricht Treaty.  
(C) A growing number of interest groups and NGO's realised that the center of gravity 
of decision-making had been gradually developed outside Greece, in the EU Council of 
Ministers. Because organised Greek policy interests can only be e nsured by an active 
participation at the European level, the Greek Industries A ssociation (SEV) submitted 
its own views regarding the general topics dealt by the 1996/1997 IGC as well as issues 
of specific interest for the industry.
1 The SEV’s counterpart, the General Confederation 
of Greek Workers (GSEE), also submitted its views
2 as did the Athens Bar of Lawyers 
(DSA) and other professional organisations.  
(D) The decisions taken in Brussels on the allocation of the Second Community Support 
Framework led to a renewed motion of the economic actors, public administration, local 
governments and mass media on Europe in general and Greece’s participation in EU 
politics. 
(E) The intensity of European NGO's, which formulated claims of great diversity with 
regard to the 1996/1997 IGC, also affected the Greek NGO's and their attitudes vis-à-vis 
the revision of the Maastricht Treaty. Various Greek sections of European NGO's chan-
nelled their views and positions to their respective European organisations, and i n-
formed the Greek citizenry about their activities.
3 Some of their contributions were d i-
rectly publicised in Greece.
4 At least four NGO's dealt with the IGC exclusively: Euro-
pean Expression (Evropaiki E kfrassi)
5, the Greek Committee for the European Union
6, 
Interpost jointly with the Marangopoulou Foundation,
7 and the Citizens Movement 
Against Racism. The main purpose of the NGO’s interventions was their claim for more 
instrumental participation rights in EU decision-making. It should not be overlooked, 
however, that the NGO's have already contributed successfully to the dissemination of 
information, to the transparency, and thus to a limited lifting of the ‘government r e-
                                                 
1   See Provlimatismi, - edition GIA (SEV), 20 June 1995. (in Greek) 
2   See ‘The proposals of GCGW - GSEE: To pave the way for a progressive revision of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’, in Trigazis, Petros, The Citizens demand, Athens 1997. (in Greek) 
3   See, for instance: ‘Association Européenne des Enseignants - A.E.D.E.’, ‘European Women’s Lob-
by’, ‘European Union of Journalists’, ‘Helsinki Citizens Assembly-HCA’, ‘House of Europe’, ‘Am-
nesty International’, ‘Forum des immigres de l’ U.E.’, ‘SOS Racism’ or ‘Young European Federa-
lists’. 
4   See, for instance: ‘Towards a more fair and equal world - the proposals of the European NGOs for 
the external relations of E.U’, Liaison Committee of 800 European Development NGOs, ‘The pro-
posals of the Platform of European Social NGO’s’, the campaign of six big environmental and eco-
logical NGO’s called ‘Greening the Treaty - Sustainable Development in a Democratic Union’ and 
proposals of the European Network of Unemployees (ENU). 
5   See the special issues of Ekfrasi, Evropaiki: ‘The double speed in Europe’ (16, 1995), ‘Europe 1996’ 
(18, 1995), and ‘Institutions and Intergovernmental Conference 1996’, (19, 1995), as well as, ‘Veto 
and unanimity vote in E.U.’ (22, 1996). 
6   Adoption and propagation of a declaration titled ‘The goals of 1996 IGC - declaration’, 23.1.1995. 
7   See the brochure: ‘Athens Appeal f or a Europe of Social Rights’ published in January 1997 and 
1998.  
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stricted area’. In one specific case, the Greek Youth Organisations and the European 
Youth Forum had put forward several proposals on the inclusion of EC treaty provisions 
for an integrated youth policy. The Greek Government set up a specific proposal on this 
issue in its memorandum to the IGC, though it did not meet any success. Equally char-
acteristic is the participation of specialised Greek research institutes and think tanks. 
They contribute to a more academic processing of EU related themes and provide for a 
wider e xchange of ideas. The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
(ELIAMEP)
1, the Greek Center for European Studies (EKEM)
2 and the Greek Center of 
European Studies & Research (EKEME)
3 also contributed widely to the IGC debate. It 
is also noteworthy that these three semi-public and independent institutes assembling 
leading scholars of the country succeeded to arrange their events on the future of Euro-
pean integration to take place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs! Thus they aimed to 
attract the attention of the Greek Government. 
(F) T he question of a referendum in Greece - like in Denmark - was continuously posed 
by the Referendum Committee for Maastricht
4, with the Communist Party holding a 
crucial influence on it. Thus, these extreme left-wing organisations, although t otally 
rejecting the EU, indirectly contributed to the debate on the nature and long term objec-
tives of the EU, its social and class stratification, its course, and institutional structure.
5  
(G) Interest in EU affairs was also raised by the Greek political leadership at the time 
because it favoured and encouraged a structured dialogue with civil society in the pub-
lic.
1 This mobilisation, however, did not sustain for long. As soon as the official IGC 
negotiations began, it lost its momentum. The dialogue with the civil society broke off 
and diplomacy took over again. This rupture proved again that the state governments 
remain the masters of the Treaties and that inter-governmental diplomacy remains the 
only way to amend the European treaties.  
                                                 
1   See Kazakos, Panos: ‘Greece in front of the IGC  - 1996’, Hellenic Foundation for European and 
Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, May 1995. This policy paper has later been published under the 
title ‘Modest reforms and practical innovations, a strategy for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty’, 
in: Defence and Foreign Policy Studies, 24, 1995. See also ‘Conference about IGC’, in: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Athens, 22 May 1995. 
2   See the  EKEM edition: ‘Conference in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the participation of 
MEP’s about the IGC - 1996’, 19 May 1995. 
3   See the EKEME conference edition: ‘Priorities and strategy for the revision of Maastricht’, Round 
Table talk in the Greek Center of European Studies and Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, 26 January 1996. 
4   More than 15 press releases of the ‘Referendum Committee for Maastricht’, which have been distri-
buted during the elaboration of the new Treaty (11.6.1996 - 5.6.1997), have been collected in Nikos 
Yannis’ personal archives. 
5   See ‘Common Declaration of 100 Greek Scholars - University Professors in view of the European 
Council of Amsterdam and claim for a referendum to be carried out in Greece’, ESIEA Conference, 
Athens, 13.6.1997 and Papadopoulos, Makis: ‘In front of the IGC - 1996’, in: Communist Review, 3, 
1995.  
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Overall, the interest of the  main Greek social actors concerning their involvement into 
the new Treaty was substantially high and unprecedented. They finally succeeded to 
initiate a public debate on the Greek national interests in the Treaty. But they were then 
excluded from the negotiations and decision-making in 1996/97. 
 
2. The Amsterdam Treaty and Greek ‘National Claims’ 
 
Public opinion in Greece was not set into motion by the very content of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. This became clear at the European elections of 13 June 1999: The campaigns in 
Greece concentrated mainly on national topics. 70 per cent of the electorate did cast 
their vote for the EP, despite compulsory voting a low rate in the Greek context but a 
particularly high participation rate if compared with the EU average. It  is doubtful 
whether even a small part of the voters were aware not only of the content of the Treaty 
but also of the fact that it had entered into force only a month before the elections (1 
May 1999). The European elections were seen as an occasion to debate the country’s 
progress towards EMU and Greek economic policy in general. However, the debate was 
largely characterised by the introversion of its protagonists. Therefore, the debate can 
not be recorded as an integral part of the discourse in relation to the Amsterdam Treaty, 
which was not connected to a revision of EMU. On the other hand, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), and the question whether this policy includes the protection 
of Greek Community borders to Turkey, constituted a major national issue. Media cov-
erage in 1999 mirrors the points of interest of public opinion, and provides clear evi-
dence for this analysis.
2 Apart from the latter issue, arrangements such as the reinforce-
ment of the EP’s powers, the development of the Greek insular areas and the creation of 
a specific Employment Title into the EC Treaty (Title VIII; Art. 125-130 ECT) were 
interpreted as attractive and popular reforms. When the Amsterdam Treaty f inally set 
limitations to the principle of closer co-operation and avoided the creation of a hard 
core group of member states to accelerate integration at the expense of their less moti-
vated partners, it satisfied the Greek elites totally. At the time they were terribly anxious 
to become completely isolated from Western Europe. It was e xpected that the Greek 
public opinion after Amsterdam would be further mobilised by the issues Treaty’s ‘left-
overs’: In particular, the re-weighting of votes in the Council, the abolition of the right 
of veto and the reduction of the number of Commissioners, especially in the absence of 
a European Constitution and a European Bill of Citizen’s Rights. However, it can be 
                                                                                                                                               
1   This positive approach of the governmental side is registered also in the Memorandum of the wor-
king group for the IGC ‘96 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the title ‘For a Citizen’s Europe, 
a Europe of Democracy and Development’, Athens 1996. 
2   Among the 30 representative abstracts published by Greek daily newspapers and magazines selected 
by the authors, more than half of them were concerned with the CFSP and borders protection while 
the others include normal references on this issue.  
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assumed that in Greece the more substantial public debate about the essence of Euro-
pean politics goes hand in hand, if not as a precondition, with the more rapid and deeper 
modernisation and Europeanisation of the countries’ institutions and its functions in 
state and society.  
 
3. The Parliament and Civil Society: National Interests and Shared European Interests 
 
In analysing the development of the Greek Parliament with regard to the 1996/1997 
IGC, one can distinguish three periods: a) the period of the Treaty’s informal elabora-
tion by the Reflection Group, b) the period of the formal negotiations and c) the ratifica-
tion period following the European Council in Amsterdam in June 1997. The participa-
tion of citizens and society was visible, with unprecedented vigour, especially in the 
first period. When the negotiations among the representatives of the member states be-
gan, neither Parliament nor the Greek citizenry were involved any longer. This hap-
pened mainly due to the structural deficiencies of the ‘authoritarian’ Greek state, the 
weak civil society, and the unceasing debate on anti-European “Greekness” in Greek 
political culture.
1  
The Amsterdam Treaty was ratified by the Greek Parliament twenty months after its 
adoption. That was the longest delay until today, although it was not related to the ac-
ceptance of the Treaty by the Greek society nor with any difficulty in achieving an ap-
proval in Parliament. On the contrary, the Maastricht Treaty, d espite the limited interest 
it attracted from society - which at that time was absorbed by the newly born FYROM -, 
provided the Greek Government with an opportunity to follow up its self-declared pro-
European stance. Consequently, the Government accelerated the ratification. As to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the delay was obviously due to some political bargaining chips and 
package-deals set by the Greek Government. 
The Greek Government’s strong support for the Amsterdam Treaty demonstrates the 
inconsistent and contradictory way in which the political elites handle European unifica-
tion in Greece. On the one hand, the elites proclaim their faith in deeper co-operation, 
the political unification of Europe, Citizens’ Europe and many even talk about the crea-
tion of a federal identity. On the other hand, they remain attached to the inter-
governmental method of constructing the Union through IGC's and IGC-like bargaining 
marathons, using ‘their’ national parliament as an ungenerous pressure tool to promote a 
strictly national attitude for the Greek presence in the EU. 
                                                 
1   See the analyses by Sotiropoulos, Authoritarianism, and Diamantouros, Nikiforos: ‘Cultural Dualism 
and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece’, Madrid, Juan March Institute, 1994 (Working 
Paper No. 50).  
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V. The Relations between the Greek Parliament and the European Parliament after 
Amsterdam 
 
Inter-parliamentary relations of the Greek Parliament are generally maintained by its 
Office for Public and International Relations. As already noted, the Voulí monitors 
European Affairs rather unsystematically through its Committee on European Affairs. 
Upon sole decision of the Chamber’s President selected  CEA-members may represent 
the Greek Parliament at COSAC, which is generally welcomed as a non-politically, 
additional source of information on EU matters. But they do not have a binding mandate 
to speak on behalf of the CEA.
1 Nevertheless, the CEA emphasises the necessity of 
further improvement of the co-ordinating role of COSAC. Moreover, better co-
ordination is seen as a prerequisite to consolidate, expand and update co-operation at the 
COSAC level. Because the valuable expertise gained through the exchange of docu-
ments, methods of parliamentary scrutiny and ways of coping with problems emerging 
from the incorporation and application of community law, COSAC is expected to facili-
tate the parliamentary follow-up and intervention at the domestic and European  levels.
2 
But Greek MEP's are only loosely associated with domestic parliamentary activities 
relating to the competences of the EP, although they provide for nearly half of the 
CEA’s members. Besides, the President of the Chamber has established his own service 
on foreign relations. He uses this special unit either to travel to other legislatures or to 
receive foreign parliamentarians. Given the strong commitment of the present govern-
ment to Greece’s participation in EMU, useful links have also been developed by the 
Voulí to the Central Bank Governors and the Economic and Financial Committee of the 
EC. It is only in foreign affairs matters that the Vouli and its CEA organise more per-
manent briefings of MP's and MEP's by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the 
Greek Permanent Representation in Brussels. However, since the inter-parliamentary 
networking is done rather unsystematically, the potential of influencing the individual 
parliamentarian’s decision has not been fully extended.  
Among the informal  contacts between the Greek Parliament and the EP the biannual 
meetings of the presidents and speakers of national parliaments and of the EP are worth 
to mention. In the meantime, they have become a fixed point in the procedures of the 
Greek Chamber in spite of their informal status. Hence, the Rules of Procedure of the 
Greek Parliament empower its committees to collect opinions of experts and other non-
members. By referring to this procedural outline, close contacts have been established 
                                                 
1   See Yannis, Nikos: The Conference of the Committees for European Affairs and the Committee for 
Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament. Institutional characteristics, efficiency, critical as-
sessment, Greek Parliament Research Report, No. 12, Athens, 6 June 1997. (in Greek)  
2   See Questionnaire for the Parliaments of Member States, XXIIIrd COSAC - Versailles, 16-17 Octo-
ber 2000. Answers by the Committee for European Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament and written 
contribution of Mr. Tzortzopoulos, Secretary General of the Greek Parliament (September 1997).   
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with MEP's, who are invited to join the proceedings of the corresponding committees in 
Athens. This interaction has been r emarkably intensified since 1989 and has increased 
the information flow and co-operation between the two legislatures. Moreover, officials 
of the Greek P arliament attend the plenary sessions of the EP from time to time. As 
regards the Greek MEP's in the CEA, they have no particular status in relation to the 
Greek Chamber. Formally they operate on the same status as their colleagues of the 
Voulí: Their parliamentary salaries are paid through the national parliament, they b e-
long to the same social insurance scheme as the national MP, they possess diplomatic 
passports and they enjoy the right of parliamentary immunity. In terms of belonging to a 
party, only MEP's of the conservative ND can participate in meetings of their party’s 
parliamentary group in the Vouli, and they may also vote for the party’s president. 
There are no such rights for their fellow colleagues in other Greek parties. The prohibi-
tion of a dual mandate makes it impossible for MEP’s to be regular members of one of 
the Vouli’s committees. If they want to follow a plenary session they have to use the 
public tribune like other Greek citizens. Finally, some additional relations b etween the 
two kinds of parliaments are provided by the EP office in Athens and the European 
Center for Parliamentary Research and Documentation in Luxembourg.
1 
 
VI. The Voulí after Amsterdam: Slow Adaptations 
 
The patterns of Greece’s historical, political and cultural development are perhaps 
unique in the EU context. The gap between institutional promise and daily reality is 
characteristic for Greece’s political culture. Although Greece was relatively successful 
in adapting Western political institutions to traditional environments in the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire, Greek experience is marked by the dichotomy between the challenges 
of a ‘modern’ Western state on the way to deeper European integration and the inade-
quate responses of a ‘traditional’ society with powerful, but sharply conflicting cultural 
traditions.
2 The highly centralised Greek state was effective in cowing the opposition 
and in imposing a singular national identity upon society at the expense of an independ-
ent development of civil society. The societies in  the geopolitical core of the EU appear 
more comfortable with the idea of Europe than Greece does, because its sense of n a-
tional identity is subverted by the participation in a formal institutional framework.
3  
In Greece, there are two mechanisms which enable the Parliament to participate in 
European politics: the Committee on European Affairs, which became permanent in 
1993, as well as the major plenary debates. In the meantime, the insufficient informa-
                                                 
1   Wenturis, Nikolaus: ‘Greece’, in: Morgan, Roger/Tame, Lare (eds.): Parliaments and Parties: the 
European Union in the Political Life of Europe, London 1996, pp. 283-303. 
2   Diamantouros, Cultural Dualism, pp. 11-15. 
3   Legg/Roberts, Greece, pp. 200-206.  
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tion basis of the Greek Parliament, and its institutional, structural and technical prob-
lems in scrutinising EC/EU affairs convincingly, have been discovered by the governing 
PASOK. There are proposals for a constitutional revision to improve the existing situa-
tion. This will include a new provision, which obliges the Government to inform the 
Voulí regularly on the total number of the European Commission’s legislative propos-
als, through the conduct of a relevant debate. The Parliament’s participation in the i n-
corporation of EC legislation is still limited in size if compared to the respective input 
of the administration. In this sense the proposal for the amendment of the Constitution 
aims to allow better information of the Greek Chamber of Deputies.
1 The identified 
problems in the field of incorporation of EC l aw into Greek law may induce the intro-
duction and general use of new information systems. They might then enable the Greek 
MP's to access directly the EP’s computerised services as well as COSAC’s internet and 
intranet services. In exchange, an information system will allow all member states con-
cerned as well as the EP to get constant information about the existing situation in 
Greece. The PASOK’s proposal asks for the EP’s financial assistance to meet the costs 
of such an initiative because the financial a nd personal resources as well as the 
infrastructure are much better developed in all the other parliaments.
2  
Studying the degree of the Greek society’s involvement in the EU, one should not over-
look the limitations of the Greek Europeanisation process: 
-  the harsh political client-oriented system where non-associated individuals by-
pass institutions and laws, and negotiate directly and unscrupulously personal f a-
vours for their support to Greek governmental parties,  
-  the existence of a fairly popular mass movement against further EU integration, 
which is still fuelled by the Communist Party of Greece and the Greek Orthodox 
Church, and 
-  the fact that the proponents of civil society came to the limelight only during the 
last ten years as part of an overall modernisation process that is emerging slowly 
but with justified claims.
3 
The historical experience of incorporating ‘Europe’ by the Greek society, the gradual 
Europeanisation of Greece in institutional terms, and the direction which European uni-
fication took itself, determine the degree in which the IGC’s, new Treaties and the insti-
tutional evolution of the EU get legitimated by the Greek society. The wider identifica-
                                                 
1   Unpublished Communication with the Hellenic Chamber of Deputies, Directorate for International 
Relations, ‘The follow-up of incorporation and application of community legislation by the Hellenic 
Parliament’, 27 January 1995, pp. 4/5. 
2   Ibid.  
3   About a broader perspective of civil society and authoritarian structures in Greece see Sotiropoulos, 
Dimitris: ‘Civil Society and central state i n the third Greek Democracy’, in: Lyrintzis, Chris-
tos/Nikolakopoulos, Iliopoulos/Sotiropoulos, Dimitris (eds.): Society and politics, Views of the 
Third Greek Democracy, 1974-1994, Hellenic Society of Political Science, Athens: Themelio 1996. 
(in Greek)  
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tion of Greek citizens with Europe remains an objective which presupposes a deeper 
change in the society’s value system and the structuring of a European demos. This de-
nationalised demos could result from the institutional evolution that is effectuated at the 
various levels of the European space as well as, at the level of NGO's, the civil society, 
and the European movements.  
In practice, the Greek case still combines a real deviation from all other EU-member 
states and is characterised by a hesitant acceptance of the institutional deepening 
through the nominal convergence and a federal-type rhetoric. 
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The Parliament of Finland: A Model Case for Effective Scrutiny?  
 
Tapio Raunio 
 
I. Introduction: Elite Orientations and Mass Attitudes Towards European Integration 
 
Finland’s integration policy is a combination of elite-level pro-integrationist and prag-
matic adaptation. This was first evident in the membership negotiations, where the 
Government accepted the Maastricht Treaty without any reservations, and with the e x-
clusion of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) sought no exemptions from existing 
policies. Government behaviour in the negotiations was characterised by flexibility 
driven by the imperative of achieving Union membership. This approach can be e x-
plained by two main factors: the depression of the early 1990’s which had exposed the 
vulnerability of the national economy, and the broad consensus between government 
and the main opposition party, Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was also in f a-
vour of membership.
1 Secondly, with the referendum outcome clear,
2 the Finnish politi-
cal system, including a ll political parties, accepted the result and started adjusting to life 
in the Union. Thirdly, n ational European policy has sought to consolidate Finland’s 
position in the inner core of the Union, EMU membership included. The Finnish a p-
proach, at least on  the elite level, has thus been co-operative and pragmatic, with mem-
bership seen as an effective channel for advancing national interests.  
                                                 
1   For information on the membership debate and negotiations, see Arter, David: ‘The EU Referendum 
in Finland on 16 October 1994, A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht’, in: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, No. 3/1995, pp. 361-387; Kivimäki, Timo: ‘Finland, a Case of Beneficial Integra-
tion’, in, Journal of International Relations and Development, No. 2/1999, pp. 154-168; Tiilikainen, 
Teija: ‘Finland and the European Union’, in: Miles, Lee (ed.): The European Union and the Nordic 
Countries, London: Routledge 1996, pp. 117-132; Törnudd, Klaus: ‘Ties that Bind to the Recent 
Past, Debating Security Policy in Finland within the Context of Membership of the European Un-
ion’, in: Co-operation and Conflict, No. 1/1996, pp. 37-68. 
2   A consultative referendum on EU m embership was held on 16 October 1994. 56.9 per cent voted in 
favour and 43.1 per cent against membership. Turnout was 74 per cent. A clear majority of the poli-
tical elite was in favour of joining the Union, including the three main parties (SDP, the Center Par-
ty, the National Coalition), the Government, the parliamentary majority, and both the former Presi-
dent Mauno Koivisto and the new President Martti Ahtisaari. The Eduskunta approved membership 
on 18 November 1994. 152 voted in favour of membership, 45 against, one member was absent and 
one abstained (the Speaker does not vote). See Jenssen, Anders Todal/Gilljam, Mikael/Pesonen, 
Pertti, (eds.): To Join or Not to Join, Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European 
Union, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 1998; Pertti Pesonen (ed.): Suomen EU-kansanäänestys 
1994, Raportti äänestäjien kannanotoista, Helsinki, Ulkoasiainministeriö, Eurooppatiedotus ja Paina-
tuskeskus, 1994.   
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Measured by the effective number of parliamentary parties, Finland’s party system is 
relatively highly fragmented.
1  The 1994 membership referendum indicated that Euro-
pean questions would prove problematic for the parties. The majority of parties were 
divided over the issue, particularly the Center Party (KESK), the Left Alliance (VAS), 
and the Green League (VIHR) (Table  9). The two rainbow governments - bringing to-
gether SDP, National Coalition Party (KOK), Left Alliance, Swedish People’s Party 
(RKP), and the Green League - headed by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (SDP) since 
1995 have been steadily committed to integration and have emphasised that only a 
strong and efficient EU can guarantee the interests of smaller member states. Similar 
arguments were used to defend the decision to join the third stage of the EMU. The 
strong leadership shown by Lipponen has been crucial  in shaping Finnish European 
policy. While the supporters and certain social democrat MP’s have been more critical, 
he has not met any strong opposition within his party. The National Coalition and the 
Swedish People’s Party pursued broadly similar pro-integrationist policies throughout 
the 1990’s. The Green League and the Left Alliance have found themselves in a rather 
awkward situation. As junior partners in a government committed to deeper integration, 
the party leaders had to strike a delicate balance between the pro-European views of the 
cabinet and the party followers who remain divided over integration. The leadership of 
the main opposition party, the Center Party, has likewise faced a tough challenge in 
pacifying its often strongly Euro-sceptical, primarily rural, voters while remaining cau-
tiously pro-integrationist in order to maintain the party’s credibility as a potential future 
governing party. Parties that resisted membership before the referendum, the Christian 
Union and the True Finns (then as i ts predecessor, the Rural Party), have accepted 
membership but were against EMU and do not support deeper integration. 
Finnish parties prefer to portray the EU as an association of independent states. Refer-
ring to the principle of subsidiarity, parties demand to bring decision-making closer to 
the citizens. However, apart from CAP, no party has put forward concrete proposals to 
reduce EU’s powers. On the other hand, none of the parties can be classified as federal-
ist, with the nation-state logic dominating  integration policies. The geopolitical and 
economic context is highly relevant, as all parties see the U nion as a way to consolidate 
Finland’s place in the West. Euro-criticism is based on prominent individual MP’s or 
MEP’s, and the lack of organised factions is at least partially explained by the Finnish 
                                                 
1  See Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy, Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press 1999, pp. 74-77. Center-right parties are the National 
Coalition, the Swedish People’s Party, the Center Party and the Christian Union. The Left consists of 
the mainstream Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance. The Green League is one of the 
strongest environmental parties in Europe, and in 1995 became the first green party to gain a cabinet 
seat in Europe. There is no extreme right-wing party. See Borg, Sami/Sänkiaho, Risto (eds.): The 
Finnish Voter, Tampere: The Finnish Political Science Association 1995; Sundberg, Jan, Partier och 
partisystem i Finland, Esbo, Schildt 1996; Sundberg, Jan: ‘The Enduring Scandinavian Party Sys-
tem’, in: Scandinavian Political Studies, No. 2/1999, pp. 221-241.   
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electoral system. The candidate selection process is decentralised and voters choose 
among individual candidates. This mechanism facilitates intra-party protest based 
around individual persons and reduces  the probability of establishing organised fac-
tions.
1  
The relatively broad elite consensus about the overall direction of national integration 
policy cannot be found among the voters. Eurobarometers show that support for mem-
bership and the deepening of integration is lower in Finland than in the EU as a whole. 
National surveys report similar findings, with Finns especially concerned about the i n-
fluence of small countries in the Union.
2 Particularly noteworthy has been the increas-
ing salience of the rural-urban cleavage. While the left-right dimension remains the 
most important structure of competition in d omestic politics, the rural-urban / center-
periphery cleavage comes not far behind. Disaffection, and outright hostility, towards 
the EU is widespread among the rural population, a development explained primarily by 
the destructive impact of the CAP on the farming sector. The Government and the party 
elites have taken a gamble on European issues by adopting positions that have been 
contradictory with the mood among the voters. According to a survey carried out in 
1995 Finnish MP’s were considerably more pro-integrationist than the citizens.
3 Such 
behaviour is mainly explained by the elites’ desire not to exclude their parties from f u-
ture government negotiations. 
The unicameral national Parliament, the Eduskunta, has 200 members elected from 14 
multimember electoral districts in proportional elections held every fourth year. The 
autonomous province of Åland is entitled to one seat. Voters choose between individual 
candidates from non-ordered party lists. Because of the decentralised, candidate-
centered electoral system, larger party groups always include stubborn and troublesome 
MP’s that the leaders of the parliamentary party groups cannot easily control. Decision-
making in the Eduskunta is based on a continuous interplay between committees and 
party groups.
4 
                                                 
1  See Raunio, Tapio: ‘Facing the European Challenge, Finnish Parties Adjust to the Integration Pro-
cess’, in: West European Politics, No. 1/1999, pp. 138-159; Johansson, Karl Magnus/Raunio, Tapio: 
‘Partisan responses to Europe, comparing Finnish and Swedish parties’, in: European Journal of Po-
litical Research, 2001, forthcoming 2001. 
2  See Eurobarometers and the public opinion surveys published in English by the Center for Finnish 
Business and Policy Studies (EVA) at http://www.eva.fi. 
3  See Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, Matti: ‘Parliaments’ Adaptation to the European Union’, in: Esaiasson, 
Peter/Heidar, Knut, (eds.): Beyond Westminster and Congress, The Nordic E xperience, Columbus, 
Ohio State University Press 2000, pp. 344-364. 
4  See Wiberg, Matti: ‘The partyness of the Finnish Eduskunta’, in, Heidar, Knut/Koole, Ruud, (eds.): 
Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies, Political parties behind closed doors, Lon-
don: Routledge 2000, pp. 161-176; Esaiasson, Peter/Heidar, Knut (eds.): Beyond Westminster and 
Congress, The Nordic Experience, Columbus, Ohio State University Press 2000.  
 
176
Table 9: Party Positions on EU Membership and Distribution of Votes in Finnish National and 
EP Elections in the 1990’s  
 
Party  Party line in the 
1994 Referendum
3 
1991 
% 
1995 
% 
1996 EP 
% 
1999 
% 
1999 EP 
% 
Center Party of Finland (KESK)  Yes  24.8  19.8  24.4  22.4  21.3 
Social Democratic Party (SDP)  Yes  22.1  28.3  21.5  22.9  17.8 
National Coalition (KOK)  Yes  19.3  17.9  20.2  21.0  25.3 
Left Alliance (VAS)  No decision  10.1  11.2  10.5  10.9  9.1 
Swedish People’s Party (RKP)  Yes  5.5  5.1  5.8  5.1  6.8 
Green League (VIHR)  No decision  6.8  6.5  7.6  7.3  13.4 
Finnish Christian Union (SKL)  No  3.1  3.0  2.8  4.2  2.4 
Finnish Rural Party (SMP)
 1  No  4.8  1.3       
Liberal People’s Party (LKP)    0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2   
Young Finns (NUORS)
2  Yes    2.8  3.0  1.0   
True Finns (PS)
        0.7  1.0  0.8 
Others
    2.7  3.5  3.1  4.0  3.1 
TOTAL    100  100  100  100  100 
1 The Rural Party was disbanded after the 1995 elections. The True Finns, established that same year, 
can be considered as its successor. 
2 The right-wing Young Finns was established in 1994. The party failed to gain seats in the 1999 elec-
tions and was subsequently disbanded.
 
3 The Left Alliance and the Green League did not adopt official positions prior to the referendum. The 
Center Party adopted a pro-membership line in its party congress, but only after the party chairman 
and the PM Esko Aho had threatened to resign were the party to oppose membership. The share of 
party supporters voting in favour of membership were: National Coalition 89 per cent, Swedish Peo-
ple’s Party 85 per cent, SDP 75 per cent, Green League 55 per cent, the Center 36 per cent, Left Alli-
ance 24 per cent. 
Source: Statistics Finland; Sänkiaho, Risto: ’Puoluesidonnaisuutta vai sitoutumattomuutta’, in: P e-
sonen, Pertti, (ed.), Suomen EU-kansanäänestys 1994: Raportti äänestäjien kannanotoista, Helsinki, 
Ulkoasiainministeriö, Eurooppatiedotus ja Painatuskeskus, 1994, pp. 164-173. 
 
The distribution of committee seats i s proportional to the distribution of seats among the 
parties in the Chamber. Committees are the principal arenas for examination and scru-
tiny of legislative initiatives. The Eduskunta has 14 specialised standing committees, 
plus the Grand Committee, which is the committee responsible for coordinating EU 
matters. All legislative proposals must be referred to a committee for deliberation before 
a final vote to approve or reject can be taken. The final committee report on a legislative 
proposal contains a recommendation to the Eduskunta and a statement explaining the 
majority position. Committee members opposed to the majority resolution may add 
their dissenting opinions to the report. The decision rule in committees is simple major-
ity. Committees meet behind  closed doors, but may declare their proceedings open to 
the public if this is seen as necessary for collecting relevant information. The Parliament 
may also establish temporary committees. 
Since the early 1980’s Finnish governments have stayed in office for the whole electoral 
period. The governments, enjoying broad parliamentary majorities and bringing t o-
gether parties across the left-right dimension, have been able to rule without much e f- 
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fective dissent from the Eduskunta. Governments are as a rule formed around two of the 
three main parties: the Center, National Coalition and the SDP.
1 Nevertheless, the MP’s 
have a variety of ways to control the executive, the most important of which are no con-
fidence votes and parliamentary questions. There are three types of votes of no confi-
dence: those following interpellations, government-initiated votes, and votes held with-
out prior warning during plenary debates. Most important are the votes following inter-
pellations. Members have the right to table written and oral questions as well as ques-
tions to the Government. The representatives ask questions on virtually all kinds of i s-
sues. Other scrutiny mechanisms i nclude parliamentary motions and debates following 
government reports.
2 
Membership in the Union has strengthened the position of the Government and the 
Prime Minister. During the post-1945 period foreign policy decision-making had been 
firmly in the hands of the President and a narrow circle of the political elite. Constitu-
tional amendments enacted since the early 1990’s have strengthened the role of the 
Government and the Eduskunta in foreign policy decision-making, particularly in inte-
gration matters.
3 The constitutional and political powers of the President have been r e-
duced to such an extent that Finland can arguably no longer be classified as a semi-
presidential system.
4 Reflecting these constitutional reforms, Finnish integration policy 
has been largely government-driven, with the President intervening mainly when for-
eign policy matters are on the agenda.
5 
                                                 
1  See Lijphart, Arend, 1999, op.cit., pp. 109-111. 
2  See Wiberg, Matti (ed.): Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries, Forms of Questioning and 
Behavioural Trends, Jyväskylä, The Finnish Political Science Association, 1994. 
3   According to Section 93 of the new codified Constitution that entered into force in March 2000, ‘the 
foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Go-
vernment. However, the Parliament approves Finland’s international obligations and their denoun-
cement and decides on the bringing into force of Finland’s international obligations in so far as pro-
vided in this Constitution. The President decides on matters of war and peace, with the consent of the 
Parliament. The Government is responsible for the national preparation of the decisions to be made 
in the European Union, and decides on the concomitant Finnish measures, unless the decision requi-
res the approval of the Parliament. The Parliament participates in the national preparation of deci-
sions to be made in the European Union, as provided in this Constitution. The communication of im-
portant foreign policy positions to foreign States and international organizations is the responsibility 
of the Minister with competence in foreign affairs.’  
4  See Nousiainen, Jaakko: ‘From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentary Government, Political and 
Constitutional Development in Finland’, in: Karvonen, Lauri/Ståhlberg, Krister (e ds.): Festschrift for 
Dag Anckar on his 60th Birthday on February 12, 2000, Åbo, Åbo Akademi University Press 2000, 
pp. 337-352. 
5   The Prime Minister represents Finland in the European Council. However, the President can also 
participate, especially when foreign policy matters are on the agenda. The Eduskunta’s Committee 
for Constitutional Law decided prior to EU membership that the Prime Minister should represent 
Finland in the European Council. President Ahtisaari refused to accept this interpretation, and in 
May 1995 the Prime Minister announced a statement, formulated jointly with the President’s Office, 
according to which the Prime Minister will always attend the summits and the President will attend 
them whenever she/he chooses. The new President, Tarja Halonen (SDP), announced upon taking 
office in March 2000 that she will take part in the summits.   
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Within the Government two developments warrant attention: the strengthened position 
of the Prime Minister and the autonomy of the departments. Governmental EU decision-
making is heavily sectionalised, with each ministry enjoying much freedom of action 
both in the preparation of issues and in actual decision-making. The main inter-
ministerial coordinating body is the Committee for EU Matters located in the Foreign 
Office. It has 17 members: high-level officials from ministries, the Prime Minister's 
Office, the Office of the President, the Bank of Finland, the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the autonomous Åland region. In reality the Committee plays a minor role. The 
Committee had 38 sections in 2000, and their function is to co-ordinate European mat-
ters within the respective ministries. Sections i nclude also representatives from relevant 
interest groups. Officials present matters to sections for discussion and inform them 
about issues in preparation. When agreement is reached, the section procedure provides 
a sufficient basis for determining Finland's final position. Otherwise the matter is pre-
sented to the Committee for EU matters and/or the Cabinet European Union Committee. 
Government work is coordinated through its four statutory ministerial committees, the 
other three being the Cabinet Foreign and Security Policy Committee, Cabinet Finance 
Committee, and the Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. All committees are chaired 
by the Prime Minister, and they prepare decisions which are given the final seal of ap-
proval by the plenary session of the whole cabinet. Established in 1995, the Cabinet 
European Union Committee handles all politically sensitive EU matters. With all gov-
ernment parties represented, and headed by the Prime Minister, the ministerial Commit-
tee procedure ensures that all key decisions are coordinated at the highest level. The 
Cabinet EU Committee has therefore provided an important forum for coordinating 
national integration policy. 
The Foreign Ministry was initially given the overall responsibility for handling Euro-
pean matters. It was in charge of coordinating ministerial policies and provided the 
home for the EU Secretariat. However, the EU Secretariat was transferred to the Prime 
Minister’s Office in the summer of 2000. Moving the responsibility for European issues 
from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister’s Office was argued to enhance the 
capacity of the whole state bureaucracy and the Parliament to process EU issues.  
In the EU the Government is represented through Finland’s Permanent Representation, 
which has performed a crucial role during the first years of membership. The permanent 
representation not only participates in the work of COREPER, but has also been an im-
portant source of information to Finnish civil servants, ministers and  MEP’s, and is a 
key actor in preparing and formulating national positions prior to Council meetings.
1  
                                                 
1  See Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, Matti: ‘Building Elite Consensus, Parliamentary Accountability in Fin-
land’, in: Journal of Legislative Studies, No. 1/2000, pp. 59-80.  
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II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Activity in EU Affairs 
 
Adaptation to European integration within the Eduskunta started already in 1990, when 
the Foreign Affairs Committee demanded that the Parliament and particularly its stand-
ing committees have access to information and can influence national policy in Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA) decision-making.
1 The constitutional reforms that reduced 
presidential powers and increased parliamentary i nvolvement in foreign policy decision-
making, especially in integration matters, were implemented by broad consensus. This 
near unanimity reflected the intention of president Mauno Koivisto (SDP) to parliamen-
tarise decision-making in both domestic and foreign policy. The goal was to guarantee 
the Eduskunta as powerful a position in EU decision-making as is possible for any n a-
tional legislature. On the other hand, the constitutional amendments aimed at respecting 
the separation between executive and legislative branches: the Parliament was given the 
right to participate in national policy formulation in EU matters while the Government 
was assigned the right to decide on such matters and to represent Finland at the Euro-
pean level.  
 
1. The Institutional Setting 
 
The Grand Committee ( Suuri valiokunta) and the Foreign Affairs Committee are the 
main committees responsible for European questions. The former handles first and third 
pillar issues, the latter second p illar matters. Decisions relating to Treaty amendments 
are prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Grand Committee has 25 members 
and 13 substitutes. In addition, the MP representing the Åland Islands is always entitled 
to participate in Grand Committee meetings. The Committee convenes on Wednesdays 
at one pm and on Fridays at two pm. An average meeting lasts two until two and a half 
hours. The Committee had 40 meetings in 1995, 56 in 1996, 45 in 1997, 55 in 1998, and 
38 in 1999.
2 The Grand Committee tends to attract prominent Eduskunta members. Fol-
                                                 
1   This section draws on previous work by the author and Matti Wiberg. See Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, 
Matt: ‘Efficiency Through Decentralisation, The Finnish Eduskunta and the European Union’, in: 
Wiberg, Matti, (ed.): Trying to Make Democracy Work, The Nordic Parliaments and the European 
Union, Stockholm: Gidlunds 1997, pp. 48-69; Wiberg, Matti/Raunio, Tapio: ‘Strong Parliament of a 
Small EU Member State, The Finnish Parliament’s Adaptation to the EU’, in: Journal of Legislative 
Studies, No. 4/1996, pp. 302-321. See also Jääskinen, Niilo/Kivisaari, Tiina: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny 
of European Union Affairs in Finland’ in: Wiberg, Matti (ed.): Trying to Make Democracy Work, 
The Nordic Parliaments and the European Union, Stockholm: Gidlunds 1997, pp. 29-47; Boedeker, 
Mika/Uusikylä, Petri: ‘Interaction between the Government and Parliament in Scrutiny of EU Deci-
sion-Making; Finnish Experiences and General Problems’, in: National Parliaments and the EU  - 
Stock-Taking for the Post-Amsterdam Era, Helsinki, Eduskunnan kanslian julkaisu 1/2000, pp. 27-
42; and especially Jääskinen, Niilo: ‘Eduskunta, Aktiivinen sopeutuja’, in: Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, 
Matti (eds.): EU ja Suomi, Unionijäsenyyden vaikutukset suomalaiseen yhteiskuntaan, Helsinki, 
Edita, 2000, pp. 114-134. 
2   Information provided by the Eduskunta. Parliamentary elections were held in 1995 and 1999.  
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lowing both the 1995 and 1999 elections, the Committee membership i ncluded five 
chairmen of standing committees and representatives from the leadership of the three 
main party groups. 
The documents considered by the Committee, together with the minutes of the meeting, 
usually become public when the minutes are signed as a correct record. Additionally, a 
press release is published after each meeting and is also available in the internet. At the 
request of the Government, however, the Committee may d ecide that its members will 
maintain the confidentiality of certain questions. This usually occurs when the Govern-
ment cannot reveal its margin of manoeuvre in the negotiations. It is also customary not 
to publish t he negotiating positions of other member states. When the Committee d e-
cides to maintain the confidentiality of question, the relevant documents and the views 
of the Committee are not appended to public documents. 
 
2. The Scope and Procedural Features of Parliamentary Involvement 
 
The involvement of the Grand Committee in EU matters is three-fold. It participates in 
national policy formulation on issues decided at the European level, gives instructions 
to cabinet ministers attending the meetings of the Council of Ministers, and scrutinizes 
the behaviour of Finnish representatives in the European Council.
1 The Constitution 
(Section 96) defines the Parliament’s role in European matters as follows: 
Firstly, the Parliament considers those proposals for acts, agreements and other meas-
ures which are to be decided in the European Union and which otherwise, according to 
the Constitution, would fall within the competence of the Parliament. 
Secondly, the Government shall, for the determination of the position of the Parliament, 
communicate a proposal referred to in paragraph 1 to the Parliament by a communica-
tion of the Government, without delay, after receiving notice of the proposal. The pro-
posal is considered in the Grand Committee and ordinarily in one or more of the other 
Committees that issue statements to the Grand Committee. However, the Foreign A f-
fairs Committee considers a proposal pertaining to foreign and s ecurity policy. Where 
necessary, the Grand Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee may issue to the 
Government a statement on the proposal. In addition, the Speaker's Council may decide 
that the matter may be taken up for debate in plenary session, during which, however, 
no decision is made by the Parliament. 
Finally, the Government shall provide the appropriate Committees with information on 
the consideration of the matter in the European Union. The Grand Committee or the 
                                                 
1   The technical details of the procedures are explained in Suuren valiokunnan lausunto 3/1995 vp, 
Euroopan unionin asioiden käsittelystä suuressa valiokunnassa ja sille lausunnon antavissa erikoisva-
liokunnissa, 22.11.1995 (SuVL 3/1995 vp). Information on the processing of EU matters, together 
with statistics, is also found in English and in French at the Eduskunta’s web site 
http://www.eduskunta.fi.  
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Foreign Affairs Committee shall also be informed of the position of the Government on 
the matter.  
 
3. National Policy Formulation on EU Matters  
 
The government must inform the Parliament without delay of any proposal for a Coun-
cil decision. These so-called ’U-matters’ are usually Commission’s legislative proposals 
that fall within the competence of the Parliament. Table 10 shows the number and cate-
gorization of ‘U-matters’ and the number of ‘E-matters’ processed by the Parliament in 
1995-99. The government must also send the Grand Committee information on the 
preparation of any issue relating to the EU that might belong to the competence of the 
Parliament. Also, according to Section 97 of the Constitution the Grand Committee 
“shall receive reports on the preparation of other matters in the European Union.” These 
so-called ‘E-matters’ are not legislative proposals nor require a decision by  the 
Eduskunta.
1 
The process begins with the Government sending a formal letter to the Speaker. The 
letter includes a summary and normally the full text of the proposal, its relevance and 
consequences for Finland, and the (tentative) position of the Government. The govern-
ment has also the duty to provide, on its own initiative, the Grand Committee and the 
competent standing committees all relevant documents relating to the decisions handled 
by the Parliament. Occasionally the Eduskunta has complained that the information 
provided by the Government is too extensive, making it difficult for MP’s to identify 
the key points of the proposals.
2 The Speaker forwards the matter to the Grand Commit-
tee and requests the competent specialised committee or committees to g ive their opin-
ion to the Grand Committee. 
 
                                                 
1   It is not possible to determine the exact number of EU documents processed by the Parliament. The 
data reported in Table 2 shows the number of dossiers opened each year. The number of documents 
included in the dossiers is much higher. Dossiers remain open until the item is no longer on the 
agenda of the EU institutions.  
2   According to Boedeker and Uusikylä, ‘given the vast amount of information flowing into the Edus-
kunta and the tight schedules of the affairs under preparation, its real opportunities to influence the 
Finnish EU-positions seem to be rather limited. The Eduskunta also seems to have difficulties in 
monitoring and following up the decision-making process after it has given its opinion on a particu-
lar matter.’ See Boedeker/Uusikylä, 2000, op.cit., p. 41.  
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Table 10: The Number of ‘U-matters’ and ‘E-matters’ Processed by the Eduskunta (1995/99) 
Year  Directives  Regulations  EC agree-
ments with 
third parties 
Third Pillar 
Conventions 
Others  Total  E-matters  Total 
1995  32  20  6  5  2  65  19  84 
1996  28  25  11  10  6  80  134  214 
1997  27  21  7  7  4  66  99  165 
1998  31  47  6  5  7  96  119  215 
1999  9  25  4  -  11  49  72  121 
Source: The Eduskunta. 
 
The majority of ‘U-matters’ are processed by more than one standing committee. Com-
mittee involvement in European matters depends on their policy jurisdiction. The stand-
ing committees issued in 1995-99 on average 148 written opinions on ‘U’- and ‘E’-
matters (Table 11). The Finance Committee has been most burdened with EU legisla-
tion, followed by the Agriculture and Forestry Committee and the Economic Affairs 
Committee. The Defence Committee has processed least EU issues. The number of 
domestic legislative initiatives has been approximately 250 per year during the same 
period. Table 11 shows the sources of ‘U-matters’ transmitted by the Government to the 
Eduskunta. The Ministry of Finance produced most U -matters for parliamentary consid-
eration. 
 
Table 11: Opinions Issued by Standing Committees on ‘U’- and ‘E’-matters (1995-1999) 
Committee  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
The Committee for Constitutional Law   1  10  3  8  1 
The Legal Affairs Committee  4  16  4  7  13 
The Foreign Affairs Committee   4  24  5  14  11 
The Finance Committee   10  31  27  60  29 
The Administration Committee   5  6  16  25  7 
The Transport and Communications Committee  9  14  12  31  7 
The Committee for Agriculture and Forestry   13  22  14  25  19 
The Defence Committee  -  -  -  -  - 
The Committee for Education and Culture  2  2  3  7  2 
The Social Affairs and Health Committee  4  12  8  8  6 
The Economic Affairs Committee  13  19  20  30  11 
The Committee for the Future  -  -  -  -  - 
The Committee of Labour and Equality  2  11  8  8  6 
The Environment Committee  7  2  18  16  6 
Total  74  169  138  239  118 
Source: The Eduskunta.  
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Table 12: The Source of ‘U-matters’ Transmitted to the Eduskunta (1995-99) 
Ministry  No.  SHARE (%) 
Ministry of Finance  99  28 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  51  14 
Ministry of Transport and Communications  37  10 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  34  10 
Ministry of Justice  31  9 
Ministry of Trade and Industry  26  7 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health  25  7 
Ministry of the Interior  19  5 
Ministry of the Environment  15  4 
Ministry of Education  11  3 
Ministry of Labour  8  2 
Ministry of Defence  0  0 
Total  356  100 
Source: The Eduskunta. 
 
The specialised committees prepare their opinions in light of information about the 
Government’s tentative position and after having heard expert testimony. It has been 
estimated that in approximately 90 per cent of  the cases the Grand Committee agrees 
with the opinion of the specialised committee.
1 When more than one specialised com-
mittee delivers an opinion, the Grand Committee summarises and mediates. After debat-
ing the issue, the Grand Committee formulates a position  - a parliamentary recommen-
dation, not a formal decision  - in the form of a summary from the chairman. The Gov-
ernment representatives are notified of the decision. In order to enhance the ability of 
the Eduskunta to monitor and guide government behaviour in the Council, an effort is 
made to formulate the view of the Grand Committee before the consideration of the 
matter begins in the preparatory organs of the Council. The Grand Committee and the 
specialised committees monitor the progress of the initiative. The government has occa-
sionally failed to inform the Eduskunta of legislative amendments enacted by the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament (EP), forcing the committees to take steps to acquire 
the relevant information. Finally, the Grand Committee has an opportunity to express its 
views to the minister prior to the decisive Council meeting. 
 
4. Instructing the Government before Council Meetings 
 
The Grand Committee convenes, usually on Fridays, to hear ministers about Council 
meetings scheduled for the following week. Committee members r eceive the agendas of 
the meetings, as approved by COREPER, in advance. They also receive, for each 
                                                 
1  See Lampinen, Risto/Räsänen, Ilkka: ‘Eduskunnan asema EU-asioiden valmistelussa’, in: Lampinen, 
Risto/Rehn, Olli/Uusikylä, Petri: EU-asioiden valmistelu Suomessa, Helsinki, Eduskunnan kanslian 
julkaisu 7/1998, pp. 121-132.  
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agenda item, a standardised memo with appropriate document references, a historical 
background summary, a summary of outstanding questions and the Government’s pro-
posed course of action. The ministers must give the Committee the chance to express its 
opinion on all matters before final decisions are taken in the Council. The Grand Com-
mittee has insisted on this, and the Government representatives have used this parlia-
mentary scrutiny reserve in negotiations at the European level, particularly during the 
1996-1997 IGC. After Council meetings the Committee always receives a report on the 
Council meeting. Ministers must be prepared to appear before the Committee and to 
explain in detail any deviations from the given policy guidelines.  
Advance scrutiny of Council agenda items means, in most cases, discussing the relevant 
issues and their implications, usually from the Finnish perspective. Actual voting i n-
structions are only given at the final stage of the process and constitute a small percent, 
albeit an important one, of all instructions. These voting i nstructions by the Grand 
Committee are not constitutionally binding. Politically, however, they are important 
because the Government must enjoy the support of the legislature. The Grand Commit-
tee usually does not impose very strict mandates, thus giving ministers a certain amount 
of freedom of manoeuvre. This is reflected in the behaviour of the Finnish Government 
in the Council, which is mainly characterized by flexibility and the desire to build com-
promises. Moreover, the Grand Committee focuses its scrutiny on selected issues, often 
those of special interest to the MP’s. The overwhelming majority of European matters 
do not cause any controversy. Excluding two cases, there have been no major differ-
ences of opinion between the Eduskunta and the cabinet, although standing committees 
do occasionally insist that the Government adopts a  more stringent and detailed negoti-
ating mandate.
1 
 
5. European Council Summits 
 
According to Section 97 of the Constitution “the Prime Minister shall provide the Par-
liament or a Committee with information on matters to be dealt with in a European 
Council  beforehand and without delay after a meeting of the Council. The same applies 
when amendments are being prepared to the treaties establishing the European Union.” 
The Prime Minister must inform the Grand Committee in a dvance of questions to be 
addressed by the European Council. After European Council meetings, she/he must 
provide the plenary session or the Committee with information on what took place. The 
                                                 
1   Both conflicts emerged in 1995, at early stages of adaptation to membership, when the parliamentary 
routines for government scrutiny were yet to be effectively established. More importantly, on a few 
occasions the Grand Committee has received information after a considerable delay, or it has not re-
ceived all the relevant information, notably in third pillar matters. In these cases the Chancellor of 
Justice has ruled that the delays have been accidental, resulting from misunderstandings, and the 
Government has accepted the criticism voiced by the Parliament. See Jääskinen, 2000, op.cit.   
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Prime Minister informs the Foreign Affairs Committee about Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) matters discussed in the European Council.  
The functional capacity of the Grand Committee has been enhanced by its secretariat. In 
2000 the Grand Committee employed three committee counsellors and three secretaries, 
who together with the secretariat of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Eduskunta’s 
representative in the EU, and the information officer of the Grand Committee form the 
EU Secretariat of the Parliament. When additional staff is required, the Grand Commit-
tee primarily relies on the staff of the  specialised committees. Committee counsellors 
with personal experience of EU matters have been especially important, suggesting that 
it would facilitate parliamentary scrutiny if each committee had one functionary special-
izing in European issues. The Eduskunta has its own EU information service. All mem-
bers and staff of the Eduskunta have unrestricted online access to the sources of the 
Government, i ncluding its central and non-public database of EU documents, and to the 
public services of the EU institutions.  
The plenary can become involved both before and after decisions are taken at the Euro-
pean level. The plenary session may, after a proposal by the Speaker’s Council, request 
the Grand Committee to submit Commission proposals to the whole Parliament, along 
with all information provided to the Committee by the Government. The plenary may 
debate the proposals, but does not make formal decisions in such cases. A formal Act of 
Parliament, that is, a decision made after plenary debate, is necessary when the i mple-
mentation of directives requires legislation. Treaty amendments also require the consent 
of national parliaments. While routine EU legislation is rarely debated on the floor, far-
reaching political decisions such as EMU, Agenda 2000, and notably the development 
of CFSP, have inspired long plenary debates. As in the case of scrutinizing European 
legislation in the committees, the debates have been conducted primarily from a n a-
tional perspective, with broader, EU-wide implications of the matters receiving less 
attention. MP’s who do not sit on the Grand Committee have expressed their concern 
about the difficulty of following European matters, arguing that more EU issues should 
be debated on the floor. 
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Figure 7: The Process of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EC/EU Affairs in Finland  
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6. The Implications of Parliamentary Involvement 
 
What explains the low level of conflict between the Eduskunta and the Government? 
First, the Eduskunta gets involved in processing Commission’s initiatives at a relatively 
early stage, not only before the decisive Council meeting. This enables the Parliament to 
monitor the preferences of the other member states and the Commission and the EP, and 
to frame its own position accordingly. Second, hearings with civil servants enable the 
Eduskunta to identify key issues and to learn about issues under preparation at the 
European level and in national ministries. For example, the Environment Committee has 
regular meetings with civil servants from the Environment Ministry. Such direct con-
tacts with civil servants are important, for according to a report based on extensive i n-
terview data middle-level civil servants have a central role in the preparation and proc-
essing of European legislation  in Finland. Ministers or even high-level bureaucrats sel-
dom have a significant impact on the substance of the issues.
1 Civil servants appreciate 
these meetings, particularly in politically controversial matters, for the committee hear-
ings enable the civil  servants to hear the MP’s views and to acquire the backing of the 
relevant Eduskunta committee for their preparatory work. Meetings also serve as occa-
sions for conflict management, where possible differences between the ministries and 
the Parliament are ironed out, and thereby reduce conflicts between the cabinet and the 
Parliament. 
Finally, committee scrutiny of European matters differs in one important respect from 
domestic legislation: the Government-opposition dimension does not play the only sig-
nificant role in either the Grand Committee or in specialised committees. The Grand 
Committee has refused to act as the Government’s rubber-stamp and insists that all 
relevant information is to be made available to both the Government and opposition 
representatives on equal terms. The main goal is understood to be to achieve parliamen-
tary, and thus national, unanimity or at least broad consensus, which can be translated 
into additional influence in the Council.
2 This not only facilitates efficient scrutiny of 
government behaviour, but also provides consistency and long-term legitimacy for the 
policy choices. With no single party forming the cabinet or even controlling anywhere 
near the majority of Eduskunta seats, the opposition has hardly any realistic chances of 
radically altering national European policy without the support of the other parties.  
Overall the Parliament has been more critical of integration than the two rainbow gov-
ernments led by Lipponen. This applies not only to the opposition, but also to the g ov-
erning parties. All parties are, to a varying degree and depending on the policy area, 
divided over European matters, and the Government is usually criticized by individual 
MP’s from both opposition and government parties rather than by a united opposition or 
                                                 
1  See Lampinen, Risto/Rehn, Olli/Uusikylä, Petri, 1998, op.cit. 
2  See Tuomioja, Erkki: ‘Konsensus tärkeää pienelle maalle’, in: Hallinto, No. 4/1998, pp. 3-7.  
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even by unitary party groups. EU matters featured in around 10 per cent of all parlia-
mentary questions and interpellations tabled between 1991 and 1998. A large share of 
the questions concerned either agriculture or regional policy.
1 However, while t he 
Eduskunta has been more critical towards the EU than the Government, and has sub-
jected the cabinet to tight scrutiny in European matters, neither the Center-led Aho gov-
ernment (1991-95) nor the Lipponen governments (1995-) have faced any major inter-
nal crisis or parliamentary rebellions over integration matters. 
 
III. The Finish Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
The Eduskunta was actively and closely involved in the proceedings of the 1996-97 
IGC. The Grand Committee set up in September 1995 a special sub-committee to deal 
with the IGC. The Eduskunta recognized the political importance of the conference:  
“The results of the IGC will require the approval of Parliament. The substance of the IGC, 
with effects for the very basis of public life and society, is comparable to a revision of the 
Constitution.”
2  
Before the Conference began the Grand Committee required “that any negotiating posi-
tions of the Government having a bearing on the Eduskunta as a national Parliament of 
a member state are duly communicated to the Eduskunta in advance and that the par-
liamentary acceptability of any such position be established before it is advanced at the 
Conference.”
3 Constitutionally, Article 54 g of the Parliament Act stated that the Prime 
Minister s hall give the Grand Committee and the Foreign A ffairs Committee advance 
information concerning sessions of the IGC. Article 53(2) gave each specialised com-
mittee the ability to receive reports on subjects within their remit that were on the table 
at the IGC. Regarding information from the Government, the Grand Committee r e-
quired that “Committees are given information in advance, before Finland’s negotiating 
positions have been fixed, as well as the possibility to adopt positions within the Com-
mittees and to express these, and not only simply information on decisions that have 
already been taken at the Conference.”
4 Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Committee stated 
that it “takes it for granted that the Government will create conditions that enable a 
                                                 
1  See Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, Matti, 2000, op.cit., p. 71. 
2   Grand Committee, Opinion No. 2/1996 Session, to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 10.4.1996 (SuVL 
2/1996 vp), p. 45. 
3   Grand Committee, Opinion No. 2/1995 Session, Preparing for the Intergovernmental Conference of 
the European Union, Opinion of the Grand Committee to the Council of Ministers, 22.11.1995 
(SuVL 2/1995 vp), p. 11. 
4   SuVL 2/1996 vp, pp. 44-45.  
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functioning dialogue with Parliament when choices have to be made between conflict-
ing lines of action.”
1 
The Grand Committee occasionally criticised the Government for not keeping it prop-
erly informed on the IGC. However, according to the Speaker, Riitta Uosukainen 
(KOK), the Eduskunta’s informational requirements were fulfilled: Prime Minister Lip-
ponen personally testified in the Grand Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the progress of the IGC before and after the Turin, Florence, and the two Dublin 
Summits, and the Grand Committee received from the Government all documents of the 
IGC.
2 Following the IGC, the Grand Committee also saw that the dialogue between the 
Government and the Eduskunta had functioned rather well considering the scope and 
complexity  of the Conference agenda and the fact that this was the first IGC in which 
Finland participated as an EU member state. The disagreements that surfaced concerned 
the timing of providing information to the Parliament, not so much the issues them-
selves. The G rand Committee argued that in the future particular attention should be 
paid to improving the openness of decision-making within the Government. More i m-
portantly, the Eduskunta should always be informed beforehand, so that it does not find 
itself in a situation where the Government has already committed itself to a specific 
position at the Conference without first hearing the opinion of the Parliament.
1  
The Government stated in its IGC report that “the EU shall be developed as an associa-
tion of independent states”, and argued that it “accords with Finland’s economic and 
security-policy interest that the European Union is developed as a strong association of 
states, in which the member states have shared power in order to use it to achieve the 
objectives that they have collectively approved.” Underlying these statements is a con-
viction that strong EU institutions are especially beneficial for smaller member states. 
The Government supported limited transfer of policy competence to the Union, for e x-
ample through a partial transfer of third pillar matters under the Community pillar, and 
being a founding member of EMU. Regarding institutional reform, the Lipponen Gov-
ernment favoured the maintenance of overall inter-institutional status quo and preserv-
ing the Council as the primary legislative organ of the Union. The Government d e-
fended the position of smaller member states, including the right of each country to a 
Commissioner. The Government supported the simplification of decision-making 
through e xtended application of QMV in basically all matters with the exception of 
                                                 
1   Parliament of Finland, Finland and the Intergovernmental Conference, Report of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, concerning the report of the Council of Ministers ‘Finland’s points of departure and ob-
jectives at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, 26 April 1996 (UaVM 7/1996 vp - VNS 1/1996 
vp), p. 22. 
2  See Uosukainen, Riitta, Speech at the informal meeting of the Presidents and Speakers of national 
parliamentary assemblies in the European Union and of the European Parliament, The Hague, 28 
February 1997.  
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constitutional questions, and the extended use of co-decision procedure. On the basis of 
a joint initiative of the Finnish and Swedish governments, a new article on military cri-
sis management was included in the Amsterdam Treaty.
2 When submitting the Treaty to 
ratification in the Eduskunta in February 1998, the Government stated that its goals 
were primarily fulfilled. For the most part, the final text reflected Finnish positions or 
even initiatives, particularly in crisis management, gender equality, transparency, con-
sumer protection, employment, environment, basic rights, and justice and home affairs. 
On the other hand, the Government expressed its disappointment that the member states 
failed to strengthen EU’s competence in external trade policy, to extend QMV in the 
Council, and to simplify third pillar decision-making. 
The position of the Eduskunta on the outcome of the IGC reflected that of the Govern-
ment.
3 The Foreign Minister, Mrs. Tarja Halonen (SDP), said that it was necessary to go 
carefully through in advance with the Eduskunta the most controversial questions, such 
as the weighting of votes and application of QMV in the Council and the inter-
institutional balance of power. According to Halonen there was hardly any conflict b e-
tween the Eduskunta and the Government: “we have pretty well anticipated Eduskunta’s 
opinions.”
4 The Grand Committee opined that there were “no actual conflicts between 
the report and [its] opinion, although there is some difference in emphasis.”
5 Both the 
Grand Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee produced detailed opinions on 
Finland’s political goals and priorities in the negotiations.
6 The overall position of the 
Eduskunta was somewhat more critical than that o f the Government, especially regard-
ing EMU. The Grand Committee stated on EMU that “a delay in the realization of EMU 
may be a realistic and possibly even a desirable solution that would allow further i m-
provement of the EMU scheme at both the national and the European level.”
7 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Suuren valiokunnan lausunto 1/1998 vp, Hallituksen esitys Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuk-
sen, Euroopan yhteisöjen perustamissopimusten ja niihin liittyvien tiettyjen asiakirjojen muuttami-
sesta tehdyn Amsterdamin sopimuksen eräiden määräysten hyväksymisestä (SuVL 1/1998 vp). 
2  See Council of Ministers, Report, Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 Intergo-
vernmental Conference (VNS 1/1996 vp). For an overview of Finnish positions in the Conference, 
see Stubb, Alexander/Kaila, Heidi/Ranta, Timo: ‘Finland - An Integrationist Member State’, in: Zeff, 
Eleanor E./Pirro, Ellen B., (eds.): The European Union and the Member states, Co-operation, Coor-
dination, and Compromise, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001, forthcoming; Petersen, Nikolaj: ‘The 
Nordic Trio and the Future of the EU’, in: E dwards, Geoffrey/Pijpers, Alfred (eds.), The Politics of 
European Treaty Reform, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond, London: Pinter 
1997, pp. 159-187. 
3  See HE 245/1997, Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen, Euroo-
pan yhteisöjen perustamissopimusten ja niihin liittyvien tiettyjen asiakirjojen muuttamisesta tehdyn 
Amsterdamin sopimuksen eräiden määräysten hyväksymisestä; SuVL 1/1998 vp.  
4   Helsingin Sanomat, 6 March 1997. 
5   SuVL 2/1996 vp, p. 30. 
6   Information on the Eduskunta’s views are based on the following documents, SuVL 2/1995 vp; 
UaVM 7/1996 vp -VNS 1/1996 vp; Committee for Constitutional Law, Opinion No 6/1996 Session; 
SuVL 2/1996 vp; and Suuren valiokunnan lausunto 2/1997 vp, Hallitusten välinen konferenssi, 
4.6.1997 (SuVL 2/1997 vp). 
7   SuVL 2/1996 vp, pp. 33-34.  
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Regarding the European Parliament, the Government and the Eduskunta supported 
strengthening EP’s legislative powers through extending the co-decision procedure to 
basically all matters in which Council decides by QMV. The extension of co-decision 
procedure was linked to simplifying the procedure. Both the Government and the 
Eduskunta argued that the legislative process should be simplified by adopting first 
pillar legislation through consultation or co-decision procedures, with the assent proce-
dure limited to approving international treaties. The Government and the Parliament 
were against giving the EP the right of legislative initiative, making Treaty ratification 
subject to EP’s approval, and of extending EP’s budgetary powers to compulsory e x-
penditure. Both also favoured the current system of controlling and appointing the 
Commission, and supported setting an upper limit to the number of MEP’s provided 
that a fair allocation of seats b etween the member states is maintained. The Eduskunta 
also supported establishing a single seat for the EP.  
Turning to party positions
1 on the EP, all parties were in favour of maintaining the pre-
sent institutional balance and of safeguarding the influence of small member countries 
in EU decision-making. The Social Democratic Party wanted to increase EP’s powers in 
issues already decided by the Union. The Center Party, on the one hand, saw no need to 
increase the powers of the EP, but on the other hand favoured a limited extension in the 
application of the co-decision procedure. The National Coalition supported using the 
co-decision procedure when the Council decides by QMV, budgetary matters included. 
The Left Alliance favoured the extension of co-decision-procedure and giving the EP 
the right of legislative initiative. The Green League was also in f avour of extending the 
co-decision procedure to further policy areas, such as environmental and taxation issues, 
and of giving the EP the right of legislative initiative. The Swedish People’s Party f a-
voured using the co-decision procedure when the Council decides by QMV, including 
in processing the annual EU budget. The party also supported making decisions on own 
resources and Treaty ratification subject to EP’s a pproval. The Christian Union argued 
that the powers of the EP should not be increased at the expense of national parliaments.  
                                                 
1   The party programs used in the analysis of party positions are, The Center Party: ‘Suomen Keskus-
tan kannanotto EU:n tulevaan kehitykseen’, Puoluevaltuuskunta, Joensuu 25.-26.11.1995: ‘Suomen 
päätösvalta turvattava HVK:ssa’, Työvaliokunta, 11 June 1997; The Christian Union: ‘Europoliitti-
nen ohjelma’, 1996; The Green League: ‘Vihreän liiton tavoitteet EU:n hallitusten väliseen konfe-
renssiin’, Puoluekokous, Tampere 18 June 1995, ‘Europarlamenttivaaliohjelma’, Vihreän liiton vuo-
sikokous, Vaasa 25.-26.5.1996; The Left Alliance, ‘Vasemmistoliitto ja Euroopan unionin kehittä-
minen’, Puoluevaltuusto, 26 November 995: ‘EU:n hallitusten välinen konferenssi ja Suomen linja, 
Avoin ja sosiaalinen Eurooppa’, Kannanotto, Euroopan unionin asioiden jaosto, 24 April 1997; The 
National Coalition: ‘Statement on the European Union’, Party Congress, Vaasa 9.-11.6.1995, ‘Ko-
koomuksen tavoitteet EU:ssa Kokoomus korostaa läheisyysperiaatetta ja EU:n toimintakykyä’, Puo-
luevaltuusto, 30 March 1996; The Social Democratic Party: ‘Kannanotto Eurooppa-politiikasta’, 
Puoluekokous, Helsinki 6.-9.6.1996, ‘EU-vaalijulistus, Työllisyys, hyvinvointia, turvallisuutta  - so-
sialidemokraattinen Eurooppa’, Puoluehallitus 22 August 1996; The Swedish People’s Party: 
‘EU:sta paras mahdollinen’, Rkp:n Eurooppapoliittinen ohjelma, 1996. Electorally marginal parties 
are excluded from the analysis (see Table 1).  
 
192
The Government and the Eduskunta emphasised that national parliaments are the pri-
mary channel for providing democratic legitimacy to EU decision-making, with the EP 
complementing the role of national legislatures. According to the Grand Committee 
“national parliaments are now and for the foreseeable future the primary representatives of 
the political sovereignty of the peoples of the member states and of the democratic legiti-
macy of their political systems. Differences in the languages, cultures, historical experience 
and political traditions of the populations of the Member states inhibit political organization 
at the European level and the formation of truly European parties and political move-
ments.”
1  
The Government and the Eduskunta held it important that national legislatures have 
effective means to influence EU decision-making and thereby to strengthen its democ-
racy.  
Both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Grand Committee listed four main points 
of departure: 
-  The foundations of the Union’s legal regime and decisions concerning the funding 
of the Union must  - as was stated in the report of the Council of Ministers - be 
based on treaties entered into by the Member states and requiring ratification by 
all national parliaments. 
-  National parliaments will continue to be the primary representatives of the politi-
cal sovereignty and democratic identity of the peoples of the Member states. 
-  Member states cannot be bound without their  consent to decisions that e ndanger 
their external or internal security or vital interests of economic or social balance. 
-  The primacy of the member states, in practice the governments representing them 
and answerable to national parliaments, must be safeguarded in the d ecision-
making of the European Union.
2 
Neither the Eduskunta nor the Government saw any need for Union-level regulation on 
the role of national legislatures:  
“realising effective supervision by national parliaments in decision-making on Union a f-
fairs is a matter within the exclusive competence of the Member states. This issue must not 
be regulated in the Treaties. The same applies to inter-parliamentary co-operation. Parlia-
ments are capable of agreeing on the forms and procedures of such co-operation without 
government interference at the IGC.”
3  
There was broad inter-party consensus on this position. The Government, the Eduskunta 
and all the main parties emphasised strongly the need to increase the openness and 
transparency of EU decision-making, partially in order to enhance national parliamen-
tary scrutiny of European matters. According to the Grand Committee effective national 
parliamentary control required that  
                                                 
1   SuVL 2/1995 vp, p. 10. 
2   UaVM 7/1996 vp - VNS 1/1996 vp, p. 5; SuVL 2/1996 vp, p. 31. 
3   SuVL 2/1996 vp, p. 40.  
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“the procedures of the Council should urgently be made more disciplined and more similar 
to the formal procedures of a legislative institution. Without binding agendas and public 
draft decisions or other preparatory documents, available in time and in all the official lan-
guages, it is difficult for government and parliaments in the Member states to make the 
preparations expected of responsible and democratic government.”
1  
Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Committee wanted to see documents of the meetings 
made public: “When votes are taken in the Council, the votes of the member states, as 
well as any explanation of votes or other declarations should be made public.”
2 The 
Grand Committee expressed its satisfaction with the Protocol on national parliaments.
3 
The Social Democratic Party stressed that improving the ability of national parliaments 
to influence and control their governments is essential to increasing the openness and 
democratic control of EU decision-making. The Center Party argued that the influence 
of the Eduskunta in the formulation of national European policy should be strengthened. 
The National Coalition supported strengthening the right of national parliaments to 
shape EU policies and argued that the Union must have a legal duty to inform national 
parliaments of all legislative initiatives within a specified time limit. The party was also 
in favour of intensifying co-operation between the EP and national legislatures. The 
Left Alliance emphasised that the role of the Eduskunta in EU decision-making needs to 
be strengthened, with particular importance attached to hearing the  Parliament and its 
committees before national positions are formulated. The party also supported giving 
national parliaments the right of legislative initiative in EU decision-making. The Green 
League saw that each national Parliament should be guaranteed at least as good an op-
portunity to control its government in EU matters as that enjoyed by the Eduskunta. The 
Swedish People’s Party stressed that national parliaments need to be actively involved 
in preparing Union decisions and that the Commission should inform national legisla-
tures of its forthcoming legislative initiatives. 
The Government and the Parliament argued that the forms and scope of inter-
parliamentary co-operation should not be regulated in the Treaties. The Government 
and the Eduskunta were a gainst reconvening the Assizes. According to the Grand 
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee inter-parliamentary co-operation should 
be strengthened through COSAC and intensification of bilateral contacts between par-
liamentary committees. The idea of establishing a second Chamber consisting of n a-
tional MP’s received no support. 
                                                 
1   SuVL 2/1996 vp, p. 40. 
2   UaVM 7/1996 vp  - VNS 1/1996 vp, p. 11. The Grand Committee emphasised the publication of 
documents instead of increasing the openness of the actual meetings. ‘The Committee considers that 
Finland’s primary objective in the transparency issue should be to ensure the access of citizens to in-
formation and to documents [...] In the decision-making stage, transparency could be achieved 
through access to documents so that the positions taken by Member states could be verified from the 
documents of the Council.” (SuVL 2/1996 vp, p. 38) 
3   SuVL 1/1998 vp.   
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Co-operation with the 16 Finnish MEP’s is primarily carried out within parties. All 
seven parties with EP seats have meetings each year between MEP’s and leading party 
organs.  In addition, in most parties at least one MEP belongs to the executive party or-
gans. While there is less institutionalised co-operation between the Euro-
Parliamentarians and the Eduskunta, the MEP’s are in regular contact with their parties’ 
Grand Committee members. However, the contentiousness of EU matters causes con-
flicts within parties, and this has to a certain extent hampered co-operation between 
MEP’s and party leadership.
1 
The EU Secretariat of the Eduskunta forwards all agendas and press releases, and, upon 
request, the minutes of the meetings, of the Grand Committee to the Finnish MEP’s. 
The Eduskunta’s representative in the EU acts also as a link between the MEP’s and the 
MP’s. Finnish MEP’s are not allowed to attend the meetings of the Grand Committee, 
and so far the Committee has not invited MEP’s to give testimony. The Grand Commit-
tee and the Finnish MEP’s hold a joint seminar twice a year, once in Stras-
bourg/Brussels, and once in Helsinki. The autumn seminar f ocuses on the EU budget 
while the s pring meeting focuses on topical issues. Lasting only a couple of hours, the 
seminar is more a social occasion than a forum for exchanging detailed policy informa-
tion. Moreover, only the minority of Grand Committee MP’s and MEP’s has attended 
the seminars. Also the standing committees have made little use of the MEP’ policy 
expertise. The Foreign Affairs Committee heard one MEP from each party during the 
1996-97 IGC, but otherwise during 1994-98 only three committees invited MEP’s to 
provide information on  European matters.
2 It appears that there is little genuine interest 
in the Eduskunta to develop contacts with MEP’s, the main reason being that the MP’s 
do not see MEP’s as useful sources of information or as an effective channel to influ-
ence EU decision-making.
3 
                                                 
1  See Linnapuomi, Mari: ‘Täällä Strasbourg, kuuleeko Helsinki? Suomalaiset europarlamentaarikot 
eurooppalaisen ja kansallisen tason yhteensovittajina’ in: Martikainen, Tuomo/Pekonen, Kyösti 
(eds.): Eurovaalit Suomessa 1996, Vaalihumusta päätöksenteon arkeen, Acta Politica, No. 10, Ylei-
sen valtio-opin laitos, Helsingin yliopisto, 1999, pp. 228-280; Raunio, Tapio: ‘Losing Independence 
or Finally Gaining Recognition? Contacts between MEP and National Parties’, in: Party Politics, No. 
2/2000, pp. 211-223. 
2   Apparently also other Committees have invited MEP, but schedule problems have prevented them 
from attending Committee meetings. 
3   Linnapuomi, 1996, op.cit., pp. 246-250.  
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IV. The Finnish Parliament after Amsterdam 
 
The Eduskunta ratified the Amsterdam Treaty on 15 June 1998 with 110 votes for and 
four votes against. Overall, the Treaty and its Protocol on national parliaments necessi-
tated no changes within the Eduskunta. The Protocol was transformed into Finnish law 
together with the whole Amsterdam Treaty and required therefore no specific imple-
mentation by the Parliament. The Protocol led neither to amendments of the rules of 
procedure, nor to changes in the composition of the COSAC delegation. 
Perhaps the two most important aspects of the Amsterdam Protocol concerned the six-
week time limit and the constitutional right of national parliaments to receive EU 
documents. The informational rights of the Eduskunta in EU matters were a lready well 
established before the Amsterdam Treaty. The right of the Parliament to receive infor-
mation from the Government is regulated in Section 47 of the Constitution:  
The Parliament has the right to receive from the Government the information it needs in 
the consideration of matters. The appropriate minister shall ensure that Committees and 
other parliamentary organs receive without delay the necessary documents and other 
information in the possession of the authorities. A Committee has the right to receive 
information from the Government or the appropriate ministry on a matter within its 
competence. The Committee may issue a statement to the Government or the ministry 
on the basis of the information. A representative has the right to information which is in 
the possession of authorities and which is necessary for the performance of the duties of 
the Representative, in so far as the information is not secret or it does not pertain to a 
State budget proposal under preparation. In addition, the right of the Parliament to i n-
formation on international affairs is governed by the provisions included elsewhere in 
this Constitution. 
This constitutional passage is important in terms of the standing committees’ a ccess to 
EU information. The right of the Grand Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee 
to receive information on EU matters is instead based on Sections 96 (‘U-matters’) and 
97 (‘E-matters’) of the Constitution. The constitutionally regulated, basically unlimited, 
access to information f rom the Government is an essential prerequisite for effective 
parliamentary scrutiny. The Grand Committee may request information on the prepara-
tion of any matter within the European Union. The Government is also under an obliga-
tion to provide information  of this kind to the Grand Committee on its own initiative 
when necessary. This access to information is particularly important regarding two pro-
cedures related to EU decision-making: written reports from the Government to the 
Grand Committee (’E-matters’)  and hearings with ministers in the Grand Committee 
prior to Council meetings. The difference between ‘E-matters’ and ‘U-matters’ is that 
the former do not belong to the remit of the Parliament. The Government delivers to the 
Grand Committee a report on an  ‘E-matter’, either upon request from the Committee or 
on its own initiative. Typical ‘E-matters’ are Commission’s legislative initiatives that  
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fall outside the jurisdiction of the Eduskunta and non-legislative documents published 
by the Commission (i.e., g reen and white papers and Commission’s opinions). Other ‘E-
matters’ include reports on Finland’s integration policy or on court cases concerning 
Finland in the European Court of Justice. In decision-making related to the foreign and 
security policy of the  EU, the Foreign Affairs Committee enjoys the same rights to re-
ceive information and to express the view of Parliament as the Grand Committee enjoys 
in relation to other EU matters. The Foreign A ffairs Committee considers EU affairs 
falling within its competence in the same manner as the Grand Committee and also ex-
presses the view of Parliament on those affairs. The Foreign Affairs Committee has 
occasionally complained that the relevant information has arrived too late. 
According to the Protocol the six-week time limit is “subject to exceptions on grounds 
of urgency, the reasons of which shall be stated in the act or common position.” The 
Grand Committee has stressed that these exceptions should require unanimity in the 
Council, and that the time limit should be taken seriously by all sides and that any de-
viations from it should be allowed only in truly exceptional circumstances.
1 However, 
the Eduskunta is informed of the Commission’s legislative initiative normally months 
before the six-week time limit of the Amsterdam Treaty begins, that is, before the pro-
posal is received in all official languages by the Council and the EP. Not only is the 
Government obliged to inform the Parliament without delay of any proposal for a 
Council decision, but it also has to i nform the Eduskunta of the preparation of any issue 
relating to the EU that might belong to the competence of the Parliament. Thus the 
Eduskunta normally b ecomes involved in the processing of the initiative long before it 
is officially published by the Commission.  
 
V. Conclusions: Streamlining the Dialogue  
 
Membership in the European Union has been an important catalyst for parliamentarising 
decision-making in Finland. The Government dictates national integration policy, with 
the President intervening mainly when Second Pillar questions are on the EU agenda. 
While decision-making on routine European legislation is rather strongly decentralised, 
with much ministerial autonomy, the overall direction of national EU policy and key 
policy choices are coordinated  within the Cabinet EU Committee and between parties, 
including the opposition, in the Eduskunta. This domestic consensus building is at least 
partially driven by the need to achieve consistency and cohesion when negotiating with 
other member states and the EU institutions. The multi-party coalition governments, 
                                                 
1   Suuren valiokunnan lausunto 3/1998 vp, Valtioneuvoston selvitys neuvoston työjärjestyksen muut-
tamisesta (SuVL 3/1998 vp - E 92/1998 vp).  
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together with the role a ccorded to the opposition in the Grand Committee, facilitate 
broad backing for governmental action at the European level. 
There is no doubt that the system established for parliamentary scrutiny of European 
matters works well. Both the MP’s and politicians in Finland as well as civil servants 
from other EU member state legislatures considered the Finnish model as success, at 
least in comparative terms. The scrutiny model of the Eduskunta has four main 
strengths: the position of the Parliament is regulated in the Constitution; the Eduskunta 
gets relatively early involved in the process of EU legislation; the Parliament enjoys 
unlimited access to information from the Government; a nd the responsibility of prepar-
ing and monitoring European matters is delegated downwards to specialised commit-
tees.
1 Particularly the decentralisation of scrutiny and policy formulation to standing 
committees increases the ability of the whole Parliament  to influence the position of the 
Government. More centralised arrangements which give specialised committees a much 
smaller role, such as those found in the majority of member states, fail to benefit from 
the cumulative expertise of the standing committees. A decentralised system, on the 
other hand, enables all representatives to engage in EU matters.
2 
The active scrutiny of European legislation has arguably improved the overall dialogue 
between the Government and the Eduskunta, thus strengthening parliamentary account-
ability also in domestic issues. The regular appearance of ministers before the Grand 
Committee has had an impact on the internal work of the Government, leading to i m-
proved policy coordination within the cabinet and among the ministries and forcing the 
ministers to study the issues more thoroughly than might otherwise be the case. The 
Protocol included in the Amsterdam Treaty led to no changes within the Eduskunta: the 
system established for scrutinising the Government in European affairs works effi-
ciently, and there are no plans for reforming the procedures. 
After Amsterdam, the Government, the Eduskunta and the main parties have continued 
to balance their broad pro-integration statements and policies with a relatively conserva-
tive approach to institutional reform. In their opinions on the IGC held in 2000, both the 
Government and the Eduskunta were against giving the EP the right to dismiss individ-
ual Commissioners. The Grand Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee were 
also against the introduction of supranational EU-wide lists for Euro-elections. The 
Finnish position is basically the same as in the 1996-97 IGC, in favour of preserving the 
overall institutional status quo, with only limited changes in the direction of more s u-
pranational decision-making.
3  
                                                 
1  See Jääskinen, 2000, op.cit. 
2  See Raunio, Tapio: ‘Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union’, in: 
Government and Opposition, No. 2/1999, pp. 180-202; Raunio, Tapio/Wiberg, Matti: ‘Does Support 
Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of EU Governance’, in: Acta Politica, 
No. 2/2000, pp. 146-168. 
3  See Valtioneuvoston selonteko 1/2000 vp, Suomen lähtökohdat ja tavoitteet Euroopan unionin vuo-
den  2000 hallitusten välisessä konferenssissa (VNS 1/2000 vp); Suuren valiokunnan lausunto 
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Finally, while the Eduskunta deserves credit for establishing an effective system of par-
liamentary scrutiny, the debating function of the Parliament has so far remained mar-
ginalised in European matters. CFSP, EMU, and Agenda 2000 excluded, plenary i n-
volvement has been weak, with lack of constructive debates on national European pol-
icy or on the future of integration. Two main factors explain this brevity of integration 
debate. The Eduskunta is a committee-based institution, with the plenary in a secondary 
role, also in the context of domestic legislation. Secondly, despite the overall consensus 
in the Grand Committee, European matters continue to produce disagreement within 
and among parties, and public debates on the floor might damage the  parties by high-
lighting these internal cleavages. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1/2000vp, Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen lähtökohdista ja tavoitteista Euroopan unionin vuoden 
2000 hallitusten välisessä konferenssissa (SuVL 1/2000 vp - VNS 1/2000 vp); Ulkoasiainvaliokun-
nan mietintö 2/2000 vp, Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen lähtökohdista ja tavoitteista Euroopan 
unionin vuoden 2000 hallitusten välisessä konferenssissa (UaVM 2/2000 vp - VNS 1/2000 vp); Pe-
rustuslakivaliokunnan lausunto 2/2000 vp, Valtioneuvoston selonteko Suomen lähtökohdista ja ta-
voitteista Euroopan unionin vuoden 2000 hallitusten välisessä konferenssissa (PeVL 2/2000 vp - 
VNS 1/2000 vp).  
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The Parliament of Spain: Slowly Moving onto the European Direction? 
 
Felipe Basabe Lloréns and Maria Teresa González Escudero 
 
I. Introduction: The Political Culture and System of Spain 
 
1. Interests, Ideas and Attitudes in EU Affairs 
 
Attitudes towards European integration in Spain are rather stable and easy to evaluate; 
no major differences can be ascertained among the main political parties and societal 
actors, partly due to the historic and political  context of accession. Spain’s entry into the 
European Communities in 1986 was the result of a long political process and the fulfil-
ment of a historical aspiration for the Spanish society.
1 For most internal and external 
observers, Spain’s incorporation to  the EC constituted the final step of the transition 
process to democracy. The prospect of EC membership was one of the stabilising ele-
ments in the transition towards democracy, being a selective incentive for it. Member-
ship meant, for political elites and  public opinion alike, the return to the Western world 
from which the country felt excluded. The EC had a legitimising effect on the new 
Spanish democracy because of Community members’ permanent criticism and rejection 
and occasional condemnation of Franco’s regime. Accession to the EC was supported 
almost unanimously by all political parties and societal actors.
2 This readiness to inte-
grate was reflected by the inclusion of Article 93 in the 1978 Constitution which allows 
for constitutional powers to be vested in international institutions. Such broad social and 
political consensus has presided over the negotiation and ratification processes of the 
later Treaty reforms and is still to be found at the basis of most of the present features of 
Spanish public attitudes towards the process of European integration.
3 
The aforementioned broad support of European integration has nevertheless experi-
enced a relative decline in the past years from 1995 onwards. This is due to political 
conflicts on certain specific issues such as fisheries, industrial re-conversion, and the 
reform of the EC common market on olive oil
4, to the rise of interests groups - still at a 
                                                 
1   See Ramírez Jiménez, M.: Europa en la conciencia española y otros estudios, Madrid, Trotta 1996. 
2   See Moreno Juste, A., España y el proceso de construcción europea, Barcelona, Ariel Practicum 
1998. 
3   See Almarcha Barbado, Amporo (ed.): Spain and EC membership evaluated, London: Pinter Publis-
hers 1993; Burgorgue-Larsen, L., L’Espagne et la Communauté Européenne, Etudes Européennes, 
Bruxelles, Université de Bruxelles, 1995; Barbé, Esther: La política europea de España, Ariel Practi-
cum 1999. 
4   See Morata, Francesc: ‘Spain: Modernization through Integration’, in: Hanf, Kenneth/Soetendorp, 
Ben (eds.): Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Union, London: 
Longman 1998, pp. 100-115; Barbé, 1999, op.cit., pp. 73-85.  
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minor scale  -, and to dissenting opinions within some of the national political parties 
(People’s Party, United Left) contrary to further developments in the process.
1 How-
ever, the general public’s and political elites’ perception still confirms a very positive 
attitude and integrationist approach to European issues, which have traditionally been 
considered as ‘state policy’ not subject to down-to-earth political debate.
2 Both Presi-
dents Gonzalez and Aznar have publicly declared that “the most precious asset Spain 
has with regard to EU negotiations is the general consensus among the political parties 
on the necessity and success of the process of European integration”.
3 The 1999 EC 
budgetary reform and the future enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe nec-
essarily are to be a crucial test for such consensus.
4 
 
2. Dynamics of Political Parties at the Domestic and the European Level 
 
The results in the 1989, 1994 and 1999 European Parliament elections tend to r eflect 
similar results to those in domestic elections.
5 The massive predominance of the Span-
ish Socialists’ Party (PSOE) and the People’s Party (PP) is barely nuanced by the elec-
toral presence of the United Left (Izquierda Unida) at EU level  - which temporarily 
borrowed Socialist votes in 1994  - and changing coalitions among the ‘nationalist’ r e-
gional parties in order to achieve the election of at least one seat which later was to ro-
tate among the party members of the coalition. 
                                                 
1   See España y el Tratado de la Unión Europea, Madrid, COLEX 1994; Alvarez-Miranda Navarro, B.: 
‘Integración europea y sistema de partidos en el Sur de Europa: despolarización y convergencia’, in: 
Revista de Estudios Políticos No. 3/1994, pp.143-167. 
2   See Cienfuegos Mateo, Manuel: ‘El control de las Cortes generales sobre el Gobierno en asuntos 
relativos a las Comunidades Europeas durante la década 1986-1995’, in: Revista de las Cortes Gene-
rales, No. 38/1996, pp. 47-99; Cienfuegos Mateo, Manuel: ‘La Comisión Mixta para la Unión Euro-
pea: Análisis y balance de una década de actividad en el seguimiento de los asuntos comunitarios’, 
in: Gaceta Jurídica de la CE, No. D -27/1997, pp. 7 -69; Barbé, Esther: ‘The National Interests of 
Spain’ in: Wessels, Wolfgang (ed.): National versus. EU-Foreign Policy Interests. Mapping ‘impor-
tant” national interests (Final collective Report), Köln/Brussels, TEPSA, 1998, pp. 70-81; Barbé, 
1999, op.cit., p. 31. 
3   In fact, the political use of the case of alleged corruption in EC flax subsidies within the Spanish 
Ministry of Agriculture under the former mandate of the current Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Ms. Loyola de Palacio, during the 1999 EP electoral campaign and the Commissio-
ners’ EP individual auditions has constituted a major exception, which was heavily criticised by 
most political actors and national press. 
4   See Cortes Generales - Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, Informe sobre La ampliación de la 
Unión Europea, Publics. Secretaría General del Congreso de los Diputados, 1999. 
5   See Almarcha Barbado, 1993, op.cit.; Moreno Juste, 1998, op.cit.  
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Table 13: Results of Elections to the European Parliament in Spain 1994-1999 
 
 
1999 Elections 
 
1994 Elections 
Political Parties  % 
Votes 
Seats  Seats in 
EP Groups 
% 
Votes 
Seats  Seats in 
EP Groups 
People’s Party -PP  39.74  27  27 PPE  40.12  28  28 PPE 
Socialist Party - PSOE  35.32  24  24 PSE  30.79  22  22 PSE 
United Left - IU  5.77  4  4 IUE  13.44  9  9 IUE 
CiU (CDC +UDC) 
Catalonian center-right 
4.43  3  1 PPE + 2 
ELDR 
4.66  3  1 PPE + 2 
ELDR 
C.E. (CC/ PA/UV/PAR) 
Canarian/ Aragones/ Valencian/ 
Andalusian Center 
3.20  2  1 ELDR+ 
1 V-ALE 
     
C.N. PNV/EA/ERC/UM) 
Basque/Catalonian/Balearic “Radi-
cal” Nationalists 
2.90  2  2 V-ALE  2.82  2  1 PPE + 1 
CRE 
BNG (Galician nationalists)  1.65  1  1 V-ALE  0.75     
EH (Basque Independentists)  1.45  1  NI  0.97     
Source: www.idea.eu.int. 
 
In any case, the relevance of the ‘nationalist’ parties, especially the Catalonian, Basque 
and Canarian ones is enormously reduced at EU level, due to the single national con-
stituency used for EP elections, compared to their actual pre-eminent role at national 
level.
1 
In any case, it can be stated that Spanish EU policy is definitely not driven by domestic 
politics.
2 The established political parties have not fundamentally changed their political 
attitudes towards EU issues, with the exception of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
This has, within the context of the current Basque ‘peace process’, recently been 
obliged to abandon the European People’s Party. The main  differences with regard to 
international politics among the Spanish political parties mainly refer to Cuba and, to a 
lesser extent, other Latin-American and Mediterranean specific relationships.
3 Finally, 
the appointment of Javier Solana as Secretary-General of NATO, apart from its reper-
cussions in domestic politics, helped to d ilute traditional reticences and misconceptions 
within the Spanish left parties towards NATO and other military alliances. 
 
                                                 
1   See the controversial Judgment 28/91 of 14 February of the Spanish Constitutional Court denying 
the abolition of the single electoral constituency for the whole Spanish territory de manded by the 
Basque Regional Parliament. 
2   See Morata, Francesc: ‘Fundamentals of Spain in E U Affairs’, in: Wessels, Wolfgang/Rometsch, 
Dietrich (eds.): The European Union and its Member States. Towards Institutional Fusion?, Man-
chester: Manchester University Press 1996, pp.134-154; Moreno Juste 1998, op.cit. 
3   See Barbé, 1999, op.cit., p. 121.  
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3. The Territorial Distribution of Power: Increasing Asymmetric ‘Regionalisation’ 
 
Spain’s gradual incorporation into the process of European integration has followed a 
process parallel to its internal territorial redistribution of power  - progressive transfer 
and acquisition of powers from the central State by  the regions (Comunidades Autóno-
mas)  - and to the reorganisation of its administrative structure and decision-making 
procedures, hence facilitating its adaptations to the EC/EU decision-making process.
1 In 
its fourteen years of EU membership, Spain has also contributed relevantly to the proc-
ess of European integration with important initiatives  - such as the concept of European 
citizenship, the development of the notion of economic and social cohesion and, t o-
gether with Germany and Belgium, the enactment of the Committee of the Regions.
2 
The rise of the ‘nationalist’ regional parties, especially the Catalonian (CiU), Basque 
(PNV) and Canarian (CC) ones, onto the main national political stage from 1993 to 
2000 has somewhat changed a lot within Spanish politics, due to the ‘moderating’ role 
played by these parties and their continuous demands of territorial nature. Though it 
was commonly accepted that no national government would be constituted without the 
participation or agreement of one or various ‘nationalist’ parties, the 2000 general elec-
tions granting absolute majority to Aznar’s party are inevitably to lessen the political 
influence and decision power of ‘nationalists’ at national level. The dramatic ongoing 
Basque ‘peace process’ and the surprising results of the 1999 Catalonian regional elec-
tions have already de facto weakened the political influence of the ‘nationalist’ parties. 
 
4. Basic Features of Parliament-Government Relationship 
 
The constitutional provisions concerning the involvement of the Spanish national Par-
liament in European affairs are rather scarce because of the preponderance of the 
Executive in the management of international and EC/EU affairs. The main role of the 
Parliament concerns the ratification of international treaties  - among them those related 
to the transfer of competences to supranational organisations  - according to articles 93, 
94 and 96.2 of the Spanish Constitution. Different voting majorities are required d e-
pending on the specific types of international treaties. The negotiations leading to the 
                                                 
1   See Morata, 1996, op.cit., pp.134-154; Burgorgue-Larsen, Laurence: ‘Espagne’, in: Rideau, Joel 
(ed.), Les États Membres de l’Union Européenne. Adaptations - Mutations - Résistances, Paris, 
L.G.D.J. 1997; Newton, M.T./Donaghy, P.J., Institutions of modern Spain: A political and economic 
guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997; Arias Martín, M.A., Comunidades Autónomas 
y elaboración del Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Oñati, I.V.A.P 1998. 
2   See Molina del Pozo, C.F. (ed.): España en la Europa comunitaria: balance de diez años, Madrid, 
CEURA 1996; Elorza Cavengt, J.: ‘El Tratado de Amsterdam: valoración para España’, in : Meri-
diano CERI No. 16/August 1997a, pp. 4-7; Elorza Cavengt, J.: ‘Reflexiones y balance de diez años 
de España en la Unión Europea’, in : Información Comercial Española No. 766/1997b, pp. 15-29.  
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adoption and signature of an international treaty are exclusively led by the Central Gov-
ernment without any prior mandate from the national Parliament. 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 grants the Government the most powers vis-à-vis the 
conduction of international relations and the negotiation of international agreements;
1 
there is barely no role for the Parliament (Cortes) in such issues, apart from the ratifica-
tion procedures of international treaties and the ex post-control of international negotia-
tions conducted by the Executive.
2 The predominant role in international negotiations is 
therefore assumed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though the dynamics of European 
integration are increasingly granting greater roles to other sectoral ministries as well as 
to the President’s O ffice together with the Permanent Representation in Brussels which 
acts as its long-distance direct agent. There are no constitutional powers granted to the 
Autonomous Communities in strict “international affairs” issues,
3 though the EU deci-
sion-making-process has indirectly provoked and allowed for their  - still incipient  - 
participation in the process.
4 The set-up of such participation and coordination mecha-
nisms vis-à-vis the definition of the Spanish national negotiation positions is the main 
demand to the Central Government unanimously shared by all ‘nationalist’ parties and, 
in some cases, regional governments.
5 
The Spanish Cortes is a bicameral Parliament where the Lower Chamber, the Congress, 
represents the people and the Upper Chamber, the Senate, is a chamber of territorial 
representation. The 350 deputies in the Congress are elected according to a system of 
proportional representation, with the provinces serving as constituencies. Two hundred 
senators are directly elected in a plurality system in the provinces, four senators per 
province. The remaining senators are designated by the assemblies of the Comunidades 
Autonomas according to population. Therefore, two different territorial entities are rep-
resented by the Senate. This has provoked continuous demands for a constitutional r e-
form, together with the fact that the Senate practically serves as a rather ineffective sec-
ond reading Chamber - despite formal equality with the Congress. 
                                                 
1   See Pérez Tremp, P.: Constitución Española y Comunidad Europea, Madrid, Civitas 1994; Mangas 
Martín, A.: ‘Le droit Constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne: Espagne’, in: Schwarze, 
Jürgen (ed.): XVII F.I.D.E. Kongress (Berlin, Oktober 1996) - Ergebnisse und Perspektiven, Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlag 1997, pp. 206-230. 
2   See Closa, Carlos: ‘Spain: The Cortes and the EU - A Growing Together’, in: Norton, Philip (ed.): 
National Parliaments and the European Union, London: Frank Cass 1996; Cienfuegos Mateo, 1997, 
op.cit., pp. 7-69. 
3   See Mangas Martín, 1997, op.cit., pp. 206-230. 
4   See Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas (Ministry for the Public Administrations), La 
participación de las Comunidades Autónomas en los asuntos comunitarios europeos, Madrid, Publi-
caciones del Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas 1995; Morata, 1996, op.cit., pp.134-154; 
Arias Martín, 1998, op.cit. 
5   See Cortes Generales-Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea, Proposición no de Ley sobre partici-
pación de las Comunidades Autónomas en la delegación del Estado en el Consejo de Ministros de la 
Unión Europea, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales No. 176, 10 March 1998.  
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Democratic parliamentary tradition, interrupted for almost 40 years, has been r estored 
and developed in parallel to the EC membership during five legislatures: the Third 
(1986-1989), the Fourth (1989-1993), the Fifth (1993-1996), the Sixth (1996-2000) and 
the Seventh Legislature (since 2000). Between 1982 and 1993, the Socialist Party gov-
erned with the backing of an absolute parliamentary majority. This is also the case with 
the People’s Party during the recently inaugurated Seventh Legislature. From 1993 to 
1996, as well as from 1996 to 2000, the Socialists and the Conservatives have respec-
tively governed with the parliamentary support of the Catalan nationalists and other 
‘regional’ nationalist parties with parliamentary representation (Canarian, Basques, 
Aragonese, etc.). 
From the beginning of its existence until 1983, the Spanish Parliament was more con-
cerned with the elaboration and enactment of a new constitution and the normalisation 
of public and political life. Therefore, there was only a marginal interest in the process 
of European integration, which was reflected in the way the Parliament adapted collec-
tively to the Constitutive Treaties and the Single European Act both in procedural and 
substantive terms at the time of accession. This could serve to explain why parliamen-
tary changes and reforms in Spain dealing with general instruments for parliamentary 
information and control in EC/EU affairs have been limited. 
The Spanish Constitution empowers the Government to direct foreign policy. Relations 
between the Executive and the Cortes in dealing with foreign affairs are exclusively 
framed by article 93 of the Spanish Constitution. This provision establishes that it is 
incumbent upon the Cortes or the Government, as the case may be, to guarantee com-
pliance with international treaties and with the resolutions emanating from international 
and supranational organisations in which the powers have been vested. The legislative 
role permitted by the EC legal system is limited to the implementation of directives. 
Given the very technical nature of the matters usually regulated by directives, they are 
seldom dealt with by the Cortes. If the matter is under “reserve of law”, then either the 
Cortes implements the directive through a bill or the Government does so through a 
‘Delegation bill’ from the Cortes. A lthough the diminution of competences linked to 
EC/EU membership affects the Parliament more than the Government, there appears to 
be an agreement that in Spain EC/EU membership has not resulted in an excessive u n-
balance in the distribution of powers between them. Given the reduced involvement of 
the Spanish Parliament in international affairs  - which could be extended to other policy 
areas  -, there is a common understanding that the level of parliamentary scrutiny in 
EC/EU affairs is similar or even higher then the average in other fields. 
Finally, the quasi-federalist structure of the Spanish State renders the Autonomous 
Communities (Comunidades Autónomas) competent for the implementation of EC leg-
islation. Both, the Congress’ and  Senate’s legislating committees, are precluded from 
interfering with the competences of the Communities and cannot scrutinise legislation 
enacted by the Autonomous Communities to give effect to EC Law, even though the 
Cenral Government remains responsible  for non-compliance. Nevertheless, and again  
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because of the abovementioned weak nature of parliamentary scrutiny in the Spanish 
system, there is no evidence that the territorial structure of the state has implied a sig-
nificant diminution or erosion of parliamentary involvement in EC/EU affairs at n a-
tional level. 
 
II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs 
 
1. The Participation of the Cortes in European Policy-Making 
 
The Spanish Cortes has a very indirect presence in the EC decision-making process. 
Parliamentary scrutiny in EC/EU affairs has in practice never been too relevant, given 
the reduced institutional role of the Parliament vis-à-vis the management of certain pol-
icy areas by the Government. Post-Maastricht and post-Amsterdam developments have 
confirmed this situation, except for specific issues of great relevance for the general 
public which had its origin in EC decisions.
1 The main parliamentary activity in relation 
to EC/EU matters has been government control  - preferably ex-post, but increasingly 
ex-ante  -, while legislative activity has been a secondary issue. Parliamentary scrutiny 
mechanisms also o perate on the legislative process to incorporate EC rules into Spanish 
statutes  - until the Law of 1994 this was not the case with administrative decrees -, as 
well as through the control of Spanish government representatives in EC i nstitutions 
and the implementation of EC decisions by the public authorities, for which the Spanish 
Government is responsible. 
The broad positive  consensus among the major political parties towards the process of 
European integration also explains the limited participation and activity of the Parlia-
ment in this field. Only certain Congress deputies of the left coalition Izquierda Unida 
and of some o f the Basque, Catalan and Canarian ‘nationalist’ parties have actually 
developed major dissenting strategies on EC affairs. The Parliament’s role  - apart from 
its symbolic connotations  - is basically reactive and limited to the reception of informa-
tion given by the Government or administrative bodies. Such information is generally 
granted after the definition of the Spanish official positions by the Government. 
The main standing parliamentary organ dealing with EC/EU affairs is the Mixed Com-
mittee of the Congress and the Senate for the European Union (Comisión Mixta para la 
Unión Europea). It is the successor of the Mixed Committee for the European Commu-
nities created by Act 47/1985 of 27 December 1985, later modified by Act 18/1988 of 1 
July 1988, whose name - and, to some extent, whose functions - were changed by Act 
8/1994 of 19 May 1994 following Spain’s parliamentary ratification of the Treaty on 
                                                 
1   Reform of certain CMOs within the CAP, fisheries, reconversion of coal and shipbuilding industries, 
immigration policy and police co-operation after the Tampere European Council...)  
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European Union. Initially this Committee was composed of a fixed number of members; 
the Congress had a larger representation than the Senate, which produced a very rigid 
structure. The Mixed Committee is currently composed of an equal number of Congress 
deputies and senators and reflects the relative strength of the political groups within the 
two Chambers. The n umber of representatives varies. It is agreed upon by the bureaus 
of both Chambers in a joint session at the beginning of the legislature in order to guar-
antee the proportional presence of all parliamentary groups. The result was a consider-
able growth in n umber of its members, from 15 in the Third to 46 in the Seventh Legis-
lature. 
The post of the presidency of the Committee is normally delegated by the President of 
the Congress. During the Committee’s early days, it used to be the First Vice-President 
of the Congress. The current parliamentary custom, however, allocates the presidency to 
the largest opposition group. Relevant politicians have in practice assumed the coordi-
nating role of the committee in the last legislatures.
1  
There is no specific quorum for holding sessions, although half of the members plus one 
must be present for a vote to be held. Decisions are reached by simple majority, for 
which each group has a number of votes proportional to its total number of deputies and 
senators. 
The Committee i s the only Mixed Committee with two members of the Parliament’s 
Legal Service (Letrados de Cortes
2) ascribed to it. They direct its Secretariat, which 
plays an extremely important role in the transmission of documents and legislative pro-
posals from the Government to the Parliament. The Congress provides for the Secre-
tariat’s staff, which is shared with the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs. The 
Parliament’s Administration acts as correspondent to the EU institutions by means of 
the General Directorate  for Studies and Documentation (Dirección General de Estudios 
y Documentación), though no Spanish parliamentary “linkage fonctionnaire” (funcion-
ario de enlace) has ever been attached to the European Parliament. The large political 
parties have specialists i n EC/EU affairs who traditionally sit in this Committee, while 
the smaller and ‘nationalist’ parties only intervene to the extent that the powers and 
interests of their respective Autonomous Community or of a certain social group or 
economic sector are affected. 
The Mixed Committee is not a legislative Committee. It is not directly involved in pre-
paring legislation. The tasks of a non-legislative committee tend to be of study and con-
trol, as well as of “impulse of the legislative activity”.
3 However, secondary legislation 
                                                 
1   Marcelino Oreja, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Commissioner; Isabel Tocino, 
former Minister for Environment; Pedro Solbes, former Minister of Economy and Finance and cur-
rent European Commissioner; Josep Borrell, former Minister of Finance and Public Works. 
2   At present, Isabel Revuelta (Congress), soon to be replaced by Ana Alvárez, and José Manuel Bretal 
(Senate). 
3   See the Standing Orders of the Congress and the Senate.  
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enacted in pursuance of EC law has to be scrutinised by the standing committees of a 
legislative nature. Any reform of the Mixed Committee itself has to be carried out by a 
legislative committee, namely the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Mixed Committee 
may adopt conclusions, opinions and motions, and pass them onto the competent legis-
lative Committee in either Chamber. However, its effectiveness depends on the political 
will and decision of the bureaus of both Chambers. In practice, the Mixed Committee 
only manages to stimulate the involvement of other committees when they depend on it 
for the provision of information. 
Proposals are sent by the Government Ministries to the Congress by means of the coor-
dination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and distributed to the relevant Parliament 
Committees by the Bureau of the Chamber. Not surprisingly, there has been frequent 
conflicts over the demarcation of the responsibilities between the legislative committees 
and the Mixed Committee. In any case, the new system enacted for the transmission of 
information from the Government to the Parliament has eased such lack of precision in 
the allocation of powers. The Mixed Committee can appoint reporting bodies  - legally 
no sub-committees (see table 14)  - f or the follow-up and monitoring of a certain politi-
cal or reform process. These reporting bodies can produce a final report, which, a p-
proved by the committee, is presented to the Government, though without any legal 
binding effect. Such was the case of the 1995 Report on the Negotiation of the Amster-
dam Treaty. 
The Mixed Committee is the only parliamentary body with direct and regular links to 
the European Parliament. Hence it plays a vital role in ensuring that the Cortes is kept 
informed of activities and developments in the European institutions. It has not been 
considered as an important parliamentary committee, in perpetual competition with 
other committees, especially that for Foreign Affairs. While the Government has always 
used the latter Committee a s its main means of communication with the Parliament in 
EC/EU affairs, the opposition does not tend to consider it as its main device for gov-
ernment supervision and control. However, it has become an atypical and rather rele-
vant committee of growing importance, because its action encompasses the totality of 
government policies.  
The Mixed Committee holds regular meetings, some on general information and others 
on specific issues. There is an average number of approximately 40 sessions per legisla-
ture, thus more than one meeting per month (see table 14). Oral questions posed by the 
Committee are usually of a sectoral nature. Except for some appearances of officials at 
their own request, and for the regular, institutionalised appearance of the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Policy and the EU, every appearance tends to take place upon request 
from the opposition groups. The Committee has been locating its field of action b e-
tween ex-post- and ex-ante-control of the Executive’s action within the Council of the 
EU. The opposition has repeatedly asked that the Committee becomes an advisory body 
getting active prior to governmental action within the Council of the EU. The govern-
ment in turn has always maintained that the speed required within the EC/EU decision- 
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making process makes it impossible to seek parliamentary support or authorisation for 
each decision. According to a proposal of Resolution presented in November 1993 by 
the then opposition PP, the Mixed Committee has been closely involved in the prepara-
tion of  the IGC 1996/1997. A major consequence of such involvement was the Commit-
tee Resolution of 21 December 1995 which contained guidelines agreed to by all par-
liamentary groups on the Spanish position for the IGC negotiations. 
Table 14: Statistics on Spain’s Parliamentary Activity in EC/EU Affairs 
IV Legislature (1989-1993) 
Plenary Sittings 
Non-legislative proposals in plenary session 
Interpelations and Oral questions in plenary session 
Written questions with written response 
3 
10 
29 
Other Sectoral Committees 
Hearings (Agric. 9; Indu. 7; Soc. 1; FA 1) 
Oral questions (Budg. 14; Soc. 1; FA 1; R&D. 1) 
12 
17 
Mixed Committee for the European Communities 
Non-legislative proposals 
Hearings (Government: 60), (Officials: 72), and (Specialists 73) 
Oral questions in Committee 
3 
205 
26 
Subcommittees on: the Accession Treaty and the Sea (known as ponencia on the internal market); on Economic 
and Monetary Union; Subcommittee/Reporting Body on Political Union 
V LEGISLATURE (1993-1996) 
Plenary Sittings 
Non-legislative proposals in plenary session 
Interpelations, Hearings and Oral questions in plenary session 
Written questions with written response 
8 
60 
114 
Other Sectoral Committees 
Hearings 
Oral questions 
23 
37 
Mixed Committee for the EC/EU; 35 sessions; Total duration: 82 hours, 12 minutes 
Non-legislative proposals 
Hearings (Government: 59), (Officials: 16) and (Specialists 12) 
Oral questions in Committee 
5 
87 
39 
Subcommittees on: Consequences for Spain of EU enlargement and institutional reforms (154/6): 13 sessions; 
report adopted on 21 december 1995; on EMU, structural and cohesion funds (154/7): 1 session; no final report 
adopted; on the situation and reform of fruit and vegetables cmo (154/21): 3 sessions; no final report adopted 
VI Legislature (1996-2000) 
Plenary Sittings 
Non-legislative proposals in plenary session 
Interpelations, Hearings and Oral questions in plenary session 
Written questions with written response 
36 
86 
271 
Other Sectoral Committees 
Hearings 
Oral questions 
41 
84 
Mixed Committee for the European Union; 38 sessions; Total duration: 99 hours, 23 minutes 
Non-legislative proposals 
Hearings (Government: 58), (Officials: 28) and (Specialists: 10) 
Oral questions in Committee 
27 
96 
69 
Subcommittees on: IGC follow-up (154/1): 13 sessions; Total duration: 30 hours 5 minutes, Number of members: 
11, Hearings: 10 + 2, Final Report adopted on 29 May 1997; on EU enlargement (154/20): 10 sessions; Total 
duration: 17 hours 45 minutes, Number of members: 14, Hearings: 1 + 6, Report adopted on 18 November 1999. 
Sources: Closa, 1996, op.cit.; Congreso de los Diputados; Own data calculation. 
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Among the rights granted to the Committee by the law of 1994 are the following (see 
table 14):  
-  to receive, via the Government, legislation proposals emanating from the Euro-
pean Commission in sufficient time to be properly informed or to e xamine such 
proposals;  
-  to request a full debate on such proposals if it should consider them necessary;  
-  to request the appearance of a government member before the Committee to i n-
form it on the outcome of bills approved by the Council of the EU;  
-  to be informed by the Government about the general lines of its European policy;  
-  to draft reports on matters relating to the European Union; and  
-  to establish links  of co-operation with their counterparts in the parliaments of 
other member states of the European Union.  
A delegation of the Mixed Committee also participates in the meetings of the Confer-
ence of European Affairs Committees (COSAC) and bilateral meetings  with delegations 
or bodies both from the European Parliament and other national parliaments of the EU. 
The Spanish Parliament limits itself to exercise its legislative functions for the imple-
mentation of EC Law by means of the regular activity of the sectoral legislative com-
mittees (tabling of amendments)  - normally at the initiative of the Government. The aim 
is to adopt the regulatory measures in order to adapt internal law to the European provi-
sions. The motions and non-binding legislative proposals approved in a parliamentary 
committee or in plenary formally oblige the Government, though there is no later sys-
tem of effective legal control. 
Informal sessions are the most important parliamentary control activity in EC/EU a f-
fairs. They are practiced on the  basis of information given by the Executive, on the lat-
ter’s own initiative or on that of the Chambers. The plenary session of the Congress of 
Deputies holds a meeting after every summit of the European Council in order to get 
informed about the result of  the negotiations. This practice was institutionalised after 
the meeting of the European Council held at the end of the first Spanish Presidency of 
the Council (1989). Since then, it has become the m ajor EC/EU affairs-related activity 
at parliamentary level. The President also reports to the Congress and answers the ques-
tions and interpellations addressed by the parliamentary leaders on such issues. Such 
interaction generally helps to create the necessary consensus for the production of 
agreements on resolutions and recommendations aiming to guide the Spanish negotiat-
ing positions in Brussels. 
The Secretary of State for Foreign Policy and the European Union also appears b i-
monthly before certain bodies of both Chambers  - the Mixed Committee and the Sen-
ate’s Budget Committee  - in order to answer questions by deputies and senators on 
EC/EU related issues. Most of the sectoral committees of the Congress (Committee on 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Industry) also 
require hearings and raise questions in order to actually control the application and en-
forcement of EC legislation in their respective fields.  
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The Mixed Committee is empowered to receive information from the Government. The 
two main instruments for the exercise of this function are the oral questions in commit-
tee and hearings. The hearings tend to be of a more general character and have taken the 
form of general debates. As regards the informal powers of the Mixed Committee in the 
upstream process of EC legislation, it receives - via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
not directly from the Permanent Representation to the EU  - all Commission proposals 
(COM documents) from the Government through the distribution mechanisms of the 
Bureau. In practice, the timing has considerably improved in the past years; the present 
situation consists of a fortnightly envoy within six weeks from the date of the adoption 
of the proposal. The Government’s obligation is limited to sending the Commission’s 
proposal, without any accompanying government reports and studies on proposed 
measures.  
The actual use of this information flux is very reduced. The Mixed Committee makes 
limited use of its power to produce reports (non-binding proposals, reports, resolutions, 
motions...), despite the recommendations by legal specialists for further activity and 
involvement in the scrutiny of normative proposals. 
Concerning informal powers on the implementation of EC Law, the Mixed Committee 
might receive information from the Government on the decisions and agreements 
reached within the Council of Ministers, though most of these documents concern major 
EC/EU initiatives. At the same time, the Government  - by means of the Secretariat of 
State for the European Union  - is obliged to provide the information expressly requested 
by individual MP’s, as well as accompanying documents that it might consider relevant. 
Finally, fifty MP’s can always start “in-constitutionality legal procedures” before the 
Constitutional Court if they consider the implementation of EC L aw as opposing any 
constitutional provision. 
It is remarkable that an annual debate on EC/EU affairs has never been established - as 
it is the case of the “State of the Nation” or “State of the Autonomous Communities” 
annual debates  -, though the general a spects of European integration and more specific 
policy-oriented issues have always been among the issues dealt with in wider political 
debates. There is, however, an important number of oral and written questions, as well 
as interpellations and motions subsequent to interpellations presented to the Govern-
ment, both in the plenary sessions and in some of the sectoral committees of both 
Chambers. Note that at least one third of these questions still pose general or institu-
tional problems. 
At the invitation o f the country holding the Presidency, the President of the Congress 
and/or a delegation of the members of the Mixed Committee regularly a ttend meetings 
of the President of the European Parliament and representatives of the national Parlia-
ments, whose aim i t is to review the network of relations among parliaments and to 
suggest ways in which existing links could be improved. The international activities and 
active involvement of Spanish parliamentary organs in external conferences (e.g. Euro-
pean Parliament h earings, Euro-mediterranean parliamentary fora) has considerably  
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increased in recent times. However, the e mpowerment of the Mixed Committee to 
maintain relations with equivalent committees in other national parliaments has been 
scarcely used and the activity has been kept to a minimum. 
The Plenary Sitting of the Senate has not been especially involved in EC/EU a ffairs 
except for questions and interpellations addressed to the Government on EC issues a f-
fecting the Autonomous Communities, such as those related with the Structural Funds 
or the Committee of the Regions. After the ratification of the Treaty on European U n-
ion, the Senate decided to set up a special committee to report on regional participation 
in Europe. However, it is before the Senate’s Budget Committee where the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Policy and the EU regularly reports on a bi-monthly basis. 
Spanish deputies and senators do not generally have other permanent channels of com-
munication with the EU institutions apart from the Secretariat of State for the EU, their 
respective political parties and personal contacts with MEP’s. 
 
2. The Participation of the Parliaments of the Autonomous Communities in EU Affairs 
 
The Spanish Autonomous Communities implement EC policies within their own areas 
of competence according to the constitutional distribution of powers. The adaptation of 
regional legislation already in force prior to Spain’s accession to the EC only affected 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Similar to the situation at n ational scale, regional 
governments remain the main actors for the decision-making and the management of 
EC/EU-related affairs. Nevertheless, regional parliaments, traditionally excluded from 
the management and control of these areas, started to expand their activities in this field 
during the last years. Apart from debating the general or sectoral impact of European 
integration for the r espective Autonomous Community, regional parliaments regularly 
adopt resolutions or recommendations addressed to the regional Government in order to 
influence both its internal policy and the relationship with the Central Government and 
administration. 
Most regional parliaments have set up permanent parliamentary committees of a non-
legislative nature in order to monitor the developments in E U affairs.
1 These parliamen-
tary committees are based on the model of the Mixed Committee of the national parlia-
ment. The regional Minister coordinating the EC/EU affairs  - normally the Minister for 
the Presidency or the Minister of Economy and Finance - reports to these committees on 
a regular basis and answers questions and interpellations posed by its members. Some 
of these committees have established formal relations with the EU Committee of the 
Regions or with similar committees in regional parliaments  of other member states. The 
first meeting of regional parliaments of the EU member states was recently held in 1998 
                                                 
1   Comisión para el seguimiento de la Unión Europea y de Actuaciones Exteriores in Catalonia, Comi-
sión Permanente para Asuntos Europeos in Madrid or Asturias...  
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in Oviedo (Asturias) and created a permanent follow-up Committee presided by Ovidio 
Sánchez Díaz, the President of the regional parliament o f Asturias (Junta General del 
Principado). 
In 1994, three regional parliaments - those of Cantabria, Madrid and Aragón  - adopted 
Regional Acts establishing specific procedures to participate in and to control the man-
agement of the EC’s Structural Funds during its different stages (project selection, pro-
gramming, financial execution...)  - a step further ahead of the control mechanisms set 
up by the national Cortes. 
Each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities has created a department which deals 
exclusively  with EC/EU affairs. These departments vary considerably in size and a d-
ministrative relevance. They are situated within one of the regional ministries (Conse-
jerías) and tend to be located in the regional capital. The ministry concerned varies from 
one Community to another, though it generally is a directorate general or service report-
ing to the regional Minister of the Presidency. In some of the larger regions, like Anda-
lusia or Catalonia, these departments have even established some offices at provincial 
level. Thus the relationships between these d epartments and the regional parliamentary 
committees vary extremely from one Community to another and are still in a continuous 
process of institutional redefinition. 
As regards regional participation of the Autonomous Communities in the EC/EU deci-
sion-making process, several steps have been taken in the last years. This development 
was mainly induced by the Socialist and Conservative governments from the Catalan  - 
but also Basque and Canarian  - nationalist parties. The initial mere structure of informa-
tion did not satisfy Catalonia and the Basque Country. They always wanted their own 
representatives to have more autonomy with respect to the Permanent Representation of 
Spain to the EU. Regions and the Central Government institutionalised regional partici-
pation in EC/EU affairs by means of the Conference on Community Affairs (Conferen-
cia para Asuntos relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas), set up at Ministry level. 
This Conference will be assisted by a permanent w orking group, the Committee of Co-
ordinators on Community Affairs (Comisión de Coordinadores para Asuntos Comuni-
tarios). At the same time, the Conference gives the impulse for regional participation in 
each Community policy and monitors it through the specific Sectoral Conferences Gov-
ernment-Regions. The functions of the Conference have been revised by means of the 
1990, 1994, 1996 and 1999 agreements between the Central Government and the r e-
gions. The Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Autonomous Communities 
(Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas) coordinates, 
among the general economic interests of the regions, those related with the EC (rela-
tions with the Ecofin, Structural Funds...).  
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III. The Spanish Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
Spain played a relevant and high-profile role in most phases of the 1996/1997 Intergov-
ernmental Conference. Unlike at previous IGC’s, its traditional ‘integrationist’ approach 
was more moderate. Hence, the Spanish Delegation acted in clear defence of its national 
interests in several negotiation dossiers.
1 In fact, despite its official position, the Spanish 
Delegation did not envisage enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries 
as the all-embracing c ommon objective which justified the reform; nor did the Spanish 
public opinion. The Spanish negotiation positions during the different IGC were not 
affected by the change in Government because of the broad consensus in these fields, 
the maintenance of the  same negotiating team at technical level centered around the 
Permanent Representation staff
2, and the referral to the Cortes Resolution on the 1996 
IGC.
3 
Hence, for the first time during an IGC, the Spanish Delegation dealt with a complete 
parliamentary text agreed by all Spanish political parties within the Mixed Committee 
for the European Union  - which acted to a certain extent as a “negotiation mandate”. 
This resolution was completed by two specific legislative proposals (motions) on the 
status of the Canary Islands (29 October 1996) and on children’s protection (9 April 
1997). The serious impact on the Spanish political elites caused by the Schäuble-
Lamers-Paper of 1994  - especially its scheme for ‘variable geometry’, and the proposal 
for a massive transfer of policy areas to qualified majority voting (QMV) at a later stage 
- is to be found at the basis of the Cortes’ Resolution and most of the later Spanish ne-
gotiating positions.
4 The Spanish negotiation positions and national interests, though not 
as proactively expressed as in the Maastricht negotiations, were clearly focused on insti-
tutional issues, the reluctance to the extension of qualified majority voting to certain 
areas, the limitation of the inclusion of the concept of flexibility within the Treaty on 
European Union, and the creation of a European area of freedom, security and justice 
with the reinforcement of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. No major 
differences could be ascertained among the main positions vis-à-vis the negotiations of 
the Amsterdam Treaty adopted by the Government, the Spanish Parliament and the 
main political parties. In fact, the Spanish national positions for the 1996/1997 IGC 
were the result of a broad political consensus among the major political forces and de-
mocratic institutions. The Government  - without further political debate  - accepted the 
                                                 
1   See Elorza Cavengt, 1997a, op.cit., pp. 4-7; Various authors, España y la negociación del Tratado de 
Amsterdam, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, ed. Política Exterior 1998, p. 35. 
2   See Various authors, 1998, op.cit., p. 45. 
3   See Dictamen de la Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea en relación con el Informe elaborado por 
la Ponencia sobre consecuencias para España de la ampliación de la Unión Europea y reformas insti-
tucionales (Conferencia Intergubernamental, 1996) of 21 December 1995 (Boletín Oficial de l as 
Cortes Generales Serie A, No. 82, of 29 December 1995, pp. 1-28). 
4   See Elorza Cavengt, 1997a, op.cit. pp. 4-7; Various authors, 1998, op.cit.; Barbé, 1999, op.cit., p. 80.  
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points included within the 1995 Cortes Resolution on the IGC; most of them were 
drafted in a very general and non-binding formulation. 
The Spanish Government did not table any specific proposal during the Amsterdam 
negotiations, which directly concerned the role to be played by the European Parliament 
and the national Parliaments in EC/EU decision-making. Nevertheless, some of its pro-
posals indirectly affected the parliamentary institutions, since they concerned the co-
decision procedure and its extension to other policy areas. In fact, the Spanish Govern-
ment has never been too keen on a large or even a general extension of the powers of 
the European Parliament. C oncerning the reinforcement of the role of national parlia-
ments, the Spanish Government expressly r ejected such a possibility in order to avoid 
the extension of strong parliamentary scrutiny models in EC/EU affairs to the Spanish 
case, which would go against the current constitutional distribution of powers among 
the institutions and the Spanish parliamentary practice. 
For the same reasons, the Spanish Government did not issue any proposal regarding the 
roles of the European Parliament and the national parliaments within i ntergovernmental 
co-operation. It would have never accept any further role to be played by the Spanish 
Parliament than the currently assigned ones. Finally, nothing can be said about the pos-
sible incorporation of any issue related to the upgrading of the role to be played by n a-
tional parliaments unilaterally vis-à-vis their governments or collectively vis-à-vis the 
EC/EU into the Spanish Government’s proposals. 
Hence, the 1995 Cortes Resolution on the 1996 IGC, as well as its 1997 follow-up re-
port
1 only contain a short reference to the issue of the roles of national parliaments in 
the EC/EU decision-making process. This reference was obviously not assumed or e x-
pressly defended by the Spanish Government during the IGC as one of its main negotia-
tion priorities. Both the 1995 Resolution and the 1997 follow-up report defended the 
impulse of a larger and more active participation of n ational parliaments in the activities 
of the European Union and formulated four proposals, namely: 
-  the punctual transmission of all consultation documents of the European Commis-
sion in the official languages of each member state, 
-  the supply of all legislative proposals from the European Commission to the n a-
tional parliaments, according to their respective legal procedures, in the official 
languages of each member state, with a sufficient preceding time lapse, 
-  the establishment of a minimum two-month period between the date of presenta-
tion of a legislative proposal by the European Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council in all linguistic versions and the date of inclusion of its 
debate on the agenda of the Council, 
                                                 
1   See Informe de la Subcomisión especial de seguimiento, encargada de estudiar y discutir el proceso 
abierto por la Conferencia Intergubernamental (154/1), aprobado a su vez por la Comisión Mixta 
para la Unión Europea en su sesión de 29 de mayo de 1997.  
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-  the maintenance of the present functions of COSAC as stated in Declaration No. 
13 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Nevertheless, the 1995 Resolution stated the need to reinforce the role of COSAC as the 
only institutional mechanism to provide for the incorporation of national parliaments to 
the EC/EU decision-making process in a clearer way, in view of the divergences and 
different constitutional and parliamentary traditions of the EU member states. 
No official reaction from the Government was issued concerning this aspect and the 
introduction of the Protocol on National Parliaments to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
IV. The Spanish Parliament after Amsterdam 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified by the Spanish Parliament on 16 December 1998 
after a long procedure in both Chambers
1 which, contrary to some fears of the Govern-
ment, did not provoke major political controversies.
2 In fact, the whole ratification 
process had an extremely low profile and was dealt with by the Government and the 
Cortes with a high degree of technicality, which clearly hindered a broad political d e-
bate.
3 Most of the parliamentary proceedings were parallel to the ratification of the 
agreements leading to Spain’s full participation in the military structure of NATO and 
                                                 
1   The whole series of parliamentary documents related with the process of ratification of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam are published in the Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (BOCG) as follows: Proyec-
to de Ley Orgánica 121/000116 (BOCG Congreso de los Diputados Serie A Núm. 117-1, of 26 May 
1998); Ampliación del plazo de enmiendas (BOCG Congreso de los Diputados Serie A Núm. 117-2, 
of 10 June 1998); Debate de totalidad (Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y 
Diputación Permanente, Núm. 171, of 18 June 1998); Enmiendas (BOCG Congreso de los Diputa-
dos Serie A Núm. 117-3, of 22 June 1998); Ratificación de la Ponencia (Diario de Sesiones del 
Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputación Permanente, Núm. 492, of 24 June 1998); Informe 
de la Ponencia (BOCG Congreso de los Diputados Serie A Núm. 117-4, of 22 September 1998); De-
bate del Dictamen de la Comisión (Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Dipu-
tación Permanente, Núm. 514, of 23 September 1998); Dictamen de la Comisión (BOCG Congreso 
de los Diputados Serie A Núm. 117-5, of 30 September 1998); Debate del Dictamen de Comisión 
(Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputación Permanente, Núm. 184, of 1 
October 1998); Aprobación por el Pleno (BOCG Congreso de los Diputados Serie A Núm. 117-6, of 
8 October 1998); Proyecto de Ley Orgánica 621/000103 (BOCG Senado Serie II Núm. 103(a), of 9 
October 1998); Propuestas de veto (BOCG Senado Serie II Núm. 103(b), of 26 October 1998); E n-
miendas (BOCG Senado Serie II Núm. 103(c), of 26 October 1998); Informe de la Ponencia (BOCG 
Senado Serie II  Núm. 103(d), of 6 November 1998); Debate del Dictamen de Comisión (Diario de 
Sesiones del Senado Núm. 358, of 12 November 1998); Dictamen de la Comisión (BOCG Senado 
Serie II Núm. 103(e), of 18 November 1998); D ebate de totalidad (Diario de Sesiones del Senado 
Núm. 107, of 24 November 1998); Texto a probado por el Senado (BOCG Senado Serie II Núm. 
103(f), of 1 December 1998). 
2   See Congreso de los Diputados - Secretaría General, Tratado de Amsterdam - Documentación prepa-
rada para la tramitación del Proyecto de Ley Orgánica por la que se autoriza la ratificación por Espa-
ña del Tratado de Amsterdam, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales nº 117-1/2 - Serie A of 26 
May 1998; Mangas Martín, 1997, op.cit., pp. 206-230. 
3   See Donaire Villa, F.J.: ‘El Tratado de Amsterdam y la Constitución’, in: Revista Española de Dere-
cho Constitucional, No. 54/1998, pp. 119-167.  
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the accession of the first new Central and Eastern European States. Evidently, this mix-
ture diluted the relevance of the Amsterdam ratification vis-à-vis public opinion and 
even the parliamentary forces.
1 In comparison to the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty’s one was simple, fast and free of unexpected legal or 
political problems.
2 
President Aznar presented the results of the Amsterdam negotiations to the Plenary Ses-
sion of the Spanish Cortes on 25 June 1997. Aznar opted for an extremely technical 
intervention. Consequently, the later debate basically focused on the political aspects of 
the “asylum protocol”, the special statute agreed for the C anary Islands and the final 
solutions agreed for the institutional problems at EU level. While no major discrepan-
cies arose with regard to both issues  - though some opinions criticised Aznar for an 
exaggeratedly positive presentation of the results “addressed to the internal public opin-
ion consumption”
3  -, the ‘nationalist’ parties insisted on the poor results obtained with 
regard to the redefinition of the subsidiarity principle and asked for the creation of e f-
fective institutional mechanisms.
4 
The later parliamentary debates at committee and plenary level took place during four 
occasions: On 10 March 1998, 10 June 1998, 1 October 1998 and 16 December 1998. 
Special attention was granted to the modalities and problems derived from the inclusion 
of the new Chapter on Employment within the EC Treaty and the ‘nationalist’ demand 
for new institutional mechanisms with regard to regional coordination and representa-
tion. This was due to the controversial role played by President Aznar during the e x-
traordinary Luxemburg European Council on E mployment in November 1997, which 
caused harsh criticism by the Spanish Trade Unions and the Socialist Party.
5 Through-
out the whole ratification process, only three special “parliamentary motions” were a d-
dressed to the Government, namely with regard to the maintenance of the Cohesion 
Fund (PP motion of 8 October 1997), the principle of subsidiarity (EA motion of 29 
October 1997), and the role of the Autonomous Communities in the EC/EU decision-
making process (IU motion of 10 March 1998). 
While the Spanish media occasionally paid attention to the developments of the ratifica-
tion process in other member states  - especially the Danish referendum, the French 
Constitutional reform and the German reactions to the Treaty  - and while the Cortes 
itself demanded information from its French and Italian colleagues on their respective 
ratification processes,
6 most of the Spanish parliamentary debates were exclusively cen-
                                                 
1   See Barbé, 1999, op.cit., p. 172. 
2   See Donaire Villa, 1998, op.cit.; Mangas Martin, 1999, op.cit. 
3   Barbé, 1999, op.cit., p. 132. 
4   See ‘Informe de la Ponencia de la Comisión General de las Comunidades Autónomas sobre papel y 
funciones de los entes territoriales en el futuro de la Unión Europea’ (543/000010), Boletín Oficial 
de las Cortes Generales, Senado, VI Legislatura, Serie I, Núm. 360, pp. 1-21. 
5   See Barbé 1999, op.cit., p. 134. 
6   See Donaire Villa, 1998, op.cit.  
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tered on one single issue: the need for an increased participation and representation of 
the Regions vis-à-vis the definition of the Spanish negotiating positions at EU level. In 
fact, the only amendments proposed to the draft proposal for an Organic Law of ratifica-
tion tabled by the Government in this sense came from the Basque ‘nationalists’ parties 
(PNV and EA) and the United Left (IU). They merely included the re-drafting of the 
Preamble of the Organic Law, and not its substantive content.
1 These amendments to 
the text of the internal Organic Law of ratification were globally r ejected, though, due 
to a procedural error by the PP parliamentary Group. They resulted in a so-called “pro-
posición no de ley” (motion, non-binding parliamentary legislative proposal), which had 
to be accepted by the People’s Party despite its lack of future legal effects on 10 March 
1998. 
The Spanish Ratification Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 17 December 1998
2 was 
passed with the practical unanimity of votes from all political parties, e xcept for some 
abstentions by the Basque ‘nationalist’ MP’s and IU members. It includes a short Pre-
amble and a single substantive article, together with an additional provision accepting 
the automatic jurisdictional competence of the European Court of Justice vis-à-vis pre-
liminary rulings in the field of judicial and police co-operation in criminal matters.
3 
The Spanish Parliament has neither officially reacted nor issued any report or m otion 
concerning the introduction of the Protocol on National Parliaments (PNP) in the A m-
sterdam Treaty. So far, no normative attempt has been materialised to implement the 
PNP in terms of amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament or of any of 
the parliamentary committees. No debates have been held in the Parliament about a 
possible extension of the scope of parliamentary scrutiny to second or third pillar issues. 
Hence, the Government already provides the Congress’ committees on External Affairs 
and Home and Justice Affairs with the EC/EU documents that it considers necessary on 
a voluntary basis. Some issues related with the Schengen acquis have been dealt with in 
the framework of the Mixed Committee at its own request. 
The PNP does not clearly commit the Government to use the time provided by the 
Council for informing its national parliament. It therefore remains up to the Cortes a nd 
the Spanish Government to negotiate on the content and procedures to be applied, espe-
cially with regard to the timing of information supply. In the Spanish case the provision 
about the six-week-period has been practically implemented after Amsterdam by  means 
of informal arrangements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via the Legal Service of 
the Cortes and its members of the Mixed Committee. 
Without any formal request (“solicitud de amparo”) from the Committees to the Bureau 
of any of the Chambers, the Legal Service of the Cortes established a new system in 
                                                 
1   See Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, VI Legislatura, Serie A, 
Núm. 117-3, pp. 73-76. 
2   See Boletín Oficial del Estado, 17 December 1998, p.42266ss. 
3   See Elorza Cavengt, 1997a, op.cit.; VV.AA., 1998, op.cit., p. 291.  
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1997 for the regular and early transmission of information from the Government about 
all legislative proposals from the European Commission to the parliamentary commit-
tees. Though each sectoral Ministry is in charge of the transmission of information r e-
lated to its field of activity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes a coordinating role 
for the information flux to the Parliament. This transmission system (“Seguimiento par-
lamentario de los Documentos COM (Final)”) has been enacted by the Secretariat of the 
Mixed Committee and the Documentation Services of the Cortes and allows for a two-
month period - presently being reduced to a six-week-period in 1999 - between the date 
of adoption of the legislative proposal and its receipt and distribution at the Cortes. The 
clear organisational success of this system, however, does not rely on any particular 
legal provision, but on the informal arrangements between the Secretariat and the Min-
istry. It might not be considered as a direct consequence of the Amsterdam Protocol. 
The ‘fiche’ transmitted to all members of the Chambers includes: 
-  the list of documents and legislative proposals; 
-  their dates of adoption by the EU bodies and the dates of receipt at the Cortes; 
-  the voluntary provision of additional information by the Government on the pro-
posal; 
-  the number of parliamentary committees to which the document or proposal is 
sent; 
-  the legal initiatives to which the proposal or document has given way; 
-  procedural remarks at EC/EU level; and  
-  the type of domestic legal provision in which the procedure might end. 
This system is updated on a fortnight or monthly basis, depending on the periods of 
parliamentary activity throughout the year. 
Despite the enactment of such an efficient information procedure, its impact on the a c-
tual effectiveness of the parliamentary scrutiny of EC/EU legislative proposals has been 
much more reduced. The relative attention given to these policy areas in the day-to-day 
activity of parliamentarians remains rather low.  
No single provision has been incorporated into Spanish national parliamentary law con-
cerning the recognition of COSAC as a means to contribute to the lack of parliamentary 
scrutiny in EC/EU affairs on a multilateral basis. In fact, the participation of the Spanish 
Parliament in COSAC is based on the same provisions enacted in 1994
1 and the infor-
mal practice of the bureaus of the Chambers. The PNP provisions on COSAC have not 
induced any revision of the composition of the Spanish  Parliament’s Delegation to 
COSAC. The composition of the Spanish Parliament’s delegation to COSAC is only 
ruled by the principle of maximal representativity of the parliamentary groups and is 
traditionally integrated by the Spokesmen of all parliamentary g roups represented 
                                                 
1   See Ley 8/1994, de 19 de mayo, por la que se regula la Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea 
(BOE No. 120, of 20 May 1994)  
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within the Mixed Committee for the European Union. During the last years, the partici-
pation of the Spanish Parliament in COSAC has increased both in quantitative and in 
qualitative terms. The Spanish Parliament has been sending a growing  delegation to all 
COSAC meetings since 1998, whose members have always been recruited within the 
Mixed Committee for the European Union. The secretariat of the Mixed Committee has 
also increased its tasks and work for the preparation and active involvement of the 
Spanish Delegation in COSAC meetings. 
While at the present moment there is a major parliamentary process to revise the Stand-
ing Orders of the Congress, no discussion has been undertaken in order to revise the 
working mechanisms of the Mixed Committee for the European Union regarding the 
frequency of meetings or its specific competencies. Due to the non-legislative nature of 
the Mixed Committee, any revision could only be initiated by reforming its Constitutive 
Act. This rigid legal basis for the actual implementation and development of its activi-
ties is responsible for the fact that most reforms and changes of the Mixed Committee 
materialise in an informal way and by means of parliamentary day-to-day activity. To 
date, no parliamentary group has tabled a proposal for the revision of the working 
mechanisms of the Mixed Committee. Instead, the ‘nationalist’ political parties tend to 
center the debate on the enactment of a new system of representation of regional inter-
ests at national parliamentary level. 
 
V. Loose Supervision: National Restrictions Matter 
 
It can be generally stated that the process of negotiation, adoption and enactment of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam has not directly and to a large extent altered the role of the Span-
ish Parliament, its Chambers or Parliamentary Committees with regard to the EC/EU 
decision-making process. It is true that some institutional and procedural changes can be 
acknowledged in the past years, but mainly due to the increase in the general interest on 
EU affairs, both w ithin the Spanish public opinion and the political elites. This i n-
creased presence of EU-related issues in the Spanish public debate has led to an e x-
tended involvement of the Spanish parliamentary institutions in these fields. However, it 
is questionable w hether that reaction derives directly from the political process that has 
surrounded the Amsterdam Treaty or whether it is rather an indirect consequence of the 
steps forward in the process of European integration in terms of the increase in policy 
scope, institutional participation etc. 
It is clear that - with the exception of very specific issues, normally related to a domes-
tic politics’ dimension  - the Amsterdam Treaty has not altered the positions, strategies 
or basic concepts taken by the national or r egional political parties with regard to the 
EC/EU. The process of European integration remains an area of broad political and 
social consensus. It is just in the field of political strategies and formal discourse where 
the ‘re-nationalisation’ of the positions of the People’s Party vis-à-vis the European  
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Union occurs, though without major ideological gaps to the rest of the political spec-
trum. One example for these ‘specific concerns’ are the areas related to Home and Judi-
cial affairs, especially immigration, asylum and police co-operation. Hence, these areas 
are highly relevant in the domestic political arena.  
The nature of EC/EU-activities of the Spanish Parliament
1 could be largely categorised 
as that of loose supervision and monitoring of the Government’s action in the EC/EU 
decision-making process. It is characterised by an increasing support for the deliberate 
definition of national preferences via reports and resolutions as well as through the 
transmission of sociatal requests to the Government via i nterpellations, oral or written 
questions. The Spanish Parliament does not play a major role in EC/EU affairs in legis-
lative terms, apart from its participation in the national legislative procedures for the 
adoption of domestic law. Furthermore, it does n ot condition the positions defended by 
the Spanish national delegations at EU level. In general terms, the position of the Span-
ish Parliament with regard to EC/EU affairs is more reactive and supervisory than pro-
active and agenda-setting. 
However, we also  witness a progressive involvement of the Spanish Parliament during 
the last years. This development has a direct impact on the increase of the number of 
initiatives, hearings and parliamentary procedures related to EC/EU a ffairs. However, 
this increase has a more quantitative than qualitative nature. The procedural changes 
with regard to the monitoring and participation of parliamentary committees concerning 
EC/EU proposals and the activity of the Government in EC/EU affairs are results of 
informal negotiations with little substantial effect. There remains a large difference b e-
tween the technical levels of the Parliament (Legal Service, Secretariat of parliamentary 
committees etc.) and the strictly political level of its elected members. 
The reasons for this relative lack of parliamentary involvement in EC/EU decision-
making are not only to be found in procedural and institutional variables, but also in the 
widespread social and political consensus with regard to European integration. This 
broad ‘yes’ to EU m embership does not cause ideological differentiation among the 
political parties. Other reasons are  
-  the power structures of the Spanish State, which grants a preponderant role to the 
Executive in international politics,  
-  the relative weakness of the parliamentary institutions,  
-  the perception of political elites that EU affairs have no direct repercussion on the 
day-to-day activities of the citizen and that they should remain a highly technical 
domain in politics reserved to specialists;  
                                                 
1   Carlos Closa defines it as ‘relative lack of interest in parallel to a very poor record of both qualitative 
and quantitative outcomes in its treatment of EU affairs” with regard to the 1986-1994 period, see 
Closa 1996, op.cit., p.145.  
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-  the Spanish parliamentary culture, which provides for a consensual style of par-
liamentary practice, and which paradoxically has ended up in reinforcing govern-
ment majorities against the opposition; and  
-  the specific nature of the institutional framework for the handling of EC/EU a f-
fairs - including the low status of the Mixed Committee for the European Union. 
Any attempt to change this situation should start from a revitalisation of the European 
debate at the parliamentary level as well as from a reinforcement of the Parliament 
within the constitutional structure of the State. The announced change of the legal n a-
ture of the Mixed Committee for the European Union from a non-legislative to a legisla-
tive parliamentary committee would probably not result in a further involvement and 
participation of the Spanish Parliament in EC/EU affairs. Hence, a more effective legis-
lative committee should be created in both Chambers simultaneously. This option seems 
rather unrealistic if one takes the similarity of the parliamentary committee  structure 
and the Ministerial allocation of competencies within the Government into account. In 
fact, the non-legislative nature of the Mixed Committee, together with the actual bene-
fits from improvements in the timing and procedures of parliamentary scrutiny might 
help its members to become parts of a real forum for in-depth discussion and more pro-
active activities with regard to EC/EU affairs. 
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The French Parliament and the EU: Progressive Assertion and Strategic 
Investment 
 
Andrea Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg 
 
I. French Parliamentarism: A Difficult Quest for Accommodation 
 
1. The Political and European Culture in France 
 
From 1960 up to the 1990’s French politics have been extraordinarily non-
parliamentarian. Since the founding years of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) coincided with the first years of the Fifth Republic, political elites  - parliamen-
tarians as well as bureaucrats and ministers - have been impregnated by the behavioural 
routines of the ‘de Gaullian policy’ style. First of all, after the painful experience of 
national split under Vichy, a leading principle was the preservation of national unity and 
coherence in policy-making ‘à tout prix’. Secondly, the alienation of the general will 
through party battles and conflicts among social groups needed to be banned from the 
political arena. France’s elites and bureaucrats had a mission to fulfil: the modernisation 
of society and the furthering of the competitiveness of a nation that was an industrial 
‘late-comer’. The Marshall plan and the creation of the European Communities have 
been the unrivalled opportunity to accomplish this difficult task.
1  
France’s political culture is characterised by the common belief that a strong and inde-
pendent nation state plays an essential role for the preservation of the ‘one and indivisi-
ble’ Republic.
2 Lijphart stipulates that France is one of the few West European coun-
tries (like Italy, Denmark, the UK and Portugal) where foreign policy is an issue (of 
medium salience) for party system cleavages.
3 With regard to Europe such cleavages 
are even more salient because they are not only shaped by inherited perceptions about 
France’s rank in the Western World but also by a certain understanding of the role that 
the state should play in the making and the implementation of public policy decisions. 
Today these beliefs still explain political cleavages and public attitudes towards Euro-
pean integration to a large extent.
1 And indeed: France is characterised by a unique 
cross-cut of old party system cleavages such as the traditional division between republi-
                                                 
1  See Milward, Alan: The European Rescue of the Nation State, London: Routledge 1992. 
2  See Flynn, George: Remaking the Hexagon. The New France in the New Europe, Boulder, West-
view 1995. 
3  See Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six 
countries, New Haven/Yale: University Press 1999, pp. 79ff., table 5.3.  
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cans and liberals
2 and a ‘European’ cleavage brought about by bitter political choices 
that profoundly re-orient the ruling state capitalist model.
3 The state still remains the 
French’s f ocus of demands for social protection. The disentanglement of the state from 
the European level was a main reason for the  - occasionally  - conflictual adaptation 
processes during the 1990’s.
4  
Hence the impact of the ‘Maastricht’-conflict on public opinion and on party-political 
cleavages remained perceivable until the 1995’s Presidential election and the third c o-
habitation (since May 1997). The entire process from the Maastricht referendum in 
1992 up to the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty and its ratification in march 1999 
reflects a d evelopment from refusal to the accommodation with the inevitable. Never-
theless this process was not linear. More than in other member states French public 
opinion suffers from a kind of ‘overload’ with regard to the European dimension. A c-
cordingly, conflictual issues tend to provoke eruptive shocks that may alienate a gener-
ally positive tendency and hide a basically low interest in European matters. As a result, 
French public opinion today is at an average with regard to the general support for the 
European integration process. According to Eurobarometer 53 of April 2000, 49 per 
cent of the French population think that EU-membership is ‘a good thing’ for France.
5 
The importance a scribed to ‘self governance’ and national sovereignty is still high and a 
prominent feature of French political culture, but it is not as far reaching and as strongly 
attached to the idea of parliamentary sovereignty as in Great Britain. In the eyes of 
French citizens parliament and parties represent a source of political legitimacy a mong 
others, namely the direct expression of the political will through referenda.
6  
 
2. The French Party System and the European Issue 
 
The French party system has become more and more complex during the last twenty 
years. Of course the multiplication of  political parties does not primarily result from the 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Dupoirier, Elisabeth/ Grunberg, Gerard: ‘La Déchirure Sociale’, in: Pouvoirs 73, avril 1995, pp. 
143-157. 
2  See Rémond, René: Les droites en France, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1982. See for a more general 
account: Marks, Gary/ Wilson, Carole J.: ‘The Past and the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party 
Response to European Integration’, in: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, 2000, pp. 433-
459. 
3  See Hooghe, Liesbet/ Woolcock, Stephen: ‘Atlantic Capitalism versus Rhine Capitalism in the Eu-
ropean Community’, in: West European Politics, No. 3/1993, pp. 329-344. See also Wilks, Stephen: 
‘Regulatory Compliance and Capitalist Diversity in Europe’, in: Journal of European Public Policy, 
No. 4/1996, pp. 536-559. 
4  See Szukala, Andrea: ‘Die Öffnung der politischen Entscheidungsprozesse in Frankreich: Ein Um-
bau des Staates in europäischer Absicht?’, in: Deutsch-Französisches Institut (ed.): Frankreich-
Jahrbuch 1999, Opladen: Leske 1999, pp. 145-159. 
5  See Eurobarometer 53, April-May 2000. 
6  See Schmidt, Vivien: ‘Discourse and (Dis)Integration in Europe: The Cases of France, Germany, 
and Great Britain’, in: Daedalus, No. 3/1997, pp. 167-198.  
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European challenge. But political parties’ attitudes towards European integration have 
also become more complex. Today the French conservatives - except from the extreme 
right which is deeply opposed to  Europe  - are divided into four factions. Choosing to 
present a separate list for the 1999 European elections, the centrist wing UDF (Union 
Pour la Démocratie Française, created by the former President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing) positions itself as euro-enthusiastic. DL (Démocratie libérale), the ‘liberal 
party’ in the French sense of the term, is favourable to European integration but very 
opposed to the development of a ‘European State’. The gaullist RPR (Rassemblement 
Pour la République) has a lways been deeply divided on European questions, as proved 
by the various shifts of President Chirac during his career. The European conflicts 
within RPR became uncontrollable after Chirac’s election to the presidency in 1995 
when he decided to follow the former President Mitterrand’s European orientations. The 
‘souverainistes’  - so-called in reference to the partisans of the autonomy of Quebec  - 
chose to break up with the RPR during the 1999 European elections and created their 
own party, the RPF (Charles Pasqua’s Rassemblement pour la France). Thus, the French 
right is severely disoriented and unable to deal coherently with European challenges. 
Solely a voter-oriented perspective permits the preservation of some kind of common 
bottom line, namely with regard to the i mportant rural interests. But when it came to a 
parliamentary vote on another core issue - the entry into stage three of EMU
1 -, Gaull-
ists appeared once again unable to keep up a partisan cohesion adequate to the problem 
at stake: by obeying their party leader Séguin, MP’s from the RPR risked to categori-
cally refuse the passage to the third stage. The intervention of President Chirac pre-
vented the worst. 
Left political parties are less perturbed by European issues. The PS (Parti Socialiste) can 
be seen as largely pro-integrationist. But even if key members of the actual Jospin gov-
ernment have solid European convictions (e.g. E. Guigou, H. Védrine), the post-1997 
socialist governmental policy differs from the ‘old’ a pproach: Whereas Mitterrand’s 
European policy was characterised by a functionalism combined with a great deal of 
voluntarism and symbolism
2, the new approach reveals to be more pragmatic in terms 
of interest formulation vis-à-vis other European governments. L. Jospin’s conditions to 
the achievement o f EMU during the 1997 election campaign, the concept of a ‘federa-
tion of nation states’
3 as well as the Amsterdam-TEU ratification law
4 that conditions 
the further development of the EU’s institutional system on the fulfilment of certain 
French demands elucidate a shift of political mentalities within the French left and 
                                                 
1  See National Assembly, 24 April 1998. 
2  See La Serre, Françoise de: ‘La politique européenne de François Mitterrand: innovante ou réac-
tive?’, in: Cohen, Samy (ed.): Mitterrand et la sortie de a guerre froide, Paris, PUF, 1998, pp. 109-
125, pp. 112ff. 
3  See Parti Socialiste, Sécretariat National: ‘Mondialisation, Europe, France’, Texte d’orientation 
adopté par le Conseil National le 30/31 Mars 1996, p. 58. 
4   Loi No. 99-229 du 23 mars 1999.  
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within the French political class in general. A new European rhetoric is gaining ground, 
underlining no longer that Europe is a challenge for the French nation (like during the 
Mitterrand y ears), but that the importance of a genuine French contribution to the Euro-
pean project is growing: “Exporting the French model can, in the French’s govern-
ment’s (and President’s) view, provide the basis of a new European synthesis markedly 
less favourable to the neo-liberal, free market solutions en vogue since the mid 
1980’s.”
1 Therefore, Jospin tries to convince his European partners and public opinion 
of a political reorientation of the EU concentrating on social and employment concerns. 
Inevitably, the very heterogeneous PS still has great c apacities for the articulation of 
resistance against the process of European integration within the left wing ‘courants’ 
(factions). The communist party, the Greens, and the left wing of the PS are not satis-
fied with the perceived ‘ultraliberal” orientation of the EU either. But the predominant 
position of social democrats within the governing coalition makes sure that the largely 
pro-European orientation of the current ‘gauche plurielle’-cabinet does not really suffer 
from those critics.  
Finally the majority of the left as well as the majority of the right are - on a more or less 
enthusiastic mood  - favourable to the pursuit of the European integration process. E x-
cept for some attempts to bring euro-sceptics from both sides of the political landscape 
together they remain deeply divided: between a right concerned about sovereignty and 
the preservation of the ‘one and indivisible republic’, and a left worried about social 
consequences of the EU and the neo-liberal ‘pensée unique internationale’. 
 
Table 15: European Orientation of French Parties and Results from the 1999 EP Elections 
  PC  PS  Green  UDF  RPR/DL  RPF  Extreme 
right 
Hunting party 
Euro-enthusiasm  -  ++  +  ++  +-  --  --  -- 
European elections
1  6,8 %  22 %  9,7 %  9,3 %  12,8 %  13 %  9 %  6,8 % 
Authors’s own compilation. Data based on idea.int. 
 
 
3. The French Political System 
 
The classification of the French political system is problematic due to the originality of 
the institutional model of the Fifth Republic. The duality of the two heads of the execu-
tive constitutes a specific feature, because the respective influence of the President and 
of the Prime Minister depends on the conformity of the parliamentary majority with the 
Presidential one. Therefore the Ljiphardian classification of democracies has to be 
                                                 
1   Cole, Alistair/Drake, Helen: ‘The Europeanisation of the French polity’, in: Journal of European 
Public Policy, No. 1/2000, pp. 26-43, p. 34.  
 
227
slightly modified in the case of France.
2 His underlying argument that stipulates a 
causal link between vertical and horizontal power distribution within a political system 
and a typical decision-making style is not u nambiguous. The case is quite clear with 
regard to the degree of hierarchical distribution of power, since France - despite all de-
centralisation efforts  - surely still counts among the most vertically integrated countries 
in Europe.
3 B ut unlike a traditional majoritarian system the concentration of executive 
power (one party government with cabinet dominance)
4 is not an invariable factor, since 
there is a paradoxical French share of competencies between the Prime Minister and the 
President
5 that may actually lead to quite different configurations and a structural divi-
sion of executive power.  
Although the National Assembly as well as the Senate are more talking than working 
parliaments
6, in political terms they can be classified as “loyal workhouses but poor 
watchdogs”
7. Indeed the basic pattern of the French Fifth Republic’s ‘parliamentarisme 
rationnalisé’ is not very conducive to an effectiveness in the exercise of the functions of 
control, legislation and interest aggregation. Legislative functions are delegated compe-
tencies, the Parliament has no organisational autonomy and the Government disposes of 
a set of strong instruments to overrule a disobedient Assembly (e.g. ‘Vote bloqué’, 
‘Question de confiance’). The President can dissolve  the National Assembly. In case of 
conformity between the p olitical colour of the President and the parliamentary majority, 
the National A ssembly is largely deprived of the choice of the Prime Minister. In case 
of ‘cohabitation’ the latter tends to appropriate a part of the political supremacy of the 
President for himself.  
Even if the French institutional model has been analysed as strongly limiting parliamen-
tary prerogatives, the various instruments of the ‘parlementarisme rationnalisé’ and the 
scrutiny mode have also contributed to the strengthening of the cohesion of the parlia-
mentary majority, be it in favour of the whole executive or in favour of the Government 
in case of cohabitation.
8 Finally France’s deputies have quite stable “electoral connec-
                                                                                                                                               
1   European elections of the 13 June 1999. This ‘second order’ election explains the dispersion of the 
votes in favour of non governmental parties. 
2  See Lijphart, Arend, 1999,op.cit., p. 190. 
3   Ibid.; but see processes of change due to European integration: Balme, Richard/Jouve, Bernard: 
‘Building the Regional State: Europe and Territorial Organization in France’, in: Hooghe, Lisbeth 
(ed.): Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level-Governance, Oxford, OUP, 
pp. 219-255. 
4  See Lijphart, Arend, 1999, op.cit., pp. 10ff. 
5   Above all in foreign and European policy-making, see Articles 5, 15, 20, 21, 52 of the French Cons-
titution. 
6  See Steffani, Winfried (ed.): Parlamentarismus ohne Transparenz, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 
1971. 
7   Frears, John: ‘The French Parliament: loyal workhouse, poor watchdog’, in: West European Politics, 
No. 3/1990, pp. 32-51. 
8  See Huber, John D.: Rationalizing Parliament, Legislative institutions and party politics in France, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.  
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tions”
1, since the electoral system creates a strong link between MP’s and their constitu-
encies. This close relationship constitutes one of the major reasons for the deputies to 
demand more competencies as to the control and the making of European politics in 
France. 
 
4. French European Policy-Making 
 
The core element of French European policy-making is the strong proclivity to an e x-
ecutive dominated style when it comes to political intercourses with the ‘exterior’.
2 The 
anxiety to preserve a homogenous image of  the ‘national interest’ and sovereignty t o-
wards the outside stands in the center of a quite ‘Rousseaunian’ concept of interest rep-
resentation. That is why the competence-share between the Prime Minister and the 
President always attracts a lot of foreign policy analysts. But today more and more stu-
dents of French foreign policy tend to recognise that the political and academic percep-
tion of the President’s role in European politics was not free from intentionalism.
3 I n-
deed the reality of genuine European policy-making in the 1990’s was not as strongly 
affected by cohabitation as some may have stipulated: in ‘high politics’ a very firm 
sense of solidarity regarding the preservation of France’s rank and influence on its 
European partners helps to surmount the potential cleavages between the Prime Minister 
and the President in almost any situation.
4 Due to the changing character of European 
day-to-day-politics the President’s policy-making functions are constantly diminishing. 
The relative insufficiency of the Elysée’s information tools and the President’s isolation 
from the interfaces of ministerial co-ordination  - the SGG and the SGCI
5  - have con-
tributed to the strengthening of the Prime Minister’s role in European affairs for the last 
fifteen years. The central role played by the SGCI in the institutional framework in 
European decision-making also stands for the traditional a dministrative centralism of 
the French bureaucracy.
6 
                                                 
1  Mayhew, David R.: Congress: The electoral connection, London: Yale University Press 1974. 
2   The following analysis is based on: Szukala, Andrea: ‘The European Transformation of the French 
Model’, in: Maurer, Andreas/Wessels, Wolfgang/Mittag, Jürgen (eds.): Fifteen Into One. The Euro-
pean Union and the Member states, Manchester: MUP 2001. 
3  See Kessler, Marie-Christine: La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus, Paris: Pres-
ses de Sciences Po 1999, p. 193. 
4   Any of the three difficult European negotiations during the three cohabitation periods (1986-88 SEA, 
1993-1995 GATT, 1997 Stability Pact) has been achieved in a consensual mode. See as well Massot, 
Jean: Alternance et Cohabitation sous la Vième République, Paris, La Documentation Française, 
1997. 
5   The general secretary of government (SGG) is in charge of the co-ordination of the Government, 
especially for the dispatching of information. Under the supervision of the Prime Minister, the SGCI 
(Sécrétarait général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopérations économiques eu-
ropéennes) provides the ministerial co-ordination for European affairs. 
6  See Lequesne, Christian: Paris-Bruxelles. Comment se fait la politique européenne en France ?, 
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 1993.  
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5. The Pioneers of Parliamentary Intervention in European Policy-Making 
 
During the f irst decades of the Fifth Republic, the Parliament paid very limited attention 
to European integration. The progressive awakening of the two assemblies is undoubt-
edly due to the fear of losing prerogatives. The unfavourable situation of the legislative 
power has contributed to make MP’s sensible to that issue. The first direct elections of 
the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, the Single Market Program and above all the 
progressive recognition of the superiority of EC legislation by the Council of State 
(Conseil d’Etat) and the Constitutional Council had fostered the awareness of deputies 
and senators. The first functional organ that monitors French European policy-making 
at the parliamentary level, the Delegation for European Affairs, was created very early 
by the Senate in 1973; the N ational Assembly came next in 1979.
1 As the number of 
permanent committees is constitutionally unchangeable and as the existing committees 
had not been very open to make use of the expertise provided by those new ‘Déléga-
tions p our les Communautés Européennes’ (18 members/Chamber), their performance 
had been more or less a failure. They had no relevant competencies and were perma-
nently overlooked by governments, which felt absolutely unbounded in their diplomatic 
practice of ‘foreign policy’-making in Brussels.  
At the beginning of the 1990’s, the parliamentary elite progressively awakened. O b-
sessed by Jacques Delors’ assertion that ‘in the future, eighty percent of the legislation 
will come from the EC’, they felt that a growing  part of parliamentary work was explic-
itly induced from the ‘above’, i.e. the EC. A first step consisted in a rudimentary reform 
of the Delegations’ general role to inform parliament on European matters: in 1990 
membership of the Delegation for European Affairs doubled, governmental information 
policy became more systematic and the ministers for European Affairs gained an i n-
formed parliamentary forum to present governmental policy via the organisation of p e-
riodic auditions.
2 But the real break-through occurred in the context of the constitutional 
reform, on which the final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was conditional. The 
preceding decision of the Constitutional Council
3 had stated non-conformity with the 
Constitution b ecause certain treaty provisions such as the formulation of a common 
visa-policy affected ‘the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty’. 
This ruling brought the two Chambers of Parliament into a veto-position, that they  - 
above all the Senate - used in a proficient way and against the Government’s initial dis-
positions.
4 As a result there emerged an extension of Parliament’s power to call into 
question the constitutional conformity of ratification laws and a revised system of par-
                                                 
1   Loi No. 79-564, 1979. 
2   Loi No. 90-385, 1990. 
3   Decision du Conseil Constitutionnel No. 92-308 du 9 avril 1992. 
4   Loi ordinaire No. 92-554, 1992.  
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liamentary screening and controlling o f European secondary law-making, which is 
based on ‘the 88-4’, a new article in the French Constitution. 
 
II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs  
 
1. A Bounded and Complex Procedure 
 
The 1992’s article 88-4 dispositions  for the first time provide the Parliament with the 
constitutional right to be informed, to scrutinise, and to intervene  - via the tabling of 
parliamentary resolutions  - with the conduct of French European Community policy.
1 
These ‘resolutions’ allow the two Chambers to give to the Government their views 
about EC draft acts.  
Normally a proposal for an act is communicated by the European Commission to the 
Permanent Representation of France to the European Union, which transmits it by fax to 
the SGCI. Before  the proposal is officially forwarded to the a ssemblies, a special kind 
of pre-selection has to be accomplished. Up to 1999 the Parliament was only allowed to 
adopt resolutions on ‘legislative’ proposals in terms of the French Constitution. The 
Council of S tate (Conseil d’État) decides on the legislative quality of EC acts. The 
Council thus plays a core role for determining the chances of the Parliament to get fully 
involved into the EC legislative process.
2  
The evaluation of the Council of State is also fundamental in the sense that the legisla-
tive or regulative nature of a proposal may prefigure the parliamentary or administrative 
way of future transposition measures into national law. That is why today the reports of 
the Conseil d’Etat on the legislative  or simply regulative quality of a proposal have to 
be published.
3 The Council has seven days to provide its analysis. In case of emergency, 
this delay can be abridged up to three days or even to twenty-four hours. When receiv-
ing the note of the Council of  State, the SGG sends those EC draft proposals, which are 
of legislative n ature  - and therefore demand an involvement of Parliament  - to the 
Presidents of the two assemblies supplemented by the report of the Council of State. 
The draft proposals are notified and published as parliamentary documents and men-
tioned in French Official Journal. The SGCI also sends the proposals that are ‘non-
legislative’ to the Delegations of the two assemblies  - be they regulative or ‘without 
object’. 
                                                 
1  See Rizzuto, Franco: ‘The French Parliament and the EU: Loosening the Constitutional Straitjacket’, 
in: Norton, Philip (ed.): National Parliaments and the European Union, London, Cass, pp. 46-59. 
2  See Aguila, Yann: ‘Le rôle du Conseil d’Etat’, in : Roussillon, Henri (ed.): L’article 88-4 de la Cons-
titution française: le rôle du parlement dans l’élaboration de la norme européenne, Toulouse, Presse 
de l’Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, 1995, pp. 161-171. 
3  See letter from the Prime Minister to President of Assembly’s Delegation, 10 July 1995, in Assem-
blée Nationale, L’Assemblée Nationale et l’Union Européenne, Paris, pp. 121ff.  
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Table 16: The Legislative Impact of EU Proposals and the Rulings of the Conseil d’Etat  
    1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
1
st Pillar  Total  542  483  488  439  357  316 
  Legislative  179  172  213  192  214  177 
2
nd Pillar  Total  0  0  0  3  0  0 
  Legislative  0  0  0  1  0  0 
3
rd Pillar  Total  0  0  0  95  90  80 
  Legislative  0  0  0  44  52  50 
Schengen  Total  0  0  0  14  42  17 
  Legislative  0  0  0  4  1  0 
Source: Sauron, Jean-Luc, ‘Le contrôle parlementaire de l’activité gouvernementale en matière de droit 
communautaire en France’, Revue trimestrielle de Droit européen, No. 2, avril-juin 1999, p. 179. 
 
Theoretically, any MP can table a proposal for a resolution. Given the large number of 
legislative proposals, the assemblies had to find a way to cope with the risk of a ‘Euro-
pean overload’. A  modification in the National Assembly’s standing o rders (RAN) in 
1994 underlined the eminent function of the parliamentary Delegation in this context.
1 
The National Assembly’s Delegation e xamines all texts that have been transmitted by 
the SGG. In most cases, the Delegation concludes that it is not necessary to continue the 
parliamentary scrutiny procedure. The same is true for the Senate, but here the President 
of the Delegation transmits a written comment to the members of the Delegation for the 
less important proposals.  
For the more important drafts both Delegations can draw proposals of resolutions. The 
Delegations may also express their opinion in a more informal way, by adopting ‘con-
clusions’ or by sending a written note to the minister in charge of t he draft proposal. 
When there is agenda pressure  - which is quite often the case  - the first Chamber’s 
Delegation may nominate instantly an own ‘rapporteur d’information’, who is compe-
tent to submit an immediate proposal for a resolution. Two thirds of the resolutions ta-
bled at the National Assembly have this origin.
1 
The analysis of the Delegation, with or without recommendations, or the information 
report of the Delegation whose recommendations may be made in the form of a motion 
for a resolution, are transmitted to one of the six permanent committees. Indeed, any 
proposal has to pass through a permanent committee to come into force.  
The scrutiny of European proposals by the permanent committees constitutes the major 
transformation introduced by the 88-4  procedure. Before 1992 the permanent commit-
tees had not been involved into the European decision-making process because they did 
not examine European texts prior to their transposition into national law. As one Euro-
                                                 
1  See Assemblée Nationale: Le Nouveau Règlement de l’Assemblée Nationale, Paris 1994. The evolu-
tion had been different at the Senate’s Delegation but the new Senate’s 1999 standing orders gave it 
the right to review all proposals, too.  
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pean proposal may provoke several parliamentary initiatives, they are pooled at the 
level of the Commission concerned. If members of other committees or if the Delega-
tions want to intervene at this stage, they must address the Committee in charge of the 
draft proposal. At the National Assembly a  Commission has one month to examine the 
proposals for resolutions if the motion was tabled by a rapporteur from the Delegation. 
The Committee’s draft resolution is considered effective if the Government and the 
Presidents of commissions, Delegations and political groups do not call for a further 
inscription at the agenda for a session.
2 If the motion is set down on the agenda, it is 
debated in public sitting before being voted upon. The debate on the floor has the ad-
vantage to give to the adoption of a resolution a more solemn feature, to implicate a 
larger number of MP’s and to lead the Government to express its official position on a 
European issue. During the tenth legislature (1993-1997), 33 resolutions, that is to say 
nearly half of the resolutions, had been debated on the floor. The situation has changed 
since 1997: no more than seven resolutions have been debated on the floor and all the 
resolutions have been approved with no debate since June 1999. The SGCI always has 
to be informed at an earlier stage, immediately when it comes to the tabling of a resolu-
tion. 
 
2. A Complete Examination of EC Documents by the Delegations for European Affairs 
 
The Parliament’s scrutiny system is based on the European Affairs Delegation as the 
major pillar. Often described as the ‘European watchtowers’ of the assemblies
3, they 
play an important role, as they are supposed to select the proposals which are judged to 
be politically significant. The Delegations are composed of 36 members proportionally 
representing the political groups and permanent committees. Although the Delegations’ 
members have adopted a quite consensual working-style, the cleavage between euro-
sceptics and euro-enthusiasts should not be neglected. The majorities of the Senate’s 
Delegation do not vary a lot and an important number of the - mostly center right - sena-
tors are favourable to European integration. At the National Assembly the majority is 
more fluctuating and the Delegation has rallied some influent right-wing anti-European 
MP’s during the 1990’s. Within Parliament the reputation of the Delegations has pro-
gressively improved. They meet about three times a month at the Senate and once a 
month at the National Assembly. The meetings last about two hours.
4 
                                                                                                                                               
1   During the 1998-99 session, the National Assembly Delegation has registered 31 reports. Bulletin de 
l’Assemblée Nationale, Statistiques, 1998-1999. 
2   The delay is eight days at the Plenary Assembly and ten days at the Senate. 
3  See ‘La délegation,  vigie européenne de l’Assemblée’, Assemblée Nationale, L’Assemblée Natio-
nale et l’Union Européenne, Paris, 1998, p. 73. 
4   The National Assembly Delegation met 34 times during the session 1998-99 which represents 65 
hours. Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale, Statistiques, 1998-1999.  
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In general, about a dozen MP’s are present. Both Delegations are supported by an i m-
portant administrative staff: About fifteen civil servants at the European affairs service 
of the National Assembly and nine at the Senate. The Delegations perform frequent 
hearings of personalities and particularly o f the minister for European affairs. During 
the tenth legislature (1993-1997), 45 auditions of members of the Government have 
been realised.
1 Representatives of the European institutions and various personalities are 
also heard. In total, about twenty persons are auditioned each year.
2 The minutes of 
those meetings as well as the other activities of the Delegation are published as written 
reports and put on the internet. Note that the Internet site of the National Assembly and 
of the Senate grant an important room to European affairs.  
Two committees examine most of the proposals of resolutions.
3 During the tenth legis-
lature (1993-1997), 74 resolutions were adopted by the National Assembly  - the Com-
mittee for Production and Exchange examined 32 proposals while the Committee for 
Economic Affairs and the Plan examined 24 proposals. European affairs can also be 
raised at a floor session. But MP’s hardly put questions to the Government about 
Europe during question time. Specific Floor sessions dedicated to European questions 
have been tested in 1994 and in 2000 but it seems that the parliamentary opposition 
tends to talk more about ‘national’ affairs. Public debates about French European policy 
including governmental general declarations seem to be a more efficient way to evoke 
EU-related issues. Even if it is the Government that tables those debates and even if the 
debates are purely formal, the proceedings make a larger number of MP’s participate in 
the examination of European matters. The debates are also a rare opportunity for the 
Government to publicly present its opinion about European issues, especially before 
European Council meetings. Thus, public debates on ‘Europe’ at the National Assembly 
have increased from five (1984-1990) to 15 (1991-1997).
4 This development testifies 
the changing political mentalities and the strengthening of the link between Parliament 
and the Government in European policy-making. 
                                                 
1  See Assemblée Nationale, 1998, op.cit., pp. 82-84. 
2   Fifteen persons have been heard by the National Assembly Delegation during the session 1998-99, 
seven of them were members of the Government. Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale, Statistiques, 
1998-1999. 
3  See Nuttens, Jean-Dominique/Sicard, François: Assemblées parlementaires et organisation euro-
péennes, Paris: La Documentation française 2000, pp. 68-69. 
4   Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale, Statistiques 1984-1997. 234  
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3. The Nature of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The Delegation of the National Assembly scrutinises European proposals on the basis of 
the following criteria
1:  
-  legal basis of a draft proposal, voting procedures at the Council, involvement of 
EP, 
-  date of transmission to the Council/date of reception at the Parliament’s presi-
dency, 
-  reasons for EU activity (respect of the subsidiary principle)/subject mat-
ter/content, 
-  national legislation engendered, 
-  French and other member states positions, 
-  Agenda in the Council of Ministers. 
The parliamentarians made a regular but not excessive use of the new instrument as the 
following statistics show. On average, five to ten per cent of the proposals transmitted 
are subject to a resolution. 
 
Table 17: The Parliamentary Resolutions in France (1993-99) 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Proposals transmitted to the Assemblies  143  171  206  201  231  206  181 
Resolutions adopted by the National Assembly  11  23  18  18  12  12  13 
Resolutions adopted by the Senate  7  13  9  13  3  9  12 
Source: Nuttens, Jean-Dominique/Sicard, François, Assemblées parlementaires et organisation européennes, 
Paris, La Documentation française, 2000, p 73. 
 
In a recent study
2, two Senate civil servants, Jean-Dominique Nuttens and François 
Sicard, have established a synthetic presentation of the content of the resolutions. Insti-
tutional questions are at the center of the assemblies’ interests, because MP’s are 
strongly attached to the respect of member states prerogatives. Thus, the Delegation of 
the National Assembly systematically analyses the legal basis of a European proposal. 
One of the most important criteria for parliamentary evaluation of a proposal at the Sen-
ate is the subsidiarity principle.
3 In a sectoral perspective the parliamentary interest for 
European matters affects agriculture, trade i ssues, budgetary questions and proposals 
related to public utilities. The preservation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and of the Community preference are the major characteristics of the resolutions regard-
ing agriculture. Nuttens and Sicard indicate that about one third of the resolutions from 
                                                 
1  See Assemblée Nationale, 1998, op.cit., pp. 124-125. 
2  See Assemblées parlementaires et organisation européennes, Paris, La Documentation française, 
2000, pp. 73-83. 
3  See Senate Civil Servant, Interview 4, 2 October 1998.  
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1993 to 1999 have been related to agriculture. The preservation of France’s interests in 
international trade  - namely in the agricultural and cultural sector and vis-à-vis the 
United States  - is another i mportant issue. During the economic crisis in the middle of 
the 1990’s, the two a ssemblies have been very keen on restrictions to the European 
Communities’ budget. T he frauds related to EC subventions have been periodically 
denounced. MP’s also have expressed concerns about the development of competition 
policy in various strategic fields, such as the energy and communication sector. The 
special interest of France regarding the preservation of certain monopolies and public 
utilities (‘Service public’) against European competition policy as well as regarding the 
social consequences of the progression of de-regulative policies in the Single Market 
have been constantly stressed. 
The parliamentary matters of interest reflect both concrete electoral concerns  - for i n-
stance in agriculture  - and a specific way of apprehending Europe through ‘national 
lenses’. Thus, the interest for public utilities and international trade is related to the con-
ception of European integration as an answer to the perceived ‘danger’ of globalisation. 
In the public debate, the European construction is generally justified as a protection 
against various global threats that could affect France’s social and economic health and 
lead to the dilution of French culture. Reflecting this national perception parliamentary 
resolutions turn out to be ambiguous regarding the support for European integration: 
Europe is both considered as a symptom and a possible remedy against the nasty conse-
quences of major world-wide evolutions. 
 
4. The Extent of Parliamentary Scrutiny, the Delays and the Access to Information 
 
The interpretation of article 88-4 had at first been quite restrictive. The right to adopt 
resolutions  initially concerned solely EC proposals of a ‘legislative’ quality according to 
the analysis of the Council of State. Second and Third Pillar policies, Inter-Institutional 
agreements and European Commission communications were excluded from that defini-
tion. However, there was a great readiness of Parliament to step into fields outside the 
EC-framework and therefore to violate the boundaries of article 88-4, e.g. when poten-
tial additional EU/EC competencies appeared in the Commission’s Green or White p a-
pers  or when ‘Agenda 2000’ was published in 1997. Important EC decisions may not 
have touched the legislative d omain at all while being very incendiary in political terms, 
e.g. the decisions on prices and the market organisation in CAP. French governments 
progressively d ecided to widen the field of examination of the Parliament during the 
1990’s. Since the adoption in 1994 of a new law modifying the ‘Loi Josselin’ of 1990
1, 
the Government had to provide the Chambers with all documents concerning the EU 
including the Second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the Third Pillars (Jus- 
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tice and Home Affairs). However, the transmission had only an informative value. In a 
letter to the President of the Assembly’s Delegation in 1995
2 Prime Minister Alain 
Juppé indicated that all legislative proposals  - including the Second and Third Pillars  - 
would be transmitted to both houses of Parliament. The latter were not allowed to table 
resolutions on EC proposals but they could adopt ‘conclusions’.  
At the beginning of the 1 990’s the delays for the parliamentary examination of Euro-
pean proposals have been too short. Some proposals had even been adopted by the 
Council before their transmission to the French Parliament. Nevertheless, the situation 
has progressively improved. The average delay of examination by the Council of State 
has been reduced from nine days in 1993 to six days in 1998. In 1999 one quarter of the 
European proposals were analysed within three days.
3 The two Chambers now estimate 
that they receive European legislative proposals in due time. As concerns the time left 
for the examination, a major reform has been introduced by a ‘circulaire’ of the Prime 
Minister in 1994
4: This letter outlines that the Chambers shall have one month to let the 
Government know if they want to adopt a resolution on a proposal. During that time the 
Government is obliged to evoke a parliamentary scrutiny reserve in the Council. The 
follow-up at the Brussels-level is two-fold: 
-  If the Council intends to put the subject matter on its agenda in less than fourteen 
days (before the meeting of the Council), the SGCI instructs the Permanent Rep-
resentation to intervene and to declare a ‘parliamentary scrutiny reserve’.  
-  If the Council intends to put the subject matter on its agenda in more than fourteen 
days, the SGCI instructs the Permanent Representation to ask for a postponement 
of the vote until a ‘prise de position du Parlement français’.  
Hence, the parliamentary reserves are implemented in a relatively informal way. The 
minister indicates a t the beginning of a Council meeting if the Parliament has finished 
its scrutiny process. The introduction of this procedure has contributed to resolve the 
problems of time lag. Further, at the national level, the French Government can always 
make use of t he procedure of accelerated examination at the Parliament. Theoretically 
the competent minister has to declare the official reasons for this demand but the proce-
dure is often handled in an informal way, too. In practice rapid examinations are very 
frequent. Until today the Parliament has complied with each governmental demand for 
an accelerated examination. The Delegations have recently pointed to the abuse of such 
procedure, and the Government has committed itself to be more careful. However, the 
problems  of delay do not always have a governmental origin. They can also be caused 
                                                                                                                                               
1   Loi No. 94-476, 1994. 
2  See Letter from the Prime Minister to President of Assembly’s Delegation, 10 July 1995, in: Assem-
blée Nationale, L’Assemblée Nationale et l’Union Européenne, Paris, 1998, pp. 166-170. 
3  See Conseil d’Etat, Rapport public 1999, Paris, La Documentation française, pp. 136-137. 
4   Circulaire du Premier ministre du 19 juillet 1994 sur la prise en compte de la position du Parlement 
français dans l’élaboration des actes communautaires. The new circulaire (circulaire du 13 décembre 
1999) confirms these dispositions.  
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by problems of transmission between the EC institutions and France. When the Euro-
pean Commission produces temporary documents on delicate issues, the Council occa-
sionally begins to  work on those documents without any transmission to the Parliament 
of France. Last but not least, the Parliament itself is often responsible for the problems 
of delay: The two-fold system of scrutiny by the Delegation and then by a permanent 
committee does not favour a quick examination of European proposals. A clear political 
bias emerges when the French Government makes clear to the assemblies that it would 
be tactless to evoke the parliamentary scrutiny reserve during the French Presidency of 
the Council or on strategic texts, e.g. trade agreements, when France’s protectionist 
reputation is at stake.  At first sight, the Chambers seem to have a complete access to 
information. On the basis of the ‘Loi Josselin’, the Parliament receives all the texts pro-
duced by European institutions. 
Table 18: EU Documents Transferred on the Basis of the Loi Josselin 
  First Pillar  Second Pillar  Third Pillar  Total 
1993  994  0  0  994 
1994  1038  0  141  1179 
1995  1060  2  985  2045 
1996  1221  77  1445  2743 
1997  1136  78  1019  2233 
1998  1144  145  926  2215 
Source : Sauron, 1999, op.cit. p. 200. 
 
Despite the elevated number of documents transferred to the Parliament its main prob-
lem is to gather information. A National Assembly civil servant, Christophe Lescot
1, 
points to the governmental reserve to deliver strategic information. This attitude, which 
is characteristic for the dominant position of the executive, affects many types of docu-
ments, for instance diplomatic telegrams and Council’s working group agendas. O nly 
the Council’s agenda is transferred by the French Government, so that two thirds of the 
decision-making, the ‘A-points’ decided at the COREPER-level, pass rather unnoticed.
2 
Contrary to the British procedure, the Government does not transmit explanatory 
memoranda that could help the A ssemblies to early seize the relevant issues at stake and 
to question the official governmental position. According to the legal provisions the 
Parliament should be informed of the evolution of the bargaining in Brussels but this 
information is not systematically given. The more delicate a project is, the more diffi-
cult it is to obtain written information. Thus, the former President of the National A s-
sembly Delegation had asked for the systematic transmission of the ministerial analysis 
                                                 
1  See Lescot, Christophe: ‘Les interactions entre leGouvernement et le Parlement dans le processus de 
décision communautaire’, juin 2000, p. 8. 
2  See National Assembly Civil Servant, Interview 1, 30 September 1998.  
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and of the reports of the Council and of the COREPER to the Parliament.
1 However, 
beyond the lack of important texts, it is in practice impossible for the two Delegations to 
cope with the massive inflow of European documents. The Chambers remain dependent 
on governmental information if they want to qualify a proposal. Which projects are 
significant? Who is at the origin of a proposal? What is France’s position? Is the Gov-
ernment isolated in the Council? Only the national Government is competent to give 
answers to those questions. Regular informal contacts between the sectoral specialists of 
the European affairs service of the two Chambers and their counterparts at the Perma-
nent Representation of France to the European Union at Brussels or at the SGCI in Paris 
seem to be the dominant way of parliamentary information gathering.
2 Thus, the access 
to information may be judged as informal and efficient as well as sporadic, uncertain 
and therefore not always exhaustive. The quality of the delivered information depends 
on personal relationships, past practices and the political rank of the questioner, a MP 
being better treated than a civil servant. 
 
5. Parliamentary Involvement without Implications ? 
 
The problems of timing and of access to information h ave not been fully solved but the 
situation has improved. Given the feeble equipment, of which the assemblies dispose in 
most of the ‘internal’ policy-making domains, the resolutions are comparatively strong 
instruments. Despite ‘motions of no confidence’, resolutions are the only parliamentary 
instrument that allow a relatively spontaneous intervention of Parliament into current 
executive decision-making.
3 In 1995, a constitutional reform
4 improved the opportuni-
ties of the Parliament to fulfil its role as  a ‘European’ actor by extending the session 
period, and by loosening the governmental monopoly on the parliamentary agenda. The 
Government paid high attention on the implementation and effectiveness of the parlia-
mentary examination of European projects. Consequently the Government has never 
opposed the tabling of a draft resolution on the parliamentary agenda. 
However, the resolutions have no compulsory effect.
5 The Prime Minister in several 
‘circulaires’ has pointed out to his ministers that a negotiation  in Brussels is inconceiv-
able without taking into consideration the positions of the Parliament
6. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
1  See Nallet, Henri: ‘Le rôle du Parlement national dans la définition des positions françaises. Le 
Parlement: quelle influence ?’, in: ENA Mensuel, No. 2/1998, p. 32. 
2  See National Assembly Civil Servant, Interview 2, 30 September 1998 and Senate Civil Servant, 
Interview, 27 October 2000. 
3   There was only  one vote of no confidence on governmental European policy after Maastricht 
concerning the reform of CAP: Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale/Débats, séance du 1 juin 
1992, pp. 1741-1763. 
4   Loi Constitutionnelle No. 95-880. 
5   Conseil Constitutionnel, décision No. 92-314 DC du 17 décembre 1992. 
6   Circulaire du 13 décembre 1999 relative à l’application de l’Article 88-4 de la Constitution, Journal 
Officiel, 17 décembre 1999.  
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latter is hardly ever informed by the Government of the follow-up of the resolutions. 
Only in some cases an explicative note has been transmitted to the Parliament. It is quite 
difficult to evaluate the implications of the resolutions because in most cases the posi-
tions of MP’s and of the Government are not divergent. The majorities of the National 
Assembly and of the Senate tend to support the President’s and the Government’s Euro-
pean policy if they belong to the same coalition. Furthermore, the tabling of resolutions 
is not an arm that the opposition exploits to undermine governmental business in Brus-
sels. However, the Parliament does not only legitimate the European decision-making. 
Some analysts have o bserved an ideological-instrumental division of labour between 
parliament and the executive, ‘that offered new political levers to both, whether on the 
domestic or on the international stage”
1,  and provided an opportunity to contain the 
forceful right-wing anti-European faction by granting a parliamentary arena. 
The proximity between the Parliament and the Executive power does not constitute the 
only explanation of the unsatisfactory follow-up of the resolutions. The follow-up of 
European draft proposals necessitates a considerable amount of work and a deep under-
standing of the EU mechanisms. This is hardly ever profitable in electoral terms. Apart 
from specific policy fields such as agriculture,  the electoral impact of parliamentary 
involvement in European projects is not obvious. MP’s p olitical willingness to step into 
European scrutiny also depends on the internal discipline of the majority and of their 
conception of their political career. A majority MP may or may not want to be in a deli-
cate position vis-à-vis the Government when defending a controversial resolution. Dur-
ing the tenth legislature, the tandem between two euro-sceptic MP’s, the National A s-
sembly’s President Philippe Séguin and the Delegation’s President Robert Pandraud, 
turned out to be efficient. Since 1997, the left Government has avoided public votes 
about resolutions given the fragmentation of the parliamentary majority and its division 
about Europe. It preferred to organise floor sessions, public debates without vote, and 
therefore adopted a low profile in European policy-making. This strategy differed from 
its attitude towards WTO-Policies, e.g. about the genetically modified organisms, when 
parliament was largely implicated i nto the debate. Further, the twofold scrutiny system 
does not promote the follow-up of resolutions, because outside the Delegations MP’s 
are less interested in EC/EU draft acts and some have not fully understood the utility of 
the resolutions as an instrument for exercising political influence.  
Thus, the two-fold scrutiny of a European proposal by the Delegations and the perma-
nent committees may be considered as complex and not too efficient. Even if in most 
cases the examination of a proposal for resolution by a committee does not profoundly 
modify the analysis of the Delegation, the procedure is very time-consuming. In other 
domains proposals for resolutions tabled in a Delegation are examined with an impor-
                                                 
1   Notably used by government in the IGC preparing the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Benoît, Bertrand: 
Social-Nationalism. An Anatomy of French Europsceptiscism, Aldershot: Ashgate 1998, p. 56.   
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tant time lag. The Delegations often hesitate to transmit a text to a permanent committee 
given the latter’s work-load with national legislation. As a civil servant notes, proposals 
for resolutions are received with a mix of ‘scepticism and boredom’
1 by permanent 
committees. For instance, the Law Committee spent a lot of time considering national 
projects about immigration whereas recent European proposals on that topic have not 
been examined. The passage through committees is justified from a constitutional and a 
political point of view, because the six  permanent committees are the only constitutional 
bodies that can adopt binding texts. Politically, the sift through committees is supposed 
to increase MP’s awareness for European affairs. If the Delegations were transformed in 
permanent committees, only the 36 members of each Delegation would be informed 
about European proposals and the other MP’s would discover a resolution at the m o-
ment of the transposition. Last but not least, the permanent committees have been very 
reluctant to be deprived of a part of  their prerogatives since the creation of the Delega-
tions, especially at the Senate. Thus, the former National Assembly President’s proposal 
to create a European Permanent Committee has not been implemented.
2 
 
III. The French Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty  
 
During the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty the French Government as well as the 
two Chambers prepared original proposals in favour of a strengthening of the role of 
national parliaments in the EU. As France has been one of the few countries to support 
the collective and direct participation of national parliaments to the EU-level decision-
making process, an analysis of its position may be helpful to further clarify the specific-
ity of the French approach towards national parliaments in the European integration 
process. 
 
1. High Parliamentary Expectations 
 
The two parliamentary Delegations observed very closely the evolution of the IGC from 
March 1996 up to June 1997. They auditioned Michel Barnier each month, the ministry 
for European affairs and French negotiator in the IGC. Even before the formal opening 
of the IGC the Delegation of the National Assembly called for the establishment of an 
inter-parliamentary committee at the European level.
3 This committee should consist of 
                                                 
1   National Assembly Civil Servant, interview, 14 November 2000. 
2  See Fabius, Laurent: ‘Préface’, in : Assemblée Nationale, Les Commissions à l’Assemblée nationale, 
Paris, ed. Assemblée nationale, 2000, p. 5. 
3  See Rapport d’information No. 1939 de Nicole Catala et Nicole Ameline: ‘Quelles réformes pour 
l’Europe de demain?’, 8 February 1995, conclusion No. 39. See also rapport d’information No. 2969 
de Maurice Ligot, Nicole Catala et Patrick Hoguet: ‘Les parlments nationaux dans l’Union euro-
péenne : acteurs ou spectateurs?’, 23 July 1996.  
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an e qual and small number of representatives from each EU parliament and represent 
collectively the national parliaments at the European level. It was called to monthly 
express its positions on European texts, without being able to amend them. The commit-
tee’s  responsibilities could cover the major decisions of the European Union  - revision 
of the Treaties, international agreements, enlargements, the budget, Justice and Home 
Affairs, monetary affairs and defence - as well as monitor the respect of the subsidiarity 
principle through the adoption of specific resolutions, so-called ‘exceptions de subsidi-
arité’, on difficult issues. Indeed, the Gaullist deputy Nicole Catala explained that the 
Court of Justice could not play this role, because the control of the principle of subsidi-
arity was essentially political. The position of the Senate was similar; its Presidents 
have supported the idea of an European Senate for a long time. Note that President Pon-
celet has re-launched this project during the Versailles-COSAC in October 2000. 
The proposals of the Chambers had been based on the implicit willingness to share 
competencies between national parliaments and the EP. According to many French 
MP’s, the EP should keep a central position in the Community process and national 
parliaments should play a similar role in intergovernmental affairs, that is in Second and 
Third Pillar policies. Thus, the preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty illustrated once 
again the distrust of many French MP’s towards the EP. The prevailing feeling w as that 
the ‘immature’ EP was trying to endorse the m onopoly of democratic legitimacy in the 
EU. The conflict became obvious in February 1997 when the EP adopted a resolution 
against a French law about immigration. However, the relations improved after a m eet-
ing of the National Assembly Delegation and the EP’s Institutional Affairs Committee 
institutional Commission, and the Neyts-Uyttebroeck report was also interpreted by 
French deputies as a recognition of the legitimacy of COSAC.
1 
After the first months  of the IGC, the Parliament stressed the isolation of France. Not 
only were the other governments globally opposed to the creation of a second Chamber 
but also did the other national parliaments not follow the idea of a collective assertion of 
national parliaments. Before the Dublin COSAC of October 1996, a Delegation of the 
National Assembly visited all European parliaments in order to convince them.
2 Those 
efforts contributed to the adoption of point five of the conclusions of the Dublin 
COSAC. Taking into consideration the reluctance of the majority of member states to 
create another European body, the French Parliament decided to concentrate its efforts 
on the strengthening of COSAC.
3 MP’s hoped that an obligation to consult COSAC in 
some cases would become part of the new treaty, especially regarding the subsidiarity 
                                                 
1  See Rapport d’information No. 3509 de Robert Pandraud, Révision des traités européens, Avant 
Amsterdam: treize mois de Conférence intergouvernmentale, 21 April 1997, pp. 20-22. 
2   The Delegation was composed of Nicole Catala, Charles Josselin, Patrick Hoguet and Maurice L i-
got. 
3  See Rapport d’information No. 3113, Maurice Ligot, Nicole Catala et Patrick Hoguet, 12 November 
1996.  
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principle. The National Assembly Delegation also wanted COSAC to express its opin-
ion on questions concerning the two intergovernmental pillars (CFSP and Justice and 
Home Affairs) and in the area of unanimous decision-making of the Council. 
 
2. The Strategic Support of the French Government 
 
Alain Juppé’s Government defended quite similar ideas. This attitude may be seen as a 
‘post Maastricht’ trauma. The ‘right’ and especially the Presidential party had been 
deeply cleaved during the referendum campaign. The quite consensual claim for the 
strengthening of national parliaments was able to conciliate pro-European  - as Alain 
Juppé and Michel Barnier - and euro-sceptic - as Philippe Séguin and Charles Pasqua - 
leaders of the gaullist family. From time to time, the Juppé Government also showed 
some troubles to control the plethoric majority of the National Assembly and to over-
come divisions resulting form the Presidential campaign. In that context, t he support for 
a parliamentary assertion in the European process had the twofold advantage of unify-
ing the right and of bringing about an answer to popular concerns about French Euro-
pean policy. Moreover, the proposal for a parliamentary involvement at the EU level 
was eventually less constraining for the executive power than the potential strengthen-
ing of the Parliament in the national political system. Thus, official documents produced 
during that period point to many reasons for upgrading the role of national parliaments
1:  
In its official paper of 13 November 1995 the Government followed the National A s-
sembly conclusions and suggested to create a body composed of representatives of n a-
tional parliaments which would be consulted in the field of subsidiarity. Such a ‘High 
Parliamentary Council’ was supposed to take shape through an institutionalisation of 
COSAC. Concerning the Third Pillar the Government suggested ‘a participation of n a-
tional parliaments in the drawing up of legislation regarding civil or penal law, thus 
enabling national parliamentarians to have their say.’ The French Government described 
quite precisely an original mechanism of collective association of national parliaments 
based on a ‘flexible forum’ that ‘could be composed of national MP’s alone or have the 
same members as COSAC’. Confronted with the criticism that any further involvement 
of national parliaments at the EU-level would complicate the system, the proposal 
specified that the forum would not be a new institution. The forum could deliver advi-
sory opinions in the field of justice and home affairs and on the theme of subsidiarity. 
During the negotiations the French Government quickly perceived that it would be dif-
ficult if not impossible to create a collective permanent body and that the reluctance was 
strong about the subsidiarity principle and the Second Pillar. At the end of 1996 the 
Government finally focused on the association of national parliaments to the projects 
                                                 
1  See the memorandum about France’s position published in Le Figaro, 20 February 1996.  
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under the Third Pillar.
1 Afterwards, in a common letter with G ermany  - on 9 December 
1996  - the Government surprisingly suggested the creation of a mixed parliamentary 
body composed of MP’s and MEP’s. Such shifts indicate that the governmental support 
of national parliaments was probably not as strong as it may seem, those contradictory 
statements provoked quite negative reactions both at the Senate and at the National A s-
sembly. 
 
3. The Reasons for the ‘Exception Française’ 
 
Why did French parliamentary proposals turn out to be unsuccessful and rather iso-
lated? One explanation is related to the experience of the two Delegations. The French 
Parliament had been one of the few to systematically study all legislative EC proposals 
in the years preceding the 1996/97 IGC. During that period, the Delegations discovered 
how bounded their prerogatives were. Since they were told repeatedly that it was not 
possible to change a legislative proposal because of the position of other member states’ 
governments the conviction that national parliaments should intervene directly and col-
lectively  - before a Council decision is taken  - gained ground. The second element of 
explanation refers to the intermediary situation of the French Parliament in comparison 
to other European Assemblies. In some countries  - in Italy for instance  - the level  of 
euro-enthusiasm was so significant that any assertion of national parliaments may have 
been seen as a backward movement of European integration. In other member states - 
notably in the Nordic countries - the main fear was that a direct and collective interven-
tion of national parliaments at the Community level could reduce national prerogatives 
of the legislative power vis-à-vis their government.  
The creation of a collective body representing national parliaments and the d efence of 
the subsidiarity principle were ambiguous. At the parliamentary level the project a t-
tracted pro-European MP’s and some famous euro-sceptic leaders. Thus, the President 
of the National Assembly, Philippe Séguin, launched numerous initiatives during that 
period in favour of the s trengthening of the parliamentary i nfluence in the national as 
well as in the European sphere. Known as a leader of the ‘Anti-Maastricht’ coalition, he 
recommended that a majority of national parliaments could express their opposition to a 
EC draft proposal on the basis of the subsidiarity principle.
2 Both the perspective of a 
reduction of the democratic deficit in the EU and the claim for a development of the 
parliamentary prerogatives contributed to the conciliation of euro-sceptics and pro-
integrationists. The left  - less divided on the European issue - was also less enthusiastic 
about the creation of a European second Chamber. The efforts of the political elite to 
                                                 
1  See Audition of Michel Barnier by the National Assembly Delegation, 20 November 1996. 
2  See his report to the Conference of Presidents of Parliaments of the European Union (London, 12-13 
May 1995) as well as the Charlemagne colloquium in Aachen (26 January 1996).  
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demonstrate the compatibility of the national and European sphere may also explain the 
French specificity during the negotiations. The major political leaders of the right and of 
the left agreed on the fact that European integration was a substantial precondition for 
upholding France’s position in the world. The building of Europe and the d efence of 
France tended to be understood as the terms of the same equation with parliament at its 
core. 
 
IV. The French Parliament after Amsterdam  
 
1. The Reform of Article 88-4 
 
The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty has been an opportunity to codify previous 
informal practices through an amendment of the French Constitution. The revision was 
imposed by the Constitutional Council
1 and helped Parliament to further foster its i n-
struments for controlling the Government. In this context MP’s benefited both techni-
cally and politically as they negotiated their support of the treaty in exchange of an i m-
provement of their European prerogatives. The new article 88-4
2 establishes that all 
legislative proposals  - including those of the Second and Third Pillar- are transmitted to 
the Chambers and that they are able to adopt resolutions. The amended article also pro-
vides for the possibility for the Government to transmit any other document emanating 
from the EU to the Parliament. The Parliament is now able to adopt resolutions on those 
documents. 
The procedure established for Second Pillar proposals remains different from the other 
areas insofar as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs covers the functions of the SGCI. If it is 
logical that the Ministry should play such a role, o ne may however conclude that this 
substitution is the result of a reluctance of French diplomats to unleash their monopoly 
of control on international affairs. 
All those changes are not really significant as they tend to ‘constitutionalise’ previous 
informal practices. The transmission of non-legislative documents still d epends on the 
Government’s appraisal. The so-called ‘clause facultative’ may be considered as a r e-
striction of parliamentary power. However, experience has shown that the Government 
is open to the demands of the Presidents of the Delegations. For example, the Govern-
ment transmitted the European Commission’s report of the on the WTO-negotiations 
and other documents regarding the WTO. Lionel Jospin decided to systematically 
transmit the White and the Green books and the annual programme of the Commission
3. 
                                                 
1  See Décision du Conseil Constitutionnel No. 97-394 du 31 décembre 1997. 
2   Loi Constitutionnelle 99-49 du 25 janvier 1999, Journal Officiel, 26 janvier 1999. 
3  See Circulaire du Premier ministre du 13 décembre 1999 relative à l’application de l’article 88-4 de 
la Constitution, remplaçant celle du 21 avril 1993 et celle du 19 juillet 1994.  
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As concerns the CFSP Pillar, the 1999 modification is symbolic given the traditional 
monopoly of the executive power on external affairs. If it is too early to evaluate the 
implementation of  the new article, the major feature is the large transmission of non-
legislative documents by Jospin’s Government which contributes significantly to i n-
crease the work of the Delegations. 
 
2. The Protocol on National Parliaments 
 
The introduction of the Protocol on National Parliaments (PNP) in the Amsterdam 
Treaty has not changed the scrutiny of European legislation by the French Parliament in 
a significant way. The reform of article 88-4 is certainly not the result of the implemen-
tation of the Protocol on N ational Parliaments.
1 The delay of a six weeks-period pro-
vided in the Protocol was a positive element but the parliamentary preferences were not 
strong on that subject given the four weeks-period provided by the national provisions. 
The protocol is even accused of being ‘anecdotal’
2 and its main impact has been psy-
chological. The fact that the Treaty distinctively mentions national parliaments may 
have changed the views of some MP’s- especially centrist senators  - who have been 
‘too’ euro-enthusiastic to favour a strengthening of national parliaments. In a document 
established for the Versailles COSAC in October 2000, both the Senate and the N a-
tional Assembly indicate that the PNP has not fundamentally changed the shape of their 
control on European activities. As for the time-span within which the MP’s have to con-
sider European legislative proposals, they remark that it is sometimes too short in three 
specific fields, namely in trade policy, in CFSP and when budgetary documents are 
amended. The Parliament estimates that the PNP has not helped to improve this prob-
lem. However Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s ‘circulaire’ of December 1999 reminds 
his cabinet colleagues to be careful about European deadlines and refers to the ‘spirit of 
the Protocol’
3. The document specifies that the Government will respect the delay of six 
weeks as provided in the PNP regarding legislative proposals that fall into the Council 
of Ministers’ own definition. As a consequence, the French Constitutional situation 
today is even more complicated given the two-fold definition of legislative acts, the 
European one based on the rules of procedure of the Council and the national one based 
on the articles 34 and 53 of the Constitution.
4 The Senate and the National Assembly 
point to the EC’s restrictive notion of legislative proposals, especially concerning budg-
                                                 
1  See Sauron, Jean-Luc: ‘Le contrôle parlementaire de l’activité gouvernementale en matière de droit 
communautaire en France’, Revue trimestrielle de Droit européen, No. 2/1999, p. 196. 
2  See Vauzelle, Michel: Rapport d’information No. 1402 sur le projet de loi autorisant la ratification 
du traité d’Amsterdam, Commissions des affaires étrangères, février 1998, p. 27. 
3   Circulaire du Premier ministre du 13 décembre 1999 relative à l’application de l’article 88-4 de la 
Constitution, remplaçant celle du 21 avril 1993 et celle du 19 juillet 1994. 
4  See Sauron, Jean-Luc, 1999, op.cit., pp. 186-187.  
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etary documents and agreements between institutions.
1 The inclusion of budgetary 
documents on the PNP should help to resolve problems of delay. The agreements b e-
tween institutions have never been transmitted to the Assemblies, even if they are con-
sidered as very important by MP’s. 
   
3. The PNP Provisions on COSAC 
 
The PNP has been interpreted by the French Parliament as a symbolic recognition of the 
legal existence of COSAC. The Delegations hoped that the Protocol could be used as an 
argument to convince the other parliaments to reform the rules of procedure of COSAC. 
Some senators were in favour of the introduction of majority voting, but the Parliament 
now considers that such a change would be difficult considering the representativeness 
of national delegations at COSAC. The position of the two Chambers is that co-
operation between national parliaments in Europe does not go far enough. The issue of 
bilateral relations between assemblies is  illustrated by the exchange of documents with 
the Bundestag and the two British Chambers. They consider that new technologies may 
help to keep MP’s informed about the proceedings of other EU affairs committees.
2 As 
for the collective assertion of n ational  parliaments, the two French Delegations hope 
that COSAC will play a more important part in the future. As organiser of the Versailles 
COSAC of October 2000, the French Parliament - and especially the National Assembly 
- developed an original mechanism before the conference. A deadline for submitting 
contributions and for amendments to the draft conclusions was set. The draft synthesis 
of the COSAC presidency was sent before the meeting. Such a mechanism was sup-
posed to contribute to the adoption of a consistent text. During the COSAC the National 
Assembly’s President Raymond Forni during the COSAC supported the creation of 
working groups which could constitute another step towards the institutionalisation of 
the COSAC. Moreover, French MP’s estimate that the PNP allows COSAC to adopt 
contributions on specific European legislative projects. The two French Delegations 
hope that the conference will examine the precise projects, especially proposals con-
cerning civil liberties and internal security. However, French MP’s do not want to limit 
the field of the contributions to the subjects mentioned in the PNP. 
Finally the PNP provisions on COSAC have not induced a revision of the composition 
of the Delegation to COSAC. The French Delegation remains to be composed of  the 
President of each parliamentary Delegation and by other MP’s representing the main 
political groups. Contrary to other national parliaments the representativeness of the 
national COSAC-Delegations is not really a conflictual issue. There is no collective 
preparation of the COSAC in both Assemblies because texts are hardly ever published 
                                                 
1   Questionnaire established for the Versailles-COSAC of October 2000, Answer to question No. four. 
2   Questionnaire established for the Versailles-COSAC of October 2000, Answer to question No. five.  
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before the meeting. Politically, the Presidents of the Delegations do not want to be 
compelled to follow the decisions of the Assemblies.
1 After the conference, the Presi-
dents usually give a short account of COSAC during a meeting of the Delegations and 
short reports with official documents are published. The weakness of the collective 
preparation and of the reporting is also linked with the fear that other MP’s - especially 
those willing to join the Delegation - would feel excluded.
2 
 
V. Conclusions: An Ambitious Parliament without Real Powers? 
 
The role played by the French Parliament in EU decision-making remains a mbiguous. 
The Amsterdam Treaty has been an opportunity t o codify previous practices but the 
adoption of the treaty has not really changed the basic rules of parliament’s involvement 
in EU affairs. The Chambers have not yet fully clarified the goals of their involvement 
in European affairs. Three different elements may be pointed out. 
Their first ambition was to change the national institutional system. Even if the i n-
volvement of the French Parliament in European affairs is usually analysed as “an o p-
portunity to recover power”
1 against the Government and the President, it is not sure 
that the relation between executive and legislative power is so antagonistic. But it seems 
that since the beginning of the Fifth Republic the unfavourable position of the Cham-
bers has led MP’s to be cautious about any additional loss of power. Europe has been an 
outlet to parliamentary frustration. Indeed formal parliamentary powers  - further i n-
creased by the Amsterdam Treaty  - have become important. The institution of resolu-
tions and parliamentary scrutiny reserves represents a considerable evolution regarding 
the balance of power of the Fifth Republic. Parliamentary prerogatives are more signifi-
cant in the European context than in national politics given that the spontaneous expres-
sion of the ‘rationalised’ Parliament about national p rojects is limited by the rigid 
framework of the Constitution. 
However, the parliamentary assertion should not be exaggerated. From Alain Juppé to 
Lionel Jospin, the magnanimity of the executive power vis-à-vis parliamentary demands 
proved that the power o f the Parliament is not as important as it may a ppear at first. 
Prime Ministers have accepted to implement parliamentary prerogatives only insofar as 
the establishing of new ‘European’ powers of the Parliament did not constitute a real 
threat to them. Hence, Lionel Jospin asks in his 1999 ‘circulaire’ for the development of 
better tools for information gathering at the governmental level and a better follow-up 
of the parliamentary resolutions. But in practice it seems that there is a governmental 
unwillingness to further d evelop the influence of the Parliament. Thus, the prevailing 
                                                 
1  See National Assembly Civil Servant, interview, 14 November 2000. 
2  See Senate Civil Servant, Interview, 27 October 2000.  
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view is that today the two Chambers have obtained enough institutional tools to inter-
vene and that the reforms of the 1990’s went as far as the balance-of-power under the 
Fifth Republic allowed.
2 The reform most urgently needed  - the transformation of the 
Delegations in permanent committees  - concerns the internal organisation of the Cham-
bers rather than their relation to the executive power. 
The second aim of the parliamentary assertion consisted in influencing the governmen-
tal European policy by scrutinising EC and EU projects. The two Chambers were not 
very well equipped to adapt to the logic of ‘consensus democracy’, which predominates 
the Brussels stage of the decision-making p rocess. It is true that the conflictual mood 
and the traditional importance of parliamentary party battles is opposed to the spirit of 
compromise within EU institutions. However, the relationship between the executive 
and the legislative powers indicates t hat this feature should not be overstated. The par-
liamentary resolutions hardly ever diverge from the governmental position. The com-
prehensive and profound work done by the Delegations indicates that they have rather 
succeeded in scrutinising the huge amount of European proposals. Nevertheless, it is 
still uncertain whether the Parliament is fully adapted to the EC/EU system of govern-
ance. The Chambers have concentrated their interest on the Council of Ministers. This 
focus is understandable insofar as a national parliament will always try to influence its 
government first. The preference for the Council is also coherent with the intergovern-
mental perception of the European decision-making process of most French MP’s. 
Meanwhile, the Parliament has neglected  other EU institutions, namely the Commission 
and the European Parliament. The development of the co-decision procedure has con-
tributed to multiply the loci of decision-making. The French Parliament finds it difficult 
to answer to this dilution even if the Senate has reacted to this challenge by setting up a 
‘parliamentary representation’ at Brussels.
3 Finally, the influence of the Chambers on 
the European policy of their Government is hard to establish and is necessarily limited 
given the challenges of multi-actor negotiations.  
The third dimension of the parliamentary intervention is related to the public d ebate. 
The mass of EC/EU-related documents is available on the webpages of the two Cham-
bers. It illustrates the parliamentary will to establish a link between the EU and the i n-
terested citizens. However, it seems that the public has not really perceived the positive 
effects of the ‘europeanisation’ of the Chambers. MP’s are still among the most u n-
popular of the political leaders. The media do not systematically give an account of their 
work. The difficulty of the two Chambers to i ntervene in the public debate is also due to 
                                                                                                                                               
1  Dubouis, Jean-Louis: ‘The European Union : An Opportunity for the French Parliament to Recover 
Powers ?’, in: European Monographs, No. 11/1996, pp. 49-63. 
2   The idea of transforming resolutions into compulsory demands is progressively ruled out even by 
MP themselves. One possible legislative reform would be to give a stronger legal basis to the par-
liamentary reserves that are only mentioned in a circulaire (Circulaire du Premier ministre du 13 dé-
cembre 1999 relative à l’application de l’article 88-4 de la Constitution). 
3  See Sénat, Bulletin d’infomations rapides No. 727, 25 mai 1999, p. 31.  
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a lack of political willingness on the part of MP’s. Outside the specific context of the 
two Delegations, MP’s find it difficult to adapt to ‘EC-culture’. The gap between the 
minority of representatives involved in the European policy process and the remaining 
majority is significant. The electoral benefits of a European involvement and the way of 
‘politicising’ Europe are still problematic. 
The competition between the three dimensions of the parliamentary assertion in Euro-
pean affairs has enticed several perverse effects. The development of the Parliament vis-
à-vis the executive power has been more or less instrumentalised by euro-sceptics. The 
demand for more prerogatives has sometimes been merged with a more fundamental 
criticism of the integration process. During the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and 
afterwards, the so-called ‘souverainistes’ used the Parliament as a tribune and as a way 
of influencing the Government. From the early 1990’s until now, the Government’s 
attitude has constantly consisted in privileging the second dimension of the parliamen-
tary involvement  - the scrutiny of EC legislation  - against the third one  - public inter-
vention. From the executive’s perspective, the Parliament is preferred as an additional 
expert rather than as a tribune. Indeed, the association of the Parliament during the 
preparation of a directive is in the Government’s interest. A first examination of a Euro-
pean text by the national parliament may be helpful to discern potential resistance that 
would be more harmful if the project was already adopted at the European level.  
Nevertheless, there is a dramatic problem of legislative implementation deficits in 
France. Transposition failures are growing to such extent that the French Government 
today feels obliged to present a kind of ‘Enabling Act’, that would allow the Govern-
ment to implement European directives without any implication of the legislator.  
This reveals a re-emergence of de Gaullian practices in European policy-making. In 
such a perspective the scrutiny mechanisms and the broad implication of parliament 
during the EU-negotiation appear more and more questionable. At the same time one 
must admit that MP’s themselves have sometimes favoured the third dimension against 
the second one, that is public intervention rather than a real attempt to influence the 
Government. Thus, many resolutions are still agreed upon without considering their 
follow-up. After a period of self-assertion against the executive power, the French Par-
liament has entered in a maturity phase in dealing with European affairs. The Parlia-
ment’s priority does not consist in creating new procedures but in using the existing 
ones with a view of associating the scrutiny of European proposals to the intervention 
on the public debate. If they are still in search of some balance between expertise and 
voice, the Chambers have decided to be both working and talking parliament in order to 
develop a position of an interface between the EU and the citizens. 251  
The Parliament of Ireland: A Passive Adapter Coming in from the Cold 
 
Brigid Laffan 
 
I. Introduction: Political Culture and the Political System 
 
The contemporary structure of Ireland’s political system evolved within the framework 
of the 1937 Constitution which provided Ireland with a directly elected head of state, a 
parliamentary system of government and a judicial branch with a Supreme Court at its 
apex. The Irish Parliament (Oireachtas) is bicameral, consisting of the Lower Chamber 
known as the Dáil and the Upper Chamber known as the Seanad. The Lower House is 
directly elected with 166 deputies and the Seanad has 60 members elected indirectly 
from a series of electoral panels. T he Dáil is the most important Chamber and is thus the 
main focus of this chapter. The Constitution established the key powers of the Upper 
and Lower Houses in relation to the appointment and dismissal of governments, law-
making and executive accountability. Under the Constitution all powers of government 
derive from the people who elect a parliament which in turn chooses a Prime Minister 
(Taoiseach) and a government. The Government is accountable to the Dáil and can only 
govern, if it commands a majority in parliament. Elections must be held at least every 
five years, but in practice, a government will rarely choose to govern for the full five 
years as Prime Ministers prefer to determine the timing of general elections.
1  
Political parties, although not mentioned in the Constitution, are the main transmission 
belts of politics in Ireland. Parties organise and provide structure for electoral competi-
tion and government formation. The Irish party system does not r eflect the cleavage 
characteristics of European p arty systems in general. The two major parties, Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael emerged from a deep split in the nationalist party Sinn Féin that was i n-
strumental in the foundation of the Irish state in 1922. The unresolved nationalist ques-
tion meant that the Irish party system was frozen around a nationalist cleavage. It was 
very difficult for smaller parties, n otably, the Irish Labour Party to realign politics so 
that they might command the level of support associated with parties of the left in 
Europe. In addition to these three parties, there are a number of other small parties with 
representation in the Dáil, notably, the Progressive Democrats (fiscal conservatives), the 
Green Party, and Sinn Fein (extreme nationalist). Periodically, the Dáil has a small 
number of independent deputies who are not affiliated to any political party. Govern-
ment formation in Ireland was characterised by the dominance of Fianna Fail in a single 
                                                 
1  See Gallagher, Michael/Coakley, John (eds.): Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd edition, London 
1999, Chubb, Basil, The Government and Politics of Ireland, Longman, 3rd edition, London 1992.  
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party government with limited periods of alternative coalitions consisting of Fine Gael, 
the Labour party and other small parties. In the 1990’s, coalition governments became 
the norm as Fianna Fail proved unable to win a majority on its own. The European Un-
ion (EU) is not a divisive issue in government formation in Ireland. 
 
II. Relevance of European Integration for the Irish Parliament 
 
The basic features of the Parliament-Executive relationship in Ireland resemble those of 
the West European tradition of parliamentary democracy. The Government must com-
mand a majority in parliament and in the absence of a majority must maintain the confi-
dence of the Parliament. Following an election, the Parliament is the arena where the 
Executive is authorised to take power. In practice once a government has a majority, it 
enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the Parliament. Executive power-the power of 
government- is strong in the Irish system of public policy-making. Put simply, there is a 
marked concentration of e xecutive power in the Irish system given the unitary nature of 
the state. The Oireachtas is in comparative terms a relatively weak parliament, although 
reforms in the 1990’s have led to the establishment of a comprehensive Committee sys-
tem that is altering the working methods of Irish parliamentarians and the role of the 
Oireachtas. In relation to the Irish Parliament, it has been argued that : 
“Parliaments may still be elected by the people, and may even elect governments, but it 
seems that once a government gets into office it can go its own way largely unchecked by 
parliament. And even in the context of these generally low expectations of how much con-
trol a parliament can really exercise over a government in any country, it has frequently 
been argued that the Dáil stands out for its exceptional weakness.”
1 
The ‘poor performance’ of the Oireachtas  is also identified in other volumes.
2 The 
weakness of the Irish Parliament has been overcome somewhat in the 1990’s. There 
were a number of reasons, notably parliamentary culture and the traditional role of the 
Irish parliamentarian, for the poor performance of the Irish Parliament. 
The practice and involvement of the Irish Parliament and Irish parliamentarians in EU 
affairs is determined more by the general role of the Parliament rather than any highly 
developed idea of how a parliament should be involved  in EU matters. That said, the 
acknowledgement of the role of national parliaments in the European U nion since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam has altered the context within which the Oireachtas responds to 
EU business.  
It is striking that in the two government papers laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas 
in April 1970 and January 1972 on Ireland’s membership of the European Union, there 
                                                 
1   Gallagher, Michael: ‘Parliament’, in: Coakley John/Gallagher Michael, (eds.): Politics in the Repu-
blic of Ireland, PSAI Press, Galway, 1992, p. 112.  
2  See Chubb, 1992, op.cit., p. 204.  
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was a reference to the potential impact of EU membership on the Constitution, but not 
on the Irish Parliament. Historically, t he Irish Parliament was a ‘talking parliament’ 
modelled on Westminster rather than a ‘working parliament’ of the continental type. 
The Westminster tradition privileged debates and question time in the full plenary rather 
than the Delegation of business to  Committees. In plenary, debates undertaken for the 
purpose of reaching a decision or making progress with legislation was the norm and 
discussion on broad general topics the e xception. Until the reforms of the 1990’s, the 
procedures and practices of the Dáil were more akin to those obtaining in the British 
Parliament at the foundation of the state.
1 This meant that Committees were much 
weaker in the Irish system than in continental European parliaments. However, plenary 
sessions were much more frequent and less stage-managed than in continental practice.  
The role of the Parliament is influenced by the constituency burden carried by Irish 
parliamentarians. Irish TD’s (Tachta Dala) are elected by proportional representation 
(PR) in multi-member constituencies by means of a Single Transferable Vote (STV). 
This generates extensive inter and intra party competition for nominations and seats. 
Consequently Irish TD’s compete with each other to service their constituencies and are 
faced with ‘punishing workloads’. T hey are forced to “spend too much time in their 
constituencies attending to minor complaints from constituents, leaving them with too 
little time to deal with important matters of national policy in Dublin”
2. A sitting TD 
claims that “the winning of a medical card for a constituent is more valuable to the poli-
tician than any finely-crafted or well motivated speech in the Dáil”
3. The importance of 
localism and clientalism in Irish political culture, reinforced by the electoral system, has 
a major impact on t he role of the Parliament and its relationship with the Executive. 
Individual members of parliament, known as backbenchers, do not see themselves as 
centrally engaged in legislative politics. The role of parliamentarians and their parties 
depends on whether they are in government or opposition. In government, the role of 
the party members is to be loyal and supportive of the Government. Backbencher r e-
volts are not a marked feature of Irish political life. In opposition, the role of party 
members is to hold  the Government accountable and to highlight weaknesses in gov-
ernment policies and practices. Irish parties are capable of controlling their members 
and a highly developed whip system is very effective in keeping backbenchers in line. 
The above synopsis of  the relationship between executive power and parliamentary 
power in Ireland and the relatively weak position of the Parliament altered somewhat in 
the latter half of the 1990’s. In 1998, the Public Accounts Committee of the Dail sought 
and was given considerable additional powers by the Dáil in its efforts to investigate the 
way in which financial institutions had managed what was known as the Deposit Inter-
                                                 
1  See Dooney, Seán/O’Toole, John: Irish Government Today, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1998. 
2   Laver, Michael: A new electoral system for Ireland?, The Political Institute, Dublin 1998, p. 1. 
3   Sunday Independent, 30 November 1997.  
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est Retention Tax (DIRT). The Committee investigated the administration of the tax and 
compelled representatives of the major financial institutions, government departments, 
the revenue commissioners and former finance ministers to attend and answer ques-
tions. The hearings were broadcast live and reported on extensively in the print media. 
The report had a  major public impact. According to the Irish Prime Minister, the work 
of the Committee: 
“has been a quantum shift, a major leap forward, for public accountability in Ireland. This 
is in line with a new demand for accountability both here in this country and in the EU it-
self. This is the culture of the future-visible accountability-Being Accountable but also be-
ing seen to be accountable.”
1  
The experience of the Public Accounts Committee in this investigation may have a 
more long-term impact on the role of t he Irish Parliament and its relations with the E x-
ecutive.  
Relative to other latecomers to the Union, the EU was not a politically divisive issue in 
Ireland, apart from sensitivities concerning defence and security. EU membership did 
not lead to splits in  Ireland’s political parties, unlike the situation in the United King-
dom, Denmark and Sweden. From the outset, Ireland’s two main p olitical parties-
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael-favoured membership of the EU. The L abour Party, which 
opposed membership in the 1972 referendum, quickly accepted the democratic choice 
of the Irish electorate but remained vigilant on such issues as neutrality and neo-liberal 
market integration. It did not take a formal position on the Single European Act in the 
1987 referendum but supported the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992. Democ-
ratic Left (which dates from 1992 and formally integrated with the Labour Party in 
1999), a party further to the left of the Labour Party, opposed the TEU but supported the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Of the remaining parties in Parliament, the Green Party and Sinn 
Féin, are the only two parties to continue to oppose Treaty change in the EU. There has 
thus been a gradual but sustained acceptance of EU membership across the political 
spectrum. 
Arising from the general political agreement about EU membership in Ireland, the EU 
has not been a major contentious issue in Irish parliamentary life. Unlike some other 
parliaments in Europe, the members of the Irish Parliament appear relatively uncon-
cerned about the impact of the EU on the nature and operation of Irish parliamentary 
democracy. Those parliamentarians who have worked to strengthen the Irish Parliament 
are motivated by general national considerations and not EU considerations as such. 
That said, the lead-up to Amsterdam and the implementation of the A msterdam Protocol 
on National Parliaments (PNP) led to a heightened degree of parliamentary interest in 
European affairs, particularly among deputies and senators in the European Affairs 
Committee.  
                                                 
1   Ahern, Bertie, Taoiseach Speech, 20 October 1999.  
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EU business  impinges on the Irish Parliament in a number of significant ways, notably: 
law-making  - primary and secondary legislation  -, and scrutiny of EU business. It does 
not impinge on the third role of the Parliament, that of appointing or dismissing a gov-
ernment. 
 
III. The Practice of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs  
 
The driving idea behind the parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms in Ireland is to hold the 
Government accountable for its actions in Brussels and to engage in public debate on 
the big European issues of the day. Because EU Treaty change requires a referendum in 
Ireland, the political parties are aware of the public dimension of EU politics in Ireland. 
However, the generally high levels of support for Ireland’s membership of the EU 
means that governments have not had to fight that hard for their EU policies. They can 
usually rely on an acquiescent parliament and an acquiescent public. The Parliament 
does not see itself as leading the n ational agenda on EU issues - that is the business of 
the Executive.  
The Parliament is involved in EU business through: 
-  legislation both primary and secondary with a European dimension, 
-  debates on the public finance estimates of government departments, 
-  the ratification of EU Treaties and the preparation for referenda on the EU, 
-  parliamentary questions, reports on European Councils, private members’ time 
used to debate EU issues, 
-  institutional mechanisms that have been established to scrutinise EU affairs.  
The Irish Parliament participates in EU affairs as part of the national legislative process, 
as a forum for public debate and as an arena for the scrutiny of the EU policies and 
practices of the Government in office. There are a number of different channels avail-
able to the Parliament to intervene in EU business. 
 
1. Plenary Sessions 
 
Europe given the Europeanisation of public policy features in a myriad of ways in ple-
nary sessions of the Parliament throughout the parliamentary year. In plenary sessions 
of the Parliament, EU business is raised in the reports of the Prime Minister following 
every European Council. From the outset, a practice developed whereby the Prime Min-
ister would make a formal statement to the Dáil following each European Council. 
Given the growing frequency of European Council meetings, there are usually four par-
liamentary set pieces each year. This allows for a general debate on the major conclu-
sions of the Council and the consequences for Ireland. The Prime Minister usually sets 
out the major developments and provides an Irish slant on such developments. The re-
port on the Berlin European Council in April 1999, not unexpectedly, concentrated on  
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the budgetary impact of Agenda 2000 on Ireland. The objective of the Taoiseach’s 
statement was to highlight the continuing budgetary transfers to Ireland while  accepting 
that there would be a significant reduction in financial flows between 2000 and 2006.
1 
Given the importance of the European Council in EU agenda setting, these reports are a 
useful device to ensure that deputies are aware of the major issues as they evolve on the 
EU agenda and on the outcome of EU deliberations at the highest level. The leaders of 
the main opposition parties respond to the statements of the Prime Minister.  
The second over-sight mechanism was traditionally the annual debates on the public 
finance estimates of individual government departments. There was usually consider-
able reference to developments in Europe during the debates on the estimates of the 
Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture and Justice. The debates were 
dominated by the interventions of the responsible minister and the main opposition 
speaker. A practice developed with the extension of the Committee system of the esti-
mates being debated in the relevant parliamentary Committee. For example, the esti-
mates of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are now debated in the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is ex officio a member of the Committee when 
it is discussing a legal bill or the estimates.  
The third way in which the plenary house deals with EU matters is when the implemen-
tation of an EU Treaty or EC directive requires a major piece of primary national legis-
lation. In such cases, the law must pass all stages of the legislative process in both 
Houses of the Oireachtas. The process followed is the normal domestic legislative proc-
ess of five stages. In 1997, the European Parliament Elections Act, the Central Bank 
Act, the Europol Act and the Organisation of Working Time Act were enacted as a con-
sequence of EU obligations. In 1998, the European Communities Amendment Act pro-
vided for ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Economic and Monetary U n-
ion Act made provision for Ireland’s membership of the Euro. Other bills such as the 
Food Safety Authority Act and the Act dealing with Jurisdiction of Courts and E n-
forcement of Judgements had a European dimension. All primary legislation is intro-
duced by the responsible minister and scrutinised by the opposition front bench. The 
vast majority of EC directives enter Irish law by means of secondary or delegated legis-
lation.  
The fourth way in which the plenary house deals with EU matters is through parliamen-
tary questions, a well-established part of Irish parliamentary procedure. Individual 
deputies may put a question for written or oral answer to the Prime Minister or a minis-
ter about the conduct of his/her department. Each week when the Parliament is sitting, 
there is about five hours of parliamentary time devoted to question time. Question time 
affords Irish parliamentarians the opportunity  to put and receive speedy replies to ques-
tions. Questions tend to cover the full range of EU public policy and Ireland’s involve-
                                                 
1  See Dail Debates, http://www.irlgov.ie:80/debates-99/1april/sect3.htm.  
 
257
ment. The Prime Minister is frequently asked about visits to other member states and 
the ‘high politics’ agenda issues. The questions for other ministers tend to be sectoral in 
nature with a particular emphasis on financial flows to Ireland, the common agricultural 
policy, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), duty free, regionalisation and Ireland’s 
record in implementing EU legislation.
1 The fifth way in which EU issues may arise in 
plenary sessions is by means of adjournment debates or private members bills. 
Box 1: Example of a Parliamentary Question on an EU matter  
 
95. Mr. Ferris asked the Minister for the Environment and Local Government the number of 
cases being taken against Ireland by the EU Commission arising from non-implementation of 
EU directives; and if he will make a statement on the matter? 
Ministerial Reply: 
“Infringement proceedings by way of reasoned opinion under Article 169 of the Treaty on 
European Union have been notified to Ireland by the European Commission in nine cases in 
respect of policy areas within my Department’s overall remit. These relate first, to the non-
transposition of EU legislation on driving licences, the maximum dimensions of vehicles, emis-
sions from non-mobile road machines and pollution by asbestos; second, to issues concerning 
the protection of water against pollution by dangerous substances, water quality problems asso-
ciated with private group water schemes, and compliance with waste legislation, and third to 
submission of reports on the implementation of water directives. 
Proceedings have been initiated before the European Court of Justice on failure to implement 
Directive 97/68/EC concerning emissions of pollutants from engines in non-road mobile m a-
chinery.” 
 
Source: <www.irlgove.ie80/debates-99/5oct99/sect8.htm> 
 
The 1972 European Communities Act required the Government to report twice yearly to 
each House of the Oireachtas on developments in the European Communities. These 
reports generally arrived too late for parliament to give serious consideration to the i s-
sues they raise. They provide an overview of developments in the European Union (EU) 
for those deputies committed to tracking EU business. Their relevance has declined 
somewhat with the increase in web-based i nformation sources on the EU. An individual 
deputy would receive much more up-to-date i nformation on developments in the EU 
from the Europe site than from the Government report. The reports tend to be bland 
documents recording the major developments in different policy areas but do not to 
tease out the Irish negotiating position on different areas of EU policy.  
 
                                                 
1  See Box 1 for a typical question.  
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2. The Committees 
 
Discussion of parliamentary  reform in Ireland has tended to revolve around the issue of 
parliamentary Committees, not a traditional feature of Irish parliamentary institutions. 
In 1983, a new government embarked on an experiment in parliamentary reform by 
establishing 17 select Committees. However, the Committees did not appear to have an 
underlying rationale or design. Rather they were “an uncoordinated mish-mash of 
Committees” whose potential was “immediately undermined by their superabundance”.
1 
The experience of the 1980’s did however have an impact on Irish parliamentary life.
2 
The Committees provided fora for Irish parliamentarians to investigate and interrogate 
government policy and Irish civil servants grew accustomed to dealing with parliamen-
tary Committees. During the 1990’s, the experiment became for the first time embedded 
with the establishment of a comprehensive Committee system that covers the entire 
gamut of government business. The Irish Parliament now has five standing Committees 
and ten select Committees. Two of the ten relate directly to Ireland’s membership of the 
EU  - the Foreign Affairs Committee and the European Affairs Committee, both of 
which date only from the 1990’s. They are joint Committees of both Houses of parlia-
ment.  
Prior to membership of the EU in 1973, concern was expressed at the impact of EU 
membership on the ‘law-making role’ of the Oireachtas. The 1972 European Communi-
ties Act conferred on ministers the right to make regulations (secondary legislation) that 
might be required to implement provisions of the EC Treaties and directives. According 
to Senator Mary Robinson, later Irish President, there was insufficient attention to the 
consequences for the Irish Parliament of EU membership prior to accession. There was 
no equivalent of the Study of Parliament Group in Britain that brought out a report in 
July 1972 on the implications of EU membership for the Westminister Parliament.
3 In 
July 1973, an amendment to the European Communities Act enhanced parliamentary 
scrutiny by establishing the first watch d og Committee on EU matters. In other words, 
the establishment of the Committee post-dated Ireland’s membership of the EU. The 
Oireachtas established the Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the Euro-
pean Communities, as a watchdog Committee to oversee the Executive. The original 
Committee had 25 members, 18 from the Dáil and seven from the Seanad. Members 
were appointed according to the numerical strength of the political parties in both 
Chambers. Committees in the Irish parliamentary system are c o-terminus with the life 
                                                 
1  See Arkins, Audrey: ‘The Committees of the 24th Oireachtas’, Irish Political Studies, No. 3/1988, p. 
94. 
2  See O’Halpin, Eunan: ‘Oireachtas Committees: experience and prospects’, Seirbhís Phoibli, No. 
3/1986, pp. 3 -9, Zimmerman, Jutta: ‘An innovation: backbench Committees’, Administration, No. 
3/1988, pp. 265-289. 
3  See Irish Times, 23 January 1973, p. 12.  
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of the Parliament and must lapse when an election is called. The Joint Committee was 
re-established after every election until its replacement by the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs in 1993. Its terms of reference allowed it to examine and report to the Oireachtas 
on Commission policy proposals, legislative proposals, EC laws, regulations made in 
Ireland under the European Communities Act 1972, and all other legal instruments that 
flowed from EC membership. Between 1988 and 1992, the  Committee published 26 
reports, the largest number of any parliamentary Committee at that time. Since Ireland 
did not have a strong tradition of parliamentary Committees, the original joint Commit-
tee was something of a novelty and contributed in the longer term to an enhanced use of 
Committees in the Irish parliamentary system. The importance of its role has been e m-
phasised in the following terms: Despite being prescribed by an external institution it 
has, by its very existence, helped creating a climate conducive to Oireachtas reform. 
Through diligent habits it has set a new precedent in scrutiny, investigation and delib-
eration. In particular the second statutory Committee provided an e xcellent tutorial for 
its members, who were instrumental in the development of later Committees.
1  
Notwithstanding its role, the Joint Committee suffered from a number of constraints that 
impeded the work of all parliamentary Committees. Its terms of reference were very 
restricted with the result that it concentrated most of i ts energies on secondary legisla-
tion and did not maintain a systematic overview of the flow of EU policies through the 
legislative process. Nor could it examine major changes in the European landscape, 
notably the collapse of communism and German unification, that were certain to shape 
the Community of the 1990’s and Ireland’s position in that system. In the work that it 
actually did, it was hampered by a weakness of both financial and human resources. 
Neither the members nor the Secretariat of the Committee had the legal or technical 
expertise to examine many of the complex issues involved in EC law and policies; the 
many time pressures on Irish politicians allowed very few parliamentarians to develop 
the kind of expertise required for a thorough examination of EU policies.  
In response to these difficulties the Fianna Fáil-Labour Government established a new 
Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1993. This subsumed 
the work of the Committee on Secondary Legislation, and also covered a much broader 
agenda encompassing the state’s foreign relations as a whole. The establishment of a 
Foreign Affairs Committee brought Irish parliamentary practice into line with other 
parliaments in Western Europe. The Foreign Ministry r esponded to the establishment of 
the Committee by seconding a junior diplomat to the Committee on a permanent basis. 
The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs was established as the largest parliamentary 
Committee with 31 members, 21 members from the Dáil and ten members from  the 
Seanad. Changes in the Committee system in 1993 coincided with but were not directly 
related to the ratification and implementation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
                                                 
1  See Arkins, 1988, op.cit. p. 93.  
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Rather the e stablishment of the Foreign Affairs Committee was seen as a response  to 
Ireland’s growing international responsibilities and to the need to modernise the Irish 
Parliament.  
The terms of reference of the Committee established in 1993 allowed the Committee to: 
-  scrutinise the estimates of the Department of Foreign Affairs and  International 
Co-operation, 
-  analyse and report on all aspects of Ireland’s international relations including its 
co-operation with developing countries and Ireland’s membership of the European 
Communities 
-  annually report to both Houses of the Oireachtas, 
-  send for personal evidence. However, information need not be provided to the 
Committee if a member of the Government certifies in writing that such informa-
tion is confidential, 
-  engage the services of consultants and specialists.
1  
Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) from Ireland including Northern Ireland 
could attend the Committee but could not vote. The Foreign Affairs Committee met 
once every two weeks and had four sub-Committees. The Foreign A ffairs Committee 
published seven reports between December 1993 and October 1995.  
A separate Joint Committee on European Affairs was established in March 1995 as part 
of the 1994 Programme for Government (Rainbow Coalition), because the work of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee left it with inadequate time to scrutinise European law and 
wider EU developments. It was felt that there was sufficient work to justify two separate 
Committees. Following the establishment of the European Affairs Committee, the For-
eign Affairs Committee no longer carried a broad European brief although ambiguity 
remained concerning the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
European Affairs Committee had 17 members, ten from the Dáil and six from the S e-
anad. It was much smaller than the Foreign Affairs Committee and regarded at  that 
stage as a less prestigious one. Both Committees ceased to exist in June 1997 when the 
Parliament was dissolved prior to an election and were re-established in autumn 1997 
by the new Parliament. The terms of reference of the European Affairs Committee e n-
able it to consider : 
-  matters arising from Ireland’s membership of the European Communities, 
-  programmes and guidelines prepared by the Commission, 
-  acts of the EC institutions, 
-  regulations under the 1972/95 European Communities Acts, 
-  other instruments necessitated by membership of the Communities, 
-  matters referred to it by the Houses of the Oireachtas, and 
-  to represent the Irish Parliament at COSAC.
1  
                                                 
1  See Dáil Debates, 28 April 1993, pp. 1641-1642.   
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The terms of reference were altered slightly in July 1999 as a consequence of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The joint Committee participates in the bi-annual meetings of COSAC 
and hosted a meeting during the 1996 Irish Presidency. The European Affairs Commit-
tee meets in plenary session once a fortnight and has one sub-Committee that deals with 
EC secondary legislation. Ireland’s 15 MEP’s have the right to attend the Committee 
and to participate in the discussions, but do not have a right to vote. See Table 19 for an 
analysis of the powers of both Committees.  
Table 19: Powers of EU Related Committees in the Irish Parliament 
  Foreign 
Affairs 
European 
Affairs 
Joint Committee  X  X 
Members 
Dáil 
Seanad 
 
14 
6 
 
14 
6 
Standing Sub-Committees  No  No 
Appoint Sub-Committees  X  X 
Engage Consultants  X  X 
Travel  X  X 
Publish Reports  X  X 
Send for persons, papers or records  No  No 
Take Evidence  X  X 
Invite Submissions  X  X 
Draft Legislation  X  X 
Meet Ministers re. policy/legislation  X  X 
Meet Office holders in State Bodies  X  X 
 
It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the Committees as they are of relatively recent 
origin and have been established at a time when there is an effort to professionalise and 
enhance the Committee structure of the Irish Parliament. In a debate in a plenary session 
of the Parliament, the Chair of the European Affairs Committee underlined the common 
perception among deputies that Committee work should receive more attention. He 
claimed that: 
“Committee life is not easy. It is outside the limelight and is not the same as speaking in ei-
ther House. Committees do not get the same degree of recognition in the national media or 
anywhere else. If the system is to work effectively for the benefit of the State it must be 
given more recognition. It is not true to say that the work is uninteresting. It may appear to 
be at first glance but it is serious work, which requires a great deal of commitment. If it 
does not receive recognition, people will not want to be part of the Committee system.”
2  
In another debate, an Irish MEP who has a dual mandate, referred to the “minor role 
accorded to t his Parliament in influencing Government policy on EU matters”
3. Neither 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See European Affairs Committee, Terms of Reference, 1997. 
2   See http://www.irlgov.ie:80/debates-00/20 April/sect3.htm. 
3   Proinsias De Rossa, http://www.irlgov.ie:80/debates-00.13 April/sect5/htm.  
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Committee has adequate research and administrative back-up to develop independent 
thinking on foreign or European issues. The Committees are heavily dependent on brief-
ing papers from  the Department of Foreign Affairs, other government departments, and 
on external consultants. There is some overlap and hence tension between the Commit-
tees on areas such as the CSFP. The terms of reference of the Committees allow the 
Foreign Affairs Committee to request a joint meeting with the European Affairs Com-
mittee on matters of common activity.  
The Committees have contributed to greater openness and accountability on foreign 
policy matters. The meetings are usually held in public and successive ministers and 
officials have attended and given evidence. The Committees have also provided a focus 
for the attentive public in this domain. A small coterie of deputies and senators has be-
come engaged in foreign policy matters and in relations with the European Union. The 
Government White Paper on Foreign Policy concluded that “these Committees have 
significant powers and are important instruments for maintaining the democratic a c-
countability of foreign policy in Ireland”
1. This clearly overstates the case but the d e-
gree of parliamentary involvement has strengthened in the 1990’s. The involvement of 
the European Affairs Committee in the COSAC has exposed Irish parliamentarians to 
practices in other member states and COSAC is seen as a channel for keeping Irish par-
liamentarians informed about Europe. 
 
3. The Scope and Timing of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The scope of parliamentary scrutiny in the Irish system has evolved within the frame-
work of Ireland’s parliamentary culture and its specific institutional attributes. Neither 
the Parliament as a whole nor the relevant Committees seek to i mpose a negotiating 
mandate on Irish ministers or officials in EU negotiations. The various devices  - d e-
bates, question time, reports, and Committee deliberations  - are designed to c ontribute 
to the debate on Ireland’s relations with the EU and to hold the Government account-
able for its actions in Brussels. The focus tends of be on issues of importance to Ireland, 
notably, Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), Agenda 2000, EMU, drugs, the CFSP 
and specific policy areas. Table 20 provides a detailed analysis of the issues dealt with 
by the Committee of European Affairs in the period of 1997 to 1999.  
 
                                                 
1   Ireland, Government White paper on Foreign Policy, Dublin, 1996, p. 333.  
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Table 20: Analysis of Minutes of the Meetings of the Irish European Affairs Committee  
(1997-1999) 
Areas of Interest  Number of Times 
Raised 
% 
 
Legislative Scrutiny Programme  14  23 
EMU  9  15 
Various Directives  9  15 
EU Enlargement  8  13 
Drugs  6  10 
IGC/Treaty Change  4   7 
Agenda 2000  4   7 
Internal Market/WTO  3   5 
Asylum/Migration   2   3 
Blockade of UK Ports  1   1 
CFSP  1   1  
Total   61  100 
Author’s own calculation. 
 
The transmission of EU proposals from the Government to the European Affairs Com-
mittee relates directly to the scope of Committee activity in relation to the flow of EU 
proposals. The Joint Committee receives all of the Commission’s legislative proposals, 
the programmes and guidelines of the Commission, the legislative acts of EU institu-
tions, all national regulations under the European Communities Act  and all other i n-
struments that arise from Ireland’s obligations arising from EU membership. In addition 
to EU documentation, different ministries prepare explanatory memoranda for the 
Committee in areas that fall within their competence and ministers and o fficials appear 
before the Committee. Table 21 identifies senior civil servants as important interlocu-
tors of the Committee.  
Table 21: Addresses to the Meetings of the Irish Committee of European Affairs (1997-1999) 
Attendance  Times  % (rounded) 
Minister  1  2 
Minister of State  1  2 
Senior Civil Servants  12  26 
Commissioners  3  7 
Commission Officials  2  4 
EP President  1  2 
Central Bank  1  2 
State Agencies  9  20 
Employers  2  4 
Trade Unions  1  2 
Agriculture  2  4 
Unemployed  1  2 
Pro-Neutrality Groups  2  4 
Irish Banks  2  4 
Irish Road Hauliers  2  4 
Other   4  9 
Author’s own calculation. 
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The memoranda are not automatic but must be requested by the Committee. The Com-
mittee uses its freedom to ask for further information from ministries on a frequent and 
continuous basis. The Committee then decides what areas of EU activity it wishes to 
focus on in any calendar year. It holds oral hearings, which are fully open to the public, 
and prepares reports for the consideration of the Oireachtas. All of its reports are laid 
before the full House and five of fourteen have been debated in plenary. Table 22 pro-
vides a list of the Committee’s reports in the period 1997 to 2000. 
Table 22: Reports of the Irish Committee of European Affairs (1998/99) 
First Report  Work Programme 1998 
Second Report  Treaty of Amsterdam 
Third Report  EU Institutional Report and Enlargement 
Fourth Report  EMU 
Fifth Report  Annual Report 1997-98 
Sixth Report  Work Programme 1999 
Seventh Report  Review of EU Legislation 
Eight Report  Drugs 
Ninth Report  EMU Changeover 
Tenth Report  EU Legislation-Two Directives 
Eleventh Report  EMU 
Twelfth Report  Annual Report 1999 
Thirteenth Report  Review of EU Legislation 
Fourteenth Report  EMU 
 
 
IV. The Irish Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
Ireland held the Presidency of the Union from July to December 1996 and had thus to 
manage the IGC negotiations on Amsterdam during a critical period in the lead up to the 
conclusion of the negotiations under the  Dutch Presidency. The Irish Presidency was 
mandated by the Florence European Council to present a general outline for a draft revi-
sion of the Treaties to the Dublin European Council in December. Provision was also 
made for an informal European Council in October under the Irish Presidency. The per-
sonal representatives met weekly over two days during the Irish Presidency and dealt 
with institutions for two full negotiating sessions. The General Affairs Council dealt 
with the IGC each month. The Irish Personal Representative, Noel Dorr, who handled 
the negotiations described his approach as ‘successive approximation’ whereby the 
Presidency attempted to i ncrease the level of agreement among the Delegations so that 
they could agree on the text. Each issue was first dealt with in an ‘introductory note’ 
that was then followed up by a paper on the ‘suggested approach’, which included the 
actual Treaty text. The Dublin European Council in December 1996 accepted the Irish 
Draft Treaty as a good basis for further negotiations. The paper included a chapter  -  
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chapter 19  - on the role of national parliaments.
1 During the Irish Presidency, the Com-
mittee for European Affairs hosted a meeting of COSAC in Dublin. The responsibility 
of the host was to make all practical arrangements for the meeting and to draft an 
agenda. Because the Dublin COSAC was taking place during an IGC, the main focus 
was on the role of national parliaments in the EU system. At this meeting agreement 
was reached on a draft protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU.
2 This was 
later reflected in the document submitted by the Irish Presidency to the European Coun-
cil in December 1996. Chapter 19 proposed the inclusion of a protocol on the role of 
national parliaments in the EU in the Treaty. The objective of the protocol was to ensure 
that national parliaments would receive copies of consultation papers and legislative 
proposals in good time to allow a four-week period between a legislative proposal being 
tabled and it being placed on the Council  Agenda for decision.
3 In addition, the protocol 
would recognise the role of COSAC as a collective voice for the national parliaments. 
The proposed draft formed the basis of the final agreement at Amsterdam but with a 
number of changes. First, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for a six-week p eriod 
rather than a four-week period between a legislative proposal being made available and 
placed on a Council agenda for decision. Second, the language of the provisions on 
COSAC was changed somewhat. The aim of the I rish Presidency was to i mprove the 
flow of information to national parliaments and to encourage their greater participation 
“without creating any new institution or body, without upsetting the balances in the 
current decision-making procedures and without  complicating the Union’s decision-
making process”
4. As the Irish Government was preparing for the Presidency, the Joint 
Committee on European Affairs drafted a r eport on “The Role of the Oireachtas in the 
European Union: Post 1996 Inter-governmental Conference”
5. This was the first report 
published by the newly formed European Affairs Committee. It was a stocktaking exer-
cise and suggested that members of the Committee were influenced by the growing 
debate in Europe about the role of national parliaments. The Committee decided to u n-
dertake an analysis of the role of the Oireachtas so that it could  
“make suggestions to both Houses as to what might be done to enhance the contribution of 
the Oireachtas in the European Union and particularly to inform the public and make the 
Union more open to its citizens”
6.  
A sub-Committee of the full Committee was given the task of preparing a draft report. 
The report was published in June 1996 as the first report of the Joint Committee on 
                                                 
1  See Intergovernmental Conference: ‘The European Union Today and Tomorrow’, 5 December 1996. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 2. 
3  See Intergovernmental Conference: ‘The European Union Today and Tomorrow’, 5 December 1996, 
p. 123. 
4   Ibid., p. 123.  
5   Joint Committee on European Affairs, The Role of the Oireachtas in the European Union: Post 1996 
Inter-governmental Conference, Dublin, June 1996. 
6   Ibid., p. 5.  
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European Affairs. In it, there is a comparative assessment of the degree of parliamentary 
control exercised in each member state. The Danish Parliament is identified as the Par-
liament with most control, followed by the Austrian, Finnish, German, Dutch and 
Swedish parliaments. The parliaments that exercise least control are identified in the 
report as the Belgian, Greek, Italian, Luxembourg, Portuguese and Spanish parliaments. 
The Irish Parliament is seen as somewhere in the middle with the British and French 
Parliaments although the Oireachtas does not use a system of ‘scrutiny reserves’.
1 The 
report outlined the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU with a particular 
emphasis on the section in the Reflection Group Report, Declarations 13 and 14 a t-
tached to the Treaty on European Union and the role of COSAC. The tone of the analy-
sis is one of support for a strengthening of the role of the national parliaments in the EU 
but no sense of urgency concerning the position of the Oireachtas. Irish parliamentari-
ans were clearly supportive of links and contact in inter-parliamentary fora but were 
unlikely to exercise a leadership role. In the section dealing with the requirements of 
national parliaments, there is a list of ten issues identified ‘during the course of meet-
ings attended by members of the Joint Committee with parliamentarians from other 
member states.
2 The Irish Parliament is essentially a taker and not shaper of the agenda 
on the role of national parliaments in the EU.  
The report made specific recommendations concerning its r ole in relation to scrutiny, 
European commissioners, the Conference of European Affairs Committees and a second 
Chamber. In relation to these issues, the Joint Committee:  
-  saw no merit in the creation of a second Chamber, 
-  supported the idea that European commissioners should appear before the n ational 
parliaments of the member states to answer questions in relation to their areas of 
responsibility, 
-  expressed strong support for COSAC because it enabled national parliamentarians 
to compare and contrast methods of parliamentary control and to exchange infor-
mation about issues of common concern, 
-  supported the inclusion of a reference to COSAC in the Treaty but wanted 
COSAC to remain consultative in nature, 
-  was generally satisfied with the provisions for scrutiny but considered that it 
needed to establish a more structured and expanded programme of scrutiny, and 
-  proposed to invite ministers to address the Committee on important issues prior to 
Council meetings.
3 
                                                 
1  See Joint Committee, 1996, op.cit., p. 9. 
2  Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
3  See Ibid., pp. 44-45.  
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The Protocol on National Parliaments (PNP) essentially met the concerns of the Joint 
Committee on European Affairs, as it did not create any additional EU level institu-
tional layer.  
 
V. The Irish Parliament after Amsterdam 
 
The context for the role of the Irish Parliament after Amsterdam was established in 
1995 with the setting up of a separate European Affairs Committee. The implementation 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam coincided with a national election in Ireland and the re-
formation of the European Affairs Committee in November 1997. There was no direct 
reference to the Amsterdam Protocol in the terms of reference of the Committee other 
than the stipulation that members of this Committee “represent the Houses of the 
Oireachtas at the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC)”
1. However, in 
July 1999  the terms of reference were amended to allow the Committee to refer pro-
posed EU legislative acts to another Oireachtas Select Committee if the Committee of 
European Affairs concluded that the issue was of sufficient national importance to war-
rant further scrutiny. This was seen as enabling the Oireachtas to “take full advantage of 
the new role of national parliaments outlined in the Treaty of Amsterdam”
2. The most 
significant change in the content of the Committee’s work was the establishment of a 
“revised  system of scrutiny of draft European legislation and Statutory Instruments”
3. 
The Committee recruited the services of legal consultants to provide it with an ongoing 
series of reports on the EU’s legislative programme so that it could choose what it 
would  analyse and follow up on. The consultants provided the Committee with eight 
reports between September 1998 and December 1998 and twelve reports in 1999.
4 The 
consultants filter the vast array of EU legislation and Irish Statutory Instruments (SIs) 
for the  Committee. Usually, the Committee follows up the consultants reports by asking 
the ministries for further information on particular SIs or draft EU legislation. For e x-
ample in 1999, the Committee followed up SIs dealing with food contamination and 
directives or proposed directives on fixed term work, water policy, fisheries and com-
bined transport.  
 
                                                 
1   European Affairs Committee, Annual Report, 1997-1998, Dublin 1999. 
2   European Affairs Committee, Annual Report, 1999, Dublin 2000, p. 4. 
3   European Affairs Committee, Annual Report, 1997/98, p. 4. 
4  See the European Affairs Committee’s Annual Reports, 1998 and 1999.  
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VI. Conclusions: Institutional Adaptation to Exogenous Demands  
 
This paper has analysed the role of the Irish Parliament in relation to Europe and Ire-
land’s m embership of the European Union. The high degree of consensus about the 
benefits of EU membership for Ireland together with the relative weakness of the Irish 
Parliament ensured that there was no great concern about the scrutiny of Ireland’s i n-
volvement in Europe at the outset. That said, the role of the Parliament in holding the 
Government accountable and the expansion of secondary legislation as a consequence 
of EU membership led to the establishment of a new institutional device  - the Joint 
Committee on  Secondary Legislation  - in the Oireachtas. This in turn contributed to the 
development of a Committee system in the Irish Parliament in the 1980’s which was 
later rationalised in the 1990’s. The 1993 decision to establish a Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee and the later decision in 1995 to establish a European Affairs Committee altered 
the institutional context for parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. The European 
Affairs Committee found itself developing in the midst of a wider debate about the role 
of national parliaments and was clearly influenced by its involvement in COSAC. Its 
fist report in 1996 addressed the issue of parliamentary involvement in the light of the 
IGC negotiations that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. It supported an enhanced role for 
national parliaments but one that did not involve further institution building at an EU 
level. In relation to its domestic role, the Committee put in place mechanisms that have 
enabled it to pay more attention to EC legislation and consequent national legislation. 
Moreover, it has concentrated its energies on the big European questions of the day - the 
Euro, IGCs, enlargement and issues that are of concern to the Irish public, asylum and 
drugs. The Protocol on National Parliaments attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam was 
welcomed and led to changes in the terms of reference of the Committee. There has thus 
been an interaction and intersection of changes in the institutional character of the Irish 
Parliament and the dynamic of European integration. Just as the EU  has been part of the 
modernisation of the Irish economy and society, it has been an element in the reform 
and modernisation of the Irish Parliament. 
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The Parliament of Italy: From Benevolent Observer to Active Player 
 
Federiga Bindi Calussi and Stefano B. Grassi 
 
I. Introduction: The Political Culture and System of Italy 
 
The relationship between European integration and Italy is an odd one. The unification 
of the continent is seen in a positive historical light: to Italians, an integrated Europe is a 
somewhat logical continuum of their history, the best way to secure overall peace. Dur-
ing the ‘glorious’ period of the Risorgimento the claim for a United Europe emerged as 
a way to free and re-unify Italy. As the EEC started to take its first steps, the Commu-
nity also tended to be associated with an improved socio-economic life-style. Thus not 
surprisingly, Italians are  - as the Eurobarometer reported along the years  - among the 
most convinced supporters of the process of European integration.
1 Furthermore, as the 
Italian system was entering in a crisis, the EC began to be perceived as the only chance 
to bring order into the national system: thus, the demand for supranational structures 
became also a demand for repairing the inefficiencies of the Italian system. On the other 
side, the EC at times was used by Italian politicians to legitimise their own a ctions.
2 
European constraints were in fact often recalled in order to justify otherwise unpopular 
fiscal and monetary measures.
3 Yet, Italy's non-implementation o f EC legislation and 
lack of respect for the obligations arising from the treaties are well known.
4 “A question 
of culture”  - The Economist defined: “Managers in Italy tend to be more flexible. Rules 
and regulations (where they exist) are often ignored  […].”
5 The relationship between 
Italy and the EC/EU therefore appears as an odd one. This is of course reflected in the 
institutions and in the procedures regarding European Affairs, as we will have the 
chance to see in the paragraphs to follow. 
 
                                                 
1   Yet, when in 1989, in a referendum held on the occasion of the European elections, 89 per cent of 
the voters expressed their support for the idea of giving a constituency mandate to the European Par-
liament, a parallel poll revealed that 55 per cent of the interviewed were unsure whether Italy was a 
member of the EC. 
2   See Cotta, Maurizio: ‘European integration and the Italian political system’, in: Francioni, Francesco 
(ed.): Italy and EC membership evaluated, London: Pinter Publishers 1992, p. 211. 
3   As the headers of leading Italian newspapers show: ‘The Twelve ask us tiers and blood’ (La Repub-
blica, 5.5.1992); ‘Privatization? It is imposed by the EC’ (Corriere della Sera, 3.8.1992). 
4   ‘No week passes without a sentence of the European Court of Justice to Italy’ titled full page Italian 
financial newspaper Sole 24 Ore in 1991 (28.10.1991). The situation has improved in the past years 
but still has to do so. 
5   The Economist (7.12.1991).  
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1. Attitudes towards European Integration 
 
Except for the period right after the war, all major parties quickly became supporters of 
the process of European integration. When in May 1947 the Communists (PCI) and 
Socialists (PSI) were pulled out of government
1, they took on a negative view of Atlan-
tic and European issues, perceived as a form of “submission” to the US. Opposed to 
this, the Christian Democrats (DC) made pro-European and pro-Atlantic values the 
main basis of their foreign policy.
2 De Gasperi's idea was in fact that Italy could better 
defend its national interests within a policy of European solidarity.
3 In addition, the 
involvement in supranational European Institutions would help strengthening the inter-
nal structure of the n ational political system and the new-born democracy.
4 European 
integration was thus seen as a fundamental opportunity for the peninsula. Joining the 
ECSC was hence essentially political, since there were a number of reserves as to the 
technical issues. In particular, the steel industry  saw the project quite sceptically.
5 The 
parliamentary debate was tense and ideological. However, soon afterwards, the social-
ists started to change their mind. The PSI in fact abstained on the EEC and voted in 
favour of EURATOM.
6 The communists, following T ogliatti, remained opposed to the 
EEC until the end of the 1960’s.
7 They revised their opinion when the first communists 
were appointed to the European Parliament (1969), to then become pro-European at the 
end of the 1970’s, with the direct election of the European Parliament (1979)
8, when 
European Federalist Altiero Spinelli was elected as an independent in the electoral lists 
of the PCI.
9 As a result, a “de-politicisation of the Italian foreign policy” started to take 
place: gradually the EC became a non-issue in the Italian political arena. That led to the 
                                                 
1   See Ginsburg, Paul A.: History of Contemporary Politics. 1943-1988, London: Penguin 1990, pp. 
110-112.  
2   See Pistone, Sergio (ed.): L’Italia e l’Unita’ Europea, Torino, Loescher, 1982, pp.134-135. 
3   See Telò, Mario: ‘L’Italia nel processo di costruzione europea’, in: Storia del l’Italia Repubblicana, 
Vol. 3, Torino, Einaudi 1996, pp. 195-196. 
4   See Cotta, M aurizio, 1992, op.cit., pp 206-207. See also Ferraris, L.Vittorio: ‘Italian-European f o-
reign policy’, in: Francioni, Francesco (ed.): Italy and EC membership, London 1992, p. 131. 
5   Besides the steel and the ‘heavy’ industry, in Italy opposition came from the PCI and the Nenni’s 
Socialists. Contrary to this, the car industry was strongly supporting membership. The steel industry 
and Confidustria (the industrialists association) would convert to Europe only in the mid 1950’s. See 
Telò, Mario, 1996, op.cit,  p. 186; Roussel, Eric, Jean Monnet, Paris, Fayard, 1996, p. 531; Gerbet, 
Paul, La Construction de l’Europe, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1983, p. 132. 
6   See Telò, Mario, 1996, op.cit., pp. 197-200. The cause of the change was primarily the invasion of 
Hungary in 1954. Already in 1955 the leader Pietro Nenni had become member of Jean Monnet’s 
Comitè d’Action. PSI then joined the majority supporting the Government in 1958, to enter the Go-
vernment in 1963. 
7   The turning point was represented by the publication of the Memoriale di Yalta after Togliatti’s 
death in 1964. In the Memoriale, Togliatti criticised the USSR. In fact one has to notice that the 
USSR would officially recognize the EEC as a juridical entity only in 1985 with Gorbachev. 
8   See It is interesting to note how Rifondazione Comunista - born from a shift from PCI when it trans-
formed in 1990 into PDS - has re-assumed an anti-European stance.  
9   See Spinelli Altiero, Diario Europeo / III, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992.   
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confirmation of the diplomats’ and bureaucrats’ leading role in EEC negotiations.
1 Only 
at times a strong political leadership emerged. That was the case in 1985, at the Euro-
pean Council in Milan (28.-29.6.1985), when the Italian Presidency  - against the will of 
the UK, Denmark and Greece - decided to move on a vote about whether to call for the 
IGC, which led to the SEA.
2 This took place once more during the 1990 Italian EC 
Presidency, when the two concurrent IGCs on the EMU and the political Union had to 
be prepared.
3 The approval of Minister Carli's report on the EMU at the Rome I infor-
mal Council, the Rome II Council in December, the bilateral meetings with both Social-
ist and Christian Democrats leaders
4  - all this made it possible to find an agreement on 
the phases of EMU and to call for the IGCs. 
Though, it is the Italian dimension rather than the European one to appeal to n ational 
politicians, who tend to consider Euro-jobs as (well paid) retirements or interim posi-
tions while waiting for good occasion to go back to the national political arena. This, of 
course, brings in serious consequences for Italy's action at the European level, as the 
Minister for EC Affairs Mr. Romiti affirmed in 1990: “Until  now, EC law has been 
adopted in Brussels without an Italian action in the preparatory phase.…”
5 
Yet, since the 1990’s, European politics have at times been used as a tool of political 
confrontation between coalitions. In March 1994, the legislative elections led to the 
victory of a center-right wing coalition (Polo), led by Silvio Berlusconi, characterised 
by nationalist policies
6 and rather anti-European sentiments.
7 This, together with the 
political isolation of the Government
8, for the first time put Italy aside in the European 
arena. In 1996, the elections were won by the center-left Ulivo coalition.
9 The new 
                                                 
1   See Telò, Mario, 1996, op.cit., p. 197. 
2   Indeed, both the Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi and the Christian Democrat Foreign Minister 
Giulio Andreotti lobbied intensively before the European Council and could count on the respective 
European political links. (Financial Times, 27.11.1991). 
3   See Middlemas, Keith: Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of the European Union, London: 
Fontana Press 1995, pp. 167-168. 
4   At the time of the TEU IGCs, six out of twelve of the EC leaders were Christian-Democrats: An-
dreotti (Italy), Ruud Lubbers (Dutch, President of the Council), Jacques Santer (Luxembourg), Wil-
fred Martens (Belgium), Constantine Mitsotakis (Greece) and the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.  
5   Sole 24 Ore, 12.4.90. 
6   Silvio Berlusconi declared in his first speech to the Parliament that Italy was to play ‘a leading role’ 
in the framework of the European Union (Il Sole 24 Ore, 17.5.1994). The Minister for Agriculture, 
Mrs. Adriana Poli Bortone, affirmed that ‘Italy is going to play hard in Brussels’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 
16.7.94). Italy opposed Slovenia’s association to the EU (Il Sole 24 Ore , 17.7.94 and 31.8.1994) and 
almost created a diplomatic case following the proposals of the German CDU of creating a two-
speed Europe, where Italy was to be in the circle of the ‘late comers’ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 3.9.1994; Il 
Popolo, 6.9.1994).  
7   The Minister for Foreign Affairs Antonio Martino is the only Italian member of Mrs. Thatcher’s 
Club de Bruges (Il Sole 24 Ore, 24.5.94). 
8   Due to the fact that the coalition parties were at the time excluded from the European political fami-
lies on the one hand, and on the other to the reactions to the presence of Alleanza Nazionale (former 
MSI) in the Government. 
9   See Sole 24 Ore, 17.2.1996.  
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Prodi government
1 was characterised by a huge effort to relocate Italy into the European 
arena, in particular focusing on its action in the economic reforms needed to success-
fully fulfil the EMU criteria. Since then a stop-and-go and sometimes artificial arguing 
started between the two opposite coalitions about “European values” and “Italian inter-
ests” and about which of the two coalitions would be more fit to preserve them. 
 
2. Basic Features of the Italian Political System 
 
The 1948 Republican Italian Constitution  - written and approved after the fascist period 
- is a long (139 articles), rigid, programmatic text, indeed a result of many compro-
mises. The Italian society is a pluralist one, and the Constitution reflects that. It d e-
signed weak institutions and strong parties, as it was believed that the system would 
work because of the strength and the authority injected from outside by the parties. The 
parties are not directly involved in policy-making, but they a ppoint the ministers, decide 
upon under-secretaries, chairmen and members of the boards of any public company or 
highly important public body, including the appointment of top-executives of public 
departments.
2 Furthermore, the Italian Parliament is “a highly polycentric institution not 
easily amenable to majoritarian decisions and to firm leadership by Cabinet”
3. The leg-
islature, in fact is based on equal bicameralism, the Senato (Upper Chamber) and the 
Camera (Lower Chamber) performing identical functions and sharing the legislative 
power.
4 The Italian Parliament has a committee-centered structure and is in many ways 
a ‘working parliament’. In particular, vertical committees are empowered, under certain 
conditions, to adopt laws without a vote in plenary. Parliamentary procedures also a s-
sign a marginal role in parliamentary works to the Government. On the other hand, op-
portunities for individual deputies and minor groups to influence the agenda setting and 
the legislative process are maximised according to a prevailing consociational inspira-
tion. All this tended to shape a recognisable organisational and procedural model 
whereby the Parliament acts as a legislator and neglects control and scrutiny functions.
5 
In the beginning this was meant to reduce confrontation and incorporate opposition 
parties in the democratic system. Over the years, it has reduced the Parliament’s per-
                                                 
1   La Repubblica, Il Sole 24 Ore, 18.5.1996. 
2   See  Amato, Giuliano: My experience as Prime Minister, speech given at the European University 
Institute (Florence), in October 1993. 
3   Cotta, Maurizio: ‘The centrality of parliament in a protracted democratic consolidation: the Italian 
Case’, in: Liebert, Ulrike/Cotta Maurizio (eds.): Parliament and democratic consolidation in Sou-
thern Europe, London: Pinter Publishers 1990, p. 76. 
4   Article 70, Italian Constitution. 
5   For a concise and illuminating description of the Parliament’s organisational model and its quantita-
tive and qualitative effects see Cotta, Maurizio: Il Parlamento nella prima repubblica, in: Pasquino, 
Gianfranco: La politica italiana, Bari, Laterza, 1996, pp. 79-91.  
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formance and effectiveness.
1 In addition, the pure proportional electoral system pro-
duced a very fragmented party system with at least eight national parties represented in 
parliament at any given time, and very little stability.
2 Yet, the new electoral system
3 
introduced for the first time in 1994 seems not to have reduced the number of parties: in 
the 1996-2000 legislature fragmentation indeed appears to have grown, with some forty 
different political groups in parliament and an eight-parties government coalition. 
The head of government is, as President of the Council, appointed by the President of 
the Republic. He is allowed to take office only after having obtained the vote of confi-
dence from the Parliament. In theory it is up to him to select the members of the Coun-
cil of Ministers. However, in practice, the President of the Council is forced to respect 
the “suggestions” of the parties' leaders. The Council of Ministers - in principle a colle-
gial body  - is not an effective center for policy co-ordination: the level of collegiality 
has usually been extremely low, as were expectations over the Cabinet's role in formu-
lating or reviewing overall sectarian policies, while inter-ministerial competition has 
always been high.
4 The mechanism allowing for an easy use of the non-confidence vote 
further helped in determining a situation i n which the Italian government was much 
weaker than most of its European counterparts. In the words of Giuliano Amato: “[...] 
Italy is an excellent example of the theory of involution”
5, expounded by Mancur O l-
son:  
“a vital system that becomes progressively rigid, incapable of correcting its increasing en-
tropy, and unable to keep up with the need of change, is finally destroyed by the impact on 
its corrupted tissues of newly emerging counter-forces.”
6  
This is why the Government recently undertook an important reform according to which 
the number of ministries will be cut to twelve from the next legislature o nwards, while 
                                                 
1     The classical analysis, although now superated by parliamentary practice, is the one made by Di 
Palma, Joseph: Surviving without governing, The Italian Parties in Parliament, Berkeley, 1977. See 
also Cotta, Maurizio, 1990, op.cit., pp. 55-89 In Italian, the leading work is Predieri, Antonio, Il Par-
lamento nel sistema politico italiano, Milano, Giuffré, 1975. See also Morisi, Massimo, Il Parlamen-
to tra partiti e interessi, in: Morlino, Leonardo (a cura di), Costruire la democrazia, Bologna, Il Muli-
no, 1991, pp. 367-445.  
2   Normally including the Christian-Democrats (DC), the Liberals (PLI), the Republicans (PRI), the 
Social-Democrats (PSDI), and, since the early 1960’s, the Socialists (PSI). The over 50 Cabinets the 
Republic had were rather large and unstable, supported for most of the post-war period by four/five 
party coalitions. 
3   According to the new electoral law, in the Camera 75 per cent of the MP are to be elected on an one-
single-turn majority system, while the remaining 25 per cent are still to be distributed on a propor-
tional basis. The former electoral law was purely proportional. 
4   See Hine, David: Governing Italy. The Politics of bargained pluralism, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon 
1993, p. 213. 
5   Professor of Constitutional law and former President of the Council (June 1992 - April 1993). 
6   Amato, Giuliano: Italy: The Rise and Decline of a System of Government, Indiana International & 
Comparative Law Review, Vol. 4, No. Winter 1994, pp. 225-230.  
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the Presidency of the Council’s powers as well as its operative tools will be sensibly 
extended.
1 
As for vertical power segmentation, regionalisation was written into the 1948 Constitu-
tion but  - except for the five “special status” regions (Val d'Aosta, Alto Adige
2, Friuli, 
Sicily, Sardinia)  - it took until the 1970’s to implement partial administrative decentrali-
sation, and even longer to d raft regional charters, transfer administrative responsibilities 
and work out financial arrangements.
3 Each regional authority consists of a directly 
elected assembly (Consiglio Regionale) which enacts regional legislation and elects the 
executive body (the Giunta) and its President. The same administrative scheme is used 
at the provincial and at the municipal levels.
4 
 
3. How European Affairs are organised in Italy 
 
The Italian Constitution does not mention European issues. In fact, when Italy co-
founded the Communities, there was no clear idea of what they were to become; hence, 
they were assimilated to classical international organisations, producing international 
law. No surprise, therefore, that the main role in dealing with EC issues was given to the 
Government, and within it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE). 
Previously divided into six thematic Directorate-Generals (DGs)
5, in January 2000 the 
MAE was reformed
6 and reorganised according to a geographical criteria: today one 
finds a DG “Europe”, and a DG “European Integration” (DGEI). In particular, the latter 
has the task to ensure - in coordination with the Presidency of the Council - the promo-
tion of Italian positions within the European institutions. In addition, DGEI spreads the 
information c oming from the Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU and the 
Commission to the other branches of the Public Administration
7. The Undersecretary 
                                                 
1   Such reforms started in 1996 with the two DD.LL. 30 luglio 1999, No. 300 and No. 303. As concer-
ning the Presidency of the Council see also the DPCM of 15 April 2000. See also Della Cananea, 
Giacinto: ‘Co-ordination of EU policy-making in Italy’, in: Kassim H., Peters B. G., Wright, V., 
(eds.): The National Co-ordination of EU Policy - The Domestic Level, Oxford 2000; Paino, Ales-
sandro/Torchia, Luisa: ‘La riforma del Governo’, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000. 
2   Alto Adige is further divided into two autonomous provinces, Bolzano and Trento. 
3   Nevertheless, the twenty regions - which are indeed important organs for the articulation of demands 
and for public policy implementation - were not given fiscal autonomy. The three tiered structure of 
elected governments below the national level (regions, provinces and m unicipalities) is organized 
following the patterns of the central Government both from a formal and informal point of view. 
4   See law 142 of 8.6.1990. 
5   Economic Affairs, Political Affairs, Culture, Emigration, Personnel, Co-operation to Development. 
6   See Il Sole 24 Ore, Stampa, Unità, 24.12.1998. 
7   Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Regolamento concernente l’organizzazione e le funzioni degli Uffici 
dirigenziali generali dell’Amministrazione Centrale del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1999.  
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for Foreign Affairs delegated with European Affairs shall assist the Foreign Minister 
both in bilateral and multilateral European Affairs meetings.
1 
With the above mentioned reform of the Government, the Foreign Ministry will be 
charged with the coordination of the “external” parts of European Affairs, i.e. the nego-
tiating phase and the institutional relationship with the EU as well as its political and 
economic external relations. The reforms in fact also aim at increasing the President of 
the Council’s coordination role in European Affairs both in the pre-negotiating and in 
the application phases on EC law by referring to the Department for European affairs 
led by the Minister for European Affairs. 
In 1980, a new non-departmental Ministry for the Co-ordination of EC Policies
2 was 
created under the Presidency of the Council. However, due to the lack of resources - and 
to some opposition of the MAE  - the coordination task was not effective.
3 In 1987, the 
so-called “Legge Fabbri”
4 introduced a new Department for the Coordination of EC 
Policies, again within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The aim of the Dipar-
timento - only operative since June 1990 - was to secure a more effective action, espe-
cially with respect to the implementation of EC directives and the completion of the 
internal market program. It was also supposed to develop better relations with EC insti-
tutions, to supervise the correct implementation of EC law and the use of EC funds.  
Experiments in such sense have been introduced several times, with little steady suc-
cess. However, there is yet no formal, hierarchical inter-ministerial coordination on EU 
topics, as it is for instance the case in Portugal with the Commissão Intermisterial para 
os Assuntos Comunitarios, or in France with the Secrétariat Général du Comité Inter-
ministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne (S.G.C.I.). Nor 
can Italy count on an efficient bureaucracy: Italian bureaucracy is in need of moderniza-
tion and reluctant to change. Moreover, it is badly distributed, over-staffed in the South, 
and with little cross-fertilization and transfers between the private and the public sector. 
 
                                                 
1   Camera dei Deputati, 1996: Governo Prodi. Ministri, Sottosegretari di Stato e segreterie particolari, 
Roma, p. 27; and Decreto di delega ai Sottosegretari di Stato per gli Affari Esteri, Governo 
D’Alema, article 1. 
2   Ministero per il Coordinamento delle Politiche Comunitarie. 
3   Massai, Alessandro: ‘Il coordinamento interno delle Politiche Comunitarie’, in: Quaderni Costitu-
zionali, No. 2/1982, pp. 481-489; Ciriolo, Antonio: Il Dipartimento per il Coordinamento delle Poli-
tiche Comunitarie, Lecce, Milella, 1991, Grottanelli de Santi, Giovanni: ‘The impact of EC integra-
tion on the Italian form of government’, in: Francioni, Francesco (ed.), 1992, op.cit., p. 186, defined 
it as the Cinderella of the Italian Ministries. 
4   Law 183/87. Its role was further specified by Law 139/90, especially as related to how it should co-
ordinate EC activities of the Government with those of the Public Administration and of the Re-
gions.  
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II. Parliamentary Practice in EU Affairs 
 
Until the end of the 1990’s, the Italian Parliament displayed a “low level of Europeani-
sation”
1, in terms of structural adaptation, energies devoted to EC law scrutiny, and 
activism i n pressing for a greater role vis-à-vis the Government. The original pattern of 
parliamentary behaviour showed little variation over the years. Community affairs were 
assimilated to foreign policy and thus reviewed in both chambers by the committees for 
Foreign affairs through normal parliamentary procedures. The rules of procedures in 
fact expressedly forbid the standing committees from addressing political resolutions to 
government on European matters.
2 
In 1968, the Senate created an ad hoc body, the Giunta per gli affari delle Comunità 
europee, with fact-finding and consultative functions. However, the Giunta had a mini-
mal impact on parliamentary activities. 
The establishment of specific institutions and procedures for the conduct of EC business 
took place in the aftermath of the SEA. Between 1987 and 1990 a number of reforms 
cumulated in a major effort to adjust the domestic EC decision-making structures to the 
changed Community context, with a view to cope with the expected flood of EC direc-
tives for achieving the Single Market. 
The mentioned Fabbri Law
3 of 1987 and, two years later, the Law La Pergola
4 provided 
the basic framework for EC domestic decision-making. Both the Senate (1988) and the 
chamber (1990) revised their rules of procedure, introducing  specific mechanisms for 
the handling of European affairs. For the first time, standing committees were empow-
ered to express their position on European Commission’s proposals in a resolution a d-
dressed to the Government. The Maastricht Treaty did not raise a debate on parliamen-
tary sovereignty.
5 The institutional changes were in fact considered in line with Declara-
tion No. 13 annexed to the TEU. 
The resulting organisational setting, which characterised the Parliament until the r e-
forms prompted by the Amsterdam Treaty, is rather simple.
6 
                                                 
1   See Rometsch, Dietrich, Wessels, Wolfgang: Conclusion. ‘European and National Institutions’, in: 
Rometsch, Dietrich/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): The European Union and Member states. Towards 
institutional fusion?, Manchester 1996, p. 354. 
2   For an account of this phase see Cassese, Antonio (ed.): Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees. 
The National Setting, Padova/New York, Oceana, 1982. A wider analysis in Italian is Morviducci, 
Claudia: Il Parlamento italiano e le Comunità Europee, Milano: Giuffré 1979. 
3   For comments see Tizzano, Antonio: ‘Sull’attuazione della normativa comunitaria in Italia: la legge 
183/87’, in: Foro Italiano, 1988, IV, col. 219; Del Vecchio, Anna Maria: L’attuazione delle direttive 
comunitarie: nuove linee di tendenza nella legislazione italiana, in: Foro italiano, 1988, IV, p. 226ff. 
4   Law 9 March 1989, No. 86. 
5   See Balducci, Massimo: ‘Italy and the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’, in: Larssen, Finn (ed.), 
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Maastricht 1993, pp. 195-200. 
6   For a detailed description of the institutional setting just after the Maastricht Treaty see Guizzi, 
Vincenzo, Italy: ‘A Consideration of the Position of the National Parliaments in the European 
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Both houses rely on specialised committees to deal with European Affairs. The chamber 
set up a brand new Commissione speciale per le politiche comunitarie in 1990 at the 
image of the Senate’s Giunta. Structure, membership and f unctions of the two bodies 
are similar, with minor differences. They both are ad hoc committees, which are equal 
to the standing committees in size, structure and functions, but are precluded from hav-
ing full legislative powers. The Giunta is formed by 24  members and the Commissione 
Speciale by 48, each of whom at the same time serves as full member of a standing 
committee. Members are appointed at the beginning of each legislature by the President 
of the Houses, on the basis of indications of the political groups, to reflect the balance 
between the political parties in the plenary. Every two years they are renewed, but they 
can be re-confirmed. 
The Giunta and the Commissione speciale elect a Chairman  - usually drawn from the 
majority  -, two Vice-Chairmen and two Secretaries, collectively known as the Bureau. 
The Chairman represents the committee in the relations with other committees and out-
side the Parliament, convenes the meetings, presides over the orderly conduct of busi-
ness and has an influential role i n shaping the agenda. The two committees are rela-
tively ‘open’ structures. The Commissione speciale, with the consent of the President of 
the House, may invite Italian members of the European Parliament to attend its meet-
ings with speaking rights but without the right to vote.
1 The Senate’s rules of procedure 
have a slightly more restrictive standing.
1 
The Bureau sets up the calendar of meetings. The Commissione and the Giunta usually 
meet two days a week. The fact that their members at the same time are members of a 
standing committee negatively affects attendance at the meetings and the continuity of 
the proceedings. Committee meetings are closed to the public. However, the minutes of 
the debates and the relevant documentation under consideration are published shortly 
after each meeting. In addition, the Chairman may authorize broadcasting of the session 
for the press and eventual visitors through the internal television channel. As for support 
services in the chamber, a special service operating within the Research Unit - the Ser-
vice for Community and International affairs  - monitors the evolution of institutional 
and legislative processes, drafts legal opinions and background documentation. The 
service is staffed with three higher civil servants, six assistants and three secretaries. An 
additional administrator supported by six assistants looks after the logistic and proce-
                                                                                                                                               
Union’, in: Laursen, Finn/Pappas, Spiros, (eds.): The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European 
Union, Maastricht 1995, pp. 151-164. 
1   The chamber’s rules of procedures provided, in addition, for a periodical meeting of the Commis-
sione speciale with a special Delegation of the European Parliament composed by the members of 
the Bureau of the Presidency of the EP, heads of EP political groups and President of EP committees 
at the opening and the end of the rotating presidency of the EC. The provision has been deleted in 
the reform adopted in July 1999.  
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dural business of the special committee. The Senate’s support staff is comparatively 
smaller. A single administrator, one assistant and t hree secretaries, look after the Giunta 
and help other committees’ staff in their handling of European business. 
The two specialised committees have horizontal functions. They are vested with a 
greater role in the area of implementation of EC norms than in the scrutiny of govern-
ment’s positions within European negotiations. The powerful Standing committees have 
the primary responsibility for reviewing proposals for EC legislation in their subject 
area. The specialised committees are entitled to receive all  EC documents and may 
adopt resolutions or reports on the institutional aspects of EC activities. They do not 
have a general function of sifting European proposals and reporting to the standing 
committees. They may however adopt an opinion on a proposal under examination by a 
standing committee. In implementing EC law, the specialised committees enjoy a full 
coordination role. All draft legislation for the implementation of Community directives 
and the incorporation of regulations into national law as well as proposals for new legis-
lation which fall within the remit of EC competencies are referred to the Giunta and the 
Commissione with a view to receive an opinion on their consistency with existing EC 
law.
2 
While the specialised committees and the standing committees share the power to moni-
tor the Government’s conduct within European negotiations, the first ones are solely 
empowered to review the half-yearly government’s report on EC politics. In addition, 
they review EC legislation after its adoption and, in  the chamber, the rulings of the 
European Court of Justice. Finally, they question ministers on EC legislation draft pro-
posals as well as on general EC policy issues. The committees may also hear high-
ranking public officials, with the assent of the competent Minister. Deputies may also 
avail of normal control and information procedures, such as questions for oral or written 
answers in order to raise a debate on EC/EU issues. Usually, the two committees have a 
consensual working style, with low-key conflicts and a non-partisan attitude. The dia-
logue with the executive takes place in an informal and co-operative atmosphere. 
The scope of parliamentary scrutiny includes the whole range of the EC’s legislative 
activity. On the basis of Law 183/187, the Government transmits all proposals of regu-
lations, directives and decisions within thirty days from their reception, as well as the 
legal acts adopted by the Community institutions, together with a short assessment of 
their impact on the domestic legal order. Furthermore, Law 86/1989 provides for an 
enhanced parliamentary access to written information on EC d evelopments. Every six 
months the Government presents a report on Italy’s participation in Community policies 
to both houses, and, every year, a general report f ocusing on the progress made by the 
                                                                                                                                               
1   Attendance of Euro-deputies is limited to a single representative for each political group present in 
the European Parliament, chosen by common agreement by the President of the Giunta and its Euro-
pean counterparts. See Senate’s Rules of Procedure, article 142. 
2   See Camera’s Rules of Procedure, article 126.c.2; Senate’s Rules of Procedure article 23.cc. 2 and 4.  
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EC towards the achievement of the Internal Market, with special attention paid to the 
effects of regional policies and to the national management of the EC’s structural 
funds.
1 
The Senate’s Giunta, the chamber’s special  committee as well as the standing commit-
tees may review draft EC legislation with the Minister being present, and adopt resolu-
tions. In most cases the review of an EC proposal is a one-meeting business. In excep-
tional cases the debate may be held over one or more supplementary meetings, allowing 
members to ask for oral or written evidence before deliberating. The scrutiny may end 
without the committee coming to a formal decision or with the adoption of a resolution, 
which carries a politically binding value.
2 When the committees debate resolutions on 
EU affairs, the Government is present and may propose amendments, ask for the post-
ponement of the vote, or request to defer it to the plenary. The scrutiny procedure is a 
decentralised procedure in line with the Parliament’s overall characteristic as a “work-
ing parliament”: The plenary cannot debate and vote a resolution when this is tabled in a 
committee. 
The most important innovation introduced in the years up to 1998 is the so-called ‘An-
nual Community Law’ (legge comunitaria annuale)
3, created with Law 86/1989 (Legge 
La Pergola). The Annual Community Law provides a specific and systematic method 
for the harmonisation of domestic regulations to Community norms. It is only partially 
an instrument for immediate implementation, but rather a device to programme and 
rationalise the various sets of implementing measures. Each year, before 31 March, the 
Government submits a bill including all EC directives and regulations in need of n a-
tional implementing measures adopted in the previous year to the Parliament. The law 
allows to choose among different techniques for direct and indirect implementation: 
-  Parliamentary abrogation or modification of existing domestic legislation, 
-  Delegation of legislative powers to the Government,  
                                                 
1   The report also extends to activities performed by the WEU and the Council of Europe, see article 7 
and 8, law 9 March 1989, n. 86. 
2   Whereas the Senate rules of procedures, article 143.c.6, expressly states that the Giunta and the 
committees may vote a resolution at the end of the scrutiny process, describing in detail the structure 
of the resolution, the Camera dei Deputati article 127 does not refer to a formal parliamentary act, 
simply indicating that the competent Committees ‘may express in a final report their opinion on the 
opportunity of future initiatives’.  
3   The legal doctrine on the Law La Pergola is rather wide. Among the most important comments see 
Borroni, Laura/Clerici, Roberta/Marzanati, Anna/Mazzoni Honorati, Maria Luisa/Stansfield, G a-
briella/Viviani Schlein, Maria Paola: ‘Commento alla Legge 9 marzo n.  86’, in: Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto pubblico comunitario, No. 2/1991, pp. 523-625; Caretti, Paolo: ‘La nuova disciplina della 
partecipazione dell’Italia al processo normativo comunitario e delle procedure di esecuzione degli 
obblighi comunitari, dettata dalla legge n. 86 del 1989 alla prova: la prima ‘legge comunitaria’, in: 
Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 1990, pp. 330-350; Guizzi, Vincenzo: ‘La legge La 
Pergola, 86/89. Una impostazione nuova del circuito decisionale e operativo Italia-Comunità’, in: 
Rivista di Diritto Europeo, 1990, pp. 3-15.  
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-  authorisation of the Government to adopt regulations in subject areas b eforehand 
regulated by primary sources and  
-  administrative acts. 
The Annual Community Law also provides a strict timing of its presentation, while the 
rules of procedure of the Parliament regulate the debate, with the aim to a pprove it 
within the year. By examining and amending the Government’s bill, the Parliament has 
a synoptic and horizontal control over the introduction of EC legal acts into the domes-
tic legal order. The parliamentary intervention triggers the regulatory power of the cen-
tral administrations or the regions, which will enact the final regulations according to 
the guidelines, set by the houses. The system of Annual Community Laws strikes a bal-
ance between competing objectives: maintaining the pivotal role of the houses in EC 
law implementation; increasing flexibility in implementation and ensuring compliance 
with EC deadlines for implementation. 
The involvement of the Parliament with regard to EC legislation was perceived to be 
necessary since the European Parliament had not yet developed into a full co-legislator 
at the European level. The national Parliament was seen as a “National-Community 
Parliament”
1, adding a second task of controlling and monitoring matters of EC compe-
tence (as long as the EP is not able to effectively check on the Council) to the scope of 
duties it naturally has within the national domain
2. Much of the changes were relatively 
easy to introduce since the creation of ad hoc bodies did not threaten the standing com-
mittees. The functions entrusted to the specialised committees were new ones and did 
not alter the relationships between the vertical committees. In addition they helped the 
Parliament in extending its control over European issues. However, the most innovative 
instrument, the power to ex-ante review of proposals for EC legislation, had to come to 
terms with a consolidated pattern of the Parliament’s behaviour. Thus, the Parliament 
interpreted it as a negative and defensive power rather t han a power to influence the 
daily elaboration of Italian negotiating positions.  
The practice of the 1990’s was a mixed one. The Parliament’s information on EC busi-
ness was insufficient and irregular. The government failed to fulfil the duty to transmit 
the Commission’s proposals and forwarded the written reports with significant delays  - 
usually superficial  - so that an eventual detailed parliamentary debate would have been 
meaningless. Not surprisingly, the houses’ participation in EC policy formulation  was 
marginal. Parliamentary committees scrutinised few proposals and adopted an even 
smaller number of resolutions.
3 Ex-post review of EC legal acts and of rulings of the 
                                                 
1   This image has been coined by Lippolis in: Lippolis, Vincenzo: ‘Il Parlamento nazional-
comunitario’, in: Quaderni costituzionali, No. 2/1991, pp. 319-347. 
2   This point is raised in particular by Mazzoni Honorati, Maria Luisa: ‘La partecipazione parlamentare 
al processo normativo europeo’, in: Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario, 1995, pp. 27-
40. 
3   During the XI (1992-1994) and XII legislature (1994-1996) the Camera dei deputati has adopted 
eleven resolutions. The Senate had a slightly greater participation. The scrutiny of Commission pro-
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European Court of Justice was minimal. The largest part of the work was carried out by 
the two specialised committees while the standing committees and the plenary remained 
isolated from the European arena. Only a handful of deputies were active and knowl-
edgeable in European affairs.
1 
The Parliament was relatively active in developing formal and informal relationships 
with other national legislatures, as well as with the European Parliament. The Assises in 
July 1990, and the first formal meeting of the COSAC were housed by the Italian Par-
liament in Rome. The standing committees had frequent contacts with their counterparts 
in the European Parliament, either at bilateral or multilateral level. The meetings, how-
ever, usually had little influence on the work of the Italian Parliament. MP’s contacts 
with MEP’s were “unsystematic, disorganised and irregular”, as bilateral relationship 
were mainly carried out by political parties, outside the Parliament, through the channel 
offered by European political parties.
2 
On the other hand, the introduction of the Annual Community Law proved to be a suc-
cessful solution. From 1990 to 1995, the adoption of five Community Laws eliminated 
the backlog and led to a consistent improvement of the share of directives transposed 
from 81,7 per cent to 90,2 per cent.
3 
The case of the EC directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions may 
provide a useful example of some contradictory features of the role played by the Par-
liament in those years.
4 
The Parliament began considering the issue many months before the proposal reached 
the Council for a final decision. In 1997, the Standing Committee on Agriculture under-
took an inquiry that ended in October, asking for the rejection of the proposal
5. Mean-
while, in August 1997, the European Commission had submitted to the Council and the 
European Parliament a modified proposal. The Committee for Agriculture of the cham-
                                                                                                                                               
posals provided for in article 144.r. has taken place 17 times. In addition article 50 has been activa-
ted six times and article 144.5 two times.  
1   Furlong speaks of a ‘small band of European specialists ... (holding) in practice very wide powers 
subject formally to the scrutiny of the full assembly”. See Furlong, Paul: ‘The Italian Parliament and 
European Integration - Responsibilities, Failures and Successes’, in: Norton, Philip (ed.): National 
Parliaments and European Union, London: Pinter Publishers 1996, p. 41. 
2   As notes Guizzi, ‘Really effective contacts between parliamentary groups at the two levels have not 
yet been established. In the administrative bodies of the national parties there is usually someone 
responsible for relationship with the federations and European political unions, so that the political 
circuit is closed: European goups-national parties-national parliamentary groups”. Guizzi, Vincenzo: 
‘Italy’, in: Morgan, Roger, Tame, Clare, (eds.): Parliament and Parties. The European Parliament in 
the Political Life of Europe, New York 1996, p. 135 and p.141. 
3   Data as of 31/12/1996. Source: XIV relazione sul controllo dell’applicazione del diritto comunitario, 
in Gazzeta Ufficiale, 31.11.1997, p. C 322. 
4   See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions in: Official Journal, No. L 213, 30 July 1998 pp. 0013-
0021. 
5   See Camera dei Deputati, XIII Commissione Agricoltura, Indagini conoscitive e documenti legislati-
vi, No. 5, Biotecnologie, Roma, 1997.  
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ber passed a resolution calling upon the Government to delay the adoption of the direc-
tive, the day before the Council reached a political agreement on a common position on 
27 November 1997.
1 On 16 February 1998, the Committee for Social Affairs of the 
chamber began debating a draft resolution inviting the Government to oppose the direc-
tive and requesting a moratorium on the production and use of genetically modified 
organisms in Europe. While the draft resolution was waiting to be voted, the Council 
adopted the common position, with the abstention of the Italian government. A couple 
of weeks later, the Committee for Social Affairs adopted the resolution. On the same 
day, the Senate passed a motion engaging the Government to request the suspension of 
the directive and to promote the elaboration of a new directive with more stringent re-
quirements for the patentability of biotechnological inventions
2. Nevertheless, the 
Council approved the directive on 6 July 1998, again with the abstention of Italy.
3 Later 
on, the Government decided to intervene in the action for annulment brought by the 
Dutch Government before the European Court of Justice.
4 Pending the Court’s judge-
ment, the Government, where diverging views existed on the matters, excluded the d i-
rective from the annual Community bill and introduced a specific piece of delegating 
legislation to implement the directive to the Parliament.
5 The bill met the resistance of a 
large coalition of parliamentary groups, seeking to force the Government to ask for a re-
writing of the directive or to make concessions in the implementing legislation. Parlia-
mentary obstruction is now likely to prevent the timely implementation of the directive, 
thus leading to tensions with the European Commission. 
The case does not only illustrate the in general little input of the Italian Parliament on 
Italian EU decision-making, but also the lack of coordination in parliamentary interven-
tion. Such a pattern justifies the evaluation of a  protracted low Europeanisation of the 
Italian Parliament.
6 In the mid 1990’s this was widely perceived as unsatisfactory and 
dysfunctional. Changes at the European level and internal developments provided the 
                                                 
1   Camera dei Deputati, risoluzione No. 8/00025 adopted by the Committee for Agriculture the 26 
November 1997. 
2   Camera dei Deputati, risoluzione 7/00422, adopted by the Committe for Social Affairs the 10 March 
1998; Senato della Repubblica, mozione 1/00095, adopted in plenary the 10 March 1998. 
3   The Parliament intervened five times in the process leading to the adoption of the directive. See 
Camera dei Deputati, La brevettabilità delle biotecnologie, No. 119, XIII legislatura  - dicembre 
1998. 
4   Case C 377/98 R. Kingdom of the Netherlands vs. Council of the European Union and European 
Parliament. 
5   See Senato della Repubblica, No. 4280, D.L. ‘Delega al governo per il recepimento della direttiva 
98/44/CE sulla protezione giuridica delle invenzione biotecnologiche”, XIII legislatura. 
6   Some authors describe the slow adaptation to EU dynamics as a deliberate effort to protect the speci-
fic organisational and functional characteristics of the Italian Parliament from the pressures for 
change coming from the European arena. See Giuliani, Marco: ‘Italy’, in: Rometsch, Die-
trich/Wessels, Wolfgang, (eds.), 1996, op.cit., pp. 105-133. Among the comments in Italian the point 
is best illustrated by Morisi, Massimo, L’attuazione delle direttive Cee in Italia. La Legge comunita-
ria in Parlamento, Milano, Giuffré, 1992.  
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catalyst for a second and comprehensive process of reforms, which has taken place after 
the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
III. The Italian Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
When the Government negotiates an international Treaty, the Parliament is usually i n-
formed about the various stages of this process. It rarely has a real say on it, though it 
can influence the Government’s position by adopting resolutions or similar acts. The 
negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty falls within this typology: as in previous cases, the 
definition of the ultimate Italian position(s) were kept in the Government’s hands and  - 
within it - of the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s. 
In view of the IGC, the Italian Government had approved a number of documents.
1 For-
eign Minister Lamberto Dini presented the  Government’s position to the Parliament on 
5 December 1995. The key priority was to guide the negotiations on the basis of three 
principles. Firstly, the IGC was to remedy the gaps and insufficiencies in the Treaty, 
and, above all, to prepare the ground for the forthcoming enlargements of the Union. 
Secondly, the Treaty was to strengthen the Union's democratic character by expanding 
the powers of the EP and the scope of co-decision, as well as the efficiency of its 
institutional mechanisms. Thirdly, the IGC was to develop the Union's capacity to play 
a leading, coherent and responsible role on the world stage, to reinforce co-operation in 
justice and home affairs and to protect the freedom and security of the citizens. On the 
subject of the national parliaments, Italy considered that their closer association with 
Union activities would entail the effective application of the declarations annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty and a more effective organisation of consultational and informational 
links between the national parliaments and their European select committees.  
The debate that followed in the Camera was harsh. After long discussions, the chamber 
adopted, on 7 December 1995, five resolutions supporting the Government's position. 
Five other motions were withdrawn. However, the discussion was only partially devoted 
to IGC issues, but rather to internal questions. At a four months distance from the legis-
lative elections, the debate offered a clear example of how European issues have at 
times been tied into national ones.
2 
                                                 
1   Italian Government statement of 23 February 1995 on Foreign Policy guidelines; Italian Government 
statement of 23 May 1995 on the Intergovernmental Conference to review the Maastricht Treaty; 
Joint Declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers regarding the 1996 
IGC, Position of the Italian Government on the IGC for the Revision of the Treaties, 18 March 1996.  
2   For instance, the most voted resolution concerned the small industry’s problems (!). Another one 
finally withdrawn was asking ‘a stable and authoritative Government, provided with the constitutio-
nally requested necessary consensus” for the Italian Presidency; see La Stampa, 8.12.1995; L’Unità, 
8.12.1995; Il Sole 24 Ore, 8.12.1995.   
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On 1 January 1996, Italy took over the Presidency of the Union. There is no doubt that 
the landmark event of this Presidency was the opening of the IGC in Turin, on 29 
March 1996. However, along the negotiations, the Italian Government maintained its 
above quoted position, especially with respect to the role of national parliaments. In fact 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry was reluctant about any further involvement of the Parlia-
ment into European issues. However, also because of the pressures of the Italian Par-
liament, the Government finally came to support the most advanced positions concern-
ing an increased role of the national parliaments. These positions argued for a better 
information of the Parliament, for establishing a minimum time-limit between the m o-
ment in which the assemblies receive a text and its inscription on the agenda of the 
Council, and for leaving a space for manoeuvring for national parliaments in the formu-
lation of directives. Concerning inter-parliamentary co-operation, Italy expressed its 
support for an improvement of COSAC as an instrument for the circulation of informa-
tion and exchange of experiences, eventually expanding its competencies to the discus-
sion of general guidelines concerning fundamental freedoms. However, the Government 
opposed any kind of institutionalisation and inclusion of COSAC into the Treaties as a 
third chamber. 
As regards the positions of the Italian Parliament, it especially insisted on the transmis-
sion of documents by the European Commission to national parliaments. At the XV 
COSAC meeting in Dublin in December 1996, the President of the chamber’s EC 
Committee, Antonio Ruberti, insisted on the need for national parliaments to receive the 
documents concerning guidelines and legislative initiatives from the European Commis-
sion. He also stressed the need to introduce a minimum time-span to pass between the 
presentation of such proposals and their adoption by the Council, thus making an impor-
tant contribution to the elaboration of point three of the final document. 
The legislative elections held in April 1996 and the subsequent formation of the Prodi 
government did not really modify the Italian position in the IGC. However, in a Joint 
Declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty the new government expressed its disap-
pointment for the results achieved together with France and Belgium as well as its view 
that further substantial institutional progress was needed before enlargement could take 
place.  
A similar judgement was given by the Italian Parliament.
1 The Camera’s Committee for 
International Affairs in fact recommended the Assembly a “conditional approval” of the 
Treaty subordinated to the request for further progresses in the p olitical dimension of 
the Union. In March 1998, the Camera approved a cross-party r esolution in which it 
stressed its discontent concerning the results achieved, while it underlined the will to re-
                                                 
1   See Camera dei Deputati, Commissione Affari esteri e comunitari, La revisione del Trattato di Maas-
tricht. Obiettivi e limiti del Trattato di Amsterdam anche in vista dell’allargamento dell’Unione eu-
ropea, Indagini conoscitive No. 18, Atti parlamentari, XIII legislatura, Roma, 1999.  
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launch the process towards Political Union by convening a new IGC.
1 The Amsterdam 
Treaty was finally approved, with 428 votes in favour, one against, 44 abstentions (Lega 
Nord) in the Camera, and with the votes of all parties, except for Lega Nord, at the Sen-
ate.
2 
 
1. The Reforms after the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
From 1998 to 2000 a number of significant reforms took place with regard to the role of 
the Parliament in European affairs. The first step of the reforms, in fact, dated back to 
August 1996, when the then ad hoc committee in the chamber was transformed into a 
permanent fommittee, named “XIV Commissione - Politiche dell'Unione Europea”.
3 
Afterwards, the ‘Annual Community law’ 1995-97
4 and the law ratifying the Amster-
dam Treaty
5, adopted in 1998, marked the start of the reform process. With the first one 
the Parliament expanded its scope of action in European affairs by obliging the Gov-
ernment to provide the houses with all proposals concerning European affairs. The 
powers of the parliamentary committees were also specified. With the second law, the 
provisions of Protocol No. 19 was ‘translated’ into national law, by foreseeing the need 
to transmit legislative initiatives concerning home and justice affairs. Then, the Annual 
Community Law for 1998 obliged the Government to merge the various written reports 
in one single annual document.
6 Finally, the Annual Community Law for 2000
7 ration-
alised the  rules on the provision of EU documents to the houses and the regions and 
introduced an Italian ‘variant’ of the parliamentary scrutiny reserve. 
At the same time, legislative reforms were paralleled by changes in the rules of proce-
dure of the Parliament. While in the chamber the procedures concerning European A f-
fairs were significantly revised in 1997 and in 1999
8, the Senate modified its internal 
rules in February 2000.
9 
The reforms, which went in parallel with the reform of the Government’s structure for 
EU policies management, aimed at two general goals. Firstly, to update the i nstruments 
for dealing with European affairs in order to promote a pro-active and anticipatory style 
                                                 
1   Allegato A, Seduta 333 del 25/3/1998, A.C. No. 4500 - Sezione 4. 
2   In the Senate, the Lega Nord voted against. See Il Sole 24 Ore, 4.6.1998. 
3   Camera dei Deputati, Amendments to the Rules of Procedures adopted on 1 August 1996. 
4   Law 24 April 1998, No 128. 
5   Law 16 June 1998, No. 209. 
6   Law 5 February 1999, No. 25. 
7   Law 29 December 2000, No. 422  
8   Camera dei Deputati, Deliberazione del 27 luglio 1999, Modificazione degli articoli 44, 118bis, 126, 
126bis, 126ter e 127-ter del Regolamento della Camera dei Deputati, pubblicata in Gazzeta Ufficiale 
30 luglio 1999, No. 177, p. 19-20. 
9   See Senato della Repubblica, Proposta di Modificazione del regolamento d’iniziativa dei senatori 
Coviello, Zecchino, Brienza e Bratina, 14 maggio 1996, Doc. II, No. 3, XIII legislatura. See also 
Giunta per gli Affari delle Comunità europee, Relazione su attività e comp etenze della Giunta, Doc. 
XVI, No. 2, 27 giugno 1997, XIII legislatura.   
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of policy-making and to establish a closer link between the negotiating and implement-
ing phases of the EC policy-making cycle. Secondly, to modify the Parliament’s phi-
losophy in dealing with European affairs by introducing the issues of quality and of 
coherence in legislation along the lines of the OECD guiding rules on the quality of 
legislation. 
In fact, the changes partly followed the path set by the post-SEA reforms, modernising 
existing structures, partly introducing innovative concepts and instruments under the 
influence of the ideas elaborated within international settings such  as the OECD and 
European inter-parliamentary fora such as the COSAC. In particular, the Italian Parlia-
ment took an active part in the work promoted by the Conference of Speakers of Euro-
pean Parliaments on the issue of the quality of legislation.
1 
All in all, the re-organisation of the role of the Parliament in EU affairs aimed at:  
-  the revision of the institutional setting, at least in the chamber,  
-  the reinforced access to EU information,  
-  the modernisation of the rules allowing for scrutiny of EC legislation proposals 
and for a political control over the Government’s action within European institu-
tions and  
-  the introduction of a policy for enhancing the quality of implementing legislation. 
 
2. The Unfinished Transformation of Specialised Committees 
 
One of the objectives of the reforms was to transform the originally ad hoc-committees 
for European affairs into standing committees as to make them the central focus and 
engine for all parliamentary activities linked to EU affairs. That happened in the cham-
ber  in 1996.
2 As a consequence, the former Special Committee for Community Policies 
is now the XIV Standing Committee and its members cannot be members of any other 
permanent fommittee.
3  
The declared aim of the reform was to raise the political profile and the authority of the 
committee and to facilitate the meetings. However, the upgrading to a Standing commit-
tee hasn’t yet had a noticeable impact on the duration and frequency of meetings. So far, 
                                                 
1   The Speaker of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Luciano Violante, co-ordinated the Conference’s 
working group on the quality of legislation. For an account of the ideas figured out by the working 
group see the document ‘The complexity of legislation and the role of Parliaments in the era of glo-
balization” adopted by the Lisbon Conference of Speakers the 21-22 May 1999. The reflection has 
been further refined during the following Conference of Speakers held in Rome the 22-24 September 
2000. 
2   See Camera’s Rules of Procedure, article 22. 
3   See Camera’s Rules of Procedure, article 19, cc. 3-7.  
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the committee meets two or three times a week, which is still  less than other standing 
committees.
1 
As far as functions are concerned, the committee now has a competence of its own in 
“institutional” activities of the EU and may conduct the primary examination and final 
adoption of bills implementing EC law
2 or domestic new legislation in those areas. 
On the contrary, in the Senate, although many proposals for reform were also presented, 
the Giunta still remains on an ad hoc status. Yet, the present legislature witnessed an 
impressing increase in its activity, in terms of the number of meetings, of questions 
deferred to its scrutiny and of bills examined as for their compatibility with EU law.
3 
Thus, there is a clear unbalance between the two chambers. One of the crucial differ-
ences lies in the powers of the two committees as related to the Annual Community 
Law. Hence, the XIV Committee coordinates the other vertical committees and is 
charged with the principal examination of the law before it is a pproved by the plenary. 
In the Senate, it still is the Committee for Constitutional Affairs that needs to be a s-
signed this role.
4 
 
3. Parliamentary Access to Commission Initiatives and Technical Information 
 
A second objective of the reforms was to enhance parliamentary access to Community 
proposals for new legislation and to supplementary technical information. 
On the basis of the Amsterdam Protocol, Law 128 of 24 April 1998 expanded the scope 
of parliamentary scrutiny as to cover all proposals for EU legal acts, including those 
tabled within the second and third pillars, and a ll proposals for consultation documents, 
such as European Commission white and green papers and its annual work program.
5 
Furthermore, the law ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty
6 included a provision reproducing 
the first part of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments, extending it as to i n-
clude “all proposals for measures to be adopted under Title VI of the TEU”, thus en-
compassing the proposals brought about by member states, which represent a large 
share of the issues discussed within the Third Pillar. Finally, the various provisions on 
EU documents’ transmission to parliament were rationalised and replaced by a single 
                                                 
1   In the XIII legislature (up to July 2000) the Committee has met 618 times, for a total of 337,15 
hours. It thus still meets comparably less than other permanent committees (See Notiziario della 
Camera dei Deputati, No. 40, XIII legislatura, luglio 2000). 
2   See Camera’s Rules of Procedure article 126, as modified the 27 July 1999. 
3   From 1996 to date, the Giunta held 234 meetings in comparison to the 27 held in the previous Par-
liament (1994-1996). In November 2000 the Giunta had examined 882 bills, almost the same num-
ber of the bills examined in the previous four legislatures. Source: Senate of the Republic. 
4   See Camera’s Rules of Procedure, article 126 ter. 
5   Should the Commission’s proposal be substantially modified during the EC legislative process, the 
law requires the Government to forward the modified text, so that the Houses may adjust their scru-
tiny. 
6   Law 16 June 1998, No. 209.  
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and comprehensive provision with Law 422 of 29 December 2000 (Annual Community 
Law for 2000). On the basis of Art. 6, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, 
or the Minister for European Policies on his behalf, has the duty to transmit all EC/EU 
consultation documents and proposals for legislation to the houses, including proposals 
tabled within the second and the third pillar, accompanying them with the provisional 
timetable for their adoption by Community institutions. 
Enhancing the Government’s delivery of technical information to the Parliament was 
the second objective of the reforms in this area. In fact, in scrutinising EU draft acts, the 
Parliament may not avail of a back-up comparable to the one provided to government 
by administrative departments. Rather than seeking to produce autonomous analysis, the 
Parliament should be able to demand key information from the Government and check 
their accuracy and significance. Traditionally, the Parliament does not receive any addi-
tional written information from government departments on the EU draft legislation’s 
estimated impact on public administration, business and citizens or  on compliance costs. 
The reforms were designed to introduce such a practice, yet without setting a clear duty 
up for the Government. The new rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies envis-
age the possibility for standing committees to demand the information necessary for 
carrying out the pre-legislative evaluation from the Government.
1 However, the stand-
ing committees are not empowered to request impact analysis with regard to proposals 
of Community acts. Article 13 of Law 128/1998 requests the Government to accompany 
the transmission of EU acts already adopted with a short assessment of the internal 
regulations to be amended in order to implement them. However, such information is 
functional to future implementation rather than to the scrutiny of EU proposals in their 
earliest stage of discussion. 
Since one of the reasons for the Government’s failure to provide technical information 
lies in the fragmentation of the various departments, the gradual implementation of the 
reforms that have enhanced the coordination role of the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers should help the Government to produce usable and concise technical informa-
tion. Accordingly, units operating within the Presidency of the Council are entrusted 
with the task of preparing regulatory impact assessment of the EU draft legislation
2 and 
consulting organised interests and regions.
1 
                                                 
1   As provided for in article 79, par. 4 and 5. This is also possible on request of a minority of Commit-
tee members. 
2   Article 5 of the Law 8 March 1999, No. 50 requires that regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is car-
ried out, initially on a trial basis, with regard to draft measures adopted by the executive and ministe-
rial and inter-ministerial regulations. In addition, parliamentary committees may request a report in-
cluding the RIA for the draft measures and bills which they are considering in order to carry out the 
preliminary legislative scrutiny from the Government. article 6 of the Direttiva Legislativa 30 July 
1999, No. 303, extends this operational methodology to the consideration of EU legislation, empo-
wering the Department for Legal Affairs of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to carry out, 
in co-operation with the Department for Community Policies, ‘the preliminary analysis of the inter-
nal economic and legal situation and the evaluation of the estimated impact of Community regula-
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Thus, progress on the Government’s side appears to be a crucial variable for the evolu-
tion of an effective parliamentary scrutiny in the future. 
At the same time, the houses have dedicated a particular attention to the development of 
their own capacity to accede to and process EU documentation and technical informa-
tion. Both houses have access to EU documentation via the Internet. In addition, the 
services of t he bodies specialised in European affairs produce dossiers containing key 
information on the legal context and the objectives of the European Commission’s pro-
posals under scrutiny. In order to facilitate the selection of the most important pieces of 
EU legislation and their insertion in the committees’ agenda, the Service for Commu-
nity and International relations of the chamber constantly monitors the EU legislative 
process and highlights the proposals of major legal and political importance in the sub-
ject  area of each standing committee. The chamber has also opened a parliamentary 
office in Brussels, housed within the building of the European Parliament.  
The long-standing issue of EU documents’ transmission to the Parliament now seems 
close to a solution.  After a long and reiterated set of parliamentary requests
2, the Gov-
ernment, as from September 2000, has started to supply the documents provided for by 
the Amsterdam Protocol and the relevant internal legislation. First practice shows minor 
dysfunctions, s uch as duplications or delays in transmission, which are hopefully to 
disappear after the initial start up-period. However, the r esponsible Department for 
Community policies is not yet able to organise the provision of supplementary technical 
information because of the fragmentation of administrations involved. 
 
4. Scrutiny of EU Draft Legislation 
 
A third major objective of the reforms was to reinforce parliamentary input in the earli-
est stage of the EU decision-making process. Protagonists looked favourably to the 
methods of detailed scrutiny of the EU draft legislation in other member states. Law 
128/1998 states the power of parliamentary committees to review the EU draft legisla-
tion and to adopt politically binding resolutions, thus reinforcing the pre-existing provi-
sions. However, the procedure of the scrutiny of European documents is rather concise 
                                                                                                                                               
tions on the domestic system”, also referring to proposals under discussion within Community insti-
tutions. Those tasks are further confirmed by article 16, c. 2, of the DPCM 15 April 2000, ‘Ordina-
mento delle strutture della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri”.  
1   On the basis of the Direttiva Legislativa, 30 July 1999, No. 303, the task of consulting organised 
interests and the regions with a view to elaborate the national position on EC legislation is entrusted 
to the Department for Community Policies operating within the Presidency of the Council of Minis-
ters. 
2   Still in July 2000 the Chamber expressed strong criticism for the Government’s failure to implement 
the provisions set in the Amsterdam Protocol and in the internal relevant legislation and reiterated 
the invitation to ensure a timely and complete transmission of the EU draft legislation as well as pro-
posals concerning the Schengen Agreement. See Motion No. 1-00439, adopted the 10 July 2000 and 
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compared with the carefully articulated ones adopted by the UK or the French Parlia-
ment. 
The rules of procedure seem to consider parliamentary scrutiny as a  one-time process, 
with the tabling of a resolution, debate and final vote in sequence. Thus, major weak-
nesses contain three aspects. 
Neither the specialised committees nor the EU’s committees’ Chairmen or the B ureau 
are empowered to carry out a systematic  sifting of proposals of major political or legal 
relevance. In theory, parliamentary committees should examine the complete flood of 
European draft legislation. In practice, they risk being unable to keep up with the devel-
opment of European legislative process, since the consideration of all documents depos-
ited by the Government is not realistic given the pressure of domestic activity. The mat-
ter  - so far irrelevant, since the Government rarely transmitted proposals to the Parlia-
ment - is now coming to the fore as a crucial point in the future organisation of scrutiny. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the six week period provided by the Amsterdam Protocol, 
the timetable of the standing committees’ business is far from being synchronised with 
the calendar of the legislative process within the EU institutions. In the chamber, com-
mittees are to conclude the scrutiny of Commission’s proposals within thirty days from 
their reception. The 1998 rules on planning the agenda include the timing of the adop-
tion of the EU draft legislation as one of the elements to be taken into account in the 
committees’ timetable. Anyway, the two provisions receive little implementation in 
practice, and there is no guarantee against the risk that a draft EU proposal is adopted 
before the scrutiny is completed while the resolution awaits to be time-tabled for vote. 
The planning of the Senate’s calendar is not even subject to similar requirements. At 
any rate, the precondition for a full guarantee of parliamentary prerogatives would lie in 
the introduction of a system of “scrutiny reserve”. In early 2000, the former President of 
the XIV Committee, Mr. Ruberti, raised the issue, proposing that the Parliament should 
receive all proposals for EU legislation and have a minimum period of 45 days counting 
from their effective reception
1 for expressing its position or clearing the proposals. After 
that period, failing a parliamentary resolution, the Government should be able to e x-
press its consent to the proposal in the Council. At first, the Government’s response was 
lukewarm. After a long debate, Art. 6 of Law 422 of 29 December 2000 introduced a 
more flexible version of the principle. The government has to communicate the date 
expected for the adoption of each piece of the EU draft legislation transmitted to the 
Parliament. If the houses have not expressed their opinion before the date indicated or, 
in case of postponement, before the meeting of the Council, where the proposals are to 
be adopted, the Government is free to make a decision.  
                                                                                                                                               
resolutions 6-00129 and 6-00130 adopted the 26 July 2000 by the plenary of the Chamber of Depu-
ties. 
1   That, in case of delays due to governments lack of transmission, may be longer than the six week 
period provided for in the Amsterdam Protocol.  
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Lastly, parliamentary practice does not reveal a frequent use of post-Council evidence 
sessions with the relevant Ministers in order to obtain information on the outcome of 
negotiations or on the follow-up given to parliamentary resolutions, when adopted.
1 
Parliamentary practice still shows a persistently low level of scrutiny activity. During 
the XIII legislature the chamber reviewed eleven proposals of EU legislation, amongst 
which ten were scrutinised by the Committee for EU policy. This confirms the crucial 
role played by the XIV Committee and the inertia of vertical committees overwhelmed 
by the pressure of domestic business. Indeed, in the same period, 33 resolutions on EU 
issues were adopted by other standing committees and 35 by the plenary.
2 These data 
highlight  an increase in the attention considering European affairs. Yet, it is interesting 
to note that a significant part of this increased attention has been channelled through 
procedures other than formal scrutiny, most of all through oral hearings. In fact, depu-
ties as well as ministers find oral evidence procedures speedier than formal scrutiny and 
more suitable to an informal and co-operative exchange of views. In many cases, there-
fore, hearings on EU proposals have replaced legislative scrutiny. During the XIII legis-
lature, different ministers made 32 appearances before the chamber’s standing commit-
tees.
3  
Existing rules prevent representatives of private interests or organisations from appear-
ing before the committees on EU matters. Thus, the committees turned to a wider use of 
inquiries as a vehicle for access to outside sources of expertise and to exchange views 
with business and trade unions, NGOs and other organised interests. Usually, inquiries 
are launched without reference to a single proposal for EU legislation. Rather, they deal 
with broad issues which remain on the EU agenda for a longer period of time or aim at 
evaluating the implementation of existing regulations in order to suggest amendments or 
new initiatives.
4 
 
                                                 
1   Yet, the rules of procedures of both Houses state that parliamentary committees may ‘request the 
Ministers to submit oral or written evidence on the implementation of laws or on the follow up given 
to resolutions, motions or orders of the day voted by the House or accepted by the Government”. See 
article 143.c.3 of the Camera’s Rules of Procedure and article 46.c.2 of the Senate’s Rules of Proce-
dure. 
2   Source: Camera dei Deputati, Osservatorio sulla legislazione, Rapporto sullo stato della legislazione, 
II/1999. Data as at the 30 June 1999. 
3   Hearings were also organized with European Commissioners, members of the European Parliament, 
the Governor of the Bank of Italy and the Director of the special co-ordination Unit for the manage-
ment of structural funds. 
4   At the Chamber, major inquiries concerned the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the national 
management of structural funds and the quality of the internal legislation implementing EU directi-
ves. The Senate’s Giunta carried out 3 inquiries on Agenda 2000, the role of regions in the prepara-
tion and implementations of EU rules, the reform of CAP. An inquiry on the drafting of the Euro-
pean Charter of Fundamental Rights was jointly conducted with the Chamber.  
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5. Review of the Government’s EU Reports and of the European Commission’s Pro-
gram 
 
The government’s written reports have been a traditional, yet modest, source for par-
liamentary control over EU policies. Article 10 of the 1998 Community Law
1 has 
merged the pre-existing variety of written r eports in a single annual report, covering 
both a retrospective on EU policies in the preceding year and a summary of govern-
ment’s standing on future EU activities. The government is now to present the report to 
the houses by 31 January, jointly with the a nnual Community bill. Such rationalisation 
of government’s obligations has been the precondition for a further re-organisation of 
parliamentary procedures in the chamber. The new rules  - in place since July 1999  - 
have devised a carefully articulated procedure for the parallel examination of the two 
documents, according to a s equence of phases and subject to mandatory time-limits. All 
standing committees are involved in the consideration of the two documents in their 
subject area. The Camera’s dommittee for EU policy has a stronger coordination role 
and reports to the Assembly. The procedure ends with a joint debate in plenary on the 
general lines of the Annual Community Law and on the guidelines for future activity of 
the Government. Then, the plenary votes on the bill and on resolutions tabled with r e-
gard to the annual report. As from 2000 onwards, the chamber adds the examination of 
the European Commission’s Annual Work Program to the consideration of the annual 
report. This aims at enhancing the Parliament’s ability to identify future issues in the 
EU system.
2 
Overall, these innovations are intended to create a “Community session”, i.e. a specific 
time-lapse in the first semester of the year where the Parliament concentrates on Euro-
pean affairs, with an overall view over trends in EU policy-making and on policies to be 
implemented.
3 The emphasis on plenary debates, in comparison to the committee-
centered scrutiny of single proposals, aims at attracting a larger a ttention on European 
issues of more general relevance of both the media and the public. 
The consideration of the European Commission’s Work Program is also an opportunity 
for inter-parliamentary co-operation. The dommittee for EU policy, integrated by rap-
porteurs of the standing committees, held a hearing of Italian members of the European 
Parliament as part of its evaluation of the document. Finally, the whole procedure was 
devised to end before the meeting of the European Parliament for the approval of the 
                                                 
1   Law 5 February 1999, No. 25. 
2   The procedure, introduced on a trial basis in March 2000, follows the one lied down for the annual 
report, involving the Standing Committees, the Committee for EU policies and the plenary, thus en-
ding with a vote on resolutions (See for an example resolution No. 6-00125, adopted by the plenary 
of the Camera dei Deputati the 6 March 2000). 
3   The model is the Budgetary session where, in the second semester of each year, the Parliament exa-
mines the budget and sets guidelines for future economic legislation.  
 
293
Commission’s Program, so that the resolution(s) adopted by the national legislature 
might be taken into account by Italian MEP’s. 
 
6. A Special Feature: The Schengen Committee 
 
One should also mention the activities of the “Parliamentary Committee for the control 
of the application of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and for 
monitoring the EUROPOL National Section”. The Schengen committee was established 
in March 1997.
1 It is a bicameral body composed by ten senators and ten deputies
2 and 
empowered to mandate the negotiating stance of Italian representatives within the 
Schengen governing bodies. In addition, it r eviews the activities of the Europol National 
Section.
3 The committee is a unique experience in the European context together with 
the SubCommittee created by the Dutch Tweede Kamer. Furthermore, it has an interest-
ing twofold originality with respect to the domestic system for control over EU affairs: 
it is a joint committee, and has a binding power instead of a consultative one. The 
committee’s main task is to scrutinise all proposals for acts to be adopted by the Execu-
tive Committee of the Schengen Agreement, and to express, within fifteen days, a l e-
gally binding opinion for the Government. A system of scrutiny reserve is provided. 
Failing a parliamentary opinion, after the  expiry of the two weeks period, the Govern-
ment may express its consent to the adoption of the acts. 
The government also presents an annual report on the implementation of the Schengen 
Convention and on the activities performed by the EUROPOL National Section. Since 
its creation, the Schengen committee examined 109 acts, in 90 per cent of the cases 
expressing a positive opinion, sometimes adding suggestions for improving the text.
4 
After the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement within the TEU, a debate is open 
within the houses on whether to discontinue the committee, incorporating its tasks in the 
various vertical standing committees or, on the contrary, to expand its role as the unique 
parliamentary body exercising a binding and global control over the e laboration of all 
EU policies related to the establishment of an area of security, freedom and justice. 
 
7. Quality of Legislation and the Re-organisation of Implementing EU Law 
 
The introduction of Annual Community Laws has brought a structural improvement in 
Italy’s performance in adapting to EU obligations.  
                                                 
1   On the basis of the Law ratifying the Schengen Agreement, Law 30 September 1993, No. 388. 
2   Committee members are appointed by the Presidents of the two Houses in proportion to the parties’ 
strength in the plenary. 
3   On the basis of article 6, Law 23 March 1998, No. 93. 
4   The Committee has adopted a negative opinion in two cases. Source: Secretariat of the Parliamentary 
Committee for the control of the Application of the Schengen Agreement.  
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Recent statistics confirm the progress in the transposition of EC law. In 1998, Italy had 
implemented 96.1 per cent of the directives regarding the Internal Market, jumping 
from the last to the ninth position in the scoreboard prepared by the European Commis-
sion.
1 
Within the context of a general improvement in implementation, it is interesting to note 
that a significant share of infringement procedures by the European Commission against 
Italy relates  to incorrect implementation or to inconsistency of n ational legislation with 
Community standards rather than to outright failure of e nacting internal measures. This 
points out that the relationship between the Italian legislator and the Community law 
has f ound an equilibrium in terms of implementation, but that the problem of quality of 
implementing legislation is now emerging. 
Accordingly, several measures have been introduced by the Parliament to enhance the 
quality of legislation and ensure greater coherence between domestic and EU regula-
tions. The chamber introduced the evaluation of the consistency with EC legislation as 
one of the mandatory parameters to be considered by standing committees when con-
ducting the pre-legislative evaluation on domestic bills. At the same time, the opinion of 
the committee for EU policies on the consistency of i nternal legislation with EU norms 
has been given a greater weight.
2 
The chamber has also included the ‘Community bill’ among the instruments to be 
evaluated by the Committee for Legislation, an hoc body established in 1998.
3 The 
committee provides the other standing committees with ‘neutral’ advice concerning the 
quality of legislation, on some categories of bills or schemes of governmental regula-
tions: this is in certain cases obligatory, in others it can happen on a request of a minor-
ity of members of the committee. Its opinion may only be overruled by a vote of the 
plenary. The impact of the committee is still to be fully assessed. However, it could play 
a significant role in fostering parliamentary attention to the issue of the quality of legis-
lation and in avoiding major inconsistencies in transposition. 
As regards the simplification of legislation, the most noteworthy innovation is the shift 
from fragmented initiatives to an organic and periodical program within the framework 
of the annual simplification law introduced with Law No. 50 of 8 March 1999.
4 The 
                                                 
1   See Single Market Scoreboard No. 5, 2 November 1999. 
2   In short, this means that the Standing Committee may overrule a negative opinion issued by the 
Committee only after having obtained a vote in their favour from the plenary. See Circular on the 
remit of Standing Committees, issued by the President of the Chamber of Deputies the 16 October 
1996. 
3   Composed of ten deputies, chosen by the President of the Chamber on an equal proportion between 
the majority and the opposition, chaired in turn by each member article 16-bis, Camera’s Rules of 
Procedure. 
4   Community Laws contain a clause authorising the Government to issue a consolidated text reorgani-
sing the legislation resulting from the directives transposed by the law itself. For an account of the 
legal uncertainties of such a solution and of the relevant practice see Lupo, Nicola: Il riordino nor-
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system, adopted for the first time in 1999, envisages that each year the Government 
presents both houses with a  program of simplification and reorganisation of the existing 
legislation in a set of areas listed therein. On the basis of the guidelines set by the Par-
liament, the Government adopts  - within a fixed timetable  - consolidated texts which 
repeal obsolete provisions, amend and coordinate the norms, and systematically identify 
legislative rules, administrative regulations and relevant EU legislation regulating the 
same subject. Parliamentary committees monitor the enactment of consolidated texts. In 
adopting t heir guidelines for the first annual simplification program, the committee for 
EU policies and the Senate’s Giunta have called upon the Government to select priority 
areas where implementing legislation needs urgent rationalisation and to promote fur-
ther simplification at European level. 
 
8. Participation in COSAC’s Activities 
 
The Italian Parliament takes an active part in COSAC meetings. Participation to com-
mon debates helped Italian deputies to share best practises and information on other 
partners’ experiences in EU scrutiny, thus influencing and promoting last years’ r e-
forms. 
However, the Italian Parliament does not favour a development of COSAC into a body 
scrutinising all Council activities. The Schengen committee has repeatedly requested to 
be included in the Italian Delegation since the Amsterdam Treaty expands COSAC 
tasks to the examination of proposals in relation to the establishment of an area of free-
dom, security and justice, or regarding fundamental rights. So far, however, the pro-
posal has not been accepted and the Italian delegation is composed by representatives of 
the Bureau of the specialised bodies of both Houses of Parliament. 
 
IV. Conclusions: An Awakened Parliament? 
 
The years following the Amsterdam Treaty have been a period of significant reforms for 
the Italian Parliament, after a decade of inertia. Compared to the large and global effort 
of reform undertaken after the SEA, the Amsterdam-period r eforms are scattered in a 
number of different acts. Yet they have a unitary direction and  constitute, altogether, a 
deep and meaningful upgrade of the way the Italian Parliament deals with European 
affairs. 
Indeed, the Amsterdam Treaty acted as a catalyst for reforms. Though, the second effort 
for the ‘Europeanisation’ of parliamentary structures was not solely due to the Amster-
                                                                                                                                               
mativo nelle leggi comunitarie tra buone intenzioni e occasioni mancate, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
Pubblico Comunitario, No. 3, 1998, pp. 965-1001.  
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dam Treaty, but it could rather be traced back to the combined influence of two sets of 
variables of a more general nature, an exogenous and an endogenous one.
1 
Among the exogenous variables one could recall the process t owards matching the 
Maastricht criteria for EMU which forced Italy into reforms and modernisation. This 
came in a time in which the political and institutional systems were severely under pres-
sure due to the crises that had started in 1992.
2 They significantly affected the Parlia-
ment and led to a number of changes in terms of parliamentary personnel, the logic of 
action and behaviours, including a first attempt to break the past consensual style of 
policy-making towards the introduction of m ajoritarian principles. These attempts also 
inspired the reform of the chambers’ standing orders in 1997. 
The pro-European standing of the largest part of the Italian political parties was not 
altered in substance, though ‘Europe’ often came to be used as a matter of litigation 
between coalitions. Although the ‘European’ issues often hide domestic questions, the 
overall result has been an increased attention on the EU policy-making and on the rela-
tionship between Italy and the Union in particular. Thus, for the first time, the idea be-
gun to emerge that the Union is a dynamic entity, whose output is indeed the result of 
the member states’ input. This general environment influenced the way the Parliament 
perceived its role vis-à-vis EC legislation and decision-making. 
The reforms having taken place just recently, it is difficult to determine their actual i m-
pact on EC/EU decision-making. What needs to be stressed is a qualitative change in 
the Parliaments’ role. The post-SEA Parliament was essentially a sovereign legislator, 
the central institution within the national political arena, ‘temporarily’ extending its 
oversight over supranational processes because of the weakness of the European Par-
liament. The post-Amsterdam Parliament is aware of being an institution embedded in a 
larger polity, organised through different levels of government. Thus, the Italian Par-
liament tries to assume the role of a forum coordinating the impact on the domestic sys-
tem of the regulations produced by various rule-making and power centers at the Euro-
pean, the national (government, administrations, independent authorities) and the r e-
gional levels. 
                                                 
1   The combined influence of endogenous (systemic crisis)  and exogenous (European) variables is 
stressed by all the relevant literature on the Europeanisation of Italy during the mid nineties. See Di 
Palma, Giuseppe, Fabbrini, Sergio and Freddi, Giuseppe, (a cura di): Condannata al successo? 
L’Italia nell’Europa  integrata degli anni novanta, Bologna: Il Mulino 2000; Ferrera, Maurizio, 
Gualmini, Elisabetta: Salvati dall’Europa?, Bologna: Il Mulino 1999; Giuliani Marco, Europeanisa-
tion and Italy, paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the European Community studies asso-
ciation, Pittsburgh, 2-5 June 1999. 
2   See Pasquino, Gianfranco: ‘No longer a Party State? Institutions, powers and the problems of Italian 
reform’, in: West European Politics, No. 1/1997, pp. 34-53; Bardi, Luciano: ‘Antiparty sentiment 
and party system change in Italy’, in: European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, 1996, pp. 345-
363; Bardi Luciano/Morlino Leonardo: ‘Italy: tracing the roots of Great Transformation’, in: Katz, 
Richard/Mair, Philip: How parties organise, London 1994, pp. 242-277.  
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In order to adjust the Parliament’s functions to the spreading of legislative powers 
among different levels, a number of innovative concepts were explored by the legisla-
ture: systematic scrutiny of EU proposals to influence the Council’s decision- making 
from the preparatory stage onwards; contribution to policy coherence b etween policies 
undertaken at national and European level, and efforts for a greater quality of legisla-
tion. 
Paradoxically enough for a founding member of the European Communities, the Italian 
Parliament is surely classifiable as a latecomer in the European arena. Having failed to 
adapt to the TEU in the early 1990’s, the Parliament was in the position to adjust to the 
further changes introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty with i nnovative ideas and widely 
ranging reforms. 
There is thus an evident willingness of the Parliament and of the two specialised com-
mittees to play a more active role in EC/EU decision-making. So far, however, this has 
only partially been translated into actual reforms. 
The 1998-1999 reforms are in fact an unfinished business. There are many areas where 
scrutiny needs improvement.  
Firstly, there is a clear imbalance between t he two houses. While the chamber has a 
standing committee on EU affairs, the Senate still has an Ad hoc-committee. 
Secondly, effective parliamentary control over EU business is based on co-operation 
with the Government. However, while the Executive has only recently started to offi-
cially transmit EU documents comprehensively to the Parliament, it is still unable to 
provide timely and useful supplementary technical information. 
Thirdly, internal procedures for scrutiny could be improved by introducing a system for 
sifting and a practice of pre- and post-Council evidence sessions with the minister r e-
sponsible of negotiations.  
Fourthly, the two specialised bodies still devote most of their work to considering draft 
domestic legislation and its compatibility with EU norms, thus often examining minor 
questions in detail. In addition, their opinions have little i mpact on the work of the other 
standing committees. This task could be suppressed, thus freeing valuable committee 
time for the scrutiny of EU proposals for legislation. 
Although any analysis should bear in mind that the lapse of time is too short to fruitfully 
assess the impact of reforms, a first evaluation suggests that parliamentary practice in 
EU affairs shows little improvement with regard to draft EU legislation, but a larger 
increase in overall parliamentary attention to EU business. So far, this has been chan-
nelled through political rather than by formal scrutiny procedures. Given the issue of 
access to Commission proposals being solved, a further i ncrease in parliamentary atten-
tion on EU draft legislation and a larger use of scrutiny procedures are foreseeable. 
‘Europeanised’ and active deputies are still a minority, but interest in the European d i-
mension of policy issues is widening. There is a large participation in the web of inter-
parliamentary fora and contacts with the European Parliament at bilateral and multilat- 
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eral level. The Government has to take parliamentary input into account on a growing 
number of issues. 
The Parliament is no longer a  ‘benevolent observer’ of EU integration, which keeps its 
domestic bargains separated from the EU arena. Nor is it yet a fully active player. In-
deed, it could be seen as a moving beast at a stage of ‘medium Europeanisation’. 
Yet, a more effective and enhanced role of the Parliament. In mid November 2000, the 
Italian Council of Ministers approved a bill reorganising the participation of parliament 
in EU decision-making. The Government proposes three changes:  
Firstly, transmission of EU-related documents from the Government to the Parliament 
could be further rationalised and extended. Secondly, a specific form of a parliamentary 
scrutiny reserve could be introduced, enabling the Government to ask for a postpone-
ment of the vote at the stage of COREPER in order to seek for clearance by the Parlia-
ment
1. Finally, the Government could be enabled to i mplement EC directives outside 
the Annual Community Law-system through statutory acts in areas previously disci-
plined by law, whenever the directives have been approved  by the co-decision proce-
dure, or the Italian Parliament has already issued an opinion in the preparatory stage.
2 
Meanwhile some of the points dealt with in this reform bill meanwhile have found a 
solution with the changes introduced by Law 422/2000, adopted in December 2000. 
The Italian Parliament’s engagement for a greater role in European affairs also extends 
to the debate on the future democratisation of the EU. The Italian Parliament believes 
that the primary response to the democratic deficit lies in a clear solution of the issue of 
the political identity of the Union and, consequently, in a different balance between the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament
3. National parliaments  - the i n-
stitutions at the juncture between domestic and European systems  - are called to con-
tribute to the application of the subsidiarity principle on a substantial level. 
According to the Parliament’s proposal, this could be organised in two ways. Firstly, 
national parliaments should contribute in shaping the EU legislative agenda, in drafting 
the Commission’s annual legislative program and in reviewing its actual implementa-
tion through the scrutiny of the annual Commission report on the implementation of the 
principle of subsidiarity.
4 Secondly, national legislatures should share a ‘constitutional 
role’ with their governments, undertaking the elaboration of ideas, principles and values 
for the reform of the Union, expressing the will of European citizens to the institutional 
future of the European Union. 
                                                 
1   The Parliament would then have three days to adopt an opinion on the text. 
2   See Consiglio dei Ministri No. 35 del 10 novembre 2000, press communiquè. 
3   See Senato della Repubblica, Giunta per gli Affari delle Comunità europee, Relazione su Legittimità 
democratica e riforma delle istituzioni dell’UE, Doc. XVI, No. 9, 20 maggio 1999. 
4  See speech by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Violante at the Conference of Speakers of 
EU Parliaments, Vienna, and speech by the President of the Senate, Mancino at the Conference of 
the Speakers of the EU Parliaments, Rome, 22-24 September 2000.  
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The Italian Parliament has not yet reached a fully accomplished effective organisational 
and functional model with regard to EC/EU decision-making. A number of new devel-
opments are to be expected in the near future. However, the road towards a greater and 
more active parliamentary presence in the European arena, no matter how many delays 
or obstacles there will be, seems to have been taken. 
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The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies: From a Toothless Tiger to a Criti-
cal Watchdog? 
 
Danielle Bossaert 
 
I. Introduction: The Socio-Political Framework 
 
In Luxembourg, the smallest member state of the European Union, there is broad con-
sensus among the public, political parties and interest groups on the pro-active attitude 
of the Government towards the further deepening of the  European integration process. 
This committed pro-European attitude is, for example, illustrated by the fact that during 
the IGC 2000 Luxembourg, together with its two Benelux partners Belgium and the 
Netherlands, strongly supports the idea of strengthening the “closer co-operation” 
clause in the Amsterdam Treaty
1 in order to prevent the EU from developing into an 
“advanced free trade area”
2. The most ambitious f uture objectives of Luxembourg’s 
European politics include strengthening the s ocial policy by establishing minimal social 
standards, encouraging a more efficient Common Security and Foreign Policy, further 
communitising the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) as well as consolidating Lux-
embourg’s position in the EU institutions and decision-making process.
3  The result of 
this broad consensus on these priorities is that EU affairs have never been a subject of 
heated debates in the smallest EU member state. Membership is considered a necessity 
and perceived as the best way to overcome the dependence of the small domestic mar-
ket and to strengthen its presence and visibility at European and international level. 
The Luxembourg consensus democracy
4 is characterized by cabinet stability and dura-
ble governments which provide effective policy-making and which can rely on a wide-
spread popular support. This durable executive as well as the existence of a coordinated 
interest group system which aims at compromise and concertation
5, make it difficult for 
the Parliament to develop a profile of its own. The e xecutive body is by far the most 
                                                 
1   Memorandum Benelux about the IGC and institutional reforms, Luxembourg 1999, p. 1-2. 
2   With regard to enlargement of the EU without a thorough reform of the institutions and decision-
making processes, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, dreads the ‘disastrous 
specter of a free trade area’. See Agence Europe, 13 December 1999, p.4. 
3   Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu des séances publiques, No. 14/97-98, Bill 4381 on the appro-
val of the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, signed in Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, pp. 3303-
3375. 
4  See Lijphart, Arend: P atterns of Democracy, Yale: University Press 1999. According to L ijphart a 
consensus democracy is characterized by proportional representation, a dominant executive, a multi-
party system and power-sharing in multiparty coalitions, pp. 3ff.  
5   Ibid., p. 3.  
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dominant and ‘visible’ actor in the decision-making process  - a fact which is further-
more underlined by the unitarian, centralised state structure. An important advantage of 
this strong executive predominance and of the flat hierarchy is that important political 
and economic decisions can be taken more quickly than in its much larger neighbours. 
In comparison with the Government, the n ational Parliament - the Chambre des Députés 
- has a rather low profile. National parliamentarians rarely appear in the media and de-
bates in parliament are never considered to be of real importance. The members of gov-
ernment, such as the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, 
or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lydie Polfer, are well known by the public, while 
this is not at all the case with most of the national Députés, whose opinions about EU 
issues are hardly noticed or known among the public. This image and visibility problem 
also reflects the low profile of the Luxembourg  Parliament as a body that controls the 
executive, particularly where it involves European affairs, as we will see later. 
The low profile of the Chambre des Députés is mainly related to specific characteristics 
of the Luxembourg semi-professional Parliament, such as for example its limited c a-
pacities
1 and its traditionally weak role in national history. The 60 parliamentarians can 
only rely on a very small administrative apparatus with a minimum of academic staff 
(about one scientific staff member per Député), a fact which makes the Parliament very 
dependent on the central administration. Because of this scarce reservoir of human r e-
sources, it is - according to some parliamentarians - nearly impossible to develop an in-
depth knowledge of European affairs. For such a small administration, whose civil ser-
vants have to be generalists rather than specialists, it is much more difficult to imple-
ment the increasingly specialised EU legislation than for a large and highly specialised 
administration.  
Moreover, one has to consider that the time of the Luxembourg Député is limited by the 
fact that besides being a parliamentarian, s/he often practises a profession or is mayor or 
juror in a big or small city (up to 50 per cent of them). Of course, this concurrent hold-
ing o f mandates also explains why it is not popular or profitable to deal with European 
affairs in depth, all the more when considering that for their re-election Députés need to 
rely on a stable local electorate. This means that they have to dedicate part of their time 
to local issues and problems. 
These characteristics of the Luxembourg political system explain to a large extent why 
the Parliament has such a low profile compared to the Government, also where it con-
cerns European affairs. An efficient control o f the Government is moreover hindered by 
the fact that the political opposition is disproportionately represented in the 19 parlia-
mentarian committees. It is a general rule in Luxembourg that the rapporteur and the 
chairman of the committees belong to the  same political party as the Minister con-
cerned. So, the organisational structure of the committees corresponds to the ministerial 
                                                 
1   The staff of the Luxembourgish Parliament amounts to 44 civil servants.  
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structure. In this context, a necessary measure which would make the controlling func-
tion of the Parliament more efficient and which was raised by the opposition party in 
parliament recently, is the strengthening of the position of the political opposition in the 
committees, particularly as regards the budget policy, by setting up a permanent budget 
committee chaired by the political party in opposition. 
The problem of size is also relevant when considering that the 19 parliamentarian com-
mittees constitute quite a heavy workload for the 60 Députés, who are quite often mem-
ber of up to three Committees at the same time. They are supposed to become ‘experts’ 
in very different fields such as agriculture, transport, environment, education, etc. A c-
cordingly, it is difficult for the small, semi-professional Parliament of Luxembourg, 
where each Committee is composed of about 11 members only, to develop extensive 
expertise and to acquire a thorough knowledge of the administration.  
 
II. Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Activity in EC/EU Affairs  
 
The above mentioned examples clearly illustrate the limited capacities of the Luxem-
bourg Parliament, which of course also have an impact on the role of the Chambre des 
Députés as a body controlling the Government. 
Compared to the other EU member states the scrutiny procedure in the Grand-Duchy is 
highly informal; it is not laid down in any legally binding text and even the ‘Règlement 
de la Chambre’ does not include any provisions about the i nvolvement of the Parliament 
in EU affairs. So, the policy regarding information provided to the Parliament depends 
to a large extent on the Government and on the personality and policy style of the re-
sponsible ministers. In Luxembourg the low degree of formalisation and institutionalisa-
tion of the political decision-making processes cannot only be seen in the interaction 
between the Government and the Parliament, but even characterises the functioning of 
the whole political system. This is undoubtedly also due to the fact that relations within 
a small d emocracy are very close: the members of the political elite know each other 
very well and, where possible, they look for solutions that are consensual.  
According to an unwritten law under the former government formed by the Christian 
Socials and the Socialists (1984-1999), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacques Poos, 
regularly informed the Committee on Foreign and European A ffairs
1  of the agenda of 
the European Councils, the positions proposed by the Luxembourg government and 
their repercussions at national level, and the progress of negotiations during the IGC.
2 
Under the new coalition government of the Christian Socials and the Liberals (since 
June 1999), the new Minister of Foreign A ffairs, Lydie Polfer, whose party strongly 
                                                 
1   This Committee meets at least once a week. 
2  See Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu des séances publiques, No. 3/94-95, Debate on the organi-
sation of work regarding European affairs, p. 675.  
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pushed for more effective parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms under the former gov-
ernment, has recently begun to establish more regular
1  and extensive contacts with the 
Committee on Foreign and European Affairs. However, so far parliamentarians from 
different political parties have considered this practice as insufficient and continuous 
efforts are being made to arrive at a stronger institutionalisation of this policy. An o p-
tion often discussed in this context is to improve the exchange of information on EU 
affairs between the specialised parliamentarian committees, which can draft an opinion 
on EU directives, and the relevant ministries. T he different ministers, such as for exam-
ple the Minister of Finance, only rarely brief the committee on Financial affairs about 
the follow-up of, for instance, the taxation dossier, which is vital to Luxembourg’s n a-
tional interests.  
In comparison with its EU neighbours, Luxembourg’s parliamentary scrutiny mecha-
nisms are characterised by a very low degree of institutionalisation. The Parliament 
does not have constitutionalised scrutiny reserve powers and can only urge the minister 
responsible not to adopt a  directive. Moreover, as stated above, the ‘Règlement de la 
Chambre des Députés’ contains no specific regulation on the involvement of the Par-
liament in the EC/EU decision-making process, which says a lot about the very limited 
parliamentarian control of t he Government’s positions on EU affairs. In order to gain a 
better insight into the current co-operation b etween the Government and the Parliament 
in EU affairs, a closer look should be taken at the existing procedure and its practical 
application. Firstly, the existing procedure, which is not legally binding, is laid down in 
a rather general guideline with no fixed time limits. The different steps can be summa-
rised as follows:  
1)  All legislative proposals are submitted to the Working Committee of the Parlia-
ment immediately after the European Commission has transmitted them to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Parliament is kept informed of the time schedule 
for the examination of the proposals by the European institutions, their implica-
tions for national law and the amendments made by the European Parliament.  
2)  The working Committee provides the proposals to the Committee on Foreign and 
European Affairs and to the appropriate specialised technical committees, which 
examine the documents carefully. The Committee on Foreign and European A f-
fairs has a close look on all documents regarding the treaties and institutional 
questions, whereas the technical Committees are responsible for all basic docu-
ments such as the European Commisssion’s white papers falling in their field of 
competence as well as for all the legislative proposals to be transposed into n a-
tional law. In order to speed up the scrutiny process, these documents are classi-
fied as follows:  
                                                 
1  See Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu des séances publiques, No. 2/99-00, Topical debate on the 
Intergovernmental Conference and on enlargement, p. 194.  
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a.  purely technical documents of no political, economic, legislative or f inancial 
interest,  
b.  documents for which the procedure has already advanced too much to jus-
tify the Committee’s position on them,  
c.  documents deserving examination (case A), and  
d.  documents on which the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs d e-
cides to deliver an opinion (case B). 
3)   If the Committee decides to examine a proposal (case A), it will establish contact 
with the minister concerned and this procedure may lead to the drafting of a report 
or an opinion. If the Committee decides to adopt an opinion (case B), it will have 
to forward it to the Government in good time, i.e. taking account of the negotia-
tion deadlines at EU level. The Committee will then be kept informed of the pro-
gress of negotiations and the Government may have to appear before  the Parlia-
ment on its request. It may also organise hearings with members of the Govern-
ment and its administration about the impact of the proposal on national legisla-
tion. The examination is concluded by the publication of an opinion or a report, 
sometimes followed by a public debate. In each case the adoption of a resolution 
or a motion during a public debate will be possible.
1  
This procedure was adopted in 1994, mainly under pressure from similar and often far-
ther reaching developments in the other EU m ember states, the main objective being 
more structured co-operation with the Government. In the mid-nineties, this topic fig-
ured high on the Parliament’s agenda and there was even a debate dedicated entirely to 
the future organisation of work regarding EU  affairs. During this discussion, parliamen-
tarians from all political parties severely criticised the lack of transparency and informa-
tion on the part of the Government as well as the Parliament’s insufficient involvement 
in EC/EU legislation. In this context, the green political party suggested increasing 
transparency by publishing the names of the civil servants who represent the Grand 
Duchy at the meetings of the working groups and within the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) as well as the agenda and the minutes of these meetings.
2 
A major point of criticism in the debate of 1994 was that Luxembourg was falling be-
hind the developments in most other EU Member states, where the Constitution forces 
the Government to take more account of the Parliament’s considerations. However, so 
far these efforts have not led to a stronger institutionalisation in the form of a more l e-
gally binding procedure. Even the guidelines of 1994 have been implemented insuffi-
ciently: In day-to-day business, the influence of the Chambre des Députés is still very 
weak in that neither the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs nor the specialised 
technical committees are actively involved in the process of drawing up EC/EU legisla-
                                                 
1  See http://www.europarl.eu.int/natparl/cosac/en/coms/lux.htm. 
2  See ‘Bausteine für ein anderes Europa’, Déi Greng zur Regierungskonferenz 2000, p. 5.  
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tion. There is no institutionalised parliamentary scrutiny regarding the preparation of 
Luxembourg’s positions on EU matters, and the role of the legislative is more or less 
limited to agreeing or not agreeing to decisions taken at European level. Even though 
the Parliament may give its opinion,  the Government is not obliged to take it into a c-
count. This powerful position of the executive is also illustrated by the fact that it is 
under no legally binding obligation to inform the Parliament.  
The rather weak influence of the Parliament in the EC/EU legislation process can be 
explained by the fact that 
-  the profile of the legislative as a controlling body is traditionally quite low,  
-  EU subjects are not controversial at all in Luxembourg, which of course does not 
stimulate the demand for stronger scrutiny mechanisms, and  
-  the Parliament’s administrative and scientific capacities are very limited com-
pared to those of the administrations and parliaments of larger member states.  
So, for the 60 Députés, each of whom has, on average, one scientific employee at 
his/her disposal and who have to sit on 19 technical committees, coping with the grow-
ing and increasingly complex EU legislation is a very demanding task. In other EU 
Member states stronger demands have recently been made by all political parties, 
mainly under pressure from similar developments, to introduce measures favouring 
more efficient control of EU matters, such as a more systematic provision of informa-
tion to the Parliament regarding the progress of negotiations on EU dossiers before final 
decisions are taken.
1 Of course, this would also involve a more active dialogue between 
the legislative and the executive about the official Luxembourg negotiation position. 
According to the coalition agreement of June 1999 between the Christian Socials and 
the Democrats, the Government i ndeed seems to be slightly concerned about the limited 
involvement of the Parliament in the EC/EU legislation process. Consequently, a pro-
posal has been made to improve the exchange of information with the Chambre des 
Députés  to the effect that in future the competent ministry should keep the specialised 
technical committees informed of the progress of negotiations on important EU direc-
tives.
1 The possible introduction of this measure must be interpreted as a first important 
step to set up a more structured dialogue between the executive and the legislative and 
to strengthen the role of the specialised Committees as a body controlling the executive. 
Nevertheless, the Luxembourg Parliament’s path from toothless tiger to critical  watch-
dog of the Government still seems to be long.  
 
III. The Luxembourg Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
                                                 
1  See Codex 4/99, Le mensuel juridique et politique du Luxembourg, p. 37 et seq.  
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In the 1996/1997 IGC the major concern of the main political actors was to safeguard 
Luxembourg’s status quo position in the decision-making bodies and to be duly repre-
sented in the European Parliament. All the national position papers written by the politi-
cal parties
2  strongly defended Luxembourg’s seat in the European Commission and its 6 
seats in the EP. Equal representation in all the EU institutions was a sacred principle 
which could not be touched. Against this background, the discussion on the future role 
of the European Parliament and the national parliaments in the EU was of minor impor-
tance and hardly noticed by the public. The most important national position paper on 
this topic was the Goerens report on “The Role of Parliaments in the European Union of 
Tomorrow”
1. The report’s main purpose was, to stimulate the debate within the political 
parties and the Parliament, and  to provide the Government with concrete ideas during 
the IGC. What was unique about this report was that the Christian Social Prime Minis-
ter, Jean-Claude Juncker, gave Charles Goerens, a European deputy from the then po-
litical party in opposition, the Liberals, the opportunity to voice his ideas on parliamen-
tary scrutiny in EC/EU matters. 
In comparison to the Protocol on the role of the national parliaments of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the report of Mr Goerens went far beyond. Against the background of a 
rather informal scrutiny process in Luxembourg, Mr Goerens favoured a more regulated 
and binding involvement of national parliaments in EC/EU affairs by strengthening the 
obligations of governments and the European institutions vis-à-vis the parliaments. He 
supported the idea of a better exchange of information and more committed co-
operation between the national parliaments and the European Parliament. In this context 
he proposed concrete measures such as the o rganisation of meetings on specific topics, 
e.g.  combating fraud and EMU, a debate on the Commission’s legislative programme at 
each autumn session of COSAC, the possibility for MEP’s to attend committee meet-
ings which concern their national parliament, and the possibility for MEP’s to ask ques-
tions of the appropriate ministers, as is the case in Belgium. 
One of his most original ideas was the inclusion, into the European Treaties, of a charter 
containing minimum obligations of governments towards the national parliaments, such 
as an obligation to inform  the national parliaments before a decision is taken at EU level 
or the right of each national parliament to be i nformed of all proposals relating to the 
three pillars of the Treaty on European Union. Each EU proposal should be accompa-
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Governmental declaration made by M. Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister, Ministre d’Etat, on 
12 August 1999 in the Chambre des Députés, p. 5. 
2  See Aide-mémoire of the Luxembourg government regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental Confe-
rence, Luxembourg, 1995; CSV (Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei), Pour une Europe démocratique 
et efficace, Position de la CSV en vue de la Conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, Luxembourg, 
1995; PD (Demokratesch Partei), Le Parti démocratique et la conférence intergouvernmentale de 
1996, Luxembourg 1995; POSL (Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbëschterpartei), Le POSL face aux 
défis de la Conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, Luxembourg 1995.  
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nied by an explanatory note from the Government outlining the justification for the pro-
posal in question and its impact on national legislation. According to the report, the 
most significant measure, which would considerably increase the power of national 
parliaments, was the r ight to institute proceedings before the European Court of Justice, 
when an EU act exceeds the U nion’s powers. The incorporation of these measures into 
the Treaty would lead to more equality between the national parliaments of the member 
states in the field of parliamentary scrutiny. Although his report asked for more efficient 
and harmonised parliamentary control in the EU member states, it did not approve the 
Danish model which involves a binding mandate of its Committee on European Affairs, 
because of its blocking effects on the European integration process. Moreover, with 
regard to the involvement of the European Parliament in the EC/EU decision-making 
process, the report supported the extension of the co-decision procedure to all areas in 
which the Council decides by qualified majority, and the reduction of the number of 
procedures to three: co-decision, assent and consultation. Another idea put forward by 
Mr Goerens was the strengthening of the European Parliament’s and the national par-
liament’s control powers with regard to the Second and the Third Pillars of the TEU by 
extending their right to information. 
At national level, the Goerens report not only served as a consultative report for the 
Government during the IGC, but was also the most important basis for the discussions 
within the political parties. As the parliamentary debates on the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference
2 illustrated, many of the ideas expressed in the report were taken over in the 
statements of the Députés from the different political groups. For instance, the right of 
the national parliament to institute proceedings before the European Court of Justice 
was supported by the Christian Socials, the Liberals and the Socialists, while a proposal 
to include the parliaments’ right to information in the Treaty was put forward by the 
Liberals, the Socialists and the Green party. In addition, all parliamentary groups 
(Christian Socials, Liberals, Socialists, Green party and ADR
3) were in favour of r e-
forming the European Parliament by simplifying the decision-making procedures in 
general and extending the co-decision procedure. These ideas on the EP’s future role 
can also be found in the official Luxembourg memorandum for the 1996/97 IGC, while 
the Benelux memorandum proposes, among other things, closer participation of the 
European Parliament in the decision-making process as regards the second and the third 
pillars.
4 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Le rôle des parlements dans l’Union Européenne de demain, Report by Mr Charles Goerens to 
Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister, Luxembourg 1995. 
2  See Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu des séances publiques, No. 13/94-95, Debate on the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, p. 3294-3343. 
3   In the party system of Luxembourg, the ‘Aktiounskomite fir Demokratie a Rentegerechtegkeet’ is 
the most ‘nationalistic’ party. 
4  See Memorandum of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the 1996/1997 IGC, p.8.  
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As these examples illustrate, there was great convergence between the Government, the 
political parties and the parliamentary groups where it concerned the f uture role of the 
European Parliament and the Chambre des Députés. They agreed that in general the 
exchange between these legislative bodies should be more e xtensive and that national 
parliaments’ right to information should be g iven a more binding effect. In this context, 
the Christian Socials proposed closer co-operation between the national parliaments and 
the European Parliament in the field of fraud.
1 Another concrete example is the proposal 
made by the Socialists to insert a  clause into the Treaty to the effect that the n ational 
parliaments must have sufficient time to communicate their opinion on a legislative 
proposal before the Council proceeds to the first reading.
2 
However, besides these general agreements, small differences persist. The most far-
reaching ideas have been put forward by the political opposition parties. For instance, in 
launching the idea of taking over the binding mandate of the Danish Parliament, the 
Green party went even the Goerens report. Compared to  the other political actors, the 
Greens are also very progressive regarding the EP’s future role in that they have been 
the only political party to propose an extension of the EP’s right of initiative.
3 Likewise, 
the ADR is of the opinion that national parliaments should have the right to partly or 
completely suspend a European directive if they think that a problem can be better 
solved at national level.
4 
Regarding the future institutional architecture at European level, only the Liberals con-
sider it useful to upgrade the role of national parliaments by creating a two-Chamber 
system. According to their proposal
5, the legislative branch in the EU should comprise, 
on the one hand, an assembly of peoples, which is similar to the EP and, on the other 
hand, a senate with delegates from the national parliaments. In contrast to this proposal, 
the other Luxembourg political parties are of the opinion that the creation of an addi-
tional institution would only complicate the decision-making process and change the 
present institutional balance between the Council, the Commission and the European 
Parliament, which they want to maintain. In this context they are generally very reluc-
tant to strengthen the role of the EP, because such a process could weaken the strong 
role of the Commission as well as the Council’s legislative powers. Consequently, dur-
ing the IGC, a major concern of Luxembourg was to extend the Commission’s right of 
initiative, mainly to the second and the Third Pillars of TEU. This view is also reflected 
in t heir position p apers for the IGC which hardly contained any proposals about the 
strengthening of the EP’s role in these fields. Only the Christian Socials d emanded that 
the EP should be informed systematically of all initiatives in these two areas, while i ts 
                                                 
1  See CSV, Pour une Europe démocratique et efficace, p.3. 
2  See POSL, Le POSL face aux défis de la conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, p. 13-14. 
3  See Chambre des Députés, n°13/94-95, p. 3318-3319. 
4   Ibid., p. 3323. 
5   Ibid., p. 3323.  
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powers should be increased only in the case of further communitarisation. The paper of 
the Liberals displayed even more reluctance with regard to this issue in that they are 
convinced that an extension of the EP’s power would not solve the problem of the de-
mocratic deficit. 
 
IV. The Luxembourg Parliament after Amsterdam 
 
So far, the Protocol on the role of the national parliaments of the Amsterdam Treaty has 
not been discussed in the Luxembourg Parliament. However, this passive attitude t o-
wards the developments taking place at European level does not imply that members of 
the Luxembourg Parliament are not in favour of stronger involvement of the national 
legislative powers in the European decision-making process. For instance, recently the 
vice-chairman o f the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Ben Fayot, drew up 
some proposals together with his Belgian counterpart, Herman de Croo
1, and his Dutch 
counterpart, Michiel Patijn
2, to make the COSAC (Conference of European Affairs 
Committees) more effective and to strengthen its role. At a meeting of these three par-
liamentarians in Brussels on 3 April 2000, they reached agreement on the following 
points: First of all, they emphasised that the COSAC was first and foremost a body that 
should debate and advise on the state of democracy in Europe. At each meeting the 
COSAC should discuss, on the basis of a report written by the chairman of the COSAC, 
the proper functioning of the European institutions, the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity and measures to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the Union and to 
bring the European construction closer to the citizens. Secondly, priority should be 
given to issues that concern the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice. 
Hence, they believe t hat the national parliaments would have the last word as r egards 
the legislation and control in these areas.  
The Chambre des Députés appoints the members of COSAC on a proposal of the politi-
cal parties. The COSAC Delegation
3  does not report on the conclusions of COSAC 
meetings in the plenary meeting of the Chamber.  
In the Grand Duchy, COSAC is mainly seen as a an important forum where ideas and 
experiences are exchanged, and even as a learning forum, particularly where it concerns 
the different mechanisms used in the EU member countries to control the actions of 
their governments in European affairs. The importance of such a body for Luxembourg 
                                                 
1   President of the Chamber of Representatives of Belgium and Chairman of the Advisory Committee 
on European Affairs. 
2   Chairman of the European Affairs Committee of the Dutch Second Chamber. 
3   The COSAC Delegation includes a parliamentarian from the Christian Social Party, one from the 
Socialist Party, one from the Liberal Party, one from the Green Party and one from the ADR.  
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should not be underestimated: A country as small as Luxembourg does not always have 
the capacities required to develop sufficient expertise in all areas. 
 
V. Conclusion: The Silence of a Loyal Parliament 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty has not led to major changes in the highly informal character of 
the Luxembourg Parliament’s involvement in EC/EU affairs, a lthough the Government 
now informs the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs more regularly on issues 
and EC directives of vital national interest. However, it seems that this new develop-
ment is also due to the change of Government in June 1999 and the coming into power 
of the Liberals. 
Furthermore, the demands made by the Chambre des Députés for more efficient i n-
volvement in the decision-making processes at European level have become stronger 
over the past few years. They mainly focus on more extensive and more detailed infor-
mation to be provided by the Government to the specialised parliamentary committees 
about EU directives as well as IGCs. Nevertheless, at the moment it would be mislead-
ing to speak of effective parliamentary control of EU affairs in the case of Luxembourg. 
In this context it should be considered that there is no procedure which includes a time-
table and is legally binding on the Parliament and the Government, that a more regular 
exchange between the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was institutionalised only recently and that the executive cannot be 
forced to take into account the opinion expressed by the Parliament. Consequently, the 
leeway of the Luxembourg government in the EC/EU legislation process is considerable 
- compared to other EU Member states  - and the Chambre des Députés is currently 
fighting to be informed correctly about the progress of negotiations on EU directives. 
This very limited involvement of the Luxembourg parliament in EC/EU affairs is i n-
creasingly criticised by the various political parties, but so far no major breakthrough  - 
apart from a growing awareness of this lack of control  - can be observed. The example 
that illustrates this situation is the recent failure of the proposal made by  the Parliament 
regarding a more detailed procedure with a timetable. According to a civil servant of the 
Parliament’s administration, the deadlock regarding this issue should also be seen in the 
light of the heavy workload of the central administration and the time constraints of the 
comparatively small number of civil servants dealing with EU affairs. 
Overall, the low profile of the Parliament as a control body in European affairs can be 
mainly explained by the specific characteristics of the Luxembourg political system as 
well as by the limited capacities of the central administration and the Chambre des D é-
putés. However, with the increasing transfer of competences from the national level to 
the European level, one can observe even in the Parliament of the Grand-Duchy a grow-
ing awareness among the Députés that national politics are closely interlinked with 
European politics and that it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate them.  
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The Parliament of Austria: A Large Potential with Little Implications 
 
Barbara Blümel and Christine Neuhold 
 
I. Introduction: The Political System of Austria  
 
1. Austrian Interests and Views on EU Affairs  
 
Although the debate about Austrian membership in the European Union (EU) has a long 
tradition, it took forty years u ntil concrete negotiations for EU membership could even-
tually be taken up. Subsequent to World War II Austrian EU membership was seen as 
incompatible with legal and p olitical obligations resulting from Austrian neutrality. 
Some members of the Austrian Government, however, did aim for co-operation with the 
European Community (EC), even EC membership, but the r estrictive neutrality policy 
advocated by the (then) Secretary of State, Bruno Kreisky, dominated Austrian foreign 
policy at the end of the 1950’s. Austria therefore became a member of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Under the leadership of the People's Party
1 
Austria tried to intensify the links with the European Economic Community (EEC) by 
undertaking endeavours in the years from 1963 to1967 to conclude a ‘Treaty of a spe-
cial kind’
2 with Brussels, which was eventually vetoed by Italy in 1967.
3 A new door in 
Austrian integration policy was opened at the beginning of the 1970’s, subsequent to the 
conclusion of the South Tyrol-package,  the demise of de Gaulle and the planned 
enlargement of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. The EC and the EFTA members 
agreed in 1972 on the implementation of a Free Trade Zone for industrial and commer-
cial goods  for the time span of 1973 to 1977.
4 The Luxembourg Declaration, the a s-
sumption of office of Commission President by Jacques Delors, and the endeavours of 
the EC member states towards intensifying the European integration process by promot-
ing projects such as the Single European Market, gave rise to a more intensive debate 
on Austrian EC membership. The Europe-application
5 of 1985 brought forward by the 
People's Party  - that aimed for quasi-full membership in the EC while preserving Aus-
trian neutrality - failed, however, to find support in the Austrian Nationalrat in 1985.  
                                                 
1   Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). 
2   ‘Vertrag besonderer Art’. 
3   Italy put in its veto due to an attack of South Tyrol activists at the Italian/Austrian border. 
4  See Schaller, Christian: ‘Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union - E(W)G/EU Diskurs in Öster-
reich’, in: Dachs, Herbert/Gerlich, Peter/Gottweis, Herbert (eds.): Handbuch des politischen Systems 
Österreichs. Die zweite Republik, Vienna: Manzsche Universitäts- und Verlagsbuchhandlung 1997, 
pp. 53-67.  
5   ‘Europa-Antrag’.  
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In the course of the 1980’s the People's Party strengthened its profile as the ‘European-
party’ as opposed to the Social Democrats
1, which were split into one wing adopting a 
more pro-integrationist stance and those who met a possible Austrian EC membership 
with scepticism based on reservations as regards to the possible jeopardy of Austrian 
neutrality. Subsequent to Delors' initiative of creating a European Economic Area 
(EEA), the EC advocates pushed for an Austrian application even before the summer of 
1989 and the taking up of negotiations for the European Economic Area.
2 The fact that 
the Social Democrats eventually could be lured into submitting an application for mem-
bership, was based to a great extent on a favourable opinion  of the social partners of 1 
March 1989. The Government then decided officially on 17 April 1989 to apply for EC 
membership, a decision, which had to be supported by a two thirds majority by the Na-
tionalrat and the Bundesrat. This support was achieved after intensive consultations 
within the political parties.
3 The application for membership was forwarded on 17 July 
1989. 
The referendum, which was conducted in June 1994 as a pre-condition to enable Aus-
tria’s accession to the EU, was exceptionally positive: 66 per cent of the Austrians voted 
in favour of EU membership.
4 From extensive analysis conducted on the voting behav-
iour one can distil three important, partly overlapping, lines of conflict: 
-  a socio-demographic line of conflict: Younger voters and men welcomed the a c-
cession to a much greater extent than older voters and women, 
-  a socio-economic line of conflict: people with higher education and material posi-
tion welcomed Austria's accession as opposed to those with a relatively low level 
of education and economic standing, 
-  a conglomerate of lines of conflict across the political spectrum: 75 per cent of the 
declared Liberal voters, 73 per cent of the supporters of the Social Democrats and 
only 66 per cent of the supporters of the People's Party voted for EU  accession, 
whereas 57 per cent of the Freedom Party
5 and 42 per cent of the Green voters 
spoke out against accession.
6 
The positions of (some of) the political parties towards the European integration process 
changed somewhat over the past decades. Whereas the Social Democrats, as shown, 
                                                 
1   Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ). 
2   These negotiations started in 1989. 
3   On 29 June 1989 175 members of the Nationalrat supported the respective resolution against the 
votes of seven MP (Social Democrats; People’s Party; Freedom Party vs. Grüne Alternative 
(Greens). The Bundesrat supported the resolution with unanimity. (See Schaller, Christian, 1997, 
op.cit., p. 57). 
4   In Sweden and Finland 52.2 per cent and 57 per cent respectively voted in favour of EU members-
hip. In Norway 52,5 per cent of the people spoke out against EU accession. 
5   Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ). 
6  See Schaller, Christian, 1997, op.cit., p. 61. See here also for example Luif, Paul: ‘Der Weg zum 12. 
Juni: 1955, 1957, 1962, 1972/73’, in: Pelinka, Anton (ed.): EU-Referendum. Zur Praxis direkter 
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adopted a more pro-European stance during the 1980’s, the Freedom Party transformed 
- interestingly enough  - from the first party demanding an a ccession to the EC in the 
1960’s to a political force at least rhetorically o pposed to the EU. The People’s Party 
favoured an accession to the EU right from the outset. A less clear-cut picture must be 
drawn when looking at the Green Party. Although some members were in favour of 
accession, the majority o pposed Austria’s way into the EU and campaigned heavily 
against it. After the referendum on Austrian EU membership, the Greens decided to 
unite their forces to work for a reform of the EU from ‘within’. The fifth party being 
present in parliament at the conclusion of the accession negotiations in 1994 was the 
Liberal Forum, which split off from the Freedom Party in 1993. Being a liberal party it 
pushed strongly for accession. 
Today, only the Freedom Party questions Austria’s EU membership substantially. It 
launched a petition for a referendum to prevent Austria joining the EURO-zone in 1997. 
Only four per cent of the registered voters supported this quest. Since February 2000 the 
People’s Party and the Freedom Party form the Austrian Federal Government. This does 
not imply that the representatives of the Freedom Party support EU integration full-
heartedly. However, it led to a somewhat more differentiated rhetoric at least by most 
government members.
1 
The support of the public for Austria's membership in the EU has declined since June 
1994 from almost 67 per cent to 60 per cent in March 2000. The figures r eflect that 
even after the measures of the other 14 EU member states imposed against Austria for 
six months the majority of the population supported and supports their country's acces-
sion to the EU.
2  
 
2. The Austrian Framework for Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs 
 
Federalism has a long tradition in Austria, where the federal principle is a basic feature 
of the Constitution. Even long before Austrian accession to the EU it became clear that 
the political sub-units, the Bundesländer, would have to be granted participatory rights 
on European level, which would go beyond those provided by the Committee of the 
Regions, in order not to deviate too far from their domestic role. The involvement of the 
Länder was not only laid down in the 1994 amendment of the Federal Constitution
3 but 
in a special agreement between the Federation and the Länder.
4  
                                                                                                                                               
Demokratie in Österreich, Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für angewandte Politikforschung, Bd. 6, 
Vienna, 1994, pp. 23-48. 
1  See Der Standard, 20.4.2000. 
2  See Profil, 6.3.2000. 
3  See article 23 d. 
4   Agreement between the Federation (Bund) and the Länder as regards to the rights of Länder and 
municipalities to be involved in matters concerning the European integration process, Federal Law 
Gazette (Federal Law Gazette) No. 775/1992.  
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On this basis the Bundesländer have introduced legal provisions. The implementation is 
regulated in a somewhat different way in each Land; six out of nine provinces have 
passed regulations on the constitutional level. All of the respective Provincial Constitu-
tional Laws contain the following provisions: establishment of respective Committees 
on EU  matters, the obligation of the provincial government to provide information and 
the right to pass a binding opinion on EU matters. However, the Länder of Upper Aus-
tria, Salzburg and Tyrol do not see the provincial parliaments but the Integration Con-
ference of the Länder as the main forum to deal with EU matters. On the other hand, 
Carinthia, Lower Austria and Vienna created Committees on EU matters and informa-
tion is exchanged informally between the provincial government and the respective 
parliaments.
1 
The procedure of involving the Länder on the European level is similar to that of the 
Nationalrat, but their rights are more limited. The Länder must be informed in detail on 
all projects in the framework of the EU which affect their sphere of competence or 
which could be of interest to them. One of the most important features of regional par-
ticipation is the right of the Länder to give an opinion on such proposals. The Austrian 
Government is subsequently bound by this opinion during negotiations at the European 
level.
2 It may only deviate for “compelling reasons relating of foreign or integration 
policy” and must come up with a justification for this deviation within eight weeks.  
Representatives of the Länder can also take part in negotiations on the European level. 
If issues are discussed that fall into their sphere of legislative competence, the Govern-
ment delegates a Länder official to the Austrian Delegation. This Delegate must how-
ever act in concertation with the Government representative. 
One may also not forget to mention that the second parliamentary Chamber, the Aus-
trian Bundesrat, which consists of representatives of the Länder, may also issue opin-
ions on EU affairs. Given that EU proposals would lead to changes of the Austrian Con-
stitution, where the Bundesrat would have to give its assent on the domestic level, de-
parture from a Bundesrat opinion is only legal for compelling reasons of foreign and 
integration policy. The fact that the interests of the Länder often diverge as regards to 
EU policies, due to their differing economic and legal background, has led to difficulties 
in the practical political process. Binding opinions of the Länder are subsequently more 
of an exception than the rule.  
A main hurdle the Länder also face is to keep up with the pace of EU negotiations and 
not at last the geographical distance between them has led to major delays when trying 
to draft a common regional standpoint. The inclusion of Länder representatives in the 
Austrian Delegation to the Council is also exceptional.  It therefore becomes apparent 
                                                 
1  See Unterlechner, Josef: Die Mitwirkung der Länder am EU-Willensbildungs-Prozess. Normen - 
Praxis - Wertung, Vienna 1997, pp. 107-108. 
2   Five out of the nine Länder must give their support.  
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that the Länder are faced with a plethora of practical problems when participating in EU 
affairs, which limit their efficiency.
1  
 
3. Basic Features of the Parliament-Government Relationship  
 
The Austrian Constitution stipulates very concisely that the legislative powers are car-
ried out by the Nationalrat together with the Bundesrat.
2 When analysing the activity of 
the Nationalrat in more detail, one will find that its functions within the Austrian politi-
cal system can be summarised as follows. 
 
3.1. The End-Formulation in the Legislative Process 
 
An analysis of the legislative initiatives reveals that these are to a large extent govern-
ment bills
3 submitted to parliament.
4 A main characteristic of these bills is that they are 
normally drawn up by that part of the bureaucracy that is involved in the implementing 
process of the respective matter and therefore has experience with similar legal provi-
sions. In addition, they are normally also scrutinised by other actors such as ministries 
and interest groups. Looking at the figures for the years from 1994 to 1996 one can note 
that these legislative proposals were to a large extent met by little resistance by the Aus-
trian Nationalrat: 63,1 per cent of these government bills were adopted without changes. 
On a conclusive note one can say that the Nationalrat has, so far, to a large extent given 
it's blessing to the proposals put forward by the Government. It is interesting to note that 
under the new Government coalition of the People's and the Freedom Party the trend is 
notably shifting from government bills to independent motions
5, a path that might be 
chosen to circumvent the involvement of the social partners.
6  
                                                 
1  See Falkner, Gerda: ‘How Pervasive are Euro-Politics? Effects of EU Membership on a New Mem-
ber State’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2/2000, pp. 223-250, with further refe-
rences. See also Leitner, Christine/Neuhold, Christine: ‘The Intermediate Level of Government and 
Administration in Austria’, in: Larsson Torbjörn/Nomden, Koen/Petiteville, Franck (eds.): The In-
termediate Level of Government in European States: Complexity versus D emocracy?, Maastricht 
1999, p. 301f. 
2   Article 24 of the Austrian Federal Constitution. 
3   ‘Regierungsvorlagen’. 
4   During the XX. legislative period (1996-1999) the data shows that 71 per cent (423) of the legisla-
tive proposals were government bills, 19 per cent (116) initiatives, nine per cent (54) committee ini-
tiatives and one per cent (3) initiatives brought forward by the Bundesrat. (See Schefbeck, Günther 
53/1999, p. 18.) Between 1994 and 1996 62 per cent of the legislative proposals were government 
bills, 29 per cent were initiatives and nine per cent were other forms of proposals such as petitions 
(Volksbegehren) and initiatives brought forward by the Bundesrat. 
5   ‘Selbständige Anträge’. 
6   This observation could be made when looking at the motions put forward in the XXI. legislative 
period. The Parliament itself initiated an examination process concerning six independent motions 
and one concerning a government bill. (XXI. legislative period: Industrial Committee: 48 + 49 I der 
Beilagen; Committee on Cultural Affairs: 126/A; Bautenausschuss: 129/A; Committee on Social Af-
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3.2. Partial Participation in the Process of Implementing EC Law 
 
According to the Federal Constitution
1 both the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat are e n-
abled to forward resolutions
2. Parliamentary resolutions, which have to be supported by 
a majority of the Nationalrat can be regarded as a ‘wish-list’ to the Executive. Further-
more the Nationalrat has the competence to decide on the budgetary law
3 and grants 
discharge for the budget. The Nationalrat also has to give its consent to the conclusion 
of State Treaties and has, as shown below, rather extensive controlling powers within 
the realm of EU affairs. One of the most powerful control mechanisms over the Gov-
ernment is the vote of censure whereby not only members of government can be asked 
to step down, but this can lead to the demise of the entire government. Another political 
instrument with less ‘dramatic’ consequences is the m otion of no confidence, which is 
nevertheless only resorted to in exceptional cases.
4  
 
3.3. Control of the Implementing Process 
 
The classical controlling instruments consist of written questions and urgent questions
5 
that can be brought forward by five members of parliament, the question-hour and the 
Committees for inquiry. The number of written questions has increased dramatically 
from 2.365 in 1983-1986 to 6.738 in 1996-1999.
6 The reason for the i ncrease is that 
these questions aim to obtain information which are not only related to a specific issue, 
but to examine a larger topic, where the responses collected can subsequently be used as 
material for other political activities.
 7 
 
3.4. A Forum of Political Debate 
 
Given that the political fora such as the Austrian Council of Ministers, the governments 
of the Bundesländer and the social partners meet behind closed doors, it is of utmost 
importance that the plenary of the Nationalrat (and the Bundesrat) performs as an open 
tribune where current political themes are discussed publicly. 
                                                                                                                                               
fairs: 19/A, 123/A, 130/A, 131/A) (Information received from the Parlamentsdirektion on 28 June 
2000). 
1   ‘Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz’ (B-VG). 
2   ‘Parlamentarische Entschließungen’. 
3   ‘Bundesfinanzgesetz’. 
4   The number of these motions of confidence varied from two (1971-1975) to 14 (1990-1994).  
5   ‘Dringliche Anfragen’. 
6  See Bundespressedienst (ed.): Österreichisches Jahrbuch 1999: Die Arbeiten des Nationalrates und 
des Bundesrates, Vienna 2000, pp. 17-84, p. 74. 
7  See Fischer, Heinz: ‘Das Parlament’, in: Dachs, Herbert/Gerlich, Peter/Gottweis, Herbert (eds.), 
1997, op.cit., pp. 99-121.   
 
319
The parliamentary groups are organised along party lines and follow a rather strict sys-
tem of party discipline. Since 1945 a rigid division of powers between the Austrian So-
cialist/Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People's Party largely dominated the 
Austrian political system. The two parties have ruled Austria since World War II, either 
in coalition, or what might even be described as a “collusion”, with the country's institu-
tions and posts shared out proportionally between the two ruling parties.
1 The role of the 
opposition was traditionally rather weak; a trend which has been reversed gradually 
since the mid 1980’s. Since 1986 a “de-concentration” of the party system is notable, 
where the two bigger parties could only unite two thirds of the votes as opposed to more 
than 90 per cent in the 1970’s.
2  
Since the mid 1980’s the number of the relevant parties has risen from three to five, 
when the Greens (1986) and the Liberal Forum (1993) became established parties 
within the Austrian Parliament. The main factor contributing the end of the dominance 
of Social Democrats and the People's Party was, however, the rise of the Freedom Party. 
The strength of this party increased dramatically, obtaining less than five per cent of the 
votes in 1983 and 21.9 per cent in 1995. In the last elections to the Austrian Parliament 
(3 October 1999) the Freedom Party could even boost 27.2 per cent of the vote, margin-
ally more votes than the mainstream Conservatives, subsequently becoming the second 
strongest party in the Austrian political arena.
3  These election results reflect most point-
edly that the traditional loyalties b etween voters and parties have been dissolved to a 
considerable extent. The “diversity” of the Austrian political arena was reduced due to 
the fact that the members of the Liberal Forum did not manage to obtain four per cent of 
the vote to be re-elected. 
The Austrian President, who has the constitutional right to nominate the Federal Chan-
cellor, and subsequently to his proposals the other members of the Government, a p-
pointed the head of the Social Democrats, Viktor Klima, to take up government negotia-
tions, following the recent election.
4 For more than a hundred days Social D emocrats 
and the People's Party negotiated with the goal in mind to form a joint government once 
again. Only when these coalition negotiations failed the People's Party subsequently 
formed a coalition with the far right-wing Freedom Party under Jörg Haider.
5 T hat led 
the USA and Israel to recall their ambassadors from Austria and European governments 
                                                 
1  See International Herald Tribune, 5./6.2.2000. 
2   In 1945 the two parties could unite 94.4 per cent, in 1970 93.1 per cent, in 1983 90.8 per cent, in 
1990 74.9 per cent and in 1995 66.4 per cent of the votes. See Müller, Wolfgang, C.: ‘Parteiensys-
tem, Politische Bewegungen’, in: Dachs, Herbert/Gerlich, Peter/Gottweis, Herbert, et al., (eds.), 
1997, op.cit., pp. 215-235. 
3   The Social Democratic Party has 65 seats the People’s Party and the Freedom Party 52 seats and the 
Greens send 14 members to the national parliament subsequent to the 1999 elections. 
4  See article 70 of the Austrian Federal Constitution. 
5   Haider resigned as head of the Freedom Party in late February 2000.  
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to begin downgrading relations in protest to Haider's anti-immigration policies.
1 The 
(other) 14 EU member states suspended bilateral relations with the Austrian G overn-
ment
2 due to the inclusion of the Freedom Party. However, they have acted on an inter-
governmental basis, outside the Treaty framework. In mid September 2000 the EU-14 
suspended their bilateral sanctions against Austria on the basis of the so-called report by 
the wise men Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frohwein and Marcellino Oreja.
3 
 
4. The Institutional Framework in European Decision-Making 
 
Since Austria's accession to the EU the competences of the Austrian Parliament and 
here e specially those of its Main  Committee
4 were strengthened  - as regards to foreign 
policy issues and the participation of the Nationalrat and of the Bundesrat in European 
affairs.
5 There are several so-called constitutional acts, which played an important role 
on Austria's path to the EU. The Federal Constitutional Law on the Accession of Austria 
to the European Union
6 was put before the people in the referendum on accession. By 
way of this law the competent constitutional organs were empowered to conclude Aus-
tria’s Accession Treaty to the EU.  
The modus of parliamentary participation concerning EU matters was laid down in the 
so-called EU-Begleit-Bundesverfassungsgesetz which was passed by the Nationalrat on 
15 December 1994.
7 By way of this amendment, the Austrian Federal Constitution  es-
tablishes a system, which allows for participation of the N ationalrat and the Bundesrat 
in EU affairs. Articles 23e and 23f of the Constitution confer the following main 
competences to both the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat:  
-  information rights, where the competent member of the Federal Government has 
to submit  - without any delay  - information about all projects within the frame-
work of the European Union to the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat
8, and  
-  the possibility to present binding opinions to the Federal Minister.
9 The l egal 
character of the binding opinions is comparable to that of a resolution  - however, 
an opinion contrary to a resolution is legally and politically binding.
1 
                                                 
1  See Financial Times, 6.3.2000. 
2   This provision was first included in a communiqué issued by the Portuguese Presidency at the be-
ginning of February. 
3   The text of the report can be downloaded from the Austrian Government’s homepage: 
http://www.austria.gv.at. 
4  See article 54-55 of the Austrian Federal Constitution. See also Neisser, Heinrich: ‘Parlamentsre-
form und EU-Beitritt’, in: Gerlich, Peter/Neiser, Heinrich (eds.): Europa als Herausforderung. Wan-
dlungsimpulse für das politische System Österreichs, Vienna 1994, pp. 336-337. 
5  See article 50-55 of the Austrian Federal Constitution. 
6  See EU-Beitritts-Bundesverfassungsgesetz, Federal Law Gazette No. 744/1994. 
7  See Federal Law Gazette No. 1013/1994. 
8  See Urbantschitsch, Wolfgang: National parliaments in the European Union - the Austrian expe-
rience, Graz 1998, p. 46. 
9  See ibid., p. 13.  
 
321
The Nationalrat and the Bundesrat have the right to present binding opinions  on issues 
falling not only into the first, but also the Second and the Third Pillars of EU law.
2 The 
chosen system follows broadly the path of its “legal predecessors”, i.e. to the participa-
tion of the provinces and municipalities concerning EU matters, which was established 
before Austria’ s accession to the EEA.
3 In case the Federal Minister departs from a 
binding opinion, s/he must report this to the EU Main Committee. So far this possibility 
was resorted to merely once in connection with the very first  binding opinion. As the 
respective legal provision in the rules of procedure of the Nationalrat was not in force at 
that time, the Government did in fact report back to parliament, but no further action 
was taken. Now the obligation to report to parliament is actually enshrined in the rules 
of procedure of the Nationalrat. This report would have to be distributed among all 
members of the Nationalrat, although it would not be public. Furthermore, the respec-
tive report could be put on the agenda of the EU Main Committee, which would then be 
free to examine it. Up to fall 2000 this procedure was, however, not implemented in the 
practical political process. 
These provisions grant the Austrian Parliament with rather extensive competences as 
regards EU affairs, at least, on paper. A number of authors consider the Austrian 
stipulations as some of the most-far reaching when compared to other EU member 
states.
4 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See Neisser, Heinrich: ‘Die Mitwirkungsbefugnisse des Nationalrates im Entscheidungsprozess der 
Europäischen Union’, in: Schäffer, Heinz/Berka, Walter/Stolzlechner, Harald/Werndl, Wolfgang 
(eds.): Staat - Verfassung - Verwaltung, Vienna 1998, pp. 339, 349.  
2  See Morass, Michael: ‘Österreich im Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Union’, in: Tálos, 
Emmerich/Falkner, Gerda (eds.): EU-Mitglied Österreich, Vienna 1996, p. 38. 
3  See Khol, Andreas: ‘Demokratieabbau durch EU-Regierungsgesetzgebung?’, in: Österreichische 
Parlamentarische Gesellschaft (ed.), 75 Jahre Bundesverfassung, Vienna 1995, p. 276; Körner, Mar-
git: ‘Das EU-Begleit-Bundesverfassungsgesetz - die Mitwirkung der Parlamente von Bund und Län-
dern bei der Schaffung von neuem EU-Recht’, in: Khol, Andreas/Ofner, Günther/Stirnemann, Alfred 
(eds.), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1994, Vienna, 1995; pp. 515ff.; see also Neisser, Hein-
rich: ‘Parlamentsreform und EU-Beitritt’, in: Gerlich, Peter/Neiser, Heinrich (eds.): Europa als H e-
rausforderung. Wandlungsimpulse für das politische System Österreichs, Vienna 1994, pp. 43-69. 
4  See Morass, Michael, 1996, op.cit., p. 37, Falkner, Gerda: ‘Österreichische Politiknetzwerke und 
EU-Mitgliedschaft: Ergebnisse und Trends’, in: Falkner, Gerda/Müller, Wolfgang C. (eds.): Öster-
reich im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, Vienna 1998, p. 231; Informationsbüro des EP für Öster-
reich, Das Europäische Parlament und Österreich, Vienna, 1999, p. 17.  
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 II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs  
 
1. The Nature of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The perceived democratic deficit of the European Union and the fear of being a ‘tooth-
less tiger’ within the Austrian decision-making process on EU affairs were the driving 
forces behind the quest of the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat to ensure a rather strong 
role for themselves. Furthermore the (then) Federal Government did not have the two 
thirds majority in parliament, which was the precondition to pass the Constitutional 
Acts on Austria's accession to the EU. Two opposition parties - the Greens and the Lib-
eral Forum  - had to be convinced to vote in favour of the changes, and the provisions to 
strengthen the Parliament’s position with regard to EU matters were part of the com-
promise, not to say trade off. 
1 
 
2. The Institutional Setting of Parliamentary Scrutiny  
 
Just like other parliaments in Europe the Austrian Parliament has diverse possibilities  - 
i.e. interpellation, urgent question, debate on matters of topical interest  - to control the 
work of the Government ex-post. Additionally, the Nationalrat - and to a lesser extent -
the Bundesrat have increasingly become fora for far-reaching and even controversial 
debates on foreign policy.
2 However, the Austrian Parliament has also secured the pos-
sibility to fulfil the exercise of ex-ante control. The rules of procedure of the National-
rat, as adapted in 1996, provide detailed rules on the parliamentary participation in EU 
decision-making. Note that European Union affairs are discussed on Committee level as 
the EU Main Committee and a specialised Standing Sub-Committee are in charge of 
fulfilling this duty on behalf of the Nationalrat. The Sub-Committee only came into 
existence in 1999, as in the former legislative period no compromise could be found as 
to who should be the chairperson to such a Committee.  
                                                 
1  See Khol, Andreas, 1995, op.cit., pp. 275ff., Fitzmaurice, John: National parliamentary control of 
EU policy in the three new member states, West European Politics, 19 (1), 1996, p. 91; Wohnout, 
Helmut: Die Mitwirkungsrechte des österreichischen Parlaments an der Willensbildung in der EU, 
Die Union, Vierteljahresschrift für Integrationsfragen, 1/1999, p. 71f. 
2  See Neisser, Heinrich, 1998, op.cit., p. 339. 323  
Figure 9: The Process of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EC/EU Affairs in Austria  
  
European Commission 
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Both Committees have the possibility to pass a binding opinion.
1 There is no duty of the 
Committees to report separately to the Nationalrat when a binding opinion is passed. 
The opinion must be transmitted immediately to the Federal Chancellor, the Minister on 
Foreign Affairs and the competent minister. 
Similar rules are in place for the Bundesrat.
2 The relevant reform to the rules of proce-
dure of the Bundesrat were, however, only passed in 1997.
3 Previously the President’s 
Conference of the Bundesrat agreed to conduct negotiations on EU affairs only if one 
parliamentary group or the members of the Bundesrat of one province put forward a 
respective demand. To create a relevant forum for discussion, the Bundesrat elected the 
members of the Committee on European Affairs in February 1995. As this Committee 
did not have the possibility to pass a binding opinion, such matters were referred to the 
plenary, which then had the possibility to pass a binding opinion on the respective mat-
ter. This rather complicated mechanism was based on the fact that Article 23e of the 
Federal Constitution of 1994 provided that the respective Committee only had the right 
to discuss the matter, whereas the plenary of the Bundesrat was given the right to pass 
an opinion. In 1996 an amendment to the Constitution
4 gave the Committee on Euro-
pean Affairs the possibility to pass a binding opinion similar to the EU Main Committee 
of the Nationalrat.
5 
Apart from the EU Main Committee and the Standing Sub-Committee, which deal with 
EU affairs the rules of procedure of the Nationalrat foresee the possibility to install a 
further Committee. This Committee would  -  according to the current composition of the 
Nationalrat  - have five members: the chairman of the Standing Sub-Committee on mat-
ters of the European Union and one representative of each parliamentary group. This 
Committee would be obliged to fulfil the task  of a ‘fire-brigade’: given that the minister 
negotiating on the European level was bound by a binding opinion this Committee 
would function as a consultative body in parliament with the aim of enabling a com-
promise at Council level.
6 Formally this Committee must, however, not speak on behalf 
of the Standing Sub-Committee.
7 Up to this point in time, this Committee has met once 
to scrutinise the results of Nice Intergovernmental Conference.
8 
                                                 
1  See section 31d of the rules of procedure of the Nationalrat. 
2  See Körner, Margit, 1995, op.cit., p. 522. 
3  See Federal Law Gazette I No. 65/1997. 
4  See article 23e, para. 6 of the Austrian Constitution. 
5  See section 13a para. 2 of the rules of procedure of the Bundesrat; Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, Das 
österreichische Parlament und die europäische Integration. Die Praxis des EU-Hauptausschusses und 
des EU-Ausschusses des Bundesrates seit dem Beitritt Österreichs zur EU, Wien, 1999, p. 17. 
6  See Neisser, Heinrich, 1998, op.cit., p. 351. 
7   This passage of the rules of procedure is considered to be soft law. Wieser, Bernd: ‘Zur schwierigen 
Umsetzung der parlamentarischen Beteiligung an der innerstaatlichen Willensbildung in EU-
Angelegenheiten: Das Komitee gem. § 31 e Abs 3 GOGNR’, Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 
3/1998,pp. 81-93. 
8   See Parlamentskorrespondenz, 1 December 2000, No. 719.  
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3. The Scope of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
3.1. Quantitative Analysis  
 
According to the constitutional provisions and the respective stipulations of the rules of 
procedure of the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat all documents connected to the EU are 
submitted to the Parliament without any pre-selection or co-ordination by the competent 
government ministers. No explanatory abstracts are to be included, as there is no duty to 
submit additional information. The Government has agreed, however, to submit cover 
pages which contain basic information concerning the respective document, but this has 
not led to a substantial change as these papers are considered not to be very informative. 
Given the number of documents submitted to parliament, one can easily imagine that 
this causes severe difficulties to select the material of relevance.
1 Some even argue that 
it is the ”idea of the bureaucracy to flood parliament with documents, until it is unable 
to breathe.”
2 
Table 23: Number of EU-documents Submitted to the Austrian Parliament 
XIX.   Legislative Period: November 1995-13.1.1996  17.968 
XX.  Legislative Period: 14.1.1996-28.10.1999  75.958 
XXI. Legislative Period: since 29.10.1999 (as of 21.6.2001)  34.428 
Source: Parlamentsdirektion 
 
One has to note, however, that in some cases the Parliament receives the same docu-
ment two or even three times, as for example different language versions are submitted 
and different ministries dealing with the same issue submit the same document. Around 
70 per cent of the incoming documents come from the Council, 20 per cent from the 
Commission, seven per cent of the Permanent Mission of Austria in Brussels and the 
Federal Ministries, and one per cent from the European Parliament, the European Court 
of Justice and the Court of Auditors, respectively. Around 20 per cent of the documents 
submitted by the Council and the Commission are agendas.
3 All incoming documents 
are inserted into a data-base, which is accessible via Intranet to the parliamentary 
groups and employees of the parliamentary Administration. A large bulk of the docu-
ments are submitted by the Federal Ministries, but also directly by EU institutions or by 
the Austrian Permanent Representation in Brussels. The Austrian Parliament recently 
created a special e-mail address in order to speed up the submission of EU documents as 
well as to minimise the bureaucratic burden by not having to scan this substantial num-
ber of documents. 
                                                 
1  See Urbantschitsch, Wolfgang, 1998, op.cit., p. 47-48, Wohnout, Helmut, 1999, op.cit., pp. 74, 78. 
2  See Falkner, Gerda, 1998, op.cit., p. 232. 
3  See Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, 1999, op.cit., p. 4.  
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During the course of 1996 to 1999 one document was transmitted to parliament dealing 
with the role of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process. This was an intro-
ductory note submitted by the Presidency to the Conference of the Representatives of 
the governments of the member states of 9 September 1996. However, this document 
was not put on the agenda of the EU Main Committee. There were no documents con-
cerning COSAC and the EP’s Neyts-Uttenbroeck report of 1997. The resolution by the 
European Parliament (EP) drawn up subsequent to this report was not even transmitted 
to the Austrian Parliament. 
 
3.2. The Number of EC/EU Documents Considered by Parliament  
 
Between the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 92 documents were on the agenda 
of the EU Main Committee.
1 From 1996 to1999 33 meetings took place and 155 docu-
ments were on the agenda. So far nine meetings were held during the XXI. Legislative 
period, which started on 29 October 1999 and 25 documents were discussed.
2 Up to 
June 2001 the Sub-Committee on European Affairs met eight times and discussed 22 
documents. The topics considered range from environmental issues, health, animal pro-
tection, E UROPOL, data protection, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Eastern 
enlargement and employment to general preparatory discussions before Council meet-
ings. 
Within the Nationalrat a so-called preparatory group
3 decides by consensus as to which 
documents should be discussed during the meetings of the EU Main Committee.
4 It can 
be said that the so-called ‘Klubsekretäre’
5 fulfil this duty instead of the heads of the 
respective parliamentary group. Interestingly enough it is mostly the opposition parties 
that propose the EU document to be discussed during the EU Main Committee meeting; 
only in a selected number of cases of Members of Parliament (MP’s) of the Government 
parties were active in such matters.
6 With regard to the topics selected to be discussed, 
matters were chosen which are regulated at the federal level and were seen as especially 
important for the Parliament’s participation.
7 In the Bundesrat the ‘Klubsekretäre’ pre-
pare the Committee meetings which deal with the opinions reached by the President’s 
Conference.
8  
 
                                                 
1  See ibid., p. 4. 
2   Source: Parlamentsdirektion as of 14 June 2001. 
3   ‘Vorbereitungskomitee’. 
4  See Parlamentsdirektion 1997, p. 10, Urbantschitsch, Wolfgang, 1998, op.cit., p. 43. 
5   These are for the most part lawyers that deal with preparatory work. 
6  See Fischer, Heinz: ‘Die Demokratisierung der EU aus Sicht des österreichischen Parlaments’, in: 
Leicht, Anton (ed.): Regierungskonferenz 1996. Wohin steuert die EU?, Vienna 1996, pp. 167-178. 
7  See Wohnout, Helmut, 1999,op.cit., p. 75. 
8  See Präsidialkonferenz des Bundesrates; Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, 1999, op.cit., p. 17.  
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3.3. Documents Produced after Consideration of EC/EU Documents 
 
The EU Main Committee and the Committee on European Affairs of the Bundesrat may 
decide on a so-called opinion, which is legally and politically binding. In the National-
rat, 18 such opinions were passed during the XIX. legislative period; 13 during the XX. 
and until June 2001 three during the XXI. period. The Standing Sub-Committee on 
European Affairs passed two opinions until June 2001. The topics of binding opinions 
vary from issues such as BSE, to animal protection, from employment policy to EMU, 
from biotechnological inventions, traffic issues to international relations. Security, agri-
culture, asylum and neutrality were also topics under consideration.  
Until the beginning of 1999 the Committee on European Affairs of the Bundesrat met 
eleven times and discussed 24 EU documents. The Bundesrat passed one opinion so far 
(concerning EUROPOL, 10 December 1996).
1 The Committee on European Affairs 
also passed a resolution concerning the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
2 and the 
Agenda 2000.
3 During the XXI. legislative period of the Nationalrat the Committee met 
five times so far. 
 
3.4. Public Access of Documents, Debates and Outcomes 
 
The position of the EU Main Committee  - when dealing with EU matters  - differs 
somewhat when compared to other Committees. Despite the fact, that the EU Main 
Committee can vote to bring EU matters before the plenary by drawing up a report, the 
place to discuss EU matters is normally the Committee itself.  This is also the reason 
why meetings of the EU Main Committee and the Sub-Committee on EU matters are 
open to the public and written records are published.
4 However, these records are only 
composed of extracts of the debate.
5 Summary minutes were available for the first time 
for the sitting of the EU Main Committee on 4 October 1996. Previously the meetings 
of the EU Main Committee on European projects had been confidential as any other 
Committee meeting. However, even prior to 1996 the text of the binding  opinions was 
often published in the literal sense by the press service of the parliamentary administra-
tion.
6 The rules of procedure of the Bundesrat  contain similar provisions as regards to 
openness and transparency.
7 During the XX. legislative period for  26 out of 33 sittings 
                                                 
1  See Parlamentskorrespondenz, 10.12.1996, No. 738.  
2   On 29 February 1996 and 17 November 1997 respectively. 
3  See Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, 1999, op.cit., p. 21. 
4   This is true since the reform of the rules of procedure of the Nationalrat in 1996. 
5  See section 31c Para. 6 of the rules of procedure of the Nationalrat. 
6   Parlamentskorrespondenz. See Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, 1999, op.cit., p. 12; personal communi-
cation. 
7  See section 13b Para. 9 of the rules of procedure of the Bundesrat.  
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summary minutes were produced by the EU Main Committee of the Nationalrat and 
five by the Bundesrat. 
It has to be pointed out that there is only little interest by the public to attend Committee 
meetings.
1 Furthermore, it is not possible for the EU Main Committee to transfer EU 
documents to specialised Committees. The EU Main Committee may decide, however, 
to bring certain matters before the Nationalrat. Generally, there is also the possibility of 
a so-called general debate
2 at the b eginning of each specialised Committee meeting and 
EU matters may be part of the discussion. The composition of the EU Main Committee 
can change according to the competence of the members regarding a certain matter.
3 
This possibility was resorted to several  times.
4 However, as around 70 percent of the 
laws dealing with economic matters are directly or indirectly influenced by EU-
regulations, it will be necessary to strengthen the European perspective even in the work 
of the specialised Committees.
5 There are  28 members to the EU Main Committee, 
when dealing with EU matters: ten Social Democrats, eight representatives of the Free-
dom Party and the People’s Party respectively as well as two Green members.
6 The 
Standing Sub-Committee on EU affairs has 14 members:  five Social Democrats, four 
representatives of the Freedom Party and the People’s Party respectively and one Green 
member. 
The organisation of the Committee meetings is not the duty of a single Committee sec-
retary but is divided between the parliamentary a dministration and the parliamentary 
groups. On the one hand approximately 400 employees are working in the parliamen-
tary a dministration, where about 50 have a university degree, mostly in law. Basically 
always two academics of the parliamentary administration are in charge to secure a 
smooth order of events during Committee meetings with regard to the provisions fixed 
in the rules of procedure. On the other hand, there are around 200 MP assistants. Each 
of the 183 MP’s has the right to employ an assistant - however, most MP’s decided to 
“share” MP assistants in order to secure a decent salary for them. If a MP is delegated to 
the EU Main Committee dealing with EU matters his/her assistant is in the practical 
process also responsible for preparing these meetings. Furthermore, there are members 
of the political group staff specifically dealing with EU affairs. 
                                                 
1  See Urbantschitsch, Wolfgang, 1998, op.cit., p. 44. 
2   ‘Allgemeine Aussprache’. 
3  See Neisser, Heinrich, 1998, op.cit., p. 352; Parlamentsdirektion 1997, p.11. 
4  See Schefbeck, Günther: ‘Verhandlungsökonomie - EU-Mitwirkungsrecht - Ausschussöffentlichkeit. 
Zur Reform der Nationalratsgeschäftsordnung’, Wiener Zeitung - Beilage Parlament, No. 31 (Octo-
ber)/1996, pp. 8-11, p. 10. 
5  See Nowotny, Ewald: ‘Europa und wir’, Wiener Journal, September 1998, pp.10-11, p. 10; Woh-
nout, Helmut, 1999, op.cit., p. 79. 
6   The composition of the committees is regulated in the sections 30 and 32 of the rules of procedure of 
the Nationalrat. Following the system of D’Hondt each parliamentary group gets the right to send a 
specific number of representatives to the committee. In smaller committees the system according to 
Shapley is used.  
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3.5. The Timing and Procedural Features of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
Originally the agreement was reached that the EU Main Committee should meet at least 
twice a month  - on Tuesdays- to discuss EU matters. However, this intention was only 
put into practice immediately after accession. In 1995 the EU Main Committee met 17 
times on EU matters. In 1999 the number decreased to six and three meetings took place 
in the first six months of the year 2000. Furthermore, one can see that instead of passing 
a binding opinion on a matter, the MP’s and/or parliamentary groups find ”informal” 
ways to communicate their point of view.
1 During the XX. and the XXI. legislative pe-
riod 38 meetings of the EU Main Committee were held, dealing with projects of the 
European Union.
2 The EU Committee of the Nationalrat met on average for 165 min-
utes. The EU-Committee of the Bundesrat lasted 134 minutes on average.  
The Sub-Committee s hould meet once a month.
3 Two parliamentary groups may r e-
quest an additional meeting, but only if their demand is well-founded. So far the Sub-
Committee on European Affairs met five times and discussed 13 documents. 
 
3.6. The Implications of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
Subsequent to the experience encountered when submitting the first opinion concerning 
the directive on the conditions for the transport of animals, which led to a sub-optimal 
result (both concerning the issue as such and concerning Austria’s stance within the 
Council) as the Nationalrat gave no room for m anoeuvre to the Federal Minister, the 
opinions are formulated in a way to give the Government representative the chance to 
negotiate a compromise. In the notable case of the transport of animals the Federal Min-
ister for Agriculture had to comply with a binding opinion, which stated that he had to 
block any Community legislation that would lead to a lowering of Austrian standards. 
At the end of the day, the directive was not only adopted against the Austrian vote, but 
contained provisions, which were even less stringent than a proposed compromise solu-
tion. Although the Federal Minister tried during the Council meeting in February 1995 
to re-consult the EU Main Committee in the quest to get it to review its opinion, he re-
portedly could only get in touch with the night-watch of the Parliament.
  4 After this i n-
                                                 
1   In 1996 ten such meetings were held, in 1997 and 1998 nine respectively. However, one must take 
into account that due to the General Elections held in October 1999, the frequency of all committee 
meetings decreased. See Schefbeck, Günther: ‘Die XX. GP im Spiegel der Statistik’, Teil II, Wiener 
Zeitung - Beilage Parlament, No. 54 (December)/1999, pp. 15-19, p. 18. 
2   33 meetings were held in the XX. legislative period and six in the XXI. (as of 15.9.2000). 
3   Originally it was planned that the Sub-Committee should meet every two weeks (See Khol, Andreas, 
1995, op.cit., p. 285). 
4  See on this issue Urbantschitsch, Wolfgang, 1998, op.cit., pp. 54-56.  
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cident rather soft formulations like ”the minister shall work towards” or ”make a strong 
effort” are used.  
 
Graph 5: Treatment of EU Documents in the Austrian Main Committee 
 
Source: Kerle, Ines/Müller, Christian, Das österreichische Parlament und die europäische Integration. Die Praxis des 
EU-Hauptausschusses und des EU-Ausschusses des Bundesrats seit dem Beitritt Österreichs zur EU, Wien 1999, p. 
15; Parlamentsdirektion. 
 
 
There are also positive examples however, for instance the unanimous vote on a binding 
opinion concerning the Council Regulation No. 2092/91 on organic production of agri-
cultural products and indications  referring thereto on agricultural products and food-
stuffs. This time a compromise was reached to clarify the Austrian position and to leave 
enough room of manoeuvre for the Federal Minister.
1 It became clear that the Austrian 
Parliament must not exercise i ts right to binding opinions in such a way that govern-
ment ministers are ‘handcuffed’. Some lawyers even argue that a rigid mechanism used 
by the Parliament to bind the Austrian representative in the Council could be seen as 
                                                 
1  See Schäffer, Heinz: ‘Österreichs Beteiligung an der Willensbildung in der Europäischen U nion, 
insbesondere an der europäischen Rechtssetzung’, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1996, pp. 3-73, 
p. 62; Parlamentskorrespondenz, 7.3.1995 and 16.5.1995. 
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conflicting with EU regulations.
1 As Heinz Fischer, President of the Nationalrat, o b-
served:  
“The system works, if the positions formulated by the different countries indicate trends 
and priorities but do not lay down the negotiating positions until the last full-stop and 
comma.”
2 
There is a general recognition that a balance must be found between the need for ensur-
ing a ‘parliamentary imprint’ and securing a reasonable degree of negotiating flexibility 
for ministers.
3 But it is also important for the Parliament itself that its possibilities of 
participation are optimised. Margit Körner, then employee in the parliamentary Group 
of the People's Party
4, argued: 
“If this model can be implemented by way of agreement between the political parties and if 
one can agree on a strategy, whereby the Parliament is not paralysed, then the position of the 
Parliament also after Austria's accession to the EU would be protected to a great extent.”
5 
One may also stress the fact that the role of the Parliament in the national decision-
making process on EU matters and the possibility even to bind Federal Ministers is 
based on the principle of democratic legitimacy.
6 Furthermore, the participation of the 
Parliament can also be considered as strengthening the Austrian representative in the 
Council as he or she has the opinion of the Parliament to fall back on
1.  
 
III. The Austrian Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
During the negotiation process leading up to the Amsterdam Treaty the EU Main Com-
mittee met and dealt with some of the provisional Treaty provisions, but did not specifi-
cally discuss the future role of national parliaments within the framework of the EU. 
The perception seemed to prevail that the (supervisory) competences of the Austrian 
Parliament, which are far-reaching when compared to other member states, could be left 
untouched.  
In its basic position of 26 March 1996 for the Intergovernmental Conference the Federal 
Government stated that the fundamental source of democratic legitimacy was based on 
                                                 
1  See Öhlinger, Theo: ‘Die Mitwirkung des Bundesparlamentes sowie der Länder in Österreich an der 
Entstehung von Europäischem Recht’, Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung, 1996, pp. 57-74, p. 70-71. 
2   Original: ‘Das System funktioniert dann, wenn die Positionen, die in den einzelnen Ländern formu-
liert werden, Tendenzen und Prioritäten angeben, aber nicht ein Anbinden der Verhandlungspositio-
nen auf Punkt und Beistrich sind.’ (Fischer, Heinz: Demokratisierung der EU, pp. 177-178).  
3  See Fitzmaurice, John, 1996, op.cit., p. 92. 
4  See Khol, Andreas, 1995, op.cit., p. 279. 
5   Original: ‘Kann dieses Modell einvernehmlich zwischen den Fraktionen im Parlament umgesetzt 
werden und kann man sich auf eine Vorgangsweise einigen, die das Parlament nicht lahmlegt, dann 
würde der Stellenwert des Parlaments auch nach dem EU-Beitritt größtmöglich gewahrt.’ (See Kör-
ner, Margit, 1995, op.cit., p. 523). 
6  See Morass, Michael, 1996, op.cit., p. 39.  
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the links established between n ational parliaments and the representatives of the respec-
tive member state in the Council. Subsequently the importance of the national parlia-
ments' i nvolvement in the integration process had to be enshrined in the Treaty. It was, 
however, to be left to the member states to decide on the form that this participation 
should take. Every national parliament should receive clear and complete information 
on the legislative proposals drawn up by the Commission. One way of achieving this 
would be by the stipulation of strict deadlines. The view put forward by the Austrian 
Government was furthermore that the relations between national parliaments should be 
complementary and not competetive. In this quest the co-operative structures should be 
maintained and developed. Any attempt to establish a Chamber consisting of national 
parliament representatives should be opposed.
2 
The Amsterdam Treaty itself was brought to parliament via a government bill
3 and was 
discussed in the Constitutional Committee. Prior to passing the A msterdam Treaty
4, the 
Parliament passed a Federal Constitutional Law on the Amsterdam Treaty
5 with great 
resemblance to the EU-Beitritts-Bundesverfassungsgesetz. As the Amsterdam Treaty 
was not considered a comprehensive change
6 of the Austrian Federal Constitution, no 
referendum was held.
7 
The plenary discussions of the Nationalrat dealing with the Amsterdam Treaty focused 
mostly on security issues (neutrality and Common Foreign Security Policy).
8 The ques-
tion of the relationship of the European Parliament and its interaction with the national 
parliaments was, however, on the agenda of the Bundesrat, which f ocused the role of 
the Landtage.
9 During the session of the Bundesrat in July 1998 criticism was brought 
forward that although the Protocol on National  Parliaments (PNP) mentions the parlia-
ments of the member states  - which would without doubt include the Landtage - in the 
practical political process the EP apparently only subsumes the national parliaments of 
the member states under this notion.
10 The Landtage therefore depend on the Federal 
Government to provide them with information and opinions, facing great time-delays. 
To circumvent these problems in the future the Bundesrat pleaded for an inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                               
1   Personal communication, February 1999. 
2  See Austrian Delegation: ‘Regierungskonferenz 1996. Österreichische Grundsatzpositionen’, 
26.3.1996, p. 12. 
3   XX. legislative period, government bill No. 1211 I der Beilagen. 
4  See Federal Law Gazette III No. 83/1998. 
5  See Federal Law Gazette I No. 76/1998. 
6   ‘Gesamtänderung’. 
7  See Europäisches Parlament/Generaldirektion Wissenschaft: Die Ratifikationsbedingungen für den 
Vertrag von Amsterdam. Arbeitsdokument. Politische Reihe W-30, Brussels, 1997, p. 20. In the case 
of the Amsterdam Treaty article 50 of the Federal Constitutions applied. 
8  See minutes of the 130. plenary sitting of the Nationalrat during the XX. legislative period, 18 June 
1998. 
9   Parliaments of the provinces (Länder). 
10  See minutes of the 642. plenary sitting of the Bundesrat, 2.7.1998, pp. 40-41.  
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the Landtage into the co-operative process between the EP and the parliaments of the 
member states. 
1 
 
IV. The Austrian Parliament after Amsterdam 
 
The introduction of the PNP in the Amsterdam Treaty did not affect the situation pre-
vailing in the Austrian Parliament as regards to EU matters.
2 This can be  explained by 
the fact that the changes introduced by the Protocol were to some extent already prac-
tice in the Austrian Parliament long before the enforcement of the A msterdam Treaty. 
The rules prevailing in the Austrian arena go beyond the PNP insofar as the Parliament 
possesses scrutiny rights vis-à-vis the Austrian Government as regards to all three Pil-
lars. The then Federal Chancellor Viktor Klima even held the opinion that the Austrian 
Parliament even has more rights than laid down in the PNP.
3 
The Austrian Government provides the Parliament, as mentioned above, not only with 
the basic documents, but with cover sheets, which are, however, not very informative, 
the explanation being that the drawing up of memoranda would be time-consuming and 
lead to a certain pre-selection process. The provision on timing in the PNP is imple-
mented in such a way that documents are forwarded “without delay” to parliament.
4  
The President’s Conference of the Nationalrat took a basic decision as to how the Aus-
trian Delegation to COSAC should be composed. As usual at COSAC, the Delegation 
may have six members. It was agreed that in principle two representatives of the Social 
Democrats (one of whom is the leader of the Delegation) and a representative of the 
then four other parliamentary groups (People’s Party, Freedom Party, Liberal Forum 
and Greens) should be present. After the General Elections of October 1999 the Free-
dom Party and the People’s Party delegate two members respectively. The Green mem-
ber of the Delegation only has observer status. It is up to the parliamentary group as to 
who will be nominated  - a member of the Nationalrat or a member of the Bundesrat. 
However, the personal composition of the Delegation varies greatly as the parliamen-
tary groups nominate their representative each time a meeting is scheduled. Further-
more, the Bundesrat is rarely represented in the Delegation. The Bundesrat criticised 
that the Committees on EU matters of the Landtage have no access to COSAC and de-
pend on the information given to them by the Bundesrat
5 or the Government.  
                                                 
1   This information is passed onto the Landtage by the governments of the provinces. 
2   Information of the Parliamentary Administration. 
3  See introductory note given by Prime Minister Viktor Klima to the Conference of the Presidents of 
the EU-Parliaments in Vienna; Parlamentskorrespondenz, 1.12.1998, No. 778. 
4  See Article 23e of the Federal Constitution. 
5   Statement by the President of the Bundesrat Jürgen Weiss (People’s Party); see Parlamentskorres-
pondenz, 1.7.1999, No. 365, p. 2.  
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It is important to note that the COSAC does not fall within the sphere of competence of 
the EU Main Committee or the respective Sub-Committee on EU matters but into that 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Chairperson of this Committee is frequently 
the leader of the COSAC Delegation.   
Before each COSAC meeting a questionnaire is passed to all member parliaments. In 
Austria, these are handled by the parliamentary administration, which also deals with 
the respective summary reports after the COSAC meetings. These documents are not 
open to the public as only the members of the Delegation get a copy. 
Given these circumstances it comes no surprise, that the process of “Cosaciation” can 
not be observed in Austria up to now. Scrutiny of European legislation is mainly carried 
out by the European Parliament and the national parliaments. In the Austrian Parliament 
COSAC is considered to play a supplementary role mainly as a platform for information 
exchange.  
 
V. Conclusions: The Limits of Constitutional Safeguard Clauses 
 
At least in the past the Austrian party system was considered as one of the least frag-
mented in Europe.
1 The Social Democrats and the People's Party largely dominated the 
Austrian political arena until the  mid-eighties with the opposition parties only playing a 
marginal role. It was only until the rise of the Freedom Party during the 1980’s, the 
foundation of the Greens and eventually the Liberal Forum that the two actors gradually 
lost in importance. Until  the end of the 1970’s Austria was considered as the country 
with the least fluctuation of voters between the two ‘grand’ parties.
2  
Building on constitutional provisions the political system is based on the close co-
operation between the Executive and the  Legislative: the Government needs the trust 
and assent of the Nationalrat and depends on the Nationalrat in so far as the latter ap-
proves the budget. It is the Parliament that by way of parliamentary resolutions puts 
forward special guidelines for the activity of the administration. On the other hand the 
activity of the Government affects the Nationalrat substantially, a fact that is not only 
reflected in the importance of governmental bills, but also in the dominance of the Gov-
ernment as regards financial  and personal resources. Members of government princi-
pally have the right to take part in the sessions of the Nationalrat and its committees and 
to take the floor under privileged circumstances.
3 The important role of the Executive in 
the decision-making process b ecomes even more salient when looking at the Austrian 
decision-making process with regard to European affairs: the Parliament is ‘showered’ 
                                                 
1   Based on the categories of Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy, Yale: University Press 1999. 
2  See Müller, Wolfgang, C.: ‘Parteiensystem, Politische Bewegungen’, in: Dachs, Herbert/Gerlich, 
Peter/Gottweis, Herbert (eds.), 1997, op.cit., pp. 227ff. 
3  See Fischer, Heinz, 1997, op.cit., p. 116.  
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with information, but does not have the resources to respond within the very stringent 
time limits prevalent  at European level and is not involved at the initial stages of the 
national decision-making process. 
Austrian policy is made on two levels: by the political parties and by the social partners, 
where since the end of the 1970’s the first gained in importance to the detriment of the 
latter. However, the corporatist structures - the crucial Austrian interest groups - are still 
of great importance, especially in their core area of labour law and labour market pol-
icy. Given their role on the national level, it comes as no surprise that the social partners 
were also granted specific participatory rights within the EU decision-making process.
1 
The Austrian federal state is based on constitutional provisions, which stipulate that the 
state functions are to be shared between the Federation and the Länder.
2 The repartition 
of competences in the political process and the role of the Bundesrat reflect however, 
that the federal principle does not have large practical implications. On the European 
level, the Länder are even face more difficulties in following EU negotiations than the 
Austrian Parliament. 
The Austrian Constitution provides the legal basis for a large bulk of decisions taken on 
the national as well as on the European level, but does not always adequately reflect the 
actual political developments, the ‘living constitution’. One notable example is the s o-
cial partnership, which played and still plays an important role in shaping the practical 
political process, but where no reference is to be found in the Constitution. 
When examining the role of national parliaments within the European arena, one can 
conclude that on the whole the Austrian Parliament cannot be described as a ‘winner’ of 
the European integration process. The fact that Austria was outvoted in the issue of 
animal transport made apparent that a number of aspects cannot be controlled by n a-
tional parliaments as many decisions in the Council are taken by qualified majority. 
Even if unanimity is required for certain issues and in theory the Parliament could suc-
ceed to impose its standpoint not only on the Government, but also push it through 
within the European arena, the sheer volume of documents transmitted to the Austrian 
Parliament prevent this in practice.  
The Amsterdam Treaty did not alter the role o f the Austrian Parliament in EC/EU a f-
fairs. This can be partly attributed to the fact that some of the provisions introduced for 
national parliaments were already parliamentary practice before the Treaty came into 
force. During the negotiations leading up  to the Amsterdam Treaty the role of national 
parliaments within the European framework was not specifically discussed.  
When comparing the two position papers the Austrian Government put forward for the 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97, one finds that  the position was somewhat e x-
                                                 
1  See Falkner, Gerda, 2000, op.cit., p. 238ff. 
2  See article 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitution.  
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panded between May 1995 and March 1996.
1 Contrary to the first paper, the Govern-
ment stressed in its second memorandum the necessity of providing national parlia-
ments with comprehensive information on Commission proposals. The i mportance of 
inter-parliamentary structures such as the COSAC was also underlined. 
Neither the Government nor the administration have an interest in stronger scrutiny 
powers for the Parliament in EU affairs. The Government values any leeway it has to 
adapt and even changes its position to developments and pressures of negotiations on 
the European level. The administration seems to see the strategy of 'drowning' the n a-
tional parliament with information as a way of not only to keep it informed, but seems 
to e xpect that the Parliament will be unable to select the most important issues for par-
liamentary opinions. 
2 
One also has to stress that although the Austrian stipulations on parliamentary involve-
ment in EU affairs might be considered as far reaching, they are designed in a way that 
the members of parliament come in at the end of the EU decision-making process on the 
national level. They are not implicated in the generation of a national 'standpoint', but 
are only involved when an issue is present in the Austrian Council of Ministers. By 
then, however, the national position is usually a lready well designed and there is little 
room for change. 
The Austrian case is a rather good example for the discrepancy between legal provisions 
and practical implications. Democracy cannot be enforced by constitutional provisions, 
but must become an intrinsic and pivotal feature of the decision-making process.  
                                                 
1  See Austrian Delegation: ‘Leitlinien zu den voraussichtlichen Themen der  Regierungskonferenz 
1996’, 30.5.1995 and Austrian Delegation: ‘Regierungskonferenz 1996. Österreichische Grundsatz-
positionen’, 26.3.1996. 
2  See Falkner, Gerda, 2000, op.cit., p. 231f. For a study in the field of environment devoted inter alia 
to this topic, see Steiner, Gerhard/Trattnigg, Rita: ‘Sektorstudie Umweltpolitik’, in: Falkner, Ger-
da/Müller, Wolfgang C. (eds.), 1998, op.cit., pp.139-173. 337  
The Parliament of the Netherlands and the European Union: Early Starter, 
Slow Mover 
 
Ben J.S. Hoetjes 
 
I. Introduction: The Netherlands in EU 
 
1. Public opinion: From Captive Audience to Positive Indifference 
 
The involvement of the Dutch in European integration dates back to the 1950’s, and 
therefore there a relatively long-term data about the Dutch attitudes towards Europe. At 
the level of general public opinion, recent comparative research has shown a long-
standing ‘loyalty’ of the Dutch public towards European integration.
1 Compared to the 
other EU member states, the Netherlands together with Luxembourg show the most 
stable public attitude towards European integration. Over the years, the Dutch have 
been warmly in favour - again, compared to other member states - of European integra-
tion, although in the 1990’s pro-EU- support slightly decreased. Whereas e.g. France 
and Italy saw a sharp increase in EU-support during the 1960’s, and a gradual decrease 
in support occurred in Germany, France and Belgium during the 1980’s and 1990s’, the 
Dutch public opinion has remained remarkably stable. The recent slight decrease in EU-
support has brought the Netherlands closer to the other member states in terms of EU-
support and EU-scepticism. 
As in other member states, a distinction should be made between the general public 
attitude and the elite. In the Netherlands, this distinction,  until the 1970’s, was closely 
linked to the system of ‘pillarisation’
2. For the general public, European integration was 
a good cause, which was to be entrusted to the experts and the elite. Ordinary citizens 
were quite willing to leave politics to the elite of their ‘pillar’
3. Voter turnout at elec-
tions was very high, due to the legal obligation to show up at the polls - voting was a 
‘citizen’s duty’. Within the political elite, there was hardly any disagreement about 
European integration, and the integration process itself was highly technical and spe-
cialised. The general public accepted its role as a ‘captive audience’ without demurring.  
During the 1960’s, things started to change, as elsewhere in Europe. Relations between 
the voters and the elite, and relations within the elite became less predictable. New par-
ties emerged  - anarchist, leftist-liberal, progressive - and the role of the floating voter in 
                                                 
1   See Janssen, J.I.H., Publieke steun voor de Europese Unie - analyse van de publieke opinie in 12 
lidstaten 1952-1998, Maastricht, 2001, p. 135. 
2   See Lijphart’s concept on consociational democracy. 
3   These pillars are e.g. Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal-Conservative.  
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elections became more important.
1 During the 1970’s, political discussion radicalised 
and became more a nd more antagonistic, especially in fields with a high moral content, 
e.g. disarmament, third world, and environment. The Netherlands became less pillarised 
and more polarised.  
Remarkably, however, this change did not affect European integration and EU member-
ship. In the relationship between the citizens and the elite, European integration r e-
mained a highly technical, specialised, and politically un-interesting field. It was left in 
the hands of elite specialists  - with a general attitude that it was a good thing for the 
country. Notions about integration were very vague. There was, at least, the implicit 
assumption that Dutch identity and Dutch political institutions would remain in place, 
and that the integration process would deliver considerable benefits, especially in eco-
nomic terms.
2 During the 1980’s, with the decline of ideology and political involvement 
among the public at large, European integration became a matter of ‘positive indiffer-
ence’. Little or no questions were asked, and knowledge about the EU decreased among 
the general public. The end of the Cold War brought a subsiding of ideological contro-
versies, a blurring of distinctions between left and right, and the possibility of new coa-
litions in Dutch politics  - even without the Christian-democrats as the indispensable 
‘balancers’. Among the public at large, interest in politics decreased dramatically. Only 
very close-to-home issues, like safety in the streets, disasters, plagues and accidents or 
very personal material interests
3 are still able to attract people’s attention. 
Gradually, European integration came to be criticised as ‘too costly’, ‘wasteful’, ‘un-
democratic’ etc. Business circles remained quite positive about the EU, but in other 
circles, positive indifference was replaced by controversy, or negative indifference. 
Voting turnout at the 1999 EP-elections reached an all-time low of less than 30%. 
 
2. Political Parties  
 
The political parties in the Netherlands, broadly speaking, have supported European 
integration over the years. Nevertheless, there are some interesting and important differ-
ences. The Christian-democrats, especially the Catholics among them  - the Christian-
democratic Party was formed in 1979 by a merger of the Catholic Party KVP and two 
protestant parties ARP and CHU  - h ave been the strongest supporters of European inte-
                                                 
1   See Andeweg, Rudy A.: Dutch voters adrift - on explanations of electoral change 1963-1977, Lei-
den, 1982. 
2   See Hoetjes, Ben J.S.: ‘The Netherlands’, in: Rometsch, Dietrich/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.), The 
European Union and member states - towards institutional fusion? Manchester/New York, 1996, pp. 
155-184; Hoetjes, Ben J.S.: Het tussenbestuur en het buitenland - de Nederlandse provincies en Eu-
ropa, Den Haag, 2000; and Hoetjes, Ben J.S.: ‘The Netherlands - a former founding father in search 
of control’, in: Wessels, Wolfgang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds.): Fifteen into one? The EU 
and its member states since the TEU, Manchester, 2001.  
3   Like e.g. the stock exchange, career openings, private business etc.  
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gration from the 1950’s onward. Also, the Conservative-liberals (VVD) have a record 
of long-standing support for EU from a market and business perspective. Kurt 
Schumachers dictum ‘when I see EEC, I see three C’s - Capitalists, Cartels and Catho-
lics - ‘, seems to hold at least for two-thirds in the Netherlands. 
The Social-democratic party PvdA had its second thoughts about European integration 
during the 1950’s. Not only was there a suspicion about international capitalism, as 
voiced e.g. by Kurt Schumacher, but also a concern about wasting money. The social-
democratic prime minister Drees, in 1957, shortly before signing the Rome treaties, is 
know to have sighed ‘there goes our good Dutch money’. Mansholt, the Dutch Social-
democrat who became President of the European Commission and Agriculture Com-
missioner, and who was a staunch supporter of European integration, for a long time 
was a loner in his own party. It took until the 1970’s before European integration was 
more widely accepted in the Dutch Labour Party.  
The  - small  - leftist-liberal party, originating in the 1960’s (Democrats-66), has had a 
strongly internationalist orientation from the start, and fully supported European inte-
gration throughout the years.  
Strong reservations and criticism towards European integration one finds among the 
Orthodox-Calvinist parties, on the one hand, and more recently also on the left. The 
Orthodox Calvinist parties, considering themselves as the representatives of the  Dutch 
national traditions, Dutch identity and the national conscience, have a lways distrusted 
European integration as a vehicle of Catholic dominance and a threat to small countries’ 
identities. Nevertheless, they actively participate in European integration, e.g. in EP-
elections, and their MEP’s are known as hard-working, serious and reliable partners, in 
spite of their critical views. Also, they have been quite successful in representing spe-
cific Dutch interests, e.g. in the transport and shipping sector. 
On the left side of the political spectrum, there are the Greens (Groenlinks, i.e. a merger 
of the Communist Party, the Pacifist Socialist Party and the Progressive-radical Chris-
tian Party) and the Socialist Party (former Maoist, revolutionary Marxist).  
The Greens are increasingly shifting their stands and their image from radical opposi-
tion to ‘potential government party’. Their highly critical views in international politics 
(Cold War, environmental degradation, world capitalism) are gradually softening, i n-
cluding a more positive attitude towards European integration.  
The Socialist Party, however, has made anti-EU-criticism into a major platform issue  - 
e.g. resisting the introduction of the Euro. It appeals to the fears of the ‘small citizen’ or 
entrepreneur being trampled by big business and globalisation, and it presents the values 
of solidarity, workers’ rights and social protection as the ‘antidote’ against individual-
ism, materialism and globalisation. This remarkable mixture of radicalism, socialism 
and populism has produced an outspoken anti-EU-stand - at least, for the time being. 
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3. The Dutch Political System 
 
3.1. Executive-Legislative Relations 
 
Overviewing the basic features of the Dutch political system, one can characterise it, 
first of a ll, as a parliamentary system. The executive (i.e. the Government) is selected 
by the legislature, and depends on the confidence of the legislature.
1 The head of state 
(the Queen/King) does not have a political responsibility and his/her political role is 
severely restricted. The real leader of government is the prime minister, who is politi-
cally responsible towards parliament. 
The executive-legislative relation, however, is not one of clear legislative dominance. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, the Netherlands’ government does not consist of MP’s but 
is recruited from various sources  - parliament, political parties, the public service, the 
private sector, universities etc. This, by itself, creates a certain distance between parlia-
ment and the executive, which is not just ‘a committee from parliament’. 
Also, the weakness of the Dutch parliament in organisational terms,  - staffing, r esearch 
facilities, resources etc.  - compared to the Government has given the executive a clear 
dominance in the development of legislation, in spite of formal parliamentary suprem-
acy. Parliament has not been able to compensate for this weakness. It tries to re-assert 
itself, however, in a different way, i.e. by means of high-publicity activities, e.g. parlia-
mentary inquiries into dramatic policy failures, disasters etc. Also, individual MP’s 
strongly focus on publicity profile, i.e. bringing the news headlines into parliament (de-
bates, questions to ministers etc.). 
Another problem in executive-legislative relations in the Netherlands springs from coa-
lition politics. Since there is no single dominant party in parliament, governments have 
to be based on coalitions - most often two- or three-party coalitions - and compromises 
on policy issues. This by itself restricts the freedom of political manoeuvring for MP’s, 
individually as well as for party fractions. Since the 1980’s, moreover, the policy pro-
grammes for incoming coalition governments are put on paper in the form of ‘regeerak-
koorden’  - agreements between government and the parties concerning the policy pro-
gramme. These agreements are intended to stabilise executive-legislative relations until 
the next elections, but in practice severely reduce parliamentary influence. Most a t-
tempts to discuss policy issues and problems in parliament are squashed in an early 
stage by government invoking the ‘regeerakkoord’. 
 
                                                 
1   See Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, New Haven/London, Yale University Press 1999, p. 119.  
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3.2. The Party System 
 
The Dutch party system, i.e. the actual life of politics, has been characterised as rela-
tively fragmented.
1 In government, one finds at least two parties, and in parliament, nine 
or ten, of which three are relatively large (Liberals, Social-democrats, Christian-
democrats) and the others relatively small (Leftist liberals, Greens, S ocialists, Orthodox 
Calvinists). The distinctions among the parties, in the past,  followed religious as well as 
socio-economic cleavages, but since the 1960’s, post-materialist values (e.g. participa-
tionism) have become increasingly important in party formation.
2 After the end of the 
Cold War, party distinctions have become much less clear. The Labour Party seems to 
have deleted the word ‘socialism’ from its political vocabulary, accepted the market and 
private business as politically correct, and increasingly recruited private sector represen-
tatives (especially consultants) for party leadership. Among the Conservative-liberals, 
notions of socially responsible business practice gained ground, stressing the impor-
tance of social values in the private as well as the public sector. The Conservative-
liberal party VVD, i.e. the old protagonist of the free market, gained much strength, and 
is widely expected to become the largest party in the 2002 Parliamentary elections. The 
ideological distinctions among and between the Christian-democrats, Social-democrats, 
Conservative and leftist liberals d ecreased to such an extent, that new coalitions could 
be formed. In 1994, for the first time in 75 years, a government without Christian-
democrats was formed, i.e. a Social-democrat, Conservative and leftist liberal, the ‘pur-
ple coalition’ (PvdA, VVD, D ‘66). In 1999, after a clear electoral success, it continued 
with the same parties and the same prime minister. 
Table 24: The Composition of the Dutch Second Chamber 
Political groups / Parties  1994  1999 
Labour Party (PvdA)  37  45 
Christian-democrats(CDA)  34  28 
Conservative Liberals (VVD)  31  39 
Leftist Liberals (D66)  24  14 
Greens (Groen Links)  5  11 
Religious Party SGP  2  3 
Religious Party GPV  2  2 
Religious Party RPF  3  3 
Socialist Party (SP)  2  5 
Elder Peoples’ Parties (AOV, Unie 55+)  7  0  
Total  150  150 
    Source: www.idea.int 
 
 
                                                 
1   See Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
2   See Ibid., p. 81.  
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3.3. The Distribution of Power  
 
In terms of distribution of governmental power, the Dutch system is rather paradoxical. 
Sometimes it has been considered semi-federal
1 because of its ‘sociological federalism’, 
i.e. its long-standing tradition of the Dutch government to recognise, subsidise and offer 
delegated powers to private associations representing the major religious and ideologi-
cal groups in society, the ‘pillars’ of consociational democracy. Coalition politics, i.e. 
the inability of a single group to dominate the system, strengthened this tradition. Espe-
cially at the central level, in central government, this ‘semi-federalism’ has allowed 
individual ministries to develop a large sphere of autonomy, a s pecific clientele con-
stituency in society, and a specific subculture. Since no (prime) minister has been able 
to dominate or ‘steer’ the others, central government in the Netherlands looks like an 
archipelago of autonomous islands, connected to each other  - these connections are 
quite important and, in some cases vital e.g. the connection with the ministry of F i-
nance, but without effective common direction. The co-ordination of ministries to a 
certain extent depends on the political strength of the prime minister. Since his 
organisational r esources are limited  - his ministry of General Affairs is little more than a 
Prime Minister’s Secretariat  - other ministries with co-ordinating roles (Finance, Inte-
rior, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs) are even more important for the (lack of ) inter-
ministerial co-ordination. In recent years, the minister of Finance has taken an increas-
ingly dominant co-ordinating role in the central archipelago of thirteen ministries. 
In vertical terms, i.e. in the relationship between central government and provin-
cial/municipal government, there is also a strong tradition of consultation and consen-
sus-seeking. The provinces and municipalities have a constitutionally guaranteed sphere 
of autonomy. Substantially, however, i.e. in terms o f finance, personnel and organisa-
tional resources, taxation powers, or actual decision-making, the center clearly domi-
nates e.g. financing some 90 per cent of the provincial and municipal budgets.
2  
It can be argued, therefore, that the Dutch system is characterised by a strong decentral-
ist culture (tradition, norms, values, politico-administrative ‘reflexes’ and language) but 
also by a central dominance, especially towards provinces and municipalities. The ques-
tion, who dominates the center, however, is much more difficult to answer. 
 
3.4. Dutch Bicameralism  
 
This paradox of centralism and quasi-federalism is also reflected in the Dutch parlia-
ment. There are two Chambers, the Second Chamber (150 members, elected by direct, 
universal franchise every four years) being the dominant Chamber in political terms. 
                                                 
1   See Ibid., p. 191. 
2   See Hoetjes, 2000, op.cit., pp. 11-15.  
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The First Chamber is indirectly elected (via the provincial assembly elections, 75 mem-
bers, four-year term)  - in fact, it is a reminder of the confederal Dutch Republic of the 
17th and 18th century  -, and although its powers are much less than the Second Cham-
ber, it has considerable political relevance. It is actively involved in the legislative pro-
cedure  - it can reject, but not amend, legislative proposals -, and the political weight of 
its members sometimes has considerable i mpact. Since the First Chamber’s impact is 
less than e.g. the U.S. Senate or the German Bundesrat, the Dutch system has been 
categorised, comparatively, as ‘medium-strength bicameralism’
1. Nevertheless, the First 
Chamber should not b e over-estimated: its membership is a part-time job (1 day a 
week), its self-image and role perception is the role of ‘the Chamber of second 
thoughts’, following the Second Chamber’s agenda rather than taking its own initia-
tives. Not surprisingly, there is a recurrent discussion about abolishing the First Cham-
ber, because of its low ‘surplus value’(Mehrwert) for the political decision-making 
process. The Dutch political culture, however, combines a radicalism in its words with a 
cautiousness and moderation  in its actions. Old traditions like the First Chamber, there-
fore can survive for a surprisingly long time. 
 
3.5. The Constitutional Frame 
 
This also holds for the Dutch constitution. It can be changed by two-thirds majority of 
both Chambers of Parliament.  The Dutch state had its first constitution in 1795 (the 
Batave Republic), the previous political system had been based on a treaty of Confed-
eration (the Union of Utrecht of 1579). In 1814, after the defeat of Napoleon, the King-
dom of the Netherlands was created with a new constitution. This constitution was 
amended on several occasions, e.g. at the secession of Belgium in 1839, but its major 
revision took place in 1848, when parliamentary supremacy was established. This 1848-
Constitution was revised thirteen times in a thorough way. Out of the 142 articles of the 
present Constitution, none has escaped one or more amendments. The last major over-
haul took place in 1983. Nevertheless, the structure of the Constitution has remained in 
place from 1848 to the present day. 
Judicial review is absent in the Netherlands. Legislation e.g. by municipalities can be 
challenged as being contrary to higher legislation. Also, preliminary court rulings can 
be given to prevent a case in the European Court of Justice. However, there is no consti-
tutional court or a judicial competence to take up issues of constitutionality. 
 
                                                 
1   See Lijphart, 1999, op.cit., p. 212  
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3.6. Interest and Intermediary Groups 
 
The role of interest groups in the Dutch political system, for a long time, has followed 
the lines of a quasi-corporatist, ‘pillarised’ system. Each ‘pillar’  - Catholic, Protestant, 
Liberal, Socialist  - was a ‘society within Dutch society’ with its own organisations in 
the social, cultural, economic and political field. At the elite level, these pillars were 
brought together by means of representation, power-sharing, consensus and compromise 
- the rules of this ‘consociational democracy’ have been analysed e.g. by Lijphart. 
Parallel with, and intertwined with parliamentary representation of the political parties, 
an elaborate system developed of official consultations of interest groups by the 
Government. Advisory bodies representing, and bringing together, the different interest 
groups could be given co-responsibility for government policy or even delegated 
legislative powers. This quasi-corporatist system developed most strongly in the field of 
agriculture, and to a less extent, in the socio-economic field (wage negotiations, socio-
economic policy). 
With the decline of pillarised society since the 1960’s, discussion and doubt arose about 
the legitimacy and the effectiveness of quasi-corporatism. In agriculture, for example, 
the reforms of the EU-CAP further eroded the support among the farmers’ organisations 
to be co-responsible for agricultural policy. In 1995, the corporatist structure in agricul-
ture was dismantled, and the farmers took more and more distance from government. 
Nevertheless, the habits of consultation and compromise have remained alive. In the 
socio-economic field, for example, informal agreement between trade unions, employ-
ers and government in the early 1980s formed the base of a new, and more flexible eco-
nomic policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s, based on flexibility, market orientation and 
moderated wage increase. This so-called ‘polder model’, basically a consociational 
mechanism in a post-pillarised society, provided the interest group underpinning for 
Dutch socio-economic policy. It shows, how the legacy of consociational democracy in 
the Netherlands is still very much alive - in virtually all fields of policy. 
 
 
II. Government and Parliament in EU Decision-Making 
 
1. General features: Supportive Co-operation 
 
The involvement of government and parliament in the decision-making process, includ-
ing decisions concerning European integration, hinges on two basic  elements: legisla-
tion and control. Parliament, as the representative of the Dutch people, decides about 
legislative proposals (which, in most cases, are presented by the executive), and in the 
implementation of laws. Parliament has the right, and the task, to control the actions of 
the executive, which has the obligation to provide the necessary information for that  
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purpose. The executive, i.e. the ministers, are r esponsible vis-à-vis Parliament. The 
Head of State forms part of the executive, but is not politically and publicly responsible. 
For the Dutch parliament’s effectiveness, therefore, it is vital that all government policy 
is translated into legislation, whether budget laws, framework laws, or any other laws. 
The confidence of Parliament in the executive can only be tested in the process of 
legislation and legislative control. In the parliamentary debate about legislative 
proposals or policy actions related to the implementation of laws, parliament can e.g. 
express its views not only by rejecting a government proposal, but also by motions of 
disapproval or censure which implies a dismissal of a minister or cabinet.
1 
In this context, it is quite important to note, that the Dutch constitution (Art. 92) allows 
the entrusting of legislative, executive or j udicial competencies to international organi-
sations. This article was adopted in 1953, shortly after the founding of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). At that moment, and also in 1958 (EEC), 1986 
(SEA) and 1992 (TEU) the Dutch Constitution has  given priority to international law, 
i.e. European law, not only on an ad hoc basis, but on a ‘Kompetenz-basis’. Legislative 
decisions, made according to European law, are therefore directly legally binding for 
Dutch citizens without any intervention by the Dutch legislature  - more specifically, the 
Dutch Parliament. Legislative competence has been ‘delegated’ to EU-institutions. The 
role of parliament in EU affairs, therefore, is more restricted than in national legislative 
affairs. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch parliament has a number of competencies and tasks concerning 
European integration, all of them based on the principle of executive r esponsibility, 
concerning EU-treaties, legal acts of the EP and the Council of Ministers, consent in 
third-pillar matters ( Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, CJHA) and implementa-
tion of EC/EU-law. 
Concerning all treaties, including EU-treaties, Dutch law prescribes that the Govern-
ment negotiates and signs them, but they can enter into force only after parliamentary 
approval. This approval can be given explicitly, i.e. by means of a law (Law of A p-
proval), or by tacit approval, i.e. by not starting the explicit approval procedure  - the 
choice is up to Parliament itself. 
Concerning EP and Council of Ministers’ decision-making, the role of the Dutch par-
liament is rather complicated from the perspective of ministerial responsibility. First, if 
the Dutch minister is overruled in the Council, he can be held responsible by the Dutch 
Parliament for the way he defended the Dutch views, but hardly for the ultimate 
EP/Council decision. Secondly, in the preparation of EP/Council acts, the so-called A -
points agreed upon in COREPER at civil servants’ level are very often formally decided 
upon in a different Council than the one corresponding to the substantial policy field of 
the A -point. For parliament, therefore, two ministers can be held responsible for the 
                                                 
1   See DelGrosso, Nicky Y.: Parlement en Europese integratie, Deventer, 2000, Chapter 3, pp. 47-74.  
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decision that was taken. Thirdly, in controlling COREPER, Council or EP/Council deci-
sions afterwards  - by requesting information,  explanation and discussion  - the Dutch 
Parliament will inevitably have to take the views and interests of other member states - 
the EU as a whole -, into account, and will therefore have to move beyond its own man-
date, i.e. representing the Dutch people, and the Dutch people only. 
In the field of CJHA and under the Schengen agreement the Dutch Parliament was and 
is involved in a very early stage of the decision-making process. Draft decision propos-
als from the Schengen Executive Committee, which have a binding legal effect for all 
participants and which have a political importance in spite of their administrative n a-
ture, have to be submitted to Parliament before decision-making. Only after parliamen-
tary approval, by both Chambers  - explicit or tacit approval  -, the Dutch minister can 
offer further co-operation in the Schengen d ecision-making procedure. The Maastricht 
Treaty extended this procedure to the broader area of CJHA. When it was decided under 
the Amsterdam Treaty, that Schengen, and more of CJHA, would be shifted to the first 
EC treaty pillar, this was no sufficient reason for the Dutch Parliament to do away with 
this right to preliminary consent. It was, and is, felt that the weakness, or even absence, 
of parliamentary control of decision-making at t he EU-level in CJHA necessitates a 
tighter, early stage control by the national parliament. Nevertheless, this preliminary 
consent is rather awkward from a Dutch constitutional viewpoint. It is the only topic of 
international relations and foreign policy,  where Parliament takes such a strong stand 
towards the Government, participating in decision-making in such an early stage. Also, 
it would raise very difficult questions, if a minister would participate in decision-
making without parliamentary pre-approval. The priority of EU-law and the constitu-
tionally recognised powers of the EU (Art. 92) would be at odds with a minister’s re-
sponsibility towards parliament. In practice, however, this test has never been taken. 
In the implementation of EC/EU-law, the Dutch Parliament is involved according to the 
national rules of legislation  - there are no specific procedures on this topic. To the ex-
tent that EC/EU-law requires (adaptation of) national legislation, the Government will 
take the initiative and offer its proposals to Parliament for a pproval  - as usual. Often, 
Parliament is hardly aware of the ‘European origin’ of the proposal. Aside from this, the 
Government reports to Parliament about the progress or backlog of EC/EU-
implementation on a three-monthly basis.  
If the implementation of EC/EU-law requires new decrees instead of laws, the usual 
procedure is followed as well. The draft decree is sent to Parliament for reaction and 
comment, and after the term for reaction has expired, the decree will enter into force. 
 
2. Strong Support, Weakening Control 
 
In general terms, then, European integration since the 1950’s has made the Dutch par-
liament less and less a legislator, and more and more a controller. From the beginning, 
parliament was involved, especially the Second Chamber, but its initial role focused on  
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the general political strategy  - it offered strong support for the Government’s attempts to 
create a federal Europe. A motion accepted by the Second Chamber in may 1948 (by 
van der Goes van Naters and Serrarens) urged the Government to commit itself to a 
federal Europe as a major goal of its foreign policy.  
During the 1960’s, the discussion between Government and Parliament took place 
within the general debates about the Annual budget and about the general Annual r e-
ports by the ministry of Foreign Affairs about the progress of European integration. 
Discussions, after initial enthusiasm, became shorter and shorter (e.g. single rounds), 
and dealt with the past rather than the future policy.  
In the mid-1970’s, Parliament had its first debate with the prime minister about the 
European Council meetings. Only in the late 1970’s, procedures were developed to dis-
cuss the agenda of the Council’s meetings in the Committees of the Second Chamber: 
The ministry of Foreign Affairs took the initiative to send General Council Meeting 
agendas to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Agriculture and Environment followed soon. 
Other Second Chamber Committees (Economic A ffairs, Social Affairs, Transport) were 
much slower to ask for the Council agendas of ‘their’ ministers.  
It took until the Single European Act in the mid-1980’s, before the need to control and 
participate in EC-decision-making became apparent for the Dutch Parliament. 
In October 1986, the Second Chamber decided to install a  Standing Committee on 
European Community Affairs; in 1994, it was changed into a General Committee on 
European Affairs, and given the explicit task to control EU affairs.  
The First Chamber had established a Committee on European Co-operation much ear-
lier, in 1970, but its role had been both broader - dealing not only with the EC/EU, but 
also with the Council of Europe, the WEU etc.  - and much less intensive - leaving the 
field of political discussion and responsibility to the Second Chamber. 
 
3. The Involvement of the Parliament in European Integration 
 
It can be argued, that the way in which the Dutch Parliament is involved in EU-
decision-making, is mainly determined by national reflexes. The procedures for its EU-
involvement are based on its constitutional power to control and supervise the execu-
tive. The motive for parliamentary involvement in European integration is the desire to 
control all national government representation in international organisations  - basically, 
a national reflex rather than an intrinsic interest in EU affairs. For a similar reason, par-
liamentary control of Council meetings and agendas is fragmented - and therefore, weak 
- rather than co-ordinated and based on a strategy or vision concerning European inte-
gration. For the Dutch Parliament, acting on the Dutch domestic political scene, control-
ling an individual minister is more important than developing a broader view on the 
position of the Netherlands in EU. Much parliamentary involvement takes the form of 
ex-post-discussions about E C/EU-decisions rather than anticipatory strategies for the 
future.  
 
348
Only in the field of CJHA, a more ‘European’ motivation seems to operate, i.e. the de-
sire to make up for the absence of EP-control of decision-making, for the sake of de-
mocracy in EU. 
 
3.1. The Organisation of the Parliament 
 
How is Dutch parliamentary involvement in EU affairs organised? In the Second 
Chamber, both plenary meetings and Committee meetings are devoted to EU-issues. For 
the approval of international treaties, including EU-treaties, a plenary debate takes 
place. Thus, both the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty were debated in ple-
nary session. The preparation of the debate was e ntrusted, by the Second Chamber’s 
presidium, to the Committee on EU affairs.  
Also, the meetings of the European Council are discussed afterwards with the prime 
minister in plenary session. This happened for the first time in 1978, but only since the 
beginning of the 1990’s a regular procedure has been developed. Before the European 
Council meetings, an ‘annotated agenda’ is sent to the Second Chamber, which forms 
the basis for discussion between the minister of Foreign/European Affairs  - in practice, 
the State secretary for European Affairs  - and the Committee on EU affairs. After the 
European Council meeting, a written report is sent to the Second Chamber, and debated 
in plenary session. 
Thirdly, there are the Annual budget debates (in September, concerning the next years’ 
budget Law). Since the EU affects several ministries’ budgets (Foreign Affairs, Agricul-
ture, Finance etc.), EU-issues can be discussed under several budget chapters. In prac-
tice, however, only the debate about the Foreign A ffairs budget paid some attention to 
EU-developments. In 1988, the Second Chamber requested a more coherent,  cross-
ministerial reporting by the Government about EU-consequences for national policy. 
The ensuing report proved useful in the ‘Europe 1992-preparation’ for the internal mar-
ket, but did not strengthen the Chamber’s plenary discussion about European integra-
tion. In 1998, therefore, it was decided to devote a separate plenary debate to the A n-
nual government document called ‘the state of the European Union’, i.e. the EU-agenda 
from the Dutch perspective. This document provides both the financial and policy i m-
plications of EU-membership for the Netherlands, as well as the policy intentions and 
financial perspectives for the near future. The plenary debates about the ‘state of the 
EU’ have not yet developed a fixed pattern: In 1999 it was combined with the debate 
about the European Council meeting, in 1999 there was a separate plenary debate, 
where the Dutch MEP’s were also giving speaking time. 
Fourthly, the plenary meeting is involved, when a specialised Committee, in casu the 
Committee for EU affairs, feels u nsatisfied about its discussion with the minister and 
wants an explicit statement on the matter by the Second Chamber as a whole. A so-
called ‘two-minute-debate’ can be requested: Every speaker is given only two minutes 
for his/her statement, and such a debate will usually result in a motion by the Second  
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Chamber. In EU affairs since 1986, only 20 motions were put forward in this way, out 
of which only seven were accepted.
1 Five of these accepted motions restricted them-
selves purely to a request to the Government ‘to give content to its European policy’ - 
leaving the Government all possible room to manoeuvre. Strikingly, in the debate sev-
eral MP’s expressed the desire to ‘prevent Danish situations’ (‘Deense toestanden’, i.e. 
an extremely narrow government mandate in EU affairs). 
All in all, the plenary meeting of the Second Chamber is involved in EU affairs on a 
regular basis, i.e. at least every six months. The First Chamber’s plenary session r e-
stricts itself to the debates about the EU-treaties - prepared by its Committee on Euro-
pean Co-operation  - and the Dutch legislation implementing EC/EU-law. In its debates, 
moreover, legal arguments are often more important than political considerations. 
 
3.2. Committee Scrutiny in the Shadow of EU Efficiency 
 
More important, then, are the Parliament’s Committees. In the Second Chamber, this is 
the General Committee on EU affairs (GCEU). In 1985 an inquiry was made by the 
Second Chamber’s presidency, into the effectiveness of the Chamber’s i nvolvement in 
EC-affairs. It  was concluded, that parliamentary control of EC-decision-making was 
weak and highly fragmented. A Standing Committee on EC-affairs was put into place in 
1986, although there was much doubt and controversy about the risk of ‘doublures’ and 
conflicts of competence with other Committees (e.g. Agriculture) and fear of ‘Danish 
situations’ (see above). In 1988, after an evaluation on the Committee’s practice, it was 
decided to keep the Committee in place. In 1992/1993 the Maastricht Treaty forced the 
Second Chamber to re-think its internal organisation. It was proposed by some to do 
away with specialised EU-committees altogether, since EU is ‘everywhere’  - others 
stressed the need to co-ordinate the Dutch parliamentary control of EU affairs. Espe-
cially after the a pproval of the Maastricht Treaty, the Dutch Parliament should equip 
itself to play a more active role in EU affairs. It was decided to install a ‘horizontal 
Committee’, i.e. a Committee dealing with a field which regards (almost) all ministries. 
This General Committee for EU affairs was installed in 1994, for a period of four years, 
i.e. one session of the Second Chamber. It was given the task to co-ordinate and to pro-
vide information about EU affairs to the other Chamber Committees. In the long run, it 
should make itself superfluous, and it should never become another separate ‘pillar’ in 
the Second Chamber. Nevertheless, after the 1998-elections the GCEU’s mandate was 
extended for another four years. The Committee itself, in a self-evaluation, stated that 
‘without its activities, the necessary attention for EU affairs in the other, Standing 
Committees would virtually disappear,’ and ‘that the Netherlands, like the other mem-
                                                 
1   See Ibid., p. 191.  
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ber states, needs a Standing Committee on EU affairs.’
1 Until 2002, however, the 
Committee will retain its present status  - it is to be expected that a re-organisation and 
strengthening will take place soon afterwards. 
The activities of the General Committee, in spite of its relatively weak status, are n u-
merous: It draws attention to EU affairs by sending relevant documents to individual 
MP’s and the Standing Committees; also, it sends out a weekly ‘bibliographical news-
letter’ (attenderingsbulletin) indicating the newest publications, e specially from sources 
outside the national government. It initiates meetings about EU affairs, inviting other 
Committees for inter-Committee meetings on EU affairs. It co-ordinates EU-
involvement by linking different specialised, but EU-related topics in the wide stream of 
information, which comes to the Chamber. For this purpose, it collaborates closely with 
the ‘political groups’ specialists’ on different topics, because they play a key role in the 
Standing Committees, and they are needed to make cross-Committee links.
2 It also calls 
the State secretary for  EU affairs to account for his actions, other than second pillar, 
which are the competence of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It prepares the plenary 
debate about the approval of EU-related treaties. It is in charge of international contacts, 
i.e. with the D utch MEP’s, with COSAC, with the European Parliament, parliaments 
and parliamentary EU-committees in other member states and future member states, 
and, finally, it offers support and facilities for the improvement of parliamentary i n-
volvement in EU affairs. For example, by stimulating research and publications in this 
field. 
The membership of the General Committee is 25 (plus 25 substitute members). They 
have to be member of the Second Chamber, so the Dutch MEP can only indirectly par-
ticipate in the Committee’s work. Only if the pre-1979 double-mandate would be re-
instated, they could be full members. About half of the GCEU’s members also belong to 
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a much smaller number (4 and 2 r e-
spectively) ‘double up’ with the Standing Committees on Agriculture and Economic 
Affairs. 
The Chairman of the GCEU plays a very important role for its effectiveness. Its first 
Chairman was one of the ‘midwives’ of the Committee in 1994, its second Chairman, 
Patijn, is a former State secretary for European affairs, and highly experienced in deal-
ing with the EU-institutions. The third Chairman, Te Veldhuis, entered in the summer 
of 2001. 
The procedures of the Committee, given its modest status, are quite simple: O rganising 
meetings, bringing other Committees together on a regular, but non-compulsory basis, 
and sending out EU-related information in a structured way to Committees, individual 
                                                 
1   See Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
2   Note that the General Committee has no competencies in this regard other than to advise, inform and 
support.  
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MP’s and the Chamber presidency. Only towards the State secretary of European A f-
fairs, in first- and third-pillar matters, it can call the executive to account for its actions. 
The staffing of the Committee is very modest. A staff of five civil servants, assisted by 
3 secretaries, forms the Bureau for International Policy, serving both the Standing 
Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the GCEU. Together with the ‘Griffie 
Interparlementaire Betrekkingen’, which serves both the First and the Second Chamber 
and the, even smaller, staff of the First Chamber’s Committee on European Co-
operation it is likely to be merged and strengthened in the near future. 
 
3.3. The Roles of Individual Members of Parliament 
 
Aside from the GCEU, it should be noted that individual MP’s and party groups can 
also play an important role in keeping parliaments’ attention for European i ntegration 
alive. Individual MP’s have the ‘question right’, i.e. to pose written or oral questions to 
individual ministers on any topic they think i mportant. Since European integration does 
not score well in public opinion polls, an individual  MP is not very likely to question a 
minister on EU affairs, unless s/he can cater to a specific constituency, e.g. the farmers, 
by doing so. Political group discipline
1 restricts parliamentary ‘solo-ism’, however. 
Nonetheless, individual MP-ambitions do play an important role, but rather in the con-
text of Committees and political groups. It was suggested, for example, that the unwill-
ingness of existing Standing Committees to leave their field to the new GCEU in 1986 
and 1994, had to do with the unwillingness of individual MP’s to lose their status as 
party spokeswo/man in a Standing Committee, if it lost out to the EU-Committee.  
 
3.4. The Role of Parties and Political Groups 
 
More important, however, are the organised efforts within political groups concerning 
EU affairs, to develop and co-ordinate party viewpoints.  
The Labour Party PvdA-group, after the 1994 elections, organised itself topic-wise in 
‘cluster-groups’. For EU affairs, however, this formula was soon abandoned, and in 
1995 the ‘co-ordination g roup Europe’ was established. In this group, which meets 
every month, the EU-specialist members of the Second Chamber, the First Chamber, 
and the Dutch Labour MEP’s meet to discuss the broad lines of EU-developments and 
to co-ordinate views. 
The Conservative liberal VVD-group does not have a special internal EU-structure, 
since the topic/policy field-related group committees pay regular attention to EU affairs. 
Also, the weekly group meeting on Tuesday morning is always attended by a VVD-
member of the European Parliament. 
                                                 
1   See the comments on the ‘regeerakkoorden’ mentioned earlier.  
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The Christian-democrats in the Second Chamber have a horizontal group-committee on 
European Affairs, which is composed of members of the other group committees. It 
meets every two weeks, and at least the EU-spokespersons attend these meetings, fur-
ther attendance depending on the topics on the agenda. Aside from this, the CDA-group 
organises ‘specials’ concerning important EU-developments, attended by all CDA-
group members. 
The leftist liberal D ‘66-group is organised according to the same principle as the Sec-
ond Chamber Committee offices. European integration falls under the cluster ‘interna-
tional policy’  - covering EU matters, foreign policy, defence and development co-
operation  -, but EU affairs are also discussed in other cluster groups, e.g. spatial plan-
ning and countryside, socio-economic policy or f inance. The D ‘66 MEP’s attend the 
weekly group meetings on Tuesday morning, and a special party officer (not MP) is in 
charge of liaison between the D ‘66’ers in the Second Chamber and the EP. 
Smaller groups, like the Orthodox Calvinist RPF, GPV or SGP operate under a very 
high workload, and therefore co-ordinate on a more informal basis. The SGP also de-
cided to invite an EP-group assistant to come to The Hague one day per month, to act as 
a r esource person and thus raise the EU-awareness and expertise in the Second Cham-
ber’s group. 
The EU involvement of the Second Chamber thus revolves around the GCEU, the 
Standing Committees, and the political groups with their specific and different EU a r-
rangements. 
 
3.5. EU Policies in the First Chamber 
 
In the First Chamber, the above mentioned Standing Committee on European Co-
operation is the focus of its EU involvement. It co-operates with the Standing Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs in the preparation of E U-related debates. Also, it is in charge of 
recruiting and briefing the Dutch delegation to COSAC, and of the overall relations 
between the Dutch Parliament and the European Parliament.  
Next to this Standing Committee, however, in 1999 a Special Committee was estab-
lished for CJHA-Councils, to enable the First Chamber to keep a closer look on the 
third pillar affairs.
1 
 
4. Distance in a Small Circuit 
 
In the relations between MP’s from both Chambers and government officials, there is a 
considerable formal d istance. An MP considers her/his role as quite different, or even 
antagonistic, towards government officials  - and vice versa. A certain formal and public 
                                                 
1   See the comments on pre-approval of draft decisions mentioned earlier.  
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distance is kept. Nevertheless, the informal circle of EU-experts and specialists in poli-
tics and administration in relatively small. Meetings organised by the European Move-
ment, Institutes for International Relations or political science associations provide an 
opportunity for informal contact. Also, the same persons over the years can be seen in 
different roles as civil servant, member of parliament or the executive. 
 
5. The Substantial Scope of Parliament’s Involvement 
 
Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, in principle covers all fields, since the Maas-
tricht Treaty has put virtually all fields of government policy on the EU-agenda in one 
way or another. The EU-related documents processed by Parliament therefore are very 
numerous and varied in content, but they can be broadly categorised in different groups.  
Firstly, and this is the most important category, there are the EU-related documents 
made available to Parliament by the Government. Documents provided from other 
sources (e.g. EU-publications, Internet-online documents) can play a role as a ‘back-up’ 
for Parliament to build a ‘second opinion’, independent from the national government. 
But most attention is paid to government-provided documents.  
The ministry of Foreign Affairs, more specifically the Secretary of state for European 
affairs, and his staff (Directorate European Integration) is the provider of most, if not 
all, Government documents concerning EU matters. 
These, again, can be subdivided. There are the official texts of treaties, the agendas of 
the European Council meetings (annotated briefly to indicate the Dutch views), the n u-
merous ‘fiches’ to be dealt with in the Councils of Ministers  - since 1991 they are all 
sent to the Chamber  -, the Councils’ agendas, the reports of Councils of Ministers’ 
meetings, the draft decisions for the CJHA-Councils, and since 1998 there is the Dutch 
EU-overview on ‘the State of the EU’. Finally, there are the three-monthly reports from 
the ministry of Foreign Affairs about the state of the Dutch implementation of EU-law. 
In the handling of these documents, the GCEU plays an important, but mostly i nformal 
role. Government sends the EU-related documents to the Presidency of the Second 
Chamber, which refers them to the General Committee. 
The General Committee channels the documents to the Standing Committees and to 
individual MP’s for whom it considers them as  relevant. Not only does this imply a 
division and splitting up of the ‘stream of information’, but also an a ttempt to link up 
different specialists and Standing Committee dealing with EU-matters. 
Since the General Committee hardly has a formal competence, however, the real selec-
tion of documents takes place in the other - twelve - Standing Committees of the Second 
Chamber. 
The Government’s ‘fiches’, for example, are only ‘monitored’ by the General Commit-
tee. Since every ‘fiche’ indicates which ministry is p rimarily responsible for the nego-
tiations on the topic, the Standing Committee corresponding to the r esponsible ministry 
receives the ‘fiche’ from the General Committee. The GCEU, on top of this, selects  
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specific ‘fiches’ which it thinks are highly important. It adds a brief annotation and asks 
the Standing Committee to pay special attention. A Standing Committee, however, can 
either follow or ignore this advice, since it does not have any formal status. 
Selection, scrutiny and attention paid to EU-related  documents, therefore is ultimately 
in the hands of the Standing Committees. They differ greatly in this respect: Agriculture 
and Justice are quite active, but, for example, Education hardly pays any attention to EU 
affairs. 
After the Second Chamber has dealt with an EU-related topic, its decisions and views 
are put into writing in the minutes of the Chamber  - the ‘Handelingen der Tweede 
Kamer’ (HTK). Separate, special documents concerning EU affairs have not been pro-
duced by the Dutch Parliament. This reflects both the limited r esources with regard to 
staffing, research and publication facilities, and the relatively low priority of EU affairs 
for the Chamber. In one case, a research project was contracted out by the General 
Committee.
1 
For the dissemination  of Parliament’s views on EU affairs - and other topics -, different 
media serve to make both the debates and all parliamentary documents available to a 
wide public audience. Aside from the independent journalists, catering to newspapers, 
radio and TV on a  daily basis  - e.g. the daily TV-programme ‘Den Haag vandaag’ -, 
parliament has its own TV and radio-station with permanent live reporting of debates, 
plus an internet site providing all documents to the public. 
 
6. Timing, Management and Procedures 
 
Timing, management and procedure of parliamentary handling of EU affairs, again, 
depends on the topic. Treaties, and overall policy views are dealt with in plenary debate, 
and are prepared by the General Committee. ‘Fiches’, on the other hand - i.e. the bulk of 
EU-decision-making, are handled mainly by the Standing Committees. 
The GCEU meets every two weeks to decide on procedure, i.e. on the way the EU-
related documents which have been received by the Chamber and by the Committee, are 
to be handled. Although this meeting hardly deals with policy content, it is highly i m-
portant for the role of the Committee vis-à-vis the Standing Committees and the plenary 
session. 
Aside from this, two procedural initiatives are worth mentioning. Firstly, in 1995 the 
GCEU proposed to streamline the Chambers’ discussions with the ministers preceding 
the EU-Council of Ministers meetings by concentrating all relevant Standing Commit-
tee meetings. This proposal was accepted, and since 1996/1997 every Thursday after-
                                                 
1   See Wolters, Menno (red.): De vierde macht in de vierde bestuurslaag - een onderzoek naar de amb-
telijke voorbereiding in Nederland van de politieke besluitvorming in de Europese Unie, Den Haag, 
1995, p. 111.  
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noon the General Committee calls all Standing Committees who will have an EU-
meeting next week, for consultation with their ministers. In fact, this so-called ‘Europa-
overleg’ is a concentrated series of (brief) Standing Committee meetings concerning 
EU-matters, and it is presided by either the Chairman of the Standing Committee in 
question or by the Chairman of the GCEU. This formula enables the Second Chamber 
to link up the dossiers of different EU-Councils of Ministers, and it also provides a clear 
reference point on the parliamentary agenda to call the Government as a whole  - not 
only the individual ministers  - to account for their actions in EU decision-making. The 
results of this initiative, it seems, were rather mixed  - in terms of attendance, duration, 
co-ordination and a ttention. In the beginning, the meetings were sometimes cancelled at 
the last moment  - indicating a lack of interest on the side of MP’s and Standing Com-
mittees. During the last two years, interest and attendance have improved considerably. 
The timely organisation of the meeting’s agenda still forms a - technical - problem. 
Another initiative regards the involvement of the Dutch MEP’s in the work of the Dutch 
parliament. The General Committee, as mentioned above, can only have Dutch MP’s as 
full members. There is a clear desire, to improve contacts with the EP, and one option 
for the future Committee, after 2002, would be to become a mixed Committee of Dutch 
MP’s and MEP’s.
1 For the time being, the Second Chamber in 1999 ordered an inquiry 
into the possibilities to involve the MEP’s closer in the Chamber’s work. In that same 
year, Dutch MEP’s also officially a ttended a plenary meeting of the Chamber and were 
given speaking time - this was the Annual plenary debate about ‘the state of the EU’ in 
the context of the general discussions of the 2000-budget on 30 September 1999. Since 
then, the Dutch MEP’s have been given speaking rights in Commission meetings - both 
the General and the Standing Committees - and once a year in the plenary debate about 
‘the State of  the EU’. The desire to strengthen the link between the Dutch and the Euro-
pean Parliament is clear, but in formal terms, the possibilities seem to be very limited. 
 
7. The Impact of the Dutch Parliament’s Participation in EU Affairs  
  
Parliamentary actors  in the Netherlands in general operate from a domestic political 
perspective. This, by itself, implies that European integration does not attract their atten-
tion automatically. Only if media attention  - briefly  - focuses on EU matters, there is a 
chance for an MP to bring up ‘the EU’ as a topic of political discussion, and then only 
as a sideline of the debate e.g. about swine fever, foot-and-mouth-disease etc., where 
the EC/EU is considered mostly as the scapegoat and sometimes as a paymaster. The 
fact, that European integration has penetrated more and more areas of domestic politics, 
has not changed this attitude. Rather, on the contrary, those who want to raise the prior-
ity of, and attention for EU affairs, find themselves increasingly confronted, outnum-
                                                 
1   See HTK 22590, 5, p. 21; and HTK 21427, 101, p. 24.  
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bered and ‘smothered’ by those who prefer to play the national political and publicity 
game without being disturbed by outside forces like the EU. In the Second Chamber, 
the small group of ‘Europeanists’ in e.g. the General Committee often find themselves 
rowing against the political mainstream. EU matters exist, but it is hardly welcome and 
a potential disturbance in national politics. Attendance and attention for EU-meetings in 
Parliament is, thus, rather low. 
Still, those who are convinced of the EU’s importance and therefore participate actively, 
feel that the impact of the Dutch Parliament is much too weak, but that they themselves, 
on an ad-hoc basis are quite often able to have a considerable impact, both on the Gov-
ernment’s viewpoints and on Dutch MEP’s. This has to do with the small group, the 
informal contacts, and also with the Dutch governmental habit of extensive consultation 
- dating back to the times of consociational democracy. The major worry of the ‘Euro-
peanist’ MP is the lack of interest among their colleagues, and the additional strength of 
the executive in virtually all ministries because of ‘Brussels’. A strength which is not 
counterbalanced by parliamentary interest and activism, and therefore puts national 
parliamentary democracy at risk. 
A striking example of this was a recent debate in spring 2001 in the Second Chamber, 
where the Minister of Justice, Korthals, expressed the desire to abolish the pre-approval 
of CJHA-draft decisions, arguing that the proper role of the Dutch Parliament was in the 
implementing stage of EC/EU-law. His argument was fiercely countered by MP Verha-
gen, pointing at the absence of parliamentary control in CJHA at the EU-level, but the 
bluntness of the Minister was quite striking. 
 
 
III. The Dutch Parliament and the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
1. The Preparation and Ratification of the Treaty 
 
The Dutch EU-presidency, which produced the treaty of Amsterdam, was prepared with 
great care and cautiousness by the Dutch Government - if only to prevent a repetition of 
the Maastricht ‘Black Monday’. The Second Chamber was extensively briefed about the 
progress of the negotiations, especially the GCEU, and the Standing Committee on For-
eign Affairs. Plenary discussions took place before and after the Amsterdam summit. 
The Dutch Government also took the initiative to add the Protocol on the role of n a-
tional Parliaments (PNP) to the Amsterdam treaty.
1 Parliament, on its part, left the Gov-
ernment all room to manoeuvre, and did not put any obstacles in its way. 
The plenary debate about the  Amsterdam Treaty in the Second Chamber was prepared 
by the GCEU, which provided a list of more than 400 questions in march 1998. Gov- 
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ernment took four months to prepare an answering note. It refused, however, to have a 
separate debate about the PNP, since i t had already discussed this topic some years be-
fore. In fact, in 1996 it sent the Chamber a note, arguing that EU developments did not 
necessitate stronger powers for the national parliament, but rather for the EP - at least in 
the first pillar.
2  
The Chamber nevertheless approved the Treaty in November 1998. In a way, the debate 
proved to be a kind of anti-climax. After the ‘Amsterdam-euphoria’ and parliamentary 
praise for the Dutch presidency, Parliament was left behind without tangible results for 
its o wn powers in EU decision-making. Further discussions were either postponed, or 
pre-empted by referring to past discussions - none of which has been very fruitful. 
  
2. The Dutch Parliament after Amsterdam  
 
Reactions on the Amsterdam Treaty PNP were thus r ather inconclusive in the Dutch 
case  - if anything at all. It is therefore not clear how, and when, the Dutch will imple-
ment the specifics of the PNP. A proposal has been put forward to amend the constitu-
tion, and to insert an article stating that ‘government and parliament together commit 
themselves to promote European integration’, but this amendment has not yet been de-
bated. With the development of an EU-military identity, some MP’s have opened the 
debates about possible expansion of parliamentary involvement in the second pillar. The 
PNP-commitment on time to be made available by the European Commission and the 
Council to inform the national parliaments - the six week period - has not yet been i m-
plemented in the Dutch case. 
The Dutch delegation to COSAC did not change because of the PNP. It is recruited via 
the First Chamber’s Standing Committee on European Co-operation, but it is held in 
very low esteem: Not a few MP’s have explicitly called the COSAC ‘useless meetings’. 
The interest in COSAC and its future competence, e.g. with regard to the room of free-
dom, security and justice, subsidiarity and fundamental rights, is therefore very low. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen above, there is an extensive discussion in the Netherlands 
concerning revision of working mechanisms of the EU-Committee for two reasons: 
Hence, its mandate ends in 2002 and either has to be extended or changed. Moreover, 
there is a increasing concern among the Second Chamber’s presidency, the small core 
of member of the GCEU, and some political group leaders (e.g. the Christian-
democrats) about the decline of parliamentary influence at the EU level as well as at the 
national level, due to EU-mechanisms. After 2002, organisation and staffing of the EU-
related Committees both in the First and  the Second Chamber are very likely to be 
streamlined and dove-tailed to make Dutch parliamentary presence in Europe  - with 
                                                                                                                                               
1   See HTK 25181, 2 (note), 3 (debate). 
2   See DelGrosso, 2000, op.cit., p. 87.  
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regard to EC/EU affairs in general, the second CFSP/ESDP and the third pillar, 
COSAC, and the EP - more efficient and effective. 
 
IV. Conclusion: Towards another Awakening? 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty, even though it was a ‘product of Dutch soil’, did not alter the 
role of the Dutch Parliament. In fact, the Single European Act in 1986, and the Maas-
tricht Treaty of 1991 had given a much greater shock to the Dutch Parliament.  
Also, in terms of the strategies and positions of the major national political parties in 
EU affairs, ‘Amsterdam’ did not bring about substantial change. The explicit commit-
ment to a federal Europe had been silenced in Maastricht, and the modest results of 
Amsterdam were applauded as ‘the best one could get’. 
Concerning the overall role and self-image of the Dutch Parliament in EU affairs, it can 
not be considered, and does not consider itself, an important actor in EU decision-
making. It has shown an early interest and support for European integration, lost its 
interest in the 1960’s and 1970s, and awakened after 1986. An early starter, and a late 
awakener. Nevertheless, at the start of 2000, parliamentary awareness of the  relevance 
of European integration seems to be growing. There is a desire to play a more important 
role, and e.g. to intensify contacts with the European Parliament, but strong national 
reflexes among most MP’s will have to be overcome. 
The Dutch constitution does put some limits to parliamentary involvement in EU deci-
sion-making  - e.g. the Dutch Parliament represents the Dutch people, and the Dutch 
people only  -, but on the other hand it explicitly leaves room for the development of the 
European Union as a level of Government.  
There is an awareness that EU decision-making will have to become a part of the Dutch 
constitutional order  - rather than an EU-Constitution being superimposed on the Dutch 
legal order.  
The recent changes made in the Netherlands to strengthen parliamentary participation 
are only very modest attempts, and small steps toward strengthening legitimacy and 
democratic accountability in the multi-level-system called EU. They can be a useful, 
albeit modest, contribution to an ongoing debate. 
 359  
The Parliament of Portugal: Loyal Scrutiny and Informal Influence  
 
Ana Fraga 
 
I. Introduction: The Relevance of European Integration for the Portuguese Parliament 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
After the Revolution of 1974, the first democratic elections of  1975 led to a Constituent 
Assembly that approved the Constitution of 2 April 1976.
1 The second democratic elec-
tions of 1976 formed the first ‘normal’ legislature (1976/80) that had six cabinets, the 
first of which, formed by a socialist minority, asked formally for the accession to the 
European Economic Community in 1977. The negotiations started in that year, the a c-
cession took place in 1986. 
This was a period of democratic consolidation. There was no political stability (between 
1976 and 1987 there were t en governments), and parliamentary practice had little effi-
cacy.
2 All the MP’s were concerned with the need of a new legislative framework that 
complied with the new constitution and the Parliament had a pre-eminent legislative 
role captivating the attention of the media with very lively discussions. 
In terms of attention to European matters, which were not of major concern,
3 the Bureau 
of the European Parliament decided to create a delegation of 18 members to ensure 
permanent contacts with the Portuguese Parliament.  
In 1979 the Assembleia da República also created a delegation of 17 members to par-
ticipate in meetings with this delegation. In February 1980 the Committee on European 
Integration was created by a decision of the Conference of the Leaders of Parliamentary 
Groups of the Assembleia da República. 
Since then and until 1987, when the Committee on European Affairs was created, the 
Committee on European Integration held regular contacts with the European Parliament, 
with other national parliaments, with the Government and with representatives of all 
sectors of the economic, political and social life about the negotiations for the accession. 
                                                 
1  See the English version of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic in http://www.parlamento.pt. 
2   Leston-Bandeira, Cristina: ‘The role of the Portuguese parliament: Towards a Legitimation Institu-
tion’, paper presented in Workshop 11: European Parliaments: Rediscovering, Refocusing or Rein-
venting?, ECPR, Manheim Joint Sessions, 1999. 
3   Magone, José: ‘The Portuguese Assembleia da República: Discovering Europe’, Journal for Legisla-
tive Studies, No. 3/1995, pp. 151-63.   
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The most part of the parliamentary activity in relation to the EEC was done by this 
Committee.
1 
After the accession, the Committee on European Affairs, one of the standing commit-
tees,
2 adopted the first law of “review and evaluation of the Portuguese participation in 
the European Communities”: Law 28/87. This law was subject to two amendments, the 
first in 1988 by Law 111/88, and the second in 1994 by Law 20/94. 
 
2. The Political Framework 
 
The political government-related instability did not correspond to a party instability or a 
fragmentation of the party system.
3 Since 1975 one could say that there were four main 
parties with parliamentary assent  - from left to right: the Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Português  - integrated in the Communist and Allies Group of the European 
Parliament), the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista  - integrated in the Socialist Group o f 
the European Parliament), the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata  - 
integrated in the European People’s Party of the European Parliament) and the Christian 
Democrats (Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular  - integrated in the Union for 
Europe of the European Parliament).
4 
From 1976 to 1985 the PS formed three governments (one in coalition with the CDS 
and one in coalition with the PSD), the PSD formed another three (always in coalition 
with the CDS) and there were three presidential governments. 
The PSD (with former Prime Minister Cavaco Silva) was in government from 1985  - 
the date of the signature of the Accession Treaties  - until 1995, the first cabinet (two 
years) with a relative majority and the next two cabinets with an absolute m ajority. 
From 1995 until now the PS (current Prime Minister: António Guterres) is in govern-
ment with a relative majority. The last elections were held in October 1999.
5  
                                                 
1   In 1977 there were eight plenary sessions in which the EEC was mentioned, in 1978 only two, in 
1979 just one, in 1980 again two, in 1982 only one, in 1984 there were four and in 1985 there were 
seven (this was the year of the signature and ratification of the accession Treaty). From 1976 until 
the first amendment of the Constitution in 1982, no provision was related to the EEC. See the consti-
tution articles related to the EEC/EU in: Fraga, Ana, The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty- Por-
tugal, Paper presented for the Seminaire on the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, IUE, Florence, 
online paper, http://www.iue.it/LAW/amsterdam/internal /Fraga_portugal .pdf, 2000. 
2   The number of the Standing Committees is decided on in each legislature of four years and varies 
around 12 to 14. 
3   According to the criteria established by Lijphart, Arend, Patterns of Democracy, Yale University 
Press, 1999, p. 74.  
4   The electoral system is proportional following the d’Hondt method. The candidates are elected by 
district lists. In spite of this there is a tendency to majority governments and the concentration of 
powers. 
5   The results were: 115 MP’s for the PS, 88 MP’s for the PSD, 15 MP’s for the CDS-Popular Party, 13 
for the PCP (plus two from the Green Party that had a coalition for the elections with the PCP) and 
two for the Left Block (Bloco de Esquerda - a new coalition formed by several very small left wing 
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The two main parties  - PS and PSD  - are in favour of the European Union and have 
identical opinions with regard to it. The PCP is in favour of Portugal’s integration in the 
EU but against further steps in the development of the EU. The CDS-PP changed its 
Bureau almost two years ago. The current Bureau is more pro-European but also against 
further steps in integration.  
The Portuguese public opinion, in general, is in favour of the EU integration, not only 
because of the structural funds that helped the economic development of the country but 
also because of the idea that Portugal gained a say i n an i nternational framework that 
gathers big European countries. This is especially important if one takes into account 
the geo-strategic shift that was made after losing the colonies in 1975. Furthermore the 
accession to the EEC during the consolidation  of the Portuguese democracy is a variable 
background that people bear in mind.
1 
 
3. The Institutional Framework 
 
Portugal is a unitary state
2 with a semi-presidentialist system, distributing the p olitical 
responsibility of the Government between the Parliament and the President of the R e-
public, both of these being elected by direct universal suffrage. The President of the 
Republic appoints the Prime Minister bearing in mind the results of the legislative elec-
tions.  
The Assembleia da República has the main  function of approving laws and controlling 
the executive mainly by approving the executive programme
3 and the state budget. Any 
party can present a motion of censure to the Government by which, in case of b eing 
approved, the Government is dismissed by the President. The executive can also present 
a motion of confidence that has the same effect if rejected by a majority of MP’s. These 
instruments show that the Government is politically accountable before the Parliament.
4 
The above mentioned parliamentary instruments are the ultimate means of accountabil-
ity of the executive, but behind them there is a continuous parliamentary control of the 
                                                                                                                                               
parties). This means that a vote can result into a strike because the number of socialist MP’s is equal 
to the number of the MP’s in the opposition. 
1   Magone, José: ‘European Integration and the construction of Portuguese democracy’, paper presen-
ted at Portugal, Southern Europe and European Integration, ISCTE/Universidade Católica, 9 -10 
Maio 1997. 
2   There are two autonomous regions, Madeira and Azores, with their own legislative assemblies and 
executives but with limited power. 
3   If not the Government is dismissed by the President. 
4   Braga da Cruz, Manuel/Lobo Antunes: ‘Revolutionary transition and problems of parliamentary 
institutionalization: the Case of the Portuguese National Assembly’, in: Liebert, U lrike/Maurizio 
Cotta (eds.): Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and Turkey, Pinter 1990, p. 154.  
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executive conduct revealed by the debates in plenary or in committees, written ques-
tions (requerimentos) and inquiry committees.
1 
In terms of European decision-making, the Treaties
2 are negotiated by the Government
3, 
approved by the Parliament
4 and ratified by the President
5. The Parliament can control 
the negotiation of international instruments only by means of asking information of the 
executive, which can be done either orally in plenary sessions or in committees or 
through written questions put to the Government. 
The Constitution also provides the basic procedural outlines for the transposition of an 
EC legal act. According to the Constitution the Assembleia da República has the gen-
eral legislative competence. On some subjects this competence is exclusive
6 and on 
others partially exclusive 
7.  
This means that on matters of exclusive legislative competence only the Parliament can 
adopt legislation.
8 On matters of partially exclusive competence the Parliament can 
adopt a law that delegates legislative powers on the Government (clearance), which then 
can adopt a decree-law following the orientations of the delegation law. On  any other 
matters the Government can adopt decree-laws. There is no hierarchy between law and 
decree-law. The possibility given to the Government of presenting a proposal of law on 
all the subjects and of adopting a decree-law leads some scholars to defend that there is 
a de facto legislative predominance of the Government upon the Parliament.
9 
The decree-laws can be called to the parliamentary appreciation and be amended.
10 If 
this happens after the amendment introduced by the Parliament the previous decree-law 
assumes the form of law of the Parliament. If the subject of an EC directive falls under 
articles 164 or 165 of the Constitution the Parliament must adopt a law. There is already 
one judgment of the Constitutional Court that stated the unconstitutionality of a decree-
law of transposition because this transposition should have been made by a parliamen-
tary law.
11 The Constitution was last amended by constitutional law 1/97,
1 which was 
                                                 
1   Vitorino, António: ‘O controlo parlamentar dos actos do Governo’, in: Batista Coelho (org.): Portu-
gal, O Sistema Politico e Constitucional, Lisboa, ICSUL, 1989, pp. 369-86. 
2   There is no constitutional distinction between the European Treaties and international treaties or 
conventions. 
3   Constitution article 197.1.b. 
4   Constitution article 161.i. 
5   Constitution article 135.b. 
6   Article 164. 
7   Article 165. 
8   The initiative belongs to MP’s - ‘projects of law’ -, and to the Government - ‘proposals of law’. 
9   About the de facto legislative predominance of the Government in opposition to the de jure predo-
minance of the parliament, see Sousa, Marcelo Rebelo de: ‘A Elaboração de Decretos-Leis Avulsos’, 
in: ‘A Feitura das Leis’ I, INA, 1986, p. 160 and Miranda, Jorge: ‘O Actual Sistema Português de 
Actos legislativos’, in: Legislação, No. 2, INA, Oeiras, 1991, p. 18.  
10   Article 169. 
11   Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional No. 184/89, Diário da República, I Série, No. 57, 9 March, 
1989.  
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enforced in 5 October 1997. There is a new paragraph 9 to article 112, stating that the 
transposition of EC directives must be done by law or decree-law. The distinction relies 
only in the subject as mentioned above  - some subjects can only be object of legislation 
by law of the Parliament.
2 
There are no accurate figures for  the transposition by law or by government measures 
(decree-law and other instruments). The majority of transpositions is made by govern-
ment measures. In very few cases this was done by law of the Parliament. 
The Parliament can only control the quality of t he transposition measures adopted by 
the Government by calling the decree-law to appreciation and amendment. There is not 
a parliamentary systematic control of the quality of transposition measures and the cases 
of amendment of a decree-law are sparse. In  the last legislature (1995/99) 39 decree-
laws were appreciated by parliament but none of them were related to the transposition 
of EC directives. The parliamentary process of legislation is not the better way for 
speeding up the transposition. In general t erms and in comparison with the Government 
process, the parliamentary process is complex and slow. The draft law is presented to 
the Speaker who admits it and sends it to the competent Standing Committee for report. 
The latter’s report is presented to the  plenary and voted in general terms. Afterwards, 
the draft text is considered by the same Standing Committee for appreciation and for 
possible amendmends. The final text is then voted in plenary. 
The Parliament is actually more concerned with the process of decision-making of 
European legislation than with the process of transposition. In general terms, if direc-
tives do not leave much room of manoeuvre for the transposition it is considered to be 
more important to influence the negotiations for their adoption than to control the trans-
position which in those cases is only a technical question.  
This leads to the importance of the ex-ante control and the relation between the Gov-
ernment and the Parliament during the negotiation of Community acts that is ruled by 
the Constitution and Law 20/94. 
The 1992 amendment to the Constitution introduced two new paragraphs  - article 163, 
ex-166.f  - stating that the Parliament had specific competences in relation with other 
organs to review and to evaluate the participation o f Portugal in the process of the EU 
construction. Furthermore the Government has a political competence to submit infor-
mation concerning the general process of the EU integration to the Assembleia da Rep-
                                                                                                                                               
1   The revision of the Constitution maybe ordinary - after five years of the last revision, which is ap-
proved by a majority of two thirds of the MP’s -, and extraordinary - within the delay of the five 
years, which can only be approved by a majority of four fifths.  
2  See about this new amendment Miranda, Jorge: ‘Revisão Constitucional de 1997: Sistema de actos 
legislativos’, Legislação, No. 19/20, INA, Oeiras, 1997, pp. 63-93; Pinheiro, Alexandre Sousa, e Má-
rio João de Brito Fernandes: Comentário à IV Revisão Constitucional, AAFDL, Lisboa, 1999; and 
Fraga, Ana: ‘O controlo parlamentar dos actos do governo na execução do direito comunitário’, rela-
tório para o seminário ‘Le contrôle du pouvoir reglementaire dans les Etats membres de l’Union’, 
Departamento de Direito, Instituto Universitário Europeu, Florença, 1999.  
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ública in due time. In the 1997 amendment to the Constitution a new alinea was intro-
duced  - article 161.n  - stating that the Parliament had a power to give its opinion, as 
provided by law, on matters that are pending before the institutions of the European 
Union and that have a bearing on the Assembleia’s exclusive legislative competence.  
In general terms, Law 20/94 states that the Government must transmit all draft secon-
dary legislation of binding nature arising from the European Treaties, draft agreements 
and conventions between member states and all other drafts considered of importance to 
Portugal to the Parliament. This is meant to include all three pillars.
1  
The Government also has to inform the Committee on European Affairs of the activities 
of the EU regularly, and there should be two plenary sessions with the presence of the 
Prime Minister for the two European Council Summits in each year. Furthermore, the 
Government must present an annual report in the first quarter of each year on the par-
ticipation of Portugal in the European Union,
2 which is appreciated by the Committee 
on European Affairs and by all other Standing Committees in order to prepare the de-
bate in plenary. The Committee on European Affairs is also the only standing commit-
tee that can present draft resolutions to the plenary.  
Analysing  the development of the legal framework of the parliamentary participation 
one can say that there was a decrease in the involvement of the Parliament from the first 
law of review and evaluation  - Law 28/87 (approved when the PSD had a cabinet sup-
ported by a relative majority)  - and the following Laws 111/88 and 20/94 that were ap-
proved during the PSD cabinets supported by absolute m ajorities. This tendency was 
somewhat compensated by the constitutionalization of the main subject of the law  - the 
duty of the  cabinet to inform the Parliament and the general competence granted to the 
Parliament to review, evaluate and deliver its opinion on EU affairs. 
But more important than the legal framework is the way in which the Parliament and the 
Government applied these rules. 
 
II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs 
 
Portuguese MP’s raised their awareness with regard to their participation in the u p-
stream process of EU law-making rather late. The main problem consists in the fact 
that, by Constitution and by the European Treaties, it belongs to the Government to 
negotiate and adopt European legislation within the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the 
national parliament is not directly involved in this process. The only way to link it with 
                                                 
1  See the English version of this Law in http://www.parlamento.pt. See also about all the parliamenta-
ry work related to the approvation of this Law, Portugal, Assembleia da República, Comissão de As-
suntos Europeus, Portugal na União Europeia - Lei de acompanhamento e apreciação, Lisboa, 1994. 
2   Preview on article 2. paragraph 3 of the Law 20/94.  
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European issues at the Council of Minister’s table is by establishing a specific relation 
to the Government.  
With the Maastricht Treaty this was recognized in Declaration no. 13, which states that 
the governments have a duty to inform their parliaments in due time. With the Amster-
dam Treaty this was also reinforced in the Protocol on National Parliaments, which 
states a period of six weeks between the presentation of a proposal from the European 
Commission and its adoption by the Council so that the national parliaments have time 
to appreciate it. 
Long before the Maastricht Treaty there already was the feeling in the Portuguese Par-
liament that MP’s should be informed of all European draft documents as shown by the 
adoption of Law 28/87. However, there have been several problems in the implementa-
tion of the laws on parliamentary review and evaluation of EU affairs, either from the 
part of the Parliament or from the Government counterpart. 
The main problems of the parliamentary intervention are related with time,
1 complex-
ity,
2 legitimacy,
3 and specialization.
4 But the main theoretical problem in Portugal con-
cerns the balance between efficiency and democracy, between leaving enough room for 
the Government to conduct the general EU policy and being responsible for it in the 
eyes of the electors and having some parliamentary control over the Government and 
make it accountable. It is this balance that is in stake when choosing the degree of par-
liamentary intervention.
5 
All these problems affect the parliamentary intervention in all member states but the 
respective parliaments have surmounted them in different ways choosing different mod-
els according to the political cultures, parliamentary traditions, size and resources of 
their member states. One can point out the m andatory model  - followed by Denmark  -, 
the systematic scrutiny model  - followed by the UK (House of Commons) and France  - 
and the information and informal influence model  - followed by several member states 
including Portugal.
1 
The most useful factors for explaining the variations are: the political system (execu-
tive-legislative relation  - repartition of competencies), opinion on European integration 
and the composition of governments (minority/coalition/majority). Other factors can be 
                                                 
1   The parliamentary procedure for appreciation of EU questions does not keep pace with the European 
rhythm of decision-making. 
2   The European legislation is by large very technical and does not allow the Parliament to understand 
their political implications for the country - the Government, with its administration, here has a huge 
informational advantage over the Parliament. 
3   If the Parliament relies only on the information given by the Government, where is its added value? 
4   European legislation is not an external affairs question but should be dealt with as an integral part of 
the national legal system requiring the involvement of the entire parliament, namely of all the stan-
ding committees. 
5   Fraga, Ana: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of the EU Decision-making: Wanting more power…a struggle 
for what?’, in: National Parliaments and the EU-Stock-Taking for the Post-Amsterdam Era, 13 Oc-
tober 1999 Helsinki, Eduskunnan Kanslian Julkaisu 1/2000, pp. 23-25.  
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added like the conceptions of sovereignty (whether derived from the people or the Par-
liament), conceptions of the legitimacy of the EU (whether derived from the member 
states or from the European Parliament), party relationships (whether consensual or 
adversary), political culture, time of accession, country size, definition of a national 
position (strong or keep up with the others). All these factors contribute in some extent 
to the choice of a model and one cannot argue that only one factor has explanatory 
value.
2  
In Portugal there are several explanations for following the model of information and 
informal influence. The lack of parliamentary tradition (suppressed for almost 50 years) 
and the predominance of the executive, the consensus on the EU of almost all the main 
parties and of public opinion, the existence of an absolute m ajority for the first nine 
years of EC membership, the scarce technical parliamentary resources
3 and the low 
visibility of the parliamentary activity related to EU affairs
4 contributed to a very soft 
parliamentary intervention. Furthermore, the institutional and procedural mechanisms 
required for a strong intervention  - EU affairs are technical, complex and time consum-
ing  - represent a very high cost to a very low benefit. Hence, the intervention has  no 
immediate results or might have no results at all, the media coverage is very low, and 
EU affairs win no votes in national elections. Consequently, in the Portuguese Parlia-
ment there are not so many reasons to make parliamentarians run. 
                                                                                                                                               
1   Ibid. 
2   See Fitzmaurice, John: ‘National parliaments and E uropean policy-making: The case of Denmark’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 76, 1976, pp. 281-292; Herman, Valentine: ‘The European Parliament and the 
National parliaments: Some conclusions’, in: Herman, Valentine/Van Schendelen, Rinus, The Euro-
pean Parliament and the National parliaments, Saxon House 1979, p. 268; Judge, David: ‘The Fai-
lure of National Parliaments?’, in: Hayward, Jack (ed.): The crisis of representation in Europe, Frank 
Cass 1996, p. 82; Pahre, Robert: ‘Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Par-
liamentary Oversight of the European U nion’, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 1/1997, pp. 
147-174; Bergman, Torbjorn: ‘National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical 
variation and competing explanations’, in: Journal of European Public Policy, No. 3/1997, pp. 373-
387; Wiberg, Matti/Raunio, Tapio: ‘Does Consensus lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and 
the L egitimacy of EU Governance’, paper presented at the ECPR Mannheim Joint Sessions of 
Workshops, 26-31 March 1999; Raunio, Tapio: ‘Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures 
and the European Union’, in: Government and Opposition, No. 1/1999, pp. 1 -23; Raunio, Tapio: 
‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Decision-Making: Comparing National Systems’, report prepared for 
the Seminar National Parliaments and the EU - Stock-Taking for the Post-Amsterdam Era, Eduskun-
ta, Helsinki, 13 October 1999. 
3   Until 1993, there was only a secretary and a graduated official for the Committee. Since 1993 there 
are one secretary and two graduated officials (the other Committee that also has two officials is the 
Committee of Constitutional Affairs). The staff works for the Department of Committees. Each poli-
tical group represented in the Committee has one assistant that works for the respective MP’s. 
4   In general, EU affairs are debated in the plenary session of Friday morning, the least important ple-
nary day. Only when the Prime Minister comes to the plenary to discuss EU affairs, which happens 
twice a year, the session occurs on a Thursday afternoon. Moreover, instead of going to the Parlia-
ment before each Summit the Prime Minister invites the leaders of the parties with parliamentary re-
presentation to his office.   
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Even though informal influence can achieve some results in specific areas, it is not used 
as an instrument to orchestrate opposition to the Government. Instead, it needs to be 
seen as a way to reinforce the position of the ‘national interest’ as expressed by the ex-
ecutive during the negotiations.  
In practical terms the model referred to is translated in the work of the Committee on 
European Affairs in the following terms:  
For each legislative session  - starting in September and ending in July  - the Committee 
establishes  a working programme, choosing several main subjects, e.g. Economic and 
Monetary Union, Agenda 2000, social cohesion etc. that it intends to deal with and pre-
pares public auditions, symposiums or hearings with academic researchers, representa-
tives of trade  unions and business associations and any other associations that are con-
cerned by the subject, the European MP’s and meetings with the Government members 
responsible for that subject. Between 1992 and 1999 107 meetings were held. Each 
meeting lasts two to  three hours on average. The Committee’s working program forms 
the basis for a report that is presented to the plenary session, sometimes with a motion 
of resolution that needs to be a pproved by the plenary. Frequently this is done in co-
operation with other standing committees responsible for the specific areas. 
During the session there are several  - monthly  - meetings with the Secretary of State for 
European Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, so that the Committee can be 
informed of all the recent developments of the Union. When a specific subject to be 
discussed involves another member of the cabinet, the meeting is held with this minis-
ter. 
Sometimes there are external inputs  - from citizens via petitions, non-governmental 
organizations, the media, the trade unions, etc.  - to the Committee, claiming their atten-
tion to a specific problem. This was the case for the EC chocolate directive, the Auto-
Oil package directives and the textile free trade agreements.  
During each session there are also two  COSAC meetings that are generally prepared 
according to the COSAC presidency’s draft agenda. The Assembleia’s delegation is 
composed by the Chairman of the Committee on European affairs,
1 two MP’s from the 
biggest party in Government, two from the second b iggest party and one from the 
smallest party in rotation.  
Finally there is the process of appreciation of the annual report about the participation 
of Portugal in the European Union, coordinated by the Committee on European affairs, 
that also involves all the other Standing Committees. The process is object of a report 
and a resolution approved in plenary session. This very appreciation process started in 
1994 and there were six resolutions until 1999. 
The described model does not guarantee that the Parliament achieves to appreciate all 
the draft EU acts in a systematic way. But in specific questions of relevant national i n-
                                                 
1   The Chairman always belongs to the party that forms the Government.  
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terest it can influence the position of the Government or even reinforce the latter’s posi-
tion during negotiations in the Council of Ministers. From 1992 until 1999 only seven 
documents were formally delivered to the Committee by the Government. However, the 
Committee has produced reports and resolutions on the IGC that led to the Amsterdam 
Treaty
1 on Economic and Monetary Union, on the Agenda 2000 and on the Auto-Oil 
Directive. Although there is not a systematic transmission of the documents by the 
Government, the general opinion of the Committee is that all the documents are avail-
able via the internet and online a ccess to EU-resources. If an individual MP wants to 
produce a report on some specific subject s/he can do it anyway. 
 
III. The Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
1. The Parliamentary Procedure  
 
The Government presented the Amsterdam Treaty to the Parliament through the pro-
posal of resolution no. 118/VII
2 on 10 August 1998. Proposal 118/VII was distributed to 
the Committee on European Affairs, which asked a report to five Standing Committees: 
the Committee of Constitutional Affairs, the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee of Defence, the Committee of Economic Affairs, the Committee of Social Affairs 
and the Committee of European Affairs also asked an opinion to the Regional Assem-
blies of Madeira and Azores. 
For the preparation of its report  - distributed through its Chairman  -, the Committee of 
European Affairs held hearings with academic scholars, experts, ancient ministers, jour-
nalists and Government members on 15 September, 30 September and 20 October 1998. 
Finally the report of the Committee was approved on 21 December 1998.
3 The Portu-
guese Parliament then approved the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty on 6 January 
1999.  
The parliamentary review of the process that led to the ratification of the Amsterdam 
Treaty started before the IGC with meetings with the Secretary of State of European 
Affairs and the personal representative in the Reflection Group. 
Even before the Reflection Group started its work in June 1995 the Portuguese Parlia-
ment presented a report on 29 December 1994 that was approved together with a draft 
resolution containing some main guidelines for the amendment of the Treaties. This was 
                                                 
1   Report from 29 December 1994 and Resolution No. 21/95, 8 April 1995. 
2   The reference in roman numbers refers to the legislature. Each legislature has four legislative ses-
sions, starting on the 15 September and ending on the 15 June (with possible prorogation). Some le-
gislatures were shorter because the parliament was dissolved.  
3   Portugal, Assembleia da República, Comissão de Assuntos Europeus, Relatório sobre a Proposta de 
Resolução No. 118/VII que aprova para ratificação o Tratado de Amesterdão (anexos os relatórios 
das outras Comissões), 21 December 1998.  
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mainly due to the presentation of the German CDU/CSU report of September 1994 - the 
so-called Schäuble-Lamers paper  - that launched the discussion in the Portuguese Par-
liament.  
The Resolution no. 21/95 of 8 April 1995 listed five broad principles, which were 
unanimously accepted:
1  
-  The enhancement of the Portuguese language. Spoken by 200 million people 
around the world, it spreads Portuguese culture and other lusophone c ultures but 
also European culture as a whole. 
-  The enforcement of the principle of equality among member states and of the 
principle of non-exclusion from the ‘core’. The revision of the Treaty must be ap-
proved unanimously, with a clear refusal of any ‘hard core’ in the decision-
making bodies, based on co-optation methods. 
-  The strengthening of the role of national parliaments and intensification of their 
co-operation with the European Parliament, namely through the COSAC in order 
to enhance the democratic nature of the European construction and increase the 
transparency of its institutions. 
-  The maintenance of social and economic cohesion as a structural component of 
European Union deepening and enlargement. 
-  The consideration of hypotheses of positive variable geometry, based on the abil-
ity and willingness of each member state. 
The Resolution also stated that its purpose was to strengthen the bargaining position of 
the Portuguese Government at the 1996/97 IGC. It called for the re-evaluation of the 
institutional balance of the Union, while keeping its unitary structure, with decision-
making bodies encompassing the entire range of Community competencies in this 
framework, and it accepted increased powers of the European Parliament. Finally it 
recommended further hearings on the IGC as a means to promote the idea of Europe as 
an essential interest of Portugal. 
During the IGC the Committee held monthly meetings with the Secretary of State of 
European Affairs, several meetings with ministers and regional assemblies,  MP’s, rep-
resentatives of the civil society, such as management confederations and labour unions, 
non-governmental organisations, associations and universities. The Parliament also 
participated in several conferences open to the citizens about the future of the European 
Union. 
This is to say that as the Parliament had a good review of the work of the IGC - in oppo-
sition to what occurred with the Maastricht Treaty  -, there were no surprises as to its 
results, and the ratification process was facilitated.  
                                                 
1   See an English version of the Resolution and a summary of the report in: Portugal, Assembleia da 
República, Comissão de Assuntos Europeus, Acompanhamento Parlamentar da Revisão do TUE na 
CIG 96, Vol. I, Lisboa, 1995, pp. 347-352.  
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2. The Amsterdam Referendum and Its Failure 
 
During the debate that occurred upon the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty  - mainly 
after the results of the Danish referendum  - several opinion leaders asked for a referen-
dum upon the Maastricht Treaty. Until then the possibility of a referendum, in general 
terms, although allowed by the constitution, had not had many supporters. The Gov-
ernment party (PSD) was not in favour of a Maastricht referendum and argued that the 
Constitution did not give the possibility of a referendum upon an international Treaty. 
This was a polemical doctrinal issue, even more because the Constitution was amended 
in 1992. The main protagonists of the referendum were the opposition parties.  
After the legislative elections of 1995, in  which the Government and the leader of the 
PSD changed, the four main parties favoured referenda in general terms as well as a 
referendum upon the new EU Treaty.  
Hence, the 1997 amendment of the Constitution allowed a referendum upon i mportant 
questions o f national interest inserted in an international agreement.
1 The Government
2 
and all the three opposition parties presented draft texts for the referendum question.
3 
By consensus between the PS and PSD, the Resolution 36-A/98, of 29 June was ap-
proved with  the following question: “Do you agree with the continuation of Portugal’s 
participation in the European Union construction in the framework of the A msterdam 
Treaty?” 
According to Constitution article 115.8 and articles 26 and 29.1 of Law 15-A/98 of 3 
April that regulated the referenda, the President was obligatorily required to ask the 
Constitutional Court if the referenda proposals were constitutional.  
The Constitutional Court
4 in its judgment no. 531/98 of 29 July 1998 decided with eight 
votes in favour  and five against that the proposed question was unconstitutional because 
it violated article 115.6 of the Constitution that states: “Each referendum shall deal with 
a single subject; the questions shall be formulated in objective terms, and clearly and 
precisely and so as to permit an answer of yes or no...”. In general terms, the Court 
maintained that it would be difficult for the citizens to understand what could be the 
result of a negative answer to the referendum question, even with a referendum cam-
paign. 
When the Constitutional Court decides that a text is unconstitutional, according to Con-
stitution article 279 the President should veto it and send it back to the organ that ap-
                                                 
1   Article 115, No. 5. 
2   Proposal of Resolution 71/VII. 
3   Projects of Resolution 69/VII - PCP, 91/VII - PSD, 94/VII - CDS-PP. 
4   As stated in Constitution article 222, the Constitutional Court has 13 judges, ten nominated by the 
Parliament and three chosen by the first ten. Six members of the Court must be judges and the others 
must have a law degree.  
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proved it. In this case the Parliament could have changed the question so that it would 
not have not suffered from unconstitutionality or confirm it with a majority of two 
thirds of the MP’s. 
Neither of these two possibilities occured. This can be explained with two reasons. The 
first concerns the assumption of all parties that the  Amsterdam Treaty did not have the 
same importance as the Maastricht Treaty. The second concerns the r esults of the first 
referendum held in Portugal since the revolution, on 28 June 1998, dealing with abor-
tion. After aggressive campaigning by both sides of society, the referendum was held 
with an abstention of 68,1 per cent. As a consequence, politicians reconsidered the use-
fulness of a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. On 29 June 1998 the referendum 
question upon the Amsterdam Treaty was approved in parliament. Given the poor turn-
out of the first one, some politicians now argued against the referendum on Amsterdam. 
However, the question on A msterdam was already on the Parliament’s agenda of the 
day, and there was not much time to think about it.  
 
3. Political Issues at Stake 
 
On 6 January 1999, the Portuguese Parliament adopted the ratification of the Amster-
dam Treaty with 205 votes in favour and 24 votes against. The 205 votes in favour were 
those of the Socialist Party  - PS (112), the Social Democratic Party - PSD (88) and the 
Popular Party  - CDS-PP (5  -  only the Bureau Group voted in f avour). The 24 votes 
against were given by the Communist Party  - PCP (13), the Green Party (2) and by 9 
MP’s of the CDS-PP. 
The most relevant political issue of the parliamentary debate was the internal division of 
the CDS-PP between those in favour of its current leader Paulo Portas, who voted in 
favour of the Treaty, and those in favour of the party’s ex-leader Manuel Monteiro, who 
voted against the Treaty. This division  became clear during the vote on the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Nine MP’s were against the new orientation of the B ureau Group and the more 
pro-European parliamentary group. One of them was ex-leader Manuel Monteiro who 
returned to parliament only to make a plenary  intervention of ten minutes about this 
issue. Almost all of the attention during the debate was concentrated on him. Two days 
earlier he had presented a book on the Amsterdam Treaty pointing out the dangers of 
further integration in the third pillar. Apart from the intervention of Manuel Monteiro, 
the media reported only briefly that the Amsterdam Treaty was approved by the Parlia-
ment.  
Public opinion was not very interested in this subject. The Amsterdam Treaty did not 
result in any kind of specific information campaign for the citizens. The media reported 
vaguely on the evolution of the IGC and the signature of the Treaty.  
Some institutions, as the Parliament, the Secretary of State of European Affairs, Univer-
sities and Centers of European Information held conferences where the citizens could 
participate, but in general only the elite and university made use of this opportunity.   
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All in all, the Amsterdam Treaty did not generate controversial issues for the Portu-
guese civil society, as the Maastricht Treaty had with EMU. During the ratification p e-
riod, the two referenda about the abortion and the regions deserved all the attention of 
the citizens, as well as the Euro in the last month of 1998. 
At the level of the political and academic elite the debate about the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty coincided with the question of the reform of the structural funds 
inserted in Agenda 2000. This was patent in the plenary speeches of 6 January 1999 
with some speakers from the opposition parties arguing that the  Government was not 
leading this process in the best way. 
The issues of the new Treaty highlighted at the conferences and in the parliamentary 
reports were the communitarisation of the third pillar (especially the extradition policy), 
the insertion of a chapter on employment, the closer co-operation-clause and the rein-
forcement of the role of the national parliaments. The view of most MP’s was in favour 
of upgrading the role of national parliaments vis-à-vis their governments and not as a 
collective body intervening in the EU decision-making process, therefore against an 
European Senate. For the MP’s of Madeira and Azores the consecration of a new statute 
for the outer-most regions in article 299.2 was an issue demanded during all IGCs since 
1987. 
What was also highlighted was the lack of major substantive modifications, everyone 
agreeing that it was a minimalist reform, especially in institutional terms.  
 
IV. The Portuguese Parliament after Amsterdam  
 
The Portuguese Parliament did not react to the introduction of the Protocol on National 
Parliaments in the Amsterdam Treaty. This can be explained by the information and 
informal influence model chosen by the Assembleia da República for which Law 20/94 
and the existent constitutional provisions were sufficient.  
Some scholars
1 stated that, after the Constitution amendment of 1997
2, Law 20/94 
should be amended to give more powers to the Parliament, namely the obligation to 
produce an opinion whenever a draft EC/EU act would have repercussions on the exclu-
sive competences of the Parliament. 
Accordingly, the CDS-PP presented draft Law 625/VII on 19 February 1999 to amend 
Law 20/94. The main proposals were 
-  the obligation of producing an opinion whenever the subject of the EC/EU act was 
related to the exclusive competences of the Parliament,  
                                                 
1   Namely Miranda, Jorge, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo V, Coimbra Editora, p. 178. 
2   Note that the amended article 161, alinea n) states that the Parliament has a ‘power to give its opi-
nion, as provided by law, on matters that are pending decision within the institutions of the European 
Union and that have a bearing on their exclusive legislative competence.”  
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-  the possibility of holding parliamentary hearings in Committee with the candidate 
proposed by the Government to the European Commission and about all the 
nominees to political functions and high posts of the European administration, and 
-  the establishment of a maximum delay between the request for a report from the 
Committee on EU affairs to other Standing Committees in order to comply with 
the deadline of six weeks provided in the Protocol.  
The Committee on EU affairs produced a report stating that the debate upon the revision 
of Law 20/94 should be open but that this specific draft Law should be rejected.
1 
In 1999 the PS presented a package of draft laws, inserted in the framework of the par-
liamentary reform  - dealing with several subjects like the rules of the Parliament, the 
statutes of MP’s, the organization of parliamentary services, the inquiry committees, 
etc.  -, in which draft Law 228/VIII of 7 June 2000 is included. This draft presents the 
following as major alterations to Law 20/94: 
-  the reinforcement of the technical support to the Committee,  
-  the information provided by the Government about the Portuguese personalities 
nominated for all the high political and administrative posts in the European insti-
tutions,  
-  the evaluation of the European budget,  
-  the creation of a group of MP’s and MEP’s that can adopt common positions on 
relevant political questions,  
-  the obligation to appreciate the legislative program of the European Commission, 
and 
-  the introduction of an annual report made by the Committee on EU affairs upon 
the conclusions of the COSAC about the functioning of the EU institutions, the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity and the measures to reinforce the d e-
mocratic legitimacy of the EU.  
This draft law, as all the others, can only be discussed in the next legislative session of 
2000/2001.  
Until now, as the scope of Law 20/94 covers the obligation of the Government to send 
all drafts of EC/EU acts to the Parliament, there were no debates about the documents 
excluded from this obligation, namely of documents falling under the CFSP pillar, 
documents concerning the entry into closer co-operation, documents prepared by mem-
ber states for the European Council or documents falling under the procedure of the 
'Protocol  on the integration of the Schengen Acquis into the framework of the European 
Union'. Furthermore, as the obligation to send the documents has not been fulfilled, the 
debate is centered on the information given in informal ways, according to the informa-
                                                 
1   The draft Law 625/VII was published in: Documentos da Assembleia da República II Série A, nº 39, 
of 25.2.99. The Report of the Committee on European Affairs was published in Documentos da As-
sembleia da República II Série A, No. 57, of 29.4.99. The discussion and vote in plenary session 
were published in Documentos da Assembleia da República I Série, No. 79, of 30.4.99.  
 
374
tion and informal influence model referred to in chapter II about the practice of parlia-
mentary scrutiny. 
The Protocol on National Parliaments did not induce a revision of the composition of 
the Parliament’s delegation to COSAC that is decided by the Committee on European 
Affairs in the items above mentioned. However, in the XXIII COSAC of Lisbon (29/30 
May 2000) there was the concern of approving a contribution in the terms of the Proto-
col and acting according to the new rules approved at the XXII COSAC of Helsinki.
1 
There is no discussion in the Parliament on revising the working mechanisms of the 
Committee on EU affairs regarding the frequency of meetings (normally once a week, 
with a duration of two hours) and specific competencies. Instead, there are greater con-
cerns about the little success of trying to i nvolve all the Standing Committees in this 
work until now. 
 
V. Conclusions: The Limited Effects of Amsterdam  
 
The Amsterdam Treaty  -  both the negotiations and the result - did not alter the role of 
the Portuguese Parliament in EU affairs. However, for the first time there was an effec-
tive parliamentary review and evaluation of the IGC, which did not occur during the 
IGCs for the Maastricht Treaty. Neither did Amsterdam alter the basic positions of n a-
tional parties with regard to the EC/EU. 
The aforementiond model of information and informal influence followed by the Portu-
guese Parliament is not a perfect one nor does it ensure a complete involvement of all 
the MP’s in EU affairs. It is a realistic model, which takes the circumstances of being a 
small parliament in a country with a young parliamentary tradition and a pre-eminent 
position of the Government in the political arena into a ccount. The Parliament is not 
considered an important actor in EC/EU decision-making. Nevertheless, it tries to con-
stitute the liaison between the European institutions and the citizens. Although the Par-
liament does not appreciate all of the EC/EU acts, it ensures some involvement of the 
citizens’ representatives in those that are appreciated. 
The MP’s are already conscious of the importance of reforming the image of the Par-
liament in general and in EU affairs. This is due to the fact that, in spite of the absence 
of immediate results, a strong intervention of the Parliament can be  a way to increase 
the involvement of national citizens in the European U nion. This can only be achieved 
if national parliaments are themselves involved in EU affairs but also, and mainly, if 
they promote the citizens’ intervention in their work. The parliamentary intervention in 
                                                 
1  See the contribution of the XXIII COSAC (and all the work of this COSAC) and the new rules of 
COSAC approved in Helsinki in www.COSAC.com).  
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EU affairs is not an end by itself but a way to reinforce the citizens’ involvement in the 
EU, and this is the only carrot that makes parliamentarians run. 377  
The Parliament of Sweden: A Successful Adapter in the European Arena 
 
Hans Hegeland  
 
I. Introduction: The Political System of Sweden 
 
The Swedish path to EU membership was complex. Due to Sweden’s policy of neutral-
ity, membership was ruled out during the era of the cold war. But the road to member-
ship opened up when the cold war ended.
1 Faced with a changed international system, 
Swedish reappraisal of membership proceeded rapidly. Rather suddenly, the Social 
Democratic Government proposed membership in October 1990 as part of an economic 
crisis policy package.
2 The membership and the European Union (EU) itself came to be 
understood mainly as an economic project rather than a peace project.  
Sweden joined the EU in 1995 after a fairly narrow yes vote in the referendum in No-
vember 1994.
3 The major political parties, both on the right and the left of the political 
spectrum, favoured a yes. This view was shared by the main interest groups, which play 
an important role in the corporatist political system. The message from most of those 
who favoured Swedish membership was that the co-operation in the EU was intergov-
ernmental and took place among sovereign n ation states. Referring to the reasoning 
behind the decision of the German Constitutional Court on the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, stated that the transfer o f power was not uncondi-
tional. This approach still persists, and one aspect of this view is that the national chain 
of democracy is the most important channel for political influence and legitimacy, in 
other words the role of the national parliament is crucial. 
The first words in the Swedish Constitution (adopted in 1974) are “All public power in 
Sweden proceeds from the people”. The Riksdag is, according to the Constitution, “the 
foremost representative of the people”. Thus, power rests with the people, who delegate 
it to the Riksdag. The Government must enjoy the confidence of the Riksdag, and the 
Riksdag can always declare that it does not have confidence in the Government, which 
would mean that the Government must resign. Legislative and financial powers rest 
with the Riksdag, as well as the power to monitor the Government. The idea of division 
                                                 
1  See Kite, Cynthia: Scandinavia faces EU: debates and decisions on membership 1961-1994. Umeå: 
Department of Political Science, Umeå University 1996. 
2  See Gustavsson, Jakob: The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the Swedish Reorienta-
tion on EC Membership, Lund: Lund University Press 1998. 
3   52.3 per cent voted yes, 46.8 per cent voted no. 0.9 per cent returned blank ballots. Turnout was 83.3 
per cent, which was higher than in previous Swedish referenda, but 3.5 percentage points lower than 
the turnout in the general election held in September 1994.   
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of powers, such as judicial r eview, is hardly seen at all in the Swedish Constitution. 
However, EU membership has strengthened the role of the courts.
1  
Swedish voters are among the most critical when it comes to the EU. They think that the 
co-operation within the EU should be limited and that the national political institutions 
should play the most important role. Confidence in national political institutions may 
not be high among the electorate, but it is at least higher than it is for the European Par-
liament and the European Commission. Actually, the EP and the Commission enjoy the 
lowest confidence among some 20 institutions ranked by the electorate.
2 The fact that 
Sweden is a unitary state may make it more difficult for voters to construe the political 
reality as consisting of different geographical levels, even if there is quite much local 
independence in the nearly 300 municipalities. Regional identity is, in a  European per-
spective, low. The o pposition towards the EU has, however, been strongest outside the 
major cities.  
Turnout in the two EP elections in Sweden (1995 and 1999) has been around 40 per 
cent, compared to more than 80 per cent in general elections. The two political parties 
that are negative towards the EU, the Left Party and the Green Party, have done better 
in the EP elections than in the general elections. The ruling Social D emocrats have done 
badly in the EP elections.  
In 1996, Swedish MEP’s were more inclined than MEP’s from any other member state 
to see national parliaments as the locus of legitimacy, rather than the European Parlia-
ment.
3 The negative view of the EP is partly explained by the fact that half of the Swed-
ish MEP’s at the time of  the survey were generally skeptical about the EU. The outcome 
of the 1999 EP election means that fewer MEP’s hold an EU-negative view. However, 
members of the Swedish Riksdag are also more inclined than other national parliamen-
tarians to focus on the national parliament rather than the EP as the source of legitimacy 
of the Union. 
The Government Offices have grown as a result of EU membership. From 1993 to 1999 
the number of employees increased by 28 %, from 3 500 to 4 500.
4 The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs  is in many ways the ministry most affected by EU membership.
5 In the 
handling of EU matters in the Government there has been a movement towards a more 
central role for the Prime Minister’s Office since 1995, partly because the political co-
                                                 
1  See Algotsson, Karl-Göran: Sveriges författning efter EU-anslutningen. Stockholm: SNS 2000. 
2   Holmberg, Sören/Weibull, Lennart: ‘Förtroendet faller’ in: Holmberg, Sören/Weibull, Lennart 
(eds.): Det nya samhället. SOM-undersökningen, Göteborgs universitet, SOM-institutet, 1999, p. 27-
42. 
3  See Katz, Richard S.: ‘Representation, the Locus of Democratic Legitimation and the Role of the 
National Parliaments in the European Union’, in: Katz, Richard S/Bernhard Wessels (eds.): The Eu-
ropean Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1999, p. 29. 
4   Source: Report on how the Riksdag evaluates the effects of its decisions. 
5  See Ekengren, Magnus: Time and European Governance. The Empirical Value of Three Reflective 
Approaches. Stockholm, University of Stockholm, Department of Political Science, 1998.  
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ordination of EU matters was not satisfactory to begin with. The Foreign Ministry still 
plays a central role, but the changes in the organization of the Government Offices have 
aimed at a more co-ordinating role for the Prime Minister’s Office. Still, there are more 
people at the Foreign Ministry than at the Prime Minister’s Office dealing with EU mat-
ters and there is still some lack of political co-ordination in the Government Offices. 
 
II. The Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs 
 
The central role of the Riksdag in the Swedish political system could be seen during the 
EU membership negotiations, when there were close contacts between the Government 
and the Riksdag. The Moderate Government was eager to keep in close touch with the 
Social Democratic opposition, whose support for the eventual negotiating outcome 
would be necessary should there be a yes in the referendum.  
Part of the national preparations for the membership concerned the relationship between 
the Government and the Riksdag. It was stated that it is the Government that represents 
Sweden in international relations, such as the EU, and that the Riksdag could hold the 
Government accountable for its actions in accordance with the general principles of 
parliamentarianism. However, this was  considered to be insufficient and new means 
were to be used to ensure that the Riksdag could exercise an active and real influence 
over Swedish EU policy. The intergovernmental view of the EU underlined the impor-
tance of the national parliament.  
The unicameral Riksdag has 349 members from seven political parties. Party c ohesion 
is very high. As in most parliamentary systems, the Government has, as long as it is 
tolerated by the Parliament, a strong position. The Government presents more than 100 
bills a year, and all MP’s have an opportunity to present their views on Government 
proposals. During a few weeks in the fall, when the Riksdag resumes its work after the 
summer there is also a right for all MP’s to submit motions (private members’ bills) on 
whatever they choose. All proposals are subject to scrutiny in one of the 16 standing 
Committees, organised according to different policy areas, and the proposals are also 
subject to a decision in the Chamber. The standing Committees prepare the matters for 
decisions in the Chamber. The EU Committee does not have that role and cannot pro-
pose that the Chamber make a certain decision. Rather, the EU Committee deliberates 
with the Government on matters that will be dealt with at the meetings in Council of 
Ministers the following week.  
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Figure 10: The Swedish Parliament in EC/EU Decision-Making  
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rangements for EU matters, especially for the stages before a decision is made in the 
Council of Ministers. The basic rules are found in chapter ten of the Riksdag Act 
(Standing Order of the Parliament). The model and how it works in practice is described 
in this section and an overview is also given in the following figure.
1 The Government 
should keep the Riksdag continuously informed about developments in the EU. The 
Riksdag receives, through the Government, a pproximately 800 documents in the COM 
series every year, including proposals for EC law as well as Green and White Papers. 
Approximately 30 documents in the SEC-series are also sent to the Riksdag every year. 
In the Riksdag, the EU documents are not formal matters in the sense that bills or m o-
tions, (private members’ bills), are. According to the Riksdag Act, the standing Com-
mittees should follow EU matters within their area of competence. In the following 
table, the number of EU documents distributed to each standing Committee is shown. 
Documents, mainly resolutions, from the EP are included as well as explanatory memo-
randa from the Government. 
Table 25: EU Documents to Each Standing Committee 
Committee on  Total  Total %  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98 
Foreign Affairs  1 082  30 %  414  331  337 
Agriculture and Environment  1 073  30 %  406  352  315 
Industry and Trade  619  17 %  246  193  180 
Transports and Communications  521  15 %  180  195  146 
Finance  484  14 %  199  145  140 
Labour Market  304  9 %   90  120  94 
Taxation  293  8 %  129  66  98 
Health and Welfare  215  6 %  95  73  47 
Education  214  6 %  72  88  54 
Constitution  199  6 %  71  50  78 
Civil Law Legislation  194  5 %  75  67  52 
Justice  144  4 %  56  55  33 
Social Insurance  128  4 %  45  51  32 
Cultural Affairs  121  3 %  56  38  27 
Defence  82  2 %  39  25  18 
Housing  66  2 %  33  21  12 
Total  3 563    1 351  1 114  1 098 
Author’s own calculation. 
 
The Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Agriculture and Environment each receive 
30 % of these EU documents. The Committees on Defence and Housing r eceive t he 
smallest number of documents. 
                                                 
1  See also Hegeland, Hans /Ingvar Mattson: ‘Another Link in the Chain: The Effects of EU Members-
hip on Delegation and Accountability in Sweden’, p. 81-104 in: Bergman, Torbjörn/Damgaard, Erik 
(eds.): Delegation and Accountability in European Integration. The Nordic Parliamentary Democra-
cies and the European Union, London: Frank Cass. Also in the special issue of The Journal of Legi-
slative Studies, No. 1/2000. The text is also based on an evaluation in the Riksdag, on how it deals 
with EU matters.   
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The Government should produce explanatory memoranda for all new important Com-
mission proposals. The memoranda should describe the proposal and its implications for 
Sweden. The Government should also give an account of its own view of the proposal. 
The memoranda may concern issues in the second and Third Pillar as well as First Pillar 
issues. The Riksdag receives approximately 100 e xplanatory memoranda every year. 
The following table shows the number of e xplanatory memoranda  distributed to each 
standing Committee in the period 1995-1998. During that period, a memorandum could 
be assigned to more than one Committee, which is not the case since fall 2000. 
Table 26: Explanatory Memoranda to Each Standing Committee 
Committee  Total  Total %  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98 
Agriculture and Environment  101  29 %  35  37  29 
Transport and Communications  73  21 %  34  20  19 
Industry and Trade  72  20 %  30  24  18 
Foreign Affairs  56  16 %  23  11  22 
Finance  34  10 %  10  12  12 
Taxation  31  9 %  14  6  11 
Civil Law Legislation  25  7 %  6  10  9 
Labor Market  19  5 %  5  6  8 
Health and Welfare  18  5 %  9  5  4 
Social Insurance  13  4 %  4  5  4 
Constitution  11  3 %  3  2  6 
Cultural Affairs  9  3 %  6  2  1 
Education  8  2 %  2  3  3 
Justice  6  2 %  3  2  1 
Defence  4  1 %  1  1  2 
Housing  2  1 %  1  1  0 
Total  353    134  107  112 
Author’s own calculations. 
 
As can be seen in the table, the Committee on Agriculture and Environment receives the 
largest number of explanatory memoranda, followed by the Committees on Transport 
and Communications and on Industry and Trade. The Committees on Defence and 
Housing receive fewest explanatory memoranda. The memoranda are not formal Riks-
dag matters, and normally no specific action is taken. However, a Committee may take 
an initiative and p ropose that the Chamber make a resolution, which has occurred con-
cerning support to Swedish egg producers for instance. A Committee may also send its 
views in writing to the EU Committee, which has happened twice so far, both cases 
during 2000. The Committee on A griculture and Environment submitted a report to the 
EU Committee on a White Paper on food safety in April 2000. The Committee on Con-
stitutional Affairs submitted its view to the EU Committee on the Commission proposal 
on public access to EU documents in November 2000. 
Since 1997, the explanatory memoranda have been distributed to all MP’s, but it is 
likely that they will only be distributed to the Committee concerned in the f uture - MP’s 
have no shortage of documents to study! The explanatory memoranda are public and are 
published on the web site of the Riksdag. The EU Committee stated in a questionnaire  
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in connection with COSAC in Paris in October 2000 that it would be good if all national 
parliaments published as much material as possible on the Internet.  
The Government should present the explanatory memoranda to the Riksdag within five 
weeks of the proposal being presented by the Commission, but this time limit is not 
always adhered to. In fifty cases during 1998, only half of the explanatory memoranda 
had been submitted within 60 days of presentation of the Commission proposal. There 
have also been instances where important Commission proposals have not been subject 
to explanatory memoranda. However, as a result of these findings, both the Government 
and the Riksdag will probably follow the selection of proposals more carefully in the 
future. The memoranda have become better over time. For instance more memoranda 
nowadays contain the views of the Government. However, improvements can still be 
made. 
Matters under consideration in the EU may also be treated as formal Riksdag matters, 
for instance when the Government presents its policy in a certain area such as commu-
nications or in law bills. EU matters are also brought up in individual MP’ motions. For 
instance, an MP may demand that the Government pursue a certain policy in the EU. 
Among other reports, the Government presents an annual report on developments in the 
EU in the previous year, which is approximately 500 pages long. This report also gives 
MP’s and standing Committees an opportunity to present their views. “EU” is men-
tioned in half of the approximately 300 reports presented by the standingCommittees 
each year. The Committees have the right to receive any information the Government 
may posses on EU matters, including secret information, and in this way the Commit-
tees are in a stronger position than they are on national issues, where no such right ex-
ists. Often, representatives of the Government inform a Committee orally on develop-
ments in the EU. 
The Riksdag may adopt resolutions when it considers formal Riksdag matters, and a p-
proximately 100 resolutions a year are adopted. Between 5 and 10 a year concern EU 
matters. Most of these resolutions concerned EU matters at the national level, such as 
distribution of regional funds. There is a tendency that, once the Riksdag makes a reso-
lution on matters at the EU level, the resolution concerns a matter on which there is 
national unanimity, such as transparency in the EU or the fights against drugs and child 
pornography. 
Two of the resolutions which urged the Government to act in a certain way in the EU 
concerned matters on which the Government eventually did not achieve the benefits 
sought for. The Riksdag wanted more support from the EU for some Swedish farmers. 
The Swedish Government acted as the Riksdag demanded, but in both cases the even-
tual EU decision was not in line with the position of the Riksdag. These cases are very 
clear examples of the Swedish perception of the democratic deficit: the national parlia-
ment has the power to demand that the Government should act in a certain way in the 
EU, but the Government cannot force the EU to act in that way.   
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The Committee on European Union Affairs plays a central role in the Riksdag when it 
comes to EU m atters. The Government informs and consults this Committee before 
each meeting in the Council of Ministers, and the Committee may ask for consultations 
regarding other EU matters as well. The EU Committee has some 40 meetings a year. 
Each meeting lasts approximately two and a half hours, in other words the Committee 
meets for 100 hours a year. The Government sends material to the Committee before 
each meeting. Normally, the members of the Committee receive the material on a Mon-
day night, but complementary m aterial is often sent during the week. Meetings take 
place on Fridays, and it may be difficult, especially for small parties, to find time to 
discuss the issues internally during the week. On the other hand, most issues return and 
are discussed several times in the Committee.  
It is the minister in person who should appear in the Committee, together with his/her 
assistants, and in approximately 80 % of the cases the minister is indeed present. In 
other cases s/he may be ill or travelling. The minister starts by telling the Committee 
what happened at the previous meeting of the Council. The members may ask questions. 
Then the minister goes through the agenda of the next Council meeting and focuses on 
important issues. The members may present their views, and  the chairman then summa-
rizes the discussion. The deliberations are made public by a shorthand verbatim record, 
normally published two weeks after the meeting in the Committee. Some minor parts 
may be secret, but most of the shorthand record is public and available on the Internet. 
After the Council meeting, the Government should send a written report to the Commit-
tee and the Riksdag within five working days. The time limit is not always adhered to, 
but almost all reports are eventually submitted to the Committee.  
Members of the Committee on European Union Affairs, who are often senior MP’s, are 
also active members of Standing Committees. The Committees most concerned with 
EU matters have several members who participate in the EU Committee as well. The 
only  Committees that lack representation in the EU Committee are the Committees on 
Defence and Housing. The contacts between the EU Committee and the Standing 
Committees take place mainly through the political parties, not least because the parties 
nominate MP’s from the relevant Standing Committees to the EU Committee. EU 
Committee members from parties that have only a few seats in the EU Committee keep 
in touch with their party colleagues in the different standingCommittees. The EU Com-
mittee, like the Standing Committees, is composed of 17 members proportionally 
elected according to the distribution of seats in the Riksdag. However, more than 40 
MP’s, including deputy members of the Committee, actively follow the work in the 
Committee. The Committee has a staff of some eight people, which is approximately 
the same as each of the Standing Committees.  
The members of the EU Committee receive some 10 000 pages a year. Most of the ma-
terial focuses on Council meetings, although other parts of the EU are covered as well. 
Different ministries submit most of the material, but the secretariat of the Committee 
also encloses information from the Internet and from different databases. A large part of  
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the material is published on the Internet. The quality of the material has improved since 
1995, and it contains roughly the same information as the corresponding material in 
Denmark and Finland. However, the Committee continuously follows up the material 
and may ask for supplementary information when needed.  
The mandate the Committee gives the minister is politically, but not legally, binding. It 
is thus expected that the Government act in accordance with the views of the Commit-
tee. The Government may try to get in touch with the Committee if something important 
happens during the EU meeting. For instance, during the European Council in Cannes in 
1995, a Minister called the representatives of the political parties to make sure that he 
had their support as a new, previously unknown, proposal was presented by another 
Member State. 
The Government may find it necessary to deviate from the standpoint of the Committee, 
but must then give an account of its reasons for doing so. It is then the EU Committee 
and the Riksdag that decide if the reasons are good enough, in other words the normal 
parliamentary control mechanisms are used. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
may criticize the Government and the Riksdag may even force the Government to r e-
sign. 
Most of the time, the Government does not meet a majority in the Committee against a 
proposed standpoint. This is in many ways similar to the preparation of bills, where the 
Government normally gets its way. However, there are signs that the Government does 
not meet as much opposition in EU matters as in national issues.
1 So far, the Committee 
has opposed the view of the Government on only a few occasions. However, the issues 
are seldom clear-cut, and the Government may well adjust its views before it comes to 
the Committee. In one case, the Government did not act in the way a majority in the EU 
Committee urged. The issue concerned a program for tourism (Philoxenia). The Gov-
ernment voted yes in the Council in spite of a no from a majority in the EU Committee. 
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs criticized the Minister responsible. After  that 
criticism the Minister in question has listened carefully to the advice of the Committee. 
In a nother case, the Committee thought that a Council resolution on education did not 
state clearly that education should primarily be dealt with at the national level. The Min-
ister came back to the Committee before the meeting in the Council, and he also had 
contacts with the political parties outside the formal Committee meetings. The Commit-
tee agreed that it would be able to accept the resolution if the Government succeeded in 
including a statement in the resolution referring to the relevant Treaty article. The Gov-
ernment achieved this objective, and a statement of that kind was included in the resolu-
tion. 
                                                 
1  See Lindgren, Karl-Oskar: ‘EU-medlemskapets inverkan på den svenska parlamentarismen’ in: 
Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, vol. 103, 2000.  
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Neither of these issues was perhaps very important in itself, but the Committee sig-
nalled to the Government that the Committee did not want EU co-operation to concern 
issues that the Committee thought should primarily be handled at the n ational level. It 
should be noted that in both these cases it was not a minister but a state secretary that 
first met the Committee, and since a state secretary has less room for manoeuvre than a 
minister, a compromise could not be reached at the Committee meeting. 
The Prime Minister regularly deliberates with the EU Committee before meetings in the 
European Council. The form of the deliberations before Council meetings in the second 
and Third Pillar is the same as for First Pillar meetings.  
When an EC-directive is to be transposed into national law, the matter is treated as other 
law bills and there is no role for the EU Committee. The matter is prepared in a Stand-
ing Committee, e.g. the Committee on Agriculture and Environment if the directive 
concerns environmental issues. Of 113 bills in 1998/99, 33 (or 30 per cent) concerned 
implementation of EC law in one form or another. A nother 19 (or 17 per cent) were in 
other ways related to the EU.
1  
MP’s may put written questions to ministers. Of approximately 1 000 questions a year, 
between ten per cent and twelve per cent concern EU m atters. MP’s may, for instance, 
ask about the view of the Government on specific Commission proposals. Interpella-
tions may also be put forward. Of some 350 interpellations a year approximately 15 % 
concern the EU. The Government may inform the Chamber about different issues and 
from 1995 to the beginning of 2000, 29 of 58 occasions of this kind of information have 
concerned the EU.
2 For instance, the Prime Minister informs the Chamber after meet-
ings in the European Council. 
Two main political dimensions in  EU matters have dominated in the Riksdag during the 
first years of Swedish membership. The EU “positive  - negative” dimension contains 
the Left Party and the Green Party on the “negative” side, and the other parties, albeit to 
varying degrees, on the „positive” side.
3 It can be noted that the Left Party and the 
Green Party are comparatively active in EU matters, and they have also been positive 
towards a stronger role for the Riksdag in EU matters than the other parties have. The 
other dimension is the traditional  - single issue based  - left-right dimension, which 
dominates deliberations about matters discussed at the ECOFIN meetings, for instance. 
This dimension is also the most important one in national politics, as it has been for 80 
years.  
                                                 
1   Source: material from evaluation of the Riksdag and the EU. 
2   Source: material from evaluation of the Riksdag and the EU.  
3   There are signs that the non-socialist political parties and the Left Party and the Green Party share a 
skeptical view of EU integration - and especially supranational decision-making - on areas such as 
education.  
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III. The Swedish Parliament and the Negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty 
 
The Riksdag and its members were involved in issues concerning the IGC in several 
ways. A Commission of Inquiry, consisting of MP’s, was set up; the Government pre-
sented - after an explicit request by the Riksdag - a report that was closely scrutinized in 
the Riksdag and in its standingCommittees; the Committee on EU Affairs met represen-
tatives of the Government almost every week during the IGC; and, finally, the Riksdag 
approved the Treaty. 
When  it came to developing positions for the IGC, it should be remembered that Swe-
den had not been a member of the EU for much more than a year when the IGC started 
in March 1996. The Government was criticized for not focusing on institutional issues 
but rather marginal issues such as youth issues and consumer policy. However, the three 
main priorities for the Government were employment, the environment and openness.
1  
The Swedish Government presented its views in a report to the Riksdag in N ovember 
1995. The Government stated that Sweden should work for a continued important role 
for the European Parliament in the EU. The complexity and number of decision-making 
procedures should be reduced in order to further efficiency and to make the procedures 
more comprehensible for the citizens. It was noted that the EP did not propose that it 
should have the right to initiate EC laws, which was also the standpoint of the Govern-
ment. Measures to give the EP a stronger role in controlling  - but not deciding upon  - 
the finances of the EU should also be considered. 
The role of the national parliaments in the decision-making process should be strength-
ened, according to the governmental report, since this role is of fundamental importance 
for the democratic legitimacy of the EU c o-operation. Each state has its procedure for 
the relationship between government and parliament, and decisions about these proce-
dures should continue to be made at the national level. It is of great importance that the 
union works in a way that facilitates good relations between governments and parlia-
ments in the member states. Measures that facilitate the role of the national parliaments 
should thus be considered. The national parliaments should be given increased possibili-
ties to influence the work in the EU, above all by having more time to examine the dif-
ferent issues. Reforms at EU level should thus not focus on increasing the collective 
role of the national parliaments and making them a player, but on creating conditions 
which facilitate consultations between each national parliament and its government.  
Regarding the Third Pillar, the Government noted that the role of the EP was less salient 
than in the First Pillar. The decisions in the Third Pillar concern matters that are of great 
importance for the fundamental rights of citizens and their personal security. Therefore 
                                                 
1  See Johansson, Karl Magnus/ Svensson, Anna Carin: ‘Sweden Negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty: 
Constrained, but Constructive?’ in: Laursen, Finn (ed.): The Amsterdam Treaty: National Preference 
Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Outcome and Ratification, Odense: Odense University Press 2001  
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the decisions should be made in forms characterized by openness and under conditions 
which make it possible for the EP to present its view on the decisions made by the 
member states. T he EP should have more access to proposals for binding decisions, 
thereby enabling the EP to present its views on the proposal within a certain time.
1 
In the debate in the Riksdag, all political parties agreed that there was a need to create 
better opportunities for the national parliament to exercise influence. That view is linked 
with the general view that the main link for legitimacy for the EU should go through the 
nation-state and not through the EU institutions. The Left Party and the Green Party 
suggested that the national parliaments should have the right to initiate EU decisions, 
but the other political parties claimed that the n ational parliaments should act primarily 
through their governments. The p olitical parties and individual MP’s could, of course, 
also use other ways to promote i ssues they found important. The Riksdag supported the 
idea of making Green Papers from the Commission easily available for national parlia-
ments.
2 
During the IGC, the Government informed and conferred with the EU Committee a l-
most every week. It was mainly Sweden’s chief negotiator, a State Secretary at the For-
eign Ministry, who met the Committee. At these meetings, the State Secretary first gave 
an account of the IGC developments since his last meeting with the Committee, and 
then there were discussions about the issues that would be dealt with at the next IGC 
meeting. There were almost 50 meetings of this kind in the Committee during 1996 and 
1997, and there were also deliberations with representatives of the Government in some 
Standing Committees, especially the Foreign Affairs Committee. The IGC was also 
discussed in the EU Committee when IGC matters were dealt with in the General A f-
fairs Council. During the concluding n egotiations in Amsterdam in June 1997, there 
were  telephone conferences between the Swedish negotiators and the Committee. There 
was also information and debate in plenary sessions about various aspects of the IGC on 
several occasions. 
In many ways, the contacts with the Committee during the IGC resembled the contacts 
between the Government and the Riksdag during the Swedish membership negotiations 
a few years earlier. The Government was apparently keen to have support from the 
Riksdag, and the Government also said after both negotiations that the close contacts 
with the Riksdag had been a great help. Members of the Committee also claim that the 
Government handled the contacts with the Riksdag in a very good manner, and not even 
members who are normally critical of the information from the Government have c om-
plained.
3 
                                                 
1   Skr. 1995/96:30, 2001. 
2   Bet. 1995/96:UU13 p. 34. 
3   This statement is made on basis of interviews with 12 members of the Committee. See Hegeland, 
Hans: Riksdagen, Europeiska unionen och demokratin, Lund, Department of Political Science, 1999, 
p. 103-104.  
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The Dublin COSAC draft protocol from October 1996 was touched on at a meeting in 
the EU Committee a few days after the Dublin COSAC meeting. The Committee 
thought that the draft dismissed the idea that the national parliaments should act collec-
tively through COSAC like a second Chamber. Representatives of the Government said 
that they would use the COSAC conclusions against that idea. According to the Gov-
ernment, the French Government was the only one which pursued that role for the par-
liaments.  
It was often stated in the Riksdag during the IGC that COSAC could not represent the 
national parliaments. Before the Swedish membership of the EU, the role of the repre-
sentatives at COSAC was also discussed and it was said that statements should be re-
garded as coming from the members as representatives of their political parties and not 
of the EU Committee as a parliamentary organ. 
The European Parliament’s Neyts-Uytterbroeck report on relations between the EP and 
the national parliament was distributed  to the members of the EU Committee.
1 Before 
the EP adopted the report, there was a meeting between the EP Committee on Institu-
tional Affairs and representatives of the national parliaments. Two Swedish MP’s par-
ticipated, and they reported in the EU Committee that there was support in the EP for 
more openness in the EU. The report was also mentioned in a written statement from 
the Committee on the role of COSAC. Actually, that statement was the first one in writ-
ing from the Committee to the Government, a sign in itself that the question of the rela-
tionship between the national parliaments and COSAC was considered to be important.
2 
The statement took as its starting point the proposal from the Dutch presidency on the 
protocol on n ational parliaments. It was noted that the Dutch proposal was in many 
ways similar to - and on some points softer than - the Dublin COSAC draft protocol. In 
the statement from the Committee it was suggested that a sentence from the Dublin 
COSAC draft protocol should be included, saying that COSAC’s “conclusions will be 
offered as suggestions and would not seek to bind any delegate or Delegations”. This 
view was r eflected in the final protocol (“Contributions made by COSAC shall in no 
way bind national parliaments or prejudge their position”), and the Swedish Govern-
ment claimed that this explicit statement made it possible for the Government to accept 
the protocol. 
The possibility of contacts between standing Committees in the national parliaments 
and the European Parliament was also mentioned in the EU Committee during the IGC. 
                                                 
1   The Neyts-Uytterbroeck report was also distributed to the secretariats of the Standing Committees in 
August 1997. However, the report was probably not distributed to many members of the Standing 
Committees (on the other hand, over 40 MP, who also were members of standing Committees, re-
ceived the report in their capacity as members of the EU Committee). 
2   There have been a few other written statements after that, for instance on the importance for national 
parliaments to receive papers on Third Pillar issues in sufficient time.  
 
390
During the Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001, a number of standingCommit-
tees in the Riksdag will host that kind of meeting. 
The composition of the Delegation to COSAC did not change as a result of the Protocol 
on National Parliaments. The Delegation of six MP’s is still proportionally formed. The 
two largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party, sometimes let the 
minor parties take one of their seats in the COSAC Delegation.  
Since the Riksdag already received the documents mentioned in the Protocol on N a-
tional Parliaments (PNP), no particular measures were taken as a result of the Protocol. 
The only measure apart from approval of the Treaty was an amendment to the Swedish 
law of accession  to the EU, through which the A msterdam Treaty (with its annexes and 
protocols) applies in Sweden.  
The main Swedish approach during the IGC was that the EU is not a parliamentary sys-
tem, and nor should it become one. The Swedish position was that the role of national 
parliament is very important, but the new powers of the EP were welcomed. However, 
the Liberal Party tends to be more positive than the other parties towards giving more 
powers to the EP.  
 
IV. The Riksdag after Amsterdam 
 
There has not been any change in routines specifically due to the Protocol on National 
Parliaments. The Riksdag still receives EU documents (and explanatory memoranda on 
important proposals), and all issues that will be discussed at a Council meeting are sub-
ject to debate in the Committee on EU Affairs.  
For the Riksdag, it is more important that there is enough time between Coreper and the 
Council meeting than it is to have a rule about six weeks between proposal and deci-
sion. The discussions in the EU Committee during the 1996-97 IGC on the role of n a-
tional parliaments therefore often focused more on the time period between Coreper and 
the Council meeting than on the six-week-period. The Riksdag has noted that there is 
agreement in the EU that at least one full week should pass between Coreper and the 
Council meeting. 
A broad internal evaluation of how the Riksdag deals with EU matters was conducted 
during 1999/2000. Generally, the system with pre-Council screening in the EU Commit-
tee is considered to function well. This means  that these routines will continue. One 
advantage is that the EU Committee gets a broad overview of all EU matters, since it 
covers all three pillars and all meetings in the Council. 
There is quite a lot of activity in the Standing Committees on EU matters, but the Stand-
ing Committees do not wholly fulfil the role intended. They are advised to fit EU mat-
ters into their schedules. Further proposals include closer and more systematic planning 
of open information from the Government in the Chamber and an annual EU debate in 
the Chamber.  
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The fact that the Government is accountable to the Riksdag is underlined by a proposal 
for a new rule in the Standing Orders of the Riksdag saying that the Government should 
account for its actions in the EU. To some extent, this already happens today, but a 
more formal regulation underlines the obligation of the Government to provide such 
information. 
Regarding the Amsterdam Treaty, it is noted in the report that the new rules for the co-
decision procedure imply that the EU decision-making process is likely to go faster, 
which stresses the importance of following issues at an early stage, i.e. b efore the 
Commission presents its formal proposal. The Riksdag should thus focus on Green and 
White Papers.  
The general rules governing t he relationship between the Riksdag and the Government 
in EU matters are also applicable to issues in the second and Third Pillar. This system 
should continue, according to the report.  
In fact, it could be claimed that the Riksdag has gained new insights  into these areas 
thanks to EU membership. Previously, the Government could negotiate matters with no 
or very limited input from the Riksdag. Now the Government must inform and consult 
with the Riksdag on issues which earlier were the prerogative of the Government. This 
applies both to many traditional foreign policy issues as well as things like conventions 
discussed in the Third Pillar. On the other hand, the EU-negative parties tend to claim 
that Sweden does not pursue any foreign policy of its own any more but simply adjusts 
to the policy of the EU. Thus, Sweden, including its parliament, has lost control over its 
foreign policy, according to this view. 
In an internal memorandum, the Ministry of Justice calls attention to the fact that the 
European Parliament has gained insight into Third Pillar issues thanks to the Amster-
dam Treaty. In light of that, it is emphasised that the Government should continuously 
and as early as possible keep the Riksdag informed. According to the memorandum, it 
cannot be accepted that the European Parliament is better informed than the Riksdag. 
In the evaluation mentioned above, there are requests that the Government supplies 
more information about the work in the Commission. This refers both to the expert 
Committees preparing p roposals on EC laws as well as the comitology.
1 Further, the 
Government should give an account of directives not yet implemented into Swedish law 
in the annual EU report to the Riksdag. 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduces a new kind of decision in the Third Pillar, framework 
decisions. In the Swedish political system, framework decisions are considered interna-
tional agreements and not supranational decisions. This means that the Riksdag must 
approve them before the Swedish Government votes in f avour of them if  they concern 
                                                 
1   The focus on the Council this far in the Riksdag is mirrored by a similar focus in the Cabinet Office. 
Thus, one could say that the Government and the Riksdag have focused on the most acute matters, 
i.e. ‘sharp’ decisions and have not really been able to follow the work in the Commission to a satis-
factory degree. This will probably change during the next few years.  
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matters that fall within the scope of the Riksdag, (unless they are covered by earlier 
parliamentary decisions). This implies that if a law must be changed due to the frame-
work decision, the Riksdag must have approved the matter.
1 According to the Govern-
ment, this procedure means that Sweden runs the risk of losing influence in the negotia-
tions, since Sweden must wait for a parliamentary decision before the Government may 
accept the framework decision. The Government has appointed a parliamentary com-
mission of inquiry to consider whether forms that allow the Riksdag to give its approval 
in advance more explicitly than under the present regulation should be introduced. 
In 1997, the EU Committee was given the right to organize open hearings, a right the 
Standing Committees have had since 1988. The Committee has organized five open 
hearings. The rules state that there should be “exceptional reasons” if the Committee is 
to organize an open hearing, a demand that is not placed on the Standing Committees. 
However, this extra demand is likely to be abolished, and one reason for that is that 
experience has shown that there are more overall issues, such as Agenda 2000, IGCs, 
and the charter for fundamental rights.  
The EU Committee focuses on matters dealt with on the Council agenda, but there has 
been a development in praxis that means that other issues are also covered. There is 
broad support in the Riksdag that this broader praxis, which includes matters such as 
IGCs and Schengen, should continue. 
Contacts with the European Parliament go mainly through the party groups. All political 
parties have close contacts with their MEP’s, but the Moderate Party probably has the 
most developed contacts, since the party is internally united on most EU issues and is 
the largest opposition party. A majority of the political parties in the Riksdag thinks that 
the MEP’s should not have the right to participate in debates in the Chamber in the 
Riksdag. However, the Liberal Party would like them to have the right to do so i n spe-
cific EU debates. One reasonable way of construing the discussions on this issue is to 
realize that the MEP’s would like a national arena, while the MP’s do not want competi-
tion in what they could d escribe as their own arena. MP’s and MEP’s are also said to 
have different mandates, and these mandates should not be confused. However, some 
Swedish MEP’s participated and asked questions in an open hearing arranged by the EU 
Committee in the fall of 2000 about the IGC. There was also a meeting afterwards be-
tween the MEP’s and the EU Committee, and it was decided that there should be a 
meeting of that kind every year. 
The Government is not the only source of information for the Riksdag. Internet and 
material from the Finnish and Danish parliaments are also u sed. During the Swedish 
                                                 
1   Thus, the Government presented a bill and the Riksdag approved the signing of the first framework 
decision, on counterfeiting of the Euro, before the Government approved the decision in the Council 
(bill. 1999/2000:85, report 1999/2000:JuU20).  
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presidency in 2001, the Riksdag will have a representative in the European Parliament 
in order to gather information. 
 
V. Conclusions: EU Membership Matters for an Influential Parliament 
 
The Riksdag has become far more involved in  European matters thanks to EU member-
ship. One sign of this is that the obligation of the Government to inform and consult 
with the Riksdag about EU matters is likely to be regulated in the Constitution and not 
only by the Riksdag Act.
1 One reason for regulating these matters in the Constitution is 
that experience shows that EU matters are often dealt with by the Riksdag.  
The Riksdag had good insight into the 1996/97 IGC. Since IGCs are not ‘EU matters’ in 
a strict sense, but rather international negotiations, one could say that the Riksdag has 
gained insight into this kind of negotiation compared with the situation before EU 
membership. On the other hand, one could say that this is simply a natural development, 
since IGCs are so important. However, it was n ot obvious from the outset that the Riks-
dag would have all this insight.  
The Riksdag is becoming better and better at following EU matters and is fairly good at 
the matters it chooses to pursue. The ongoing deliberations in the EU Committee mean 
that almost all important issues are discussed several times. The Government probably 
tries to pre-empt criticism from the Riksdag and therefore adjusts its positions in a d-
vance.  
However, there are several limitations. Before an issue is dealt with at a Council meet-
ing, it will have been discussed in a working group and in COREPER. If a country 
changes its position at Council level, it will lose the confidence of the other member 
states. This means that the Riksdag should make its views known to the Government 
before the issue is discussed at ministerial level, but there are no routines that ensure 
that this happens for all matters. Furthermore, the Riksdag is not constantly in session. 
MP’s need to have time to be in their constituencies, but this may mean that there is 
simply no time for EU matters when the opportunities for influence are the greatest. A 
long-term perspective is necessary to avoid such situations. The Amsterdam Treaty 
implies that the EU decision-making process will be faster, which underlines the  neces-
sity to follow issues from an early stage.  
The Riksdag did not have all routines for dealing with EU matters in place from the 
very start of the Swedish EU membership. Some papers were not delivered, information 
was sometimes late and the Government did not always present its views. There are still 
                                                 
1   The political parties agree that the Constitution should be changed in this way, and after the next 
general election in September 2002, this is likely to happen. A change of the Constitution must be 
decided both before and after a general election in order to be valid.  
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gaps, but the Riksdag receives better information now and also finds more and more 
information on its own. 
The Riksdag is making an effort to strengthen its role. There are definitely good chances 
that it w ill succeed as both the Riksdag and the Government get more used to working 
with EU matters. There is a movement towards more long-range planning, not least 
among the standing committees. The formal conditions for a very active Riksdag are 
there, and ultimately it is only the Riksdag itself that can decide if its formal powers 
should be used. With a growing awareness of how much the EU influences important 
issues, the chances that these opportunities will be used increase. Still, there are quite a 
few things to do before the Riksdag has the same role in EU matters as it has in national 
issues. The problem is that few issues are ‘national’ nowadays. Thanks to EU member-
ship, the Riksdag has more opportunities than before to influence issues decided at the 
European level. 395  
The Parliament of the United Kingdom: From Supportive Scrutiny to 
Unleashed Control? 
 
Caitríona A. Carter
1 
 
I. Introduction: The Socio-Political Framework of the United Kingdom
2 
 
The current United Kingdom (UK) Labour Government, elected with  a large m ajority in 
May 1997, holds a clear ‘pro-Europe’ manifesto commitment. Its strong unequivocal 
EU policy stance is new, both for the UK and for the UK Labour Party. In the first in-
stance, neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party were initially keen to join 
the (then) European Communities in the 1950’s. In the second instance, the Labour 
Party was against the terms of UK membership negotiated in the 1970’s. Moreover, 
since joining “both parties have  […] been internally divided on the issue”
3. A recent 
interpretation of MP’s political attitudes to Europe, however, would suggest that today 
the dissident wings of the two main parties are decreasing in number. And, that the two 
main parties have ‘crossed positions’ since the 1975 referendum
4:
 
“On almost every issue the picture is much the same: the majority of Labour MP’s - often a 
large majority - adopt what, for want of a better term, can be described as a pro-European, 
euro-enthusiastic stance; the majority of Conservative MP’s - and often a large majority - 
adopt a sceptical position.”
5 
The current political situation in the Houses of Parliament vis-à-vis the EU is thus his-
torically specific. There is a ‘pro-Europe’ Labour Government with a very large major-
ity in the House of Commons. Opposition Conservative MP’s are, for the most part, 
‘anti-Europe’ (and voted against the Treaty of Amsterdam).
6 However, a large propor-
                                                 
1   The author would like to thank Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott, along with the editors, for their 
comments. The author would also like to thank officials interviewed, without whose help and co-
operation such research would not have been possible. 
2   Some of the information used in this chapter is drawn from interview material. Except where other-
wise indicated, ‘interview material’ refers to interviews of parliamentary officials in both Houses of 
Parliament conducted by the author on 15 June 2000, for the purposes of this chapter. Other informa-
tion is drawn from research conducted within an ESRC-funded research project entitled ‘Devolution 
and European Policy-Making in Britain’ (ESRC Ref. L327 25 3024). Some of the material is derived 
from work undertaken by fellow researchers on that project: Simon Bulmer, Martin Burch, Patricia 
Hogwood, Andrew Scott. 
3   Norton, Philip (ed.): National Parliaments and the EU, London: Frank Cass 1996, p. 94. 
4  See Cowley, Philip: ‘Europe’  in the House of Commons, in: Scully, Roger/Glees, Anthony (eds.): 
Brunel University European Affairs Unit, Discussion Paper Series, No.99/5, 1999, p. 21. 
5   Ibid., p. 1. 
6   Ibid., pp. 21-22.  
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tion of Liberal Democrats (who are also opposition MP’s) are ‘pro-Europe’ (and vote 
with the Government on EU issues). In short, the UK a ppears to be undergoing a 
changed political climate as far as the EU is concerned. 
Against this political backdrop, one of the first manifesto commitments fulfilled by the 
incoming Labour Government was to improve parliamentary oversight of the European 
Union’s (EU)’s decision-making processes.
1 This it did in November 1998, through the 
introduction of a number of key reforms to the scrutiny procedures operating in both 
Houses of Parliament. Parliamentary oversight of EU business is now subject to an ad-
vanced set of procedures in the UK. A new government appears to have heralded a new 
approach to scrutiny. This approach  - which is to encourage the effective involvement 
of national parliaments in the EU governance system  - is also manifest at EU level. Dur-
ing the 1996/1997 Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, the UK Government initiated key 
elements of the Protocol on N ational Parliaments (PNP), attached to the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). These elements apply to all member states’ parliaments, with 
an e xpectant outcome of a strengthened parliamentary dimension to the aggregate EU 
decisional system. 
It is unwise, however, only to consider the broader political debate on ‘Europe’ in the 
Houses of Parliament when assessing both Houses’ overall attitude to s crutiny proce-
dures.
2 For, even in the past, with more ‘reluctant’ UK governments in power, the ap-
proach taken vis-à-vis scrutiny of European legislation has always been very construc-
tive.
3 Indeed, even in the 1992 Parliament, where dispute over EU issues accounted for 
40 per cent of the rebellions on all issues
4, the House of Commons European Legisla-
tion Committee reported that “the British [scrutiny] system in fact compares extremely 
well with others in the Union”
5. 
That the scrutiny system was comparatively well-developed even in the mid-1990’s 
under the Major (Conservative) Government is confirmed by other comparative studies: 
for example, in 1996 Rometsch and Wessels concluded that the UK Parliament dis-
played a high degree of Europeanisation.
6 Moreover,  many of the recent reforms made 
by the Labour Government emanate from proposals made by the UK European Com-
mittees in reports written during the 1992-97 Conservative Government. This is also 
true with regard to reform at the EU level. The 1996/1997 Intergovernmental Confer-
                                                 
1   I am using the term ‘EU’ to refer to all activities of the EU. The term ‘EC’ is used to refer specifical-
ly to matters falling under the European Community Pillar of the Treaty on European Union. 
2   European matters are also addressed within general parliamentary procedures. This chapter is solely 
concerned with the specific scrutiny procedures. 
3  See Norton, Philip: ‘The UK: Political Conflict, Parliamentary Scrutiny’, in: Norton, Philip (ed.), 
National Parliaments and the EU, London: Frank Cass 1996, p. 95. 
4  See Cowley, 1999, op.cit., p. 16. 
5   House of Commons, Select Committee on European Legislation, 27th Report Session 1995-6, ‘The 
Scrutiny of European Business’ HMSO paper 51 xxvii 18-07-96, point 16. 
6  See Rometsch, Dietrich/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): The European Union and Member States: To-
wards Institutional Fusion?, Manchester: MUP 1996, p. 356.  
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ence (IGC) process - leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam  - began under a Conservative 
Government. Even though it finished under a Labour Government, which ultimately 
negotiated and signed the PNP, many of the key ideas for reform of Council of Minis-
ters’ rules were ideas generated within previous European Committees established u n-
der the Conservative Government. 
In the UK experience, therefore, the ‘nature’ of parliamentary scrutiny is not solely 
linked to a specific Government’s European policy. Alternative accounts for the devel-
opment of a strong scrutiny system must be sought. One possible approach is to adapt 
broader analytical constructs deployed in political science literature on parliamentary 
control of the executive. For, scrutiny is  a form of parliamentary control of the execu-
tive, embedded in executive-legislative relations; and 
“parliamentary control of the executive  […] depend[s] on the nature of executive-
legislative relationships, including the type of cabinet in office and the p revailing patterns 
of interaction between parliamentary and governmental actors”
1. 
According to Judge, it is primarily the nature of executive-legislative relations which is 
the key determinant to a national system’s form of scrutiny: 
“From the outset [...] existing patterns of national legislative-executive relations came to 
imprint themselves upon the wider patterns of national parliamentary activity at the EC 
level.”
2 
This view is shared by others. For example, Norton argues that the UK parliamentary 
response to EU membership and the creation of its scrutiny procedure in 1974 was de-
termined by a combination of national “Constitutional, political and practical factors”
3. 
What was witnessed in 1974 was a parliamentary response in keeping with the doctrine 
and symbolism of parliamentary sovereignty (even if parliamentary rules of implied 
repeal are contested within the EC system): 
“Given its historic role as a law-effecting body, it was difficult for many parliamentarians 
to accept a passive part in the process by which measures of public policy were approved.”
4 
As such, a strong parliamentary response to EU membership was in keeping with UK 
Constitutional tradition. In the creation of the original House of Commons Committee, 
it is argued, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility  - a UK Constitutional convention  - 
was simply extended to the procedure of parliamentary control of ministers within the 
EC Council of Ministers.
5 
                                                 
1   Damgaard, Erik: Representation, Delegation and Parliamentary Control, Paper presented to the 
workshop on ‘Parliamentary control of the Executive, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Copen-
hagen, April 14-19 2000, p. 7. 
2   Judge, David: ‘The Failure of National Parliaments?’, in: Hayward, Jack (ed.): The Crisis of Repre-
sentation in Europe, London: Frank Cass Ltd.,1995, p. 82. 
3   Norton, 1996, op.cit., p. 103. 
4   Ibid., p. 103. 
5  See Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 85.  
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However, such an account of events does not tell the whole story. For, in what Judge 
acknowledges as a “paradox”
1, the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC)
2 in the House 
of Commons was in fact given a very different kind of parliamentary control function 
than that held within parliament. Parliament had powers of scrutiny over secondary 
legislation  - an ex-post control function  - which enables the holding of a Minister to 
account where necessary. By contrast, the ESC was given powers of ex-ante control  - 
control of the pre-legislative phase of the policy process: 
“The procedures adopted by the House in 1974 allowed MP’s to consider pre-legislative 
proposals for EC directives, while parliament remained systematically excluded from the 
pre-legislative stage of UK domestic legislation.”
3 
Moreover, the decision to utilise the committee structure as t he institutional setting for 
parliamentary scrutiny, as distinct from the Chamber, was as a result of practical con-
siderations, rather than “a natural consequence of existing practice”
4. Indeed, neither the 
House of Lords nor the House of Commons made great use of permanent committee 
structures at this point.
5 So, even though UK parliamentary adaptation to EU member-
ship appears to be within the Constitutional norm prior to membership, one may ques-
tion the extent to which joining the EU created a new institutional setting and a new set 
of executive-legislative relations at the domestic level. 
A study of recent developments in the UK parliamentary European scrutiny system thus 
re-opens the broader debate on the implications that multi-level governance holds for 
national constitutions and parliamentary control of the executive at n ational level. A 
number of related questions emerge. How far does the evolving EU governance system 
affect ‘state’ parliament/government relations and the broader nature of (national)  par-
liamentary control  - a ‘Europeanisation’ of parliamentary practice? Can specific sys-
temic change at the EU level (e.g. the new PNP) facilitate further (independent) increase 
in parliamentary control at the d omestic level? The UK experience indicates that the 
critical starting point in addressing these issues is not to rehearse the well-known ‘de-
mocratic deficit’ argument and the conclusions this draws with respect to national gov-
ernment/parliament relations. Rather, we should ask why and how are parliaments now 
seemingly adapting to EU membership and what impact does this have at the national 
level? Arguably, this is more than a mere change of emphasis. It forces a re-evaluation 
of why and how ‘nation state’ institutions change over time in r esponse to an evolving 
system of multi-level governance.
6 
                                                 
1   Ibid., p. 86. 
2   Formerly European Legislation Committee. 
3   Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 86. 
4   Norton, 1996, op.cit., p. 104. 
5  See Norton, 1996, op.cit., p. 103. 
6   For further discussion of perspectives on multi-level governance see Pierre Jon/Stoker, Gerry: ‘To-
wards Multi-Level Governance’, in: Dunleavy/Gamble/Holliday/Peele (eds.): Developments in Bri-
tish Politics, London: Macmillan 2000, pp. 29-46.  
 
399
This chapter will consider both the internal (national) reform of UK parliamentary pro-
cedures and the role of the UK in the 1996/97 IGC process, leading to reform at the EU 
(supranational) level. The aim is to e xplore the evolving method of UK parliamentary 
scrutiny and the role that the European integration process, and inherent within that the 
IGC process, has had in influencing UK parliamentary culture. 
 
II. Practice and Evaluation of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
Parliamentary scrutiny in the UK was significantly reformed in 1998. Reform is rooted 
in three distinct (but overlapping) processes. The first is the form of integration under-
taken in the 1990’s and the process of European integration itself. Since the establish-
ment of the UK European Committees in 1974, little was done to amend their original 
powers and functions in a changing Union. The entry into force of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) in 1993, however, crystallised thinking on national parliamentary 
scrutiny procedures. It was acknowledged that the external context had altered, not least 
because of the nature of Union that this Treaty gave rise to:  
“Twenty-three years of United Kingdom membership have seen fundamental changes in 
the Community […]. And yet the system suggested by the Foster Committee has remained 
essentially unchanged.”
1 
The evolution of the European Committees in the UK was quite distinct in this regard 
by comparison with the experience of the original six member state countries. In o ther 
member states, the Single European Act (SEA) and its accompanying Single Market 
Programme (SMP) were pivotal in provoking an institutional r esponse at the national 
level.
2 In the UK, the SEA and the SMP had limited effect of that kind. The move to 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers, although considered a 
major turning point as far as the EC system of governance was concerned (and the role 
of national parliaments within that system) did not result in major internal reform. The 
main changes made to the 1980 Resolution were to extend its coverage to include ele-
ments of the new co-operation procedure, such as the new ‘common position’ to be 
attained in the Council of Ministers.
3 
Over the period of 1994 to 1998, the European Committees in the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords conducted a comprehensive review of their respective proce-
dures and issued a number of reports outlining proposed changes.
4 The prospect of f u-
                                                 
1   House of Commons, 27th Report, 1996, points 3 and 4. Sir John Foster - First Chair of Select Com-
mittee on European Legislation appointed 21 December 1972. 
2  See Norton, Philip: ‘Conclusion: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in National Parliaments and the 
EU’, in: Norton, 1996, op.cit., p. 178. 
3  See Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 87-88. 
4  See House of Commons, Select Committee on European Legislation, 24th Report, The 1996 IGC: 
The Agenda; Democracy and Efficiency; The Role of National Parliaments, HC 239-I and II (1994-
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ture Treaty reform at the EU level acted as a catalyst in this regard. The IGC held as one 
of its main objectives to increase transparency of EU decision-making procedures and 
to reconnect the EU to the people(s) of Europe (in part) through the democratisation of 
the institutional framework.
1 The expectation that the I GC would review Declaration 13 
which set out the role for national parliaments in the EU as part of its overall remit is 
apparent in the reports. The principle of subsidiarity is highlighted in this regard. The 
process of deepening integration thus strengthened claims at the national level for a 
stronger and more effective scrutiny procedure. On interview, this was e xpressed as a 
changed attitude in the country that encouraged ‘engagement’ with Europe rather than 
“pretending it’s not there”
2. Arguably, the  election of the new Labour Government in 
1997 was central to this overall shift in approach within the UK. 
The second process which determined reform of UK parliamentary scrutiny processes 
during this period is that of domestic Constitutional reform. The n ew Labour Govern-
ment of 1997 held a manifesto commitment to reform the UK Constitution. The central 
pillars of such reform were the modernisation of the House of Commons and reform of 
the House of Lords, and devolution  - the creation of new territorial institutions in Scot-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland.
3 A review of scrutiny of European matters was con-
sidered a key element of that reform process: 
“It was clear to us from the outset that no attempt by us to seek to modernise the proce-
dures and practice of the House could progress very far without a thorough examination of 
the way in which the House scrutinises European business.”
4 
The concept of the ‘modern’ Parliament endorsed a clear understanding that the Parlia-
ment had responsibilities in terms of parliamentary control of the executive which 
                                                                                                                                               
5) 17-07-95; House of Lords, The 1996 IGC, 21st Report, 1994-5, HL Paper 105; Response of the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the ELC 24th Report, Cm 3051, No-
vember 1995; House of Commons, Select Committee on European Legislation, 27th Report, Session 
1995-6, The Scrutiny of European Business, HMSO paper 51 xxvii 18-07-96; House of Commons, 
Select Committee on European Legislation, 28th R eport, The Role of National Parliaments in the 
EU, HC 51-xxvii (1995-6), 18-07-96; Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs to the ELC 28th Report: Cm 3440, October 1996; House of Commons, Select Com-
mittee on European Legislation, 1st Special Report, The Scrutiny of European Business: The G o-
vernment’s Reply to the 27th R eport from the Committee in Session 1996-96, HC 140: House of 
Commons, Select Committee on European Legislation, 13th Report, The Draft Protocol on the Role 
of National Parliaments, 10-02-97. 
1  See also De Burca, Grainne: ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union’, in: Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 59/1996, pp. 249-376. 
2   Interview material. 
3   For discussion see Dunleavy/Gamble/Holliday/Peele: ‘Introduction’, in: Dunleavy/Gamble/Holliday/ 
Peele, 2000, op.cit., pp. 1-9. According to Dunleavy et.al., the shape of the ‘new’ emerging polity in 
the UK has three major structural features: first, and with regard to the EU, the issue of the single 
currency; second, the programme of Constitutional reform; and third, the radical reconstruction of 
the party system and the possibility of a fundamental political realignment. 
4   House of Commons, Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, 7th Report, 
The Scrutiny of European Business, 15-07-98, point 2.  
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stemmed from the supranational (EU) policy process  - that the Parliament was not only 
involved in the nation state policy system. 
The third process which is relevant to any discussion of parliamentary scrutiny in the 
UK is the process of devolution. This has entailed the creation of new parliamentary and 
Assemblyinstitutions in Scotland and Wales respectively (and Northern Ireland), and 
two new European Committees with powers of scrutiny of European legislation.
1 A 
system of ‘asymmetric scrutiny’ can now be seen to be evolving within Britain, 
whereby the EU scrutiny process is subject to both vertical and horizontal arrangements 
between national and sub-member state institutions, and takes place within two distinct 
models of devolution: a legislative model (Scotland) and an executive model (Wales). 
This is discussed in detail elsewhere.
2 The role of the devolved, or third-level, assem-
blies in the process adds another layer to the overall system, such that it is now incorrect 
to refer to UK parliamentary scrutiny without incorporating in that definition the role of 
the sub-member state Committees. A new system of multi-level governance is thus 
emergent in the UK which will be significant in the future development of UK parlia-
mentary scrutiny.
3 
 
1. The Nature of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The definition of ‘scrutiny’ in the UK has developed over the years. Today, the term 
includes a number of functions: sifting of documents; reporting on and clearing of 
documents, debating the political and legal importance of documents, conducting sub-
stantial inquiries, debating matters of principle and policy of documents, publishing 
detailed reports, and placing EU issues and information in the public domain. The 
Committees in the two Houses have their own rules and terms of reference which define 
their respective (different) relations with the Government. The overall procedure is con-
cerned with two aspects of parliamentary control of the executive - ‘influence’ and ‘ac-
countability’. Ex-ante  influence as a control function refers to influence over the content 
of legislation before decision is reached in the Council of Ministers. Accountability as a 
                                                 
1   The Standing Orders for the Northern Ireland Assembly have created a new ‘Committee of the Cen-
tre’, which holds powers in respect of European Affairs.  This Committee replaces the Standing 
Committee on European Affairs and the Standing Committee on Equality, Human Rights and Com-
munity Relations. 
2  See Carter, Caitriona A.: ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State: Third-Level Assemblies 
and Scrutiny of European Legislation’, in: European Public Law, No. 3/2000, pp. 429-459. 
3   This chapter is only concerned with the national level of this system. With regard to the effect devo-
lution holds for parliamentary scrutiny at national level, this has yet to materialise. Devolution holds 
a couple of considerations for the procedure of scrutiny within the House of Commons. Questions of 
timing and information sharing between parliaments become significant. In addition, the reform of 
the House of Lords has resulted in the creation of a new Constitutional Committee which may have 
resource implications for sub-Committee E and may attract prestigious members away from the Eu-
ropean Committee. However, it is too early to predict the precise effects a new kind of membership 
will cause.  
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control function is present both ex-ante in the sense that a minister’s policy position 
should b e cleared prior to negotiation and ex-post in that ministers can be called to ex-
plain negotiated policy outcomes.
1 The overall system incorporates both formal and 
informal procedures and generates information of both a public and private nature. 
Influence  is achieved through the scrutiny processes. Accountability is achieved through 
the scrutiny reserve resolution which operates in both Houses. In the House of Com-
mons
2, ministers are constrained from giving agreement in either the Council or the 
European Council to any proposal for EC legislation or to any major decision under the 
intergovernmental pillars of the TEU “which is still subject to scrutiny… or which is 
awaiting consideration by the House”
3. The Resolution may be waived for exceptional 
reasons: f or example when the proposal is trivial, or when the ESC has given its agree-
ment to waive it. Otherwise, the minister may agree to a proposal which is still subject 
to scrutiny or awaiting consideration in the House if she/he decides that there are ‘spe-
cial reasons’ which necessitate such agreement.
4 Reasons under this category must be 
explained to the ESC or the House ‘at the first opportunity’
5. The ESC views its primary 
role as one which ensures that “the Government complies with undertakings to Parlia-
ment”
6. Accountability of the executive to its legislature thus has as its foundation the 
rules governing the ESC’s role in monitoring the Government and the actions of UK 
ministers in the Council of Ministers.
7 
The House of Lords, too, has recently adopted its own scrutiny reserve, specific to the 
nature of scrutiny conducted in this House. A document will be deemed not to have 
been cleared by the Select Committee when it “is still subject to scrutiny” or when the 
Select Committee has “made a report to the House for debate, but .... the debate has not 
yet taken place”
8. The authority of the Committee’s powers are thus clarified.
1 Similar 
conditions apply with regard to the over-riding of the reserve. In short, the same princi-
ple applies both in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords. 
A final observation pertaining to the nature of UK scrutiny concerns the underlying 
aspect of scrutiny, one of legitimising EU policy outcomes (and indeed the EU system 
of governance as a whole). Both Committees have, from time to time, made claims as to 
their role in this respect: 
                                                 
1   There is also a form of scrutiny of secondary legislation - i.e. scrutiny of the implementation of EC 
law. This procedure is not discussed in this chapter. 
2  See House of Commons, Resolution of the House of 17 November 1998, Votes and Proceedings, p. 
1250. See also Carter, Caitriona A.: Third-level Assemblies, 2000, pp. 440-441. 
3   House of Commons, Resolution of the House of 17 November 1998, Votes and Proceedings, 1(a) 
and (b). 
4  See House of Commons, Resolution of the House of 17 November 1998, Votes and Proceedings, 
4(a) and (b). 
5  Ibid. 
6   The European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons: A Short Guide, November 1998, p. 9. 
7   Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 440. 
8   House of Lords Resolution, 6th December 1999 (1).  
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“scale and distance will always mean that National Parliaments are the primary focus of 
democratic legitimacy in the Union. They are closer to the citizen, and have a special part 
to play in providing the responsiveness and democratic control that the Union needs”
2. 
Importantly, there are differences between the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords in terms of their democratic mandate, in that the House of Lords is not a directly 
elected body.  As we shall see below, the type of scrutiny conducted by the House of 
Lords  - which involves in-depth public inquiries and interviews of a broad civic nature - 
bestows its reports with a quality of legitimacy different from that claimed by the House 
of Commons. The Government’s programme to reform the House of Lords, by intro-
ducing the election of some of its members, clearly will have an hitherto unknown i m-
pact on this dimension of the scrutiny process. What is certain is that the Government is 
keen to retain the House’s role in European Affairs. 
 
2. The Institutional Setting 
 
Scrutiny is conducted in Committee in both the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords in a complementary fashion. Both Houses have created ‘European’ Committees 
with specific remits. In the House of Commons, use is also made of other specific 
Committees such as the Public Accounts Committee, the Public Administration Com-
mittee, and the Environmental Audit Committee. Both Houses also make use of the 
floor for plenary debates. 
 
2.1 The House of Commons 
 
The main scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons is the European Scrutiny 
Committee (ESC). This was formally called the European Legislation Committee but 
the name was changed during the modernisation process in 1998. The Committee has 
16 members and is served by a staff of 16 officials. Of the 16 members nominated for 
the current parliamentary session, ten are Labour, four Conservative, one from the Scot-
tish Nationalist Party and one Liberal Democrat. The Committee is chaired by Jimmy 
Hood, MP (Labour). In the past, the ESC has been chaired by a member of the Opposi-
tion Party, to ensure ‘independence’ of the Committee. This is not the case this time. On 
interview it was reported that, due to ‘party political reasons’, the whips’ expectations 
were not followed by the Select Committee causing ‘eyebrows to be raised’. As such, 
the appointment is considered ‘controversial’ and one which breaks with tradition. 
The ESC’s relations with the Executive are determined by its remit which is to examine 
EU documents
1 and to report its opinion on the legal and political importance of a 
                                                                                                                                               
1  See House of Lords SCEU Special Report 1999-2000 HL, 12. 
2   House of Commons, ELC, 13th Report, point 2.  
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document (including its opinion on any matters of ‘principle, policy or law’ which 
might be affected); to make recommendations for the further consideration of a docu-
ment (for example, by referring a document for debate to the European Standing Com-
mittees or to the Floor of the House of Commons
2) and to consider any issue arising 
from the consideration of a document or set of documents.
3 
The European Standing Committees w ere created in 1989 to 1990 to allow more time 
for debate on EU matters than plenary sessions on the floor of the House permitted
4 and 
in the light of the extensive legislation to be enacted under the aegis of the SMP.
5 These 
Committees proceed by debate,  rather than inquiry, including question and answer ses-
sions with invited ministers. There are currently three European Standing Committees 
with different subject areas: Committee A considers documents referred to it by the 
ESC on agriculture and fisheries: Committee B considers documents on social security 
and home affairs; and Committee C considers trade and industry. They have 13 perma-
nent members, but all MP’s may attend and non-permanent members may move 
amendments.
6 
During the debate on the modernisation of the House, the ESC proposed the creation of 
five Committees. This had been a long standing aim of the ESC and was related to the 
need to achieve specialisation in EU affairs. This was not adopted by the Government, 
who argued in part that there were  simply not enough Opposition MP’s to fill five 
Committees. This remains a matter of disagreement between the ESC and the Govern-
ment. There have been other problems associated with the European Standing Commit-
tees, however. Indeed, for many they are viewed  as a weakness in the overall scrutiny 
procedure.
1 The key problem to date has been non-attendance of members. There is 
disappointment attached to this. The Standing Committees were created with the hope 
that they would be an “exciting new development .... a real alternative to a debate on the 
                                                                                                                                               
1   I am using the term ‘EU’ here to include both EU and EC documents. The use of the term ‘EC’ in 
the text refers explicitly to legislation under the Community pillar of the TEU. 
2  See Standing Order No. 119 on the European Standing Committees. Recommendations for debate on 
the floor of the House of Commons are made sparingly. Documents are recommended for debate by 
the ESC, but such referral must have the approval of the Government. If the Government accepts, the 
document is ‘de-referred’ from the Standing Committee. During preliminary discussions on the mo-
dernisation of the House, the ESC suggested a reversal of the presumption underlying the procedure, 
so that a document referred by the ESC would stand referred unless the Government took action to 
reverse the recommendation: HC, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998: Appendix 1, Memo-
randum by the Select Committee on European Legislation, The House’s Scrutiny of EU Business, 
point 61. This suggestion was not however taken up by the Modernisation Committee: see HC, Mo-
dernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998, point 29. 
3  See Standing Order No.143 (I) (a)(b)(c). 
4  See Armstrong, Kenneth/Bulmer, Simon: ‘United Kingdom’, in: Rometsch/Wessels, 1996, op.cit., p. 
274. 
5  See Judge, 1995, op.cit. pp. 87 et. seq.. 
6  See House of Commons, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998, point 21 (3); HC, Modernisa-
tion Committee, 7th Report, 1998: Appendix 1, Memorandum by the Select Committee on European 
Legislation, The House’s Scrutiny of EU Business, point 72(c).  
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floor”
2. But, a high workload coupled with the lack of compulsory attendance has meant 
that these Committees have not fulfilled such expectations. To attempt to remedy this, 
recent developments include greater co-ordination between the ESC and departmental 
select Committees to encourage awareness and, in so doing, attendance. 
 
2.2 The House of Lords 
 
The House of Lords has a specialised Committee system, headed by the Select Commit-
tee on the European Union (SCEU). This Committee was established in 1974, and it is 
now considered one of the senior Committees in the House.
3 As a prestigious Commit-
tee, members of the House are keen to serve on it. Membership is on a volunteer basis - 
career strategy is not a factor in the House of Lords (as it is in the House of Commons). 
Members who express a wish to serve on this Committee will do so if they want to do 
the work and have a reasonable knowledge of the subject matter. At the present time the 
SCEU has 20 members, and is chaired by Lord Tordoff (Lib.Dem.). In common with 
the ESC, the Committee’s title was changed in 1998 to reflect the changing nature of 
the EU. The SCEU is served by a number of subject area sub-Committees: Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Trade and External Relations (A); Energy, Industry and Transport 
(B); Common Foreign and Security Policy (C); Environment, Agriculture, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection (D); Law and Institutions (E); Social Affairs, Educa-
tion and Home A ffairs (F). During the reform of the House of Lords, the former sub-
Committees C and D were merged to create one new Committee looking at agriculture 
and environment. This also created space for the Committee to scrutinise matters under 
the CFSP pillar. Members of the SCEU are shared across sub-Committees. In addition, 
other members of the Lords can be co-opted onto sub-Committees. According to a re-
cent House of Lords briefing, around 70 Lords are i nvolved at any one time in the work 
of the Committees: this means that about 10 per cent of the membership of the House is 
involved with scrutiny of EU business
4. 
The role of the House of Lords’ Committee is different from that of its equivalent in the 
House of Commons. Its terms of reference are to “consider EU documents and other 
matters relating to  the European Union”. It conducts substantial inquiries, examining 
witnesses and publishing detailed reports. It is less procedural in its function, concen-
trating on the ‘big issues’, rather than a textual examination of documents.
5 Frequently, 
groups of documents are considered as part of a wider inquiry. Its relations with the 
                                                                                                                                               
1   Interview material. 
2   Interview material. 
3   Interview material. 
4   House of Lords, Briefing, January 2000; or House of Lords Web Site at: http://www.parliament.uk - 
see ‘Remit and Organisation of the Committee’. 
5   Interview material.  
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Government are thus different from those of the ESC and this (in part) stems from the 
different nature of its terms of reference. 
 
3. The Scope of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics was maintained for a long time with 
regard to the kind of parliamentary control exercised. This has now changed. Post-
Maastricht a difference emerged in the scope of scrutiny between the two Houses. The 
House of Commons’ scrutiny and scrutiny reserve was limited to the EC pillar, as was, 
technically, the House of Lords’. During this period, however, the House of Lords “laid 
claim to” Third Pillar issues. On interview, it was reported that, in the 1990’s, the House 
of Lords began to look at key issues raised in the area of Justice and Home affairs. Non-
Governmental Organisations, such as ‘Statewatch’, furnished the SCEU with documents 
and information, alerting them to relevant developments at EU level. The Committee 
began a process of writing to the Government requesting further documents, requests to 
which the Government at times responded. At this stage, the Government had no clear 
rule as to which documents should be made available to the SCEU. This process all 
came to a head when the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, refused to commit the 
UK to a decision in the Council of Ministers, stating that he could not agree ‘because 
there was a parliamentary scrutiny reserve on the proposal’. From then on, the SCEU 
behaved a s if a scrutiny reserve now existed in respect of Justice and Home Affairs, 
thereby extending its powers in Third Pillar matters. 
During the Major Government (1992-1997), the House of Commons’ ESC published a 
series of reports arguing that “both intergovernmental pillars should be brought formally 
within the House’s European scrutiny system”
1, and that the scrutiny reserve should be 
extended to cover all EU matters.
2 The Major Government rejected these proposals.
3 
However, as part of its modernisation programme, the new Labour Government a c-
cepted the ESC’s suggestions and extended both the scope of influence and accountabil-
ity in both Houses. Powers were extended to include scrutiny of matters falling u nder 
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and EU Police and Judicial Co-operation in 
                                                 
1   House of Commons, ELC, 27th Report, 1996, point 83. 
2  See House of Commons, ELC, 27th Report, 1996, point 85. 
3  See ibid., point 76: ‘The Government’s response thus fell short of the Lords recommendations by - 
in practice excluding the CFSP pillar - by the (apparent) exclusion from the JHA arrangements of 
documents that would need to be implemented by secondary legislation”. The Government also re-
jected the extension of the scrutiny reserve to CFSP and JHA - reasons given by the Government are 
listed in the Report - for example, there is a reference to the need to ensure ‘speed in decision-
making’.  
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criminal matters, and the scrutiny reserve was also extended. This regularised the sys-
tem in both Houses.
1  
In addition, and also as part of the modernisation programme, the definition of the type 
of EU document to be scrutinised was broadened. According to UK resolutions, an 
agreement or proposal includes pre-legislative documents, ministerial agreements to 
common positions within all EC parliamentary decision-making procedures (and at all 
stages of such procedures), final enactment agreements within the Council, agreements 
on soft law and, finally, political agreements (including agreements within the European 
Council)
2: As such, “the definition of ‘European Union documents’ adopted by both 
Houses [...] extends beyond the matters mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the proto-
col”
3. 
 
3.1 The House of Commons 
 
The ESC considers 900 to 1000 documents per year. These are sent to the Committee 
by the relevant Whitehall department. Each document is accompanied by an Explana-
tory Memorandum (EM) and a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The EM must be 
sent by the Whitehall department within ten working days of deposit of a document 
with the ESC. The EM will provide the factual and legal background on an EU docu-
ment, where ministerial responsibility lies, and the Government's view.
4 In this manner, 
the EM does not merely perform an informational function. Rather it establishes the 
department’s (and government’s) public policy position on the document under r eview.
5 
As such, it is a key element of the scrutiny process: “The EM is signed by a Minister, 
and constitutes the Minister's evidence to Parliament”.
6 
The ESC also expects to receive the Council of Ministers’ text, with full information 
from the Government about the state of play at EU  level, i.e. where conflict is likely to 
ensue, which elements will be agreed by the Council and so forth.
7 The Cabinet Office 
has been extremely helpful with regard to this. The key difficulty from the ESC’s per-
spective is the fact that the Council meets i n private. Importantly, other member states’ 
negotiating positions are not provided. 
                                                 
1   The substantive benefits of change with regard to the House of Lords have been presented in an 
article published by the Legal Advisor to the Committee. He argues that there have been substantive 
benefits in the changed procedures and the significance of the public policy discussed under the third 
pillar. See Kerse, Christopher Stephen: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Third Pillar’, in: European 
Public Law, No. 1/2000, pp. 81-101. 
2  See Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 436. 
3   Kerse, 2000, op.cit., p. 99. 
4   For a complete list of the contents of an Explantory Memorandum see ‘The European Scrutiny Sys-
tem in the House of Commons: A Short Guide’, November 1998, pp. 13-14. 
5  See Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 438. 
6   The European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons: A Short Guide, November 1998. p. 14. 
7   Interview material.  
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The ESC itself produces information of both a public and a private nature. Private notes 
are produced by the ESC on an ‘in confidence’ basis, and can constitute its communica-
tion to the UK Ministry.
1 The ESC also produces a public report on a weekly basis set-
ting out its deliberations, including its advice as to whether a document or elements of a 
document are of legal or political importance.
2 This is published on the internet. Infor-
mation is also sought from other parliamentary Committees. New informal arrange-
ments have recently been put in place for exchanges of documents between Commit-
tees. The new Standing Orders now give power to the ESC to ask for a formal opinion 
from departmental Committees on a particular document. Although these procedures 
have not been used much, where they have been used, this has had a qualitative impact. 
Departmental select Committees can and have produced opinions on EU documents 
which are then debated in the European Standing Committees  - a good example given 
on interview was in reference to a debate on a White Paper on environmental liability 
where the Environmental Audit Committee raised a number of technical issues of policy 
substance not raised by the ESC. On a day to day basis, there is an exchange of informa-
tion between the ESC and departmental Committees. On the whole, EU matters are 
being shared across Committees: “part of integrating EU affairs into the consideration 
of the House as a whole rather than it being regarded as a ghetto issue”
3. 
Europeanisation is evident in that this is considered as a two-way process - that depart-
mental Committees are kept abreast of EU developments and the ESC is able to more 
readily assess the impact on UK policy. 
 
3.2 The House of Lords 
 
The House of Lords also considers around 1000 documents per year, deposited as they 
are in the House of Commons with an accompanying EM expected within ten working 
days. About 250 documents are referred for scrutiny by the sub-Committee
4, with only 
20-30 each year being subject to detailed examination. The sub-Committees take oral 
and written evidence from government departments, EC institutions and other interested 
relevant organisations and individuals, drawing on a wide range of interest from within 
the national and European community.
5 In-depth reports are drafted by the sub-
Committees, and approved before publication by the Select Committee.
6 The reports 
published by the Lords Select Committee are thus quite different from ESC reports. The 
                                                 
1  See Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 439. See also for full discussion of information sharing. 
2   House of Commons, Select Committee on Procedures, The Procedural Consequences of Devolution, 
4th Report, 1998-1999 HC 185, 24.05.99: Appendix 18, Memorandum by the Clerk of the House, 
Annex, point 13. 
3   Interview material. 
4   House of Lords, Briefing 2000, p. 3. 
5  See House of Lords Briefing, January 2000, p. 2. 
6  See House of Lords Briefing: January 2000, p. 3.  
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Lords’ reports are extremely d etailed and well-researched reports into the substantive, 
as well as the political, issues raised by a document or series of documents. They are 
highly regarded reports with sophisticated policy analysis. This provides another good 
example of the complementarity of the scrutiny systems between the Houses. 
 
4. The Procedural Features of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The process of scrutiny is ongoing, and corresponds to the EU policy cycle: “the [House 
of Lords] Committee’s work on the Convention shows quite graphically that scrutiny is 
not a once and for all experience”
1. 
 
4.1 The House of Commons 
 
The ESC meets on a weekly basis on a Wednesday. The main work of the ESC is to sift 
documents; decide which ones should be subject to scrutiny and which ones should be 
debated in the Standing Committees. This role of sifting has developed considerably 
over the years and it would be a mistake to describe the Committee today as it has been 
in the past as a mere ‘sifting’ Committee.
2 I mportantly, the ESC reports on and clears 
some documents from scrutiny. Not all documents are debated. The ESC can clear the 
document without referring it for debate. Indeed, it is precisely this function of assess-
ing the importance of a particular document, and whether it necessitates debate, which 
enables the ESC to scrutinise legislation.
3 An extra degree of objectivity exists in the 
ESC by comparison to other select Committees and this is understood as being related 
to the procedural aspect of the Committee. The ESC does not debate merits of docu-
ments  - this debate takes place in the Standing Committees and on the Floor of the 
House. As a result, members of the ESC can have widely different views on European 
issues, but the overall view is often one of consensus.
4 On the whole, officials expressed 
confidence in this aspect of the scrutiny procedure. 
The European Standing Committees debate documents. Debates last for one hour and 
then there is a question and answer period with a minister present. All in all proceedings 
last on average two and a half hours. As a result of the modernisation process, more 
than one minister can now attend the question/answer period and the statement and an-
swer period with the minister(s) can be increased by 30 minutes at the discretion of the 
Chair. 
Scrutiny of the outcome of negotiations is also now subject to special procedures in the 
House. The ESC has powers to call a minister before it to elaborate upon and account 
                                                 
1   Kerse, 2000, op.cit., p. 95. 
2  See Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 86. 
3  See Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 436. 
4   Interview material.  
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for the UK negotiating position taken in Council. These ex-post scrutiny sessions are 
held in public: proceedings are published in the ESC’s weekly report.
1 This is a rela-
tively new procedure, which is bedding down. 
 
4.2 The House of Lords 
 
The Lords’ sift is conducted on a weekly basis by the Chair and Clerk of the SCEU, 
along with other sub-Committee clerks, and with specific input from the legal advisor to 
the SCEU and his/her assistant. The Lords’ sift has evolved over the years. Today, the 
SCEU no longer has to approve the sift, which is officially delegated to the Chair. 
Committee approval was considered inefficient and was changed a few years ago. The 
accelerating pace of legislation was given as a key factor in the streamlining of proce-
dures.
2 Criteria for sifting stem from the SCEU’s terms of  reference and are subject to 
change over the years.
3 The n ature of scrutiny conducted in the House of Lords and the 
specificity of its procedural aspect determines, to a certain degree, what can and what 
can not be scrutinised. The sift is geared towards i dentifying subjects which “have a 
long shelf life” and will have future importance  - e.g. the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights; the EU Food Authority; E -Commerce; merger of EU and the Western European 
Union.
4 
 
5. The Timing Features of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
Both the Commons and the Lords Committees have expressed concerns with regard to 
timing. When reporting in 1996, one of the key conclusions made by the ESC was that: 
“The scrutiny process in both Houses needs information and time”
5. 
The external EU/EC framework within which scrutiny is conducted necessarily sets the 
pace and timing of scrutiny. The new ‘six week period’ which must now exist between 
the publication of a proposal by the Commission and the date when it is placed on a 
Council agenda for a decision has not had any noticeable impact. The main challenge 
which remains for national Committees, as far as the UK is concerned, is the speedy 
                                                 
1  See House of Commons, Resolution of the House of 17 November 1998, Votes and Proceedings, 
1(a) and (b), p. 33. 
2   Interview material. 
3   A good example of the flexibility of the system was given on interview in relation to matters falling 
under the former JHA pillar. No agreed criteria had been set between the Government and the Select 
Committee on what should be deposited, so the Committee developed its own test. 
4   Interview material. 
5   House of Commons, ELC, 27th Report, point 63.  
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response required by the later stages of the co-decision procedure.
1 These challenges are 
discussed further in Chapter IV below. 
Not all time constraints stem from the external framework, however. To ensure a rapid 
response, the Committees must receive ‘timely’ and ‘accurate’ information from the 
Government. That the Government does not always fulfil this expectation was one of 
the central arguments made by the ESC in its report to the Modernisation Committee 
during the process of modernisation of the House of Commons. Such is the degree of 
seriousness with which this is regarded by the ESC, that failures of this nature are fully 
documented in a ‘black book’. Examples of failures include:  
“30 June 1997: John Battle signs an EM on renewable sources of energy that is evidently 
out of date: ‘The Presidency hopes that the draft Resolution will be adopted shortly’. In 
fact, it had been adopted three days before (DTI)”: “Tessa Blackstone’s letter of 30 June to 
Lord Tordoff is said to be copied to the Chairman of ‘the Commons Select Committee on 
the European Communities [sic]’. It is actually sent to the Clerk of the Select Committee 
on Education and Employment (DfEE)”; 13 October 1997 “Helen Liddell writes on settle-
ment finality and payment systems, saying that she is enclosing an unofficial text. No text 
is enclosed (HMT); 28 October 1997 “Barbara Roche writes to Committee to say that ‘for 
administrative reasons’ a Scrutiny Reserve has been raised (on a document where a request 
for information has been outstanding for 20 months) [...] but gives no explanation of the 
delay (DTI).”
2 
Lists of failures such as these were presented to the Modernisation Committee and are 
annexed to its final report. In 1997, some 100 failures are listed as a “selection” of fail-
ures in this regard. 
As in the House of Commons, timing is “crucial” for effective scrutiny in the House of 
Lords. However,  the different nature of scrutiny being conducted here throws up differ-
ent issues with regard to both timing and information. In the main, the routine of keep-
ing the Government up to the mark is left to the House of Commons: the House of 
Lords does not keep a ‘black book’, for example. But, in cases of ‘flagrant abuse of the 
system’, the SCEU will become exercised. On interview, one example given was 
receiving a letter from the Home Office noting a key proposal, which had in fact already 
been agreed to.
3 In  such cases, the SCEU will write a letter, expressing its concerns. 
With regard to information flow in the House of Lords, too, therefore, “the experience 
in the UK has, from time to time, been one of delays in obtaining documents”
4. 
Despite these difficulties, officials from the two Committees in the both Houses have 
recently detected a greater understanding in Whitehall as to what scrutiny is all about. 
                                                 
1   This is also the case for sub-Member State scrutiny. Interviews with parliamentary officials (UK, 
Scotland): 15.04.99, 18.02.00. 
2   House of Commons, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998: Annex G, 1997. The people men-
tioned here were all junior ministers in their respective departments at that time. DTI is the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, the DfEE, Department of Education and Employment, and the HMT, 
Her Majesty’s Treasury. 
3   Interview material. 
4   Kerse, 2000, op.cit., p. 99.  
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After the TEU, and as a result of the efforts in the House of Commons, a change is no-
ticeable. In particular, reports written post-TEU by the previous Committee stressed the 
need to ensure a standard of professionalism, getting documents to parliament on time, 
and provision of sufficient information on which informed decisions can be made. 
These kinds of suggestions inspired the new change in approach now beginning to oper-
ate within Whitehall.
1 Officials also mentioned the role of the previous Leader in the 
House of Commons, Tony Newton, who took a clear interest in European issues. R e-
cently, therefore, there has been a tightening of information flow generally between 
departments and a willingness to ‘get it right’. Civil servants are now taking Europe 
seriously, although this still varies b etween departments.
2 On interview, it was stressed 
that one of the Committee’s ‘great a llies in this is the Cabinet Office’ with its co-
ordinating role to ensure that the Government’s business passes smoothly in Brussels 
and “prevent blood on the floor because the minister has been held to account”
3. A key 
question is whether in the new political climate there is any n oticeable difference in 
failure rates. The answer seems to vary from department to department and the priority 
given to EC matters within a particular policy area.
4 
 
6. The Implications of Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
The question on the effect scrutiny has for the Government is difficult to answer. In 
discussions on the rules for clearing a document under the Scrutiny Reserve Resolution, 
it has been reported that “the occasions on which the Government might be defeated in 
ESC would be very rare”
5. It is perhaps better to consider more closely the nature of the 
effect on the Government as far as the UK is concerned. With a Government of a small 
majority, the Committee is perhaps likely to have more effect in terms of i ts influence, 
although this is difficult to quantify. A better way to approach the question on the i m-
plication of scrutiny for the Government is in terms of the types of accountability pre-
sent in the system  - and the quality of the scrutiny reserve. One quality of accountability 
is concerned with public embarrassment. Direct influence is achieved through an e x-
pression of a strong public and embarrassing voice; someone constantly ‘breathing 
down their necks’, prepared to ask vociferously for information and  to humiliate if fre-
                                                 
1   Interview material. Interview parliamentary officials (UK), 15.04.99. 
2   Interview material. 
3   Interview material. 
4  See also Armstrong, Kenneth/Bulmer, Simon: ‘The UK: Between Political Controversy and Admi-
nistrative Efficiency’, in:  Wessels, Wolfgang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds.): Fifteen into 
One? The European Union and its Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2001 
forthcoming); Bulmer, Simon/Burch, Martin: ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State 
and European Union’, in: Public Administration, Vol. 76, No. 4/1998, pp. 601-628. 
5   House of Commons, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998, Appendix 1, Memorandum by the 
Select Committee on European Legislation, The House’s Scrutiny of EU Business, point 65.  
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quently ignored  - what clinical psychologists would describe as the ‘controlling parent 
voice’. “You won’t hit your little sister if your mother’s watching”
1: 
“Ministers do not like being called into the House to give an account of why they have ig-
nored the scrutiny reserve ....... Civil servants don’t like things being held up with a Minis-
ter saying ‘why can’t I agree to this in Council because my friends want me to’ and being 
told it’s because they didn’t supply sufficient information to the House of Commons.”
2 
From the House of Lords’ perspective, the reserve is regarded as a principle, and a simi-
lar type of language is used: “it sets down a framework and the Government is expected 
to behave within that framework” with the “ultimate sanction” being that the minister 
may be called in to answer for his/her actions.
3 Therein lies its strength. As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, it is a quality of the scrutiny reserve to i mpose a general discipline on 
the Government.
4 
On the other hand, both the ESC and the SCEU have sources of information at their 
disposal which can be tapped by the Government to enhance its own voice in Europe - 
the ‘nurturing parent voice’. In this type of accountability, scrutiny performs a key func-
tion in maintaining the quality of the Government’s policy preferences and bolstering its 
political position within the Council of Ministers. Thus, if we conceptualise account-
ability as a type of relationship, we can see that there are different voices within that 
relationship. 
 
III. The UK Parliament and the Negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
“The focus of our IGC work over the last two years has … been twofold: how to ensure 
that National Parliaments can affect Community (and Union) decision-making; and, from a 
UK point of view, how to make the scrutiny system for which we are responsible play an 
influential part in this process.”
1 
This section sets out the ideas which informed the UK’s negotiating position during the 
1996/97 IGC on the appropriate role for national parliaments within the EU. Two suc-
cessive governments of different political colours were involved in the negotiations. 
When the IGC opened, the Major Government (Conservative) was at the helm. The 
final negotiations at Amsterdam, however, were conducted under the Blair Government 
(Labour) which came to power in May 1997. Both Governments’ negotiating positions 
were strongly influenced by the scrutiny Committees and, in particular, by the Commit-
tees as established under the Conservative Government. Indeed, many of the proposals 
for the Protocol on National Parliaments (PNP) emerged from within these Committees 
                                                 
1   Interview material. 
2   Interview material. 
3   Interview material. 
4  See Carter, 2000, op.cit., p. 440.  
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and are published in their reports. This section provides an account of the significance 
of UK initiatives to the final text of the PNP, and, in so doing, illustrates the degree of 
influence e xerted by the ESC and the SCEU during this period (a period which pre-
dates the changes noted above).  
 
1. Negotiation under the Conservative Major Government 
 
One of the main objectives of the IGC was to improve the EU’s institutional structure, 
both by strengthening democratic procedures and through greater transparency of deci-
sion-making. The call for ‘more democracy’ was in part linked to the wider notion of 
attempting to ‘re-connect’ the EU system with the European public(s). With regard to 
national parliaments this raised a number of difficult questions. For historic reasons, 
national parliaments hold no formal role in the EU policy process.
2 This led many to ask 
what their role should be when acting either individually or c ollectively. A subsidiary 
issue which was also discussed during the course of the IGC was the appropriate role 
for national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) respectively. This emerged 
as a somewhat muddled debate, with competing claims as to which type of parliament 
commanded greater ‘democracy’. The EP had already taken a specific stance on this in 
early 1990.
3 In the Duverger Resolution, the EP claimed its status as the democratic 
body representing the member states’ electorate.
4 The question  of legitimacy is perhaps 
not so simple. Others would argue that national parliaments do provide the legitimation 
of executive action within the Council of Ministers: “national parliaments have pro-
vided the legitimating frame within which the development of the EC has been able to 
take place.”
5 
The debate on legitimacy and types of parliaments was thus bound to be controversial 
and highly political. 
The UK Conservative Government took a specific approach to this, seeing nation states 
and their parliaments as the key institutional means for legitimising the overall policy 
process. This view is neatly encapsulated by David Davis, the UK representative to the 
IGC under Major (and a reputed ‘Euro-sceptic’
6): 
“Despite the gradual granting of competences to the EU, Europe has not become more de-
mocratic. Democracy cannot simply result from the enforcement of the European Parlia-
                                                                                                                                               
1   House of Commons, ELC, 13th Report, 1997, point 6. 
2  See Norton, Democratic Deficit, 1996, op.cit., p. 192. 
3  See Westlake, Martin: ‘The View from ‘Brussels’, in: Norton, 1996, op.cit., pp. 168-169. 
4   EP Resolution on the Preparation of the Meeting with the National Parliaments to discuss the Future 
of the Community (the Assises), adopted on 12.07.90, Official Journal EC, C 231, 17.09.90, p. 165. 
5   Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 81. 
6   Lynch, Philip: ‘British Policy Towards Europe: From Commonwealth and US Ties to Awkward 
Partnership within the European Union’, in: Barbour (ed.), The European Union Handbook, London 
Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1996, p. 67.  
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ment […]. Democracy also needs nations. The main political force in Europe today is the 
liberal nation.”
1 
Conservative thinking linked the role of national parliaments to a broader conception of 
a desired model of integration and a specific interpretation of the principle of subsidiar-
ity. The Government’s approach was set out in a White Paper published in March 
1996.
2 The White Paper identified  a number of challenges facing the EU, one of which 
was the level of ‘public unease and alienation’ across the Union.
3 The Government 
noted that the response to this crisis of legitimacy in other member states was a call for 
‘more Europe’  - the strengthening of the supranational elements of the institutional 
framework and deeper political integration. Instead, a radically opposing view was o f-
fered, one which: 
“rejects that conception of Europe’s future. We are determined to safeguard the power and 
responsibilities of the nation states that are signatories to the Treaty [...]. That is why it is 
crucial that national parliaments remain the central focus of democratic legitimacy.”
4 
The White Paper argued that the EP could not replace the ‘primary role’ of n ational 
parliaments, a view which grants the EP secondary status in terms of its electoral-
representative function. Moreover, the EP was accused of being irresponsible and, as a 
consequence, lacking in public support. Lack of public support was evidenced by the 
low turnout in European elections.
5 In order to ‘win public trust and confidence’
6, the 
EP had to demonstrate that it made responsible use of its already existent powers. The 
White Paper thus accorded the EP a limited role (and no further increase in powers), 
with a clearly defined set of functions to hold the Commission to account, to monitor 
EC spending and to combat financial mismanagement.  
By contrast, the White Paper proposed an extension of powers for national parliaments - 
institutions defined here as holding “the primary focus of democratic legitimacy in the 
European Union”, able to hold national ministers to a ccount.
7 Significantly, reference 
was made to the two UK parliamentary Committee proposals aimed at extending the 
powers of national parliaments within the EU policy system. These proposals were con-
cerned with the input of national parliaments to the EU policy processes via two ave-
nues. First, the i ncreased influence of national parliaments over the institution of the 
Council of Ministers to e ncourage accountability and transparency of policy outcomes. 
Second, the accepted role national parliaments should play when acting in a collective 
                                                 
1   Davis in Agence Europe No.6406, 22 January 1995. 
2   Government White Paper on the IGC, A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the Inter-
Governmental Conference 1996, Cm 3181, March 12, 1996. 
3   Ibid., point 4. 
4   Ibid., point 5. Emphasis added. 
5   For a discussion of this see Smith, Julie: ‘The 1994 European Elections: Twelve into One Won’t 
Go?’, in: Hayward, 1995, op.cit. 
6   Government White Paper, 1996, op.cit., point 35. 
7   Ibid., point 33.  
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capacity at the EU level. The Government thus appeared receptive to Committee think-
ing. Let us examine this more closely. 
One of the main preoccupations of UK parliamentary discussions during the 1996 IGC 
was the operation of the Council of Ministers. The ESC was keen to change the culture 
of ministerial meetings and re-fashion executive/legislative relations at this level, irre-
spective of the specific nature of individual (national) parliamentary control mecha-
nisms: 
“While it is for each Parliament to consider how best to proceed, we believe that a high 
priority given to detailed demanding and timely scrutiny throughout the Parliaments of the 
Union would have a salutary effect on the Council of Ministers, and would create a climate 
of accountability which would offset the disproportionate and growing power of Execu-
tives.”
1 
The first report written by the ESC, and published in July 1995 (after the Reflection 
Group began its deliberations), highlighted a number of areas of Council business which 
the ESC felt were in need of review. Overall, the report adopted a pragmatic approach 
stating that “action is now needed, backed where necessary by legal requirement”
2. The 
starting point for reform was a recognition by the ESC that Declaration 13 (which states 
that governments should notify national parliaments ‘in good time’) had not fulfilled its 
objective: “the Declaration […] has been routinely ignored. It has proved to be a sham, 
reflecting no credit on those who negotiated it at Maastricht”
3. 
The report set out a number of outstanding problems experienced by the ESC in the 
conduct of scrutiny. From a procedural point of view, the central difficulties were first, 
the frequently short time frame between the publication of a legislative proposal by the 
Commission and the Council’s decision, and second, the practice of legislating in the 
Council without an official text, where ministerial negotiations involved the introduc-
tion of new elements not included in the original Commission proposal. 
To address these emergent institutional behavioural patterns, the ESC made a number of 
critical proposals - critical not least because they were to form the basis of the PNP ne-
gotiated at Amsterdam. Importantly, the ESC proposed a requirement of a “minimum 
period of notice [which] should be four weeks” for national parliaments to scrutinise EU 
documents prior to Council’s negotiation. The  minimum period would exist between the 
availability of an official text, in the appropriate language, in all capitals of the EU, and 
any decision being taken in the Council. Moreover, such a minimum period of notice 
should be legally binding: “a clear Treaty requirement, not just a provision in the Coun-
cil’s rules of procedure”
4. 
                                                 
1   House of Commons, ELC, 24th Report, 1995, point 113. 
2   Ibid., point 60. 
3   Ibid., point 109. 
4   Ibid., point 65.  
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The report went on to discuss rules concerning the waiving of the notice period in u r-
gent situations and the scope of the requirement to include any document with legisla-
tive implications (including pre-legislative acts).
1 
These proposals were to form the bedrock of the UK Conservative Government’s initial 
negotiating position once the IGC got underway. The House of Lords Committee was 
quick to lend its support.
2 The Government’s response was also favourable
3, stating that 
the notice period should only begin once the text became available in all languages.
4 In 
line with this, David Davis floated the idea of a minimum notice requirement in one of 
the pre-IGC Study Groups and it found its way into the Council Secretariat’s papers in 
October 1995. By the time the EP task-force had reported in its briefing on the role of 
national parliaments in March 1996, just prior to the official opening of the IGC in T u-
rin, this was still a UK-only initiative.
5 
It is to be noted that, at this stage, there were a number of other proposals which were 
made by UK Committees, but which were not supported by the Major Government. 
These were to increase the transparency of the operation of the Council of Ministers and 
were initiated by the House of Lords’ SCEU.
6 The SCEU was particularly concerned 
with transparency of the voting patterns within the Council of Ministers
7 and the trans-
parency of Council business in the outer two pillars of the TEU: 
“The common foreign and security policy is presently formulated in secrecy and this does 
not accord with the Majesty’s Government’s frequently expressed wish to see scrutiny by 
national parliaments increased. This is a role for national parliaments, and we strongly rec-
ommend their involvement to a significantly greater extent.”
8 
The report recommended opening up both pillars to input from all national parliaments. 
The Major Government did not support this proposal, arguing its disagreement on 
grounds of the confidential nature of substance of the outer pillars.
9 
A final issue which had been a matter of some discussion since 1995, was a suggestion 
to grant national parliaments a formal role when acting collectively. The UK position 
was that a formal role was not appropriate. Both the Committees and the Government 
were in agreement on this. The view of the ESC in respect of COSAC was that its: 
“great strength is its informality; that it should be a forum for making contacts and sharing 
experience and problems; and that it i s most effective when discussing problems of Na-
                                                 
1   Ibid., point 67. 
2   House of Lords, 21st Report, 1995, point 307. 
3   Government White Paper, 1996, op.cit., point 9. 
4   Ibid., point 9. 
5   IGC EP Task-Force on the IGC, Briefing on the Role of National Parliaments, No. 6 Luxembourg, 
25-03-96, PE 165.966. 
6   House of Lords, 21st Report, 1995. 
7   Ibid., point 247. 
8   Ibid., point 270. 
9   House of Commons, ELC, 27th Report, 1996, points 73 & 76.  
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tional Parliamentary Scrutiny and control common to many Chambers, rather than holding 
broad debates on often vague political topics.”
1 
The House of Lords Committee was also not in favour of granting any formality to co-
operation between national parliaments.
2 
During the latter half of 1996, and in the lead up to the Dublin Summit, the ESC pro-
duced a second report, emphasising the importance of taking national parliaments seri-
ously.
3 At the COSAC Dublin meeting in October 1996, other national parliaments 
agreed on the mechanisms for so doing, offering unanimous support for UK parliamen-
tary proposals. The UK Government’s response this time was still generally favourable 
tabling a Treaty amendment one week after the COSAC conference. The key element of 
this amendment was the minimum notice period. There was one noticeable departure 
from the ESC’s original text, however. The reference to “pre-legislative acts” was now 
dropped
4 and this despite previous government statements in support of an all-inclusive 
clause
5. 
In December, the member states agreed the Dublin ‘Treaty’ Outline. Included therein 
was a draft form of a protocol on national parliaments, which included a minimum n o-
tice period of four weeks. The contents  of this protocol fell short of UK Committee 
recommendations. In response, a number of specific criticisms were made by the ESC 
and published in a report communicated to government. According to the ESC, the text 
of the draft protocol was ambiguous on a number of points: first, it did not identify the 
precise moment when the four week notice period officially started;
6 second, it did not 
specify the ‘exceptions on grounds of u rgency’ when the minimum period of notice 
could be waived.
7 The ESC raised the question whether conditions for waiving the n o-
tice period should appropriately be placed in the Protocol itself or in the Council rules 
of procedure (where they could be more easily and less publicly changed). The report 
argued that by placing the rules in the Protocol, the member states’ governments would 
be giving: “explicit assurance at the time of negotiation that the minimum notice r e-
quirement cannot be routinely set aside”
8. 
 
2. Negotiation under the Blair Labour Government 
 
In May 1997, the Labour Party  was elected to government. Consequently, it was the 
Blair Government which negotiated and signed the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 and the 
                                                 
1   House of Commons, ELC, 13th Report, 1997, points 64 & 65. 
2   House of Lords, 21st Report, 1995, point 306. 
3   House of Commons, ELC, 28th Report, 1996. 
4   House of Commons, ELC, 1st Special Report, 1996. 
5   Cm. 3051. 
6   House of Commons, ELC, 13th Report, 1997, points 39-48. 
7   Cm. 3440, 18-21. 
8   House of Commons, ELC, 13th Report, 1997, point 58.  
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Protocol on National Parliaments. The new Government took a rather different a p-
proach from that of its predecessor on the  question of the overall strengthening of the 
parliamentary dimension of the EC’s institutional framework. A d egree of discontinuity 
in the UK line is thus apparent in that the Government did not see any contradiction in 
strengthening both the powers of the EP and those of n ational parliaments. With regard 
to EC supranational provisions, during the Amsterdam negotiations, the new UK Gov-
ernment supported an increase in the powers of the EP via reform of the co-decision 
procedure (as well as an increase in the numbers of policy areas to be subject to QMV 
and co-decision).
1 With regard to the specific provisions relating to national parlia-
ments, the Blair Government negotiated both an extension of the minimum period of 
notice from four to six weeks and an extension of its coverage to include matters falling 
under the (now) Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters Pillar (formerly 
Justice and Home Affairs).
2 
Based on evidence so far collected, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the 
change of government in the UK was crucial to the final wording of the PNP. Clearly, 
both UK governments had a significant role to play in its creation. A consistent UK 
position has been that national parliaments have an important role to play holding their 
governments to account. This notwithstanding, a number of issues which had been 
raised by the UK Committees were, however, left unresolved by both governments and 
by the PNP. First, there was no agreement reached on the rules for over-riding the six-
week period.  Second, there was no agreement reached on the minimum period allowed 
for scrutiny by national parliaments during the course of a parliamentary procedure 
when substantive new elements are introduced into a document during Council negotia-
tions. Third, there was no agreement reached to ensure greater transparency of decision-
making within the Council of Ministers. Fourth, the Protocol did not apply to all the 
activities of the EU: CFSP matters are excluded.
3 
 
IV. The UK Parliament After Amsterdam 
 
Given that the UK national reform package of 1998 pre-empted the coming into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, no substantive changes were made in 1999. In the House of 
Commons, minor word changes were made to Standing Order 143 to reflect the new 
title of the former  Justice and Home Affairs Pillar  - now re-named provisions of Police 
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters - and the new types of political and legal 
                                                 
1  See Armstrong/Bulmer, 2001 forthcoming, op.cit. 
2   The Scrutiny of EU Business, Cm 4095, November 1998, p. 1. 
3   Some of these failings at EU level have been addressed at national level in the UK - for example, as 
is clear from Section II of this chapter, the UK (Blair) Government has interpreted the wording of 
the Protocol in its widest sense and UK national scrutiny is greater in scope than the PNP proposes.  
 
420
instruments now able to be adopted under the Treaty. In the House of Lords, no substan-
tial changes were deemed necessary: 
“There seems no reason to change domestic requirements such as those in the UK, though 
the Protocol may help to focus government departments on the scrutiny timetable.”
1 
In both Houses, the six week period has had little noticeable practical impact. To begin 
with, in the initial stages of an EC parliamentary procedure, about six weeks or more 
had always generally lapsed between the publication of a first draft of a Commission 
proposal and the reaching of a common position in the Council of Ministers. In addi-
tion, the six week period had not helped “one iota” in problems experienced in the later 
stages of the EC parliamentary process, and in the co-decision procedure in particular
2. 
From the perspective of the House of Lords, time pressures still exist.
3 In terms of the 
nature of the scrutiny conducted in this House, the six week period “gets you to the 
starting point”
4. Six weeks is simply not enough time to sift, refer to Committee, take 
evidence and write a substantial report on a subject matter. These difficulties notwith-
standing, officials in both Houses said that from a ‘symbolic’ or ‘psychological’ point 
of view, the six-week period was very significant. It is viewed as a “suitable thing [with 
which] to beat governments”
5. 
Other problems remain. First, and despite the wording of the PNP, there seems to be a 
residual difficulty of knowing when the six week period has actually begun. The UK 
have developed their own understanding on this point. As far as the ESC is concerned, 
the six-week period begins with publication by the Commission. The ESC does not 
believe that this is when it should begin. It believes  - as did its predecessor - that the 
period should begin once documents are deposited by the Council in all of the Perma-
nent Representations of the Member States (in the appropriate language(s)), to ensure a 
parity of scrutiny across the EU. Second, the fact that the Council meets in private is 
more of a problem to the ESC than the six-week rule - in particular in gaining access to 
likely problem areas of negotiation. Difficulties persist when officials choose to exer-
cise ‘professional discretion’ and keep Council business confidential. Third, the ESC 
expressed discontent that EU documents are still not being transmitted electronically. 
Major problems still remain with regard to the collective role of national parliaments 
and in particular the role of COSAC. From the parliamentary perspective, COSAC is 
viewed as a problematic body, unable to function effectively given that it brings t o-
gether Committees from extremely varying Constitutional settlements, with different 
mandates, and little synergy between the systems. Officials in both Houses mentioned 
the ‘major row’ which erupted at the meeting of COSAC in Lisbon in June 2000 - and 
                                                 
1   Kerse, 2000, op.cit., p. 100. 
2   Interview material. 
3  See Kerse, 2000, op.cit., p. 100. 
4   Interview material. 
5   Interview material.  
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expressed concern over the unwieldy nature of this body. For, clearly, national interest 
fault-lines on policy matters exist as much between parliaments as they do between 
governments. Questions remain over the reason for this body  - the exact nature of the 
role it can play Constitutionally in the EU system. Is it justified in terms of legitimacy  - 
and what is the exact nature of its legitimacy which is not found elsewhere within the 
system? 
On the question of the respective roles of national parliaments and the EP, conflicting 
views now abound. The current ESC has emphasised that in its view, national parlia-
ments and the EP hold quite distinct and different roles to play in the overall EU sys-
tem: 
“We see the roles of the of the EP and National Parliaments as complementary, not com-
peting […]. There is also a profound difference between Parliaments which authorise taxes 
and sustain a Government in office, and the role of the EP as defined in the Treaties. We 
think this should be the background for any discussion of the EP/Westminster relation-
ship.”
1 
In the overall EU system, the EP is a legislative body, whereas national parliaments are 
not: they are exercising control and influence over national governments. This would 
not prevent co-operation between parliaments - indeed, the UK Committees do have an 
exchange of papers with the relevant EP Committees. A final question asked on inter-
view was whether, from the UK’s point of view, there was a limit to the involvement of 
national parliaments in the EU system, and whether in fact with the PNP, this limit had 
been reached. The answer given in both Houses related to the degree of dissimilarity 
between procedures in member states, which perhaps put a limit on collective national 
parliamentary involvement overall. A recent i nnovation from the Prime Minister may 
have influence in this area, however. In a recent speech to the Polish Stock Exchange
2, 
Tony Blair proposed the establishment of a second Chamber of the EP, to be composed 
of representatives of national parliaments. The role of this body would be to politically 
review the application of subsidiarity (i.e. to implement any EU statement of princi-
ples). It thus remains to be seen how much support this will receive in the two Houses. 
 
V. Conclusion: A Modernising Parliament in Search for EU-Fitness 
 
In conclusion, some observations can be made. First, in the UK experience, the PNP 
had minimal constitutional impact. This does not mean, however, that the process of the 
IGC had no impact of a constitutional nature. It is important in the case of the UK to 
distinguish the specific constitutional outcome of the process from the actual process of 
                                                 
1   House of Commons, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 1998: Annex, Proposed Amendments to 
the Standing Orders, point 87. 
2   6th October, 2000.  
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constitutional negotiation. For, as has been shown, both the ESC and the SCEU used the 
framework of the IGC discussions on democratic accountability and the involvement of 
national parliaments to campaign for greater powers within the UK system. The ESC, in 
particular, saw an opportunity to put in the public eye a number of suggestions which 
had been raised in previous years and thus existed in the system, as it were, prior to the 
IGC itself. In this manner, the overall process opened space for parliamentary voice. 
The key changes made to the scrutiny system in the UK were, however, an immediate 
result of internal reform. A question raised i s to what extent recent change is incre-
mental and inevitable, and to what extent it can be explained solely as a result of a 
change in Government. The Labour Government made a number of significant changes 
to the Standing Orders and it is unlikely that this would have happened under a Conser-
vative Government - partly because, as is documented above, a number of these changes 
had been on the table for a large number of years. But, much of the recent change in 
culture is clearly inspired by the previous European Committees in operation under the 
Major Government. The impression given by the reports and on interview is that this is 
incremental change. And yet, as one official put it, “in retrospect it will be seen to be [a 
point of departure for scrutiny in the UK] but at the moment it is incremental”
1. 
Whether 1998 can be regarded as ‘unleashing scrutiny’ is thus hard to judge at the pre-
sent time. Much will depend on how other processes now at work under the Govern-
ment’s ongoing agenda of Constitutional change  (including devolution, modernisation 
of the House of Commons and reform of the House of Lords) evolve in the future.
2 
In making these observations, it may be the case that the established view on UK scru-
tiny no longer applies. One question still to be addressed is the extent to which there is 
an alteration in the nature of executive control. Judge, for example, has argued that the 
Government, as a general rule, only welcomed parliamentary participation where this 
strengthened the Government’s own bargaining position  - otherwise it was ignored. He 
listed specific factors which would suggest that there has been no real change in the 
control of ministers by parliament.
3 But, much has changed since. Many of the reasons 
he gives for supporting his claims  - such a s the “unpredictable schedule of [the consid-
eration of Commission proposals] by the Council of Ministers”
4 - no longer apply. For, 
as the European Committees have responded to EC membership, and established their 
own momentum and indeed general drive, we s hould ask how powerful they are. Is it 
still true that “what stands out [...] is the replication and reinforcement of pre-existing 
power differentials between the UK Parliament and the executive in the processing of 
                                                 
1   Interview material. 
2   For example, the procedures for clearing documents by the House under the Scrutiny Reserve Reso-
lution may be re-considered in the light of the overall process of modernisation of the House of 
Commons. This in turn may strengthen the ESC. See HC, Modernisation Committee, 7th Report, 
1998, point 30. 
3  See Judge, 1995, op.cit., p. 86. 
4   Ibid., p. 86.  
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EC legislation”
1? Certainly, the example given in this chapter on the ability of the 
House of Lords’ Committee to ‘claim’ areas for scrutiny merits further consideration in 
this regard. 
Any analysis of the above must consider the way in which EU membership has affected 
executive-legislative relations at the national level, and precisely how these are evolving 
over time. For they are clearly not static. In the case of the UK, three key areas can be 
isolated. First, in the creation of the committees in 1974, a new type of parliamentary 
control of p ublic policy  - a form of ‘ex-ante’ control was introduced. Recent reports 
from the House suggest that pre-legislative scrutiny will now be introduced in other 
areas and become a feature of the UK Constitution. Second, the committees in both 
Houses have emerged as strong institutions. They have extensive scope of scrutiny, 
sophisticated procedures, and good relations with Whitehall departments. In general, the 
scrutiny procedure is a professional procedure and a key element of parliamentary work. 
This is perhaps more advanced in the House of Lords, but recent developments in the 
House of Commons would suggest cultural changes here, too. The committees have an 
authoritative and distinctive voice, which is quite unrelated to the ‘bad press’ sometimes 
given to E U matters within the UK. A question to be addressed here would be to con-
sider to what extent this differs from other select committees. For, the general moderni-
sation of the House of Commons has laid emphasis on strengthening the role of com-
mittees generally, and with particular reference to the European Committees as exam-
ples of good practice. Third, there is in evidence an emergent ‘Europeanisation’ of par-
liamentary culture generally. This is seen in the mainstreaming of European issues, with 
Departmental Select Committees becoming increasingly involved in the scrutiny proc-
ess. Further adaptation along these lines potentially fosters a new quality to the charac-
ter of executive/legislative relations. 
                                                 
1   Ibid., p. 86. 425  
National Parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to N ational 
Players?  
 
Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels 
 
 
I. Locating National Parliamentarians in the European Union 
 
1. Relevance for European Politics 
 
The European Union moves forward to a complex, multi-level and multi-actor, political 
system, which uses state-like instruments within a non-state polity.
1 Within this process, 
national parliaments and the European Parliament face a growing number of challenges 
which call their institutional position as the directly legitimate and representative aggre-
gates of the European Union’s citizenry into question: They constantly have to adapt 
and adjust the possibilities and arrangements for parliamentary involvement in response 
to Community legislation and Union action.
2  
The transfer of national parliamentary powers to the European level has not automati-
cally entailed an immediate transfer of these originally legislative powers to the Euro-
pean Parliament. Instead, the transfer of powers from the national to the European level 
has been larger and more rapid than either the strengthening of the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament or the supervision of the development of European legislation by n a-
tional parliaments.
3 In addition, since the Treaty revisions of Maastricht and Amster-
dam, decision-making on an intergovernmental basis in the fields of Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as in the framework of Co-operation in Justice and 
Home affairs (CJHA) generates specific forms of European governance, where neither 
the European Parliament (EP) nor the national parliaments are invited to participate in 
the formulation, codification and detailed scrutiny of legal acts. Instead, parliamentary 
involvement is mainly restricted to consultation and, most of the time, to ex-post infor-
mation.  
                                                 
1   See the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume. See also: Maurer, Andreas/Wessels, Wolf-
gang: ‘The EU matters: Structuring Self-made Offers and Demands’, in: Wessels, Wolfgang/Maurer, 
Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds): Fifteen into One? The European Union and its Member States, Man-
chester: MUP, forthcoming. 
2   See Groud, Hervé: ‘Les délégations parlementaires pour les Communautés européennes. Adaptation 
des assemblées au processus de construction européenne?’, in: Revue du Droit Public et de la Sci-
ence Politique en France et à l’Etranger, No. 5/1991, p. 1311.  
3   See Nothomb, Charles-Ferdinand: ‘The role of national parliaments and the European Parliament in 
buliding the European Union’, in: The Brussels Review, No. 4/1994, p. 12.  
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2. On the Process of European Integration: Fusion Dynamics  
 
During the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
the loss of parliamentary legislative competencies at the level of the member states b e-
came one of the core issues in national legislatures. Despite a gradual increase in the 
European Parliament's legislative and control powers, representatives in national parlia-
ments and in the European Parliament detected various i ncompatibilities between the 
institutional and procedural structure of the TEU and the principles of democracy that 
should apply in the European Union and its member states. They argued that minimum 
criteria for ensuring compliance with the principles of democracy, to which the pream-
ble and Article 6.1 of the TEU refer, are not fully satisfied.
1 This judgement is not only 
shared by some parliamentary idealists in the European Parliament. Also governmental 
actors argue that the European Union faces a problem of democracy.
2  
What are the challenges for the parliaments of  the member states? We considered a set 
of fundamental trends of the Brussels arenas and their evolution towards a f usion of 
actors, instruments and procedures, which need to be analysed in terms of their potential 
effects on the level of national parliamentary systems. According to our approach, the 
following indicators are of relevance
3:  
-  the dynamic evolution of new and refined treaty provisions leading to an ever 
increasing set of communitarised frameworks for policy-making;  
-  the subsequent widening of t he functional scope of the EU leading to a sectoral 
differentiation of an increasing variety of policy fields and thus involving more 
and more national actors;  
                                                 
1   According to this fundamental article, ‘the Union shall respect the national identities of its member 
states, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy’. Hence the TEU 
itself does not provide an operational definition of the principle of democracy. Article 6.1 consists 
only a simple indication of one but essential common ground for European integration, namely that 
all member states are founded on the same principles of ‘liberty, democracy, respect for human righ-
ts and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’. 
2   See e.g. the speeches and declarations made under the framework of the ongoing debate on the Fu-
ture of the E uropean Union: Fischer, Joschka: ‘Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation - G edanken über 
die Finalität der europäischen Integration’, in: Integration, No. 3/2000, pp. 149-156; Chirac, Jacques: 
‘Notre Europe’, Speech before the German Bundestag, 27 June 2000,  http://www.elysee.fr; Blair, 
Tony, Speech at the House of Commons, 11 December 2000, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?4489; Jospin, Lionel: Discours sur ‘l’avenir de l’Europe 
élargie’, Paris, centre d’accueil de la presse étrangère, Maison Radio France, 28 mai 2001. ‘Les 
perspectives pour l’avenir de l’Union face aux défis de l’élargissement’, Discours de Michel Barnier 
lors d’un séminaire de l’Institute of Public Affairs à Varsovie, 16 juillet; ‘The Future of Europe’, 
Speech by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of Italy, at the Istituto di Studi di politica internazionale, 
Milano, 3 July 2001; ‘Our common future’;  
3   See the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume.  
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-  the creation of institutions by subsequent treaty amendments leading to institu-
tional differentiation, which increases the number of interaction styles and modes 
of governance in the policy cycles;  
-  the set-up and cross-institutional combination of different kinds of procedures, 
which provide the actors with several opportunity structures for taking binding 
decisions. This procedural differentiation increases the complexity of the EU’s 
multi-level system and the need of national actors to i mprove their procedural 
skills; 
-  the activation of policy networks, procedural and working mechanisms, which 
allow a growing set of interest groups outside the ‘official’ array of institutions to 
participate in EC/EU policy-making. This specific kind of a ctor differentiation 
leads to the need of allowing more and more actors to a rticulate their opinions. 
Consequently, actor differentation then induces an increasing need to take politi-
cal sensitivities in a broader set of coalition games into account; 
-  the increase in scope and density of legal obligations. The doubling of the acquis 
communautaire from the early 1980’s to 1998 indicates both the rise of the para-
constitutional set-up as well as the ‘invasion’ of the legal space of member states. 
Given these indicators, we asked whether national parliaments catched up with a pro-
found change of their politico-institutional environment: Do parliamentarians remain 
the losers or latecomers of integration? Or are we witnessing a process of institutional 
adaptation to the EU’s multi-level and multi-actor system?  
 
 
3. The Growing Significance: A Key Issue for the Political System of Europe 
 
We describe the political system of the EU in term of a multi-level game.
1 In this r e-
gard, one should acknowledge that the debate on the role of the national parliaments in 
the decision-making process of the European Union relates to a critical aspect of the 
European political system. As a multi-tiered structure, the European Union faces the 
problem of interrelating governmental and political institutions of different layers. 
                                                 
1   See Putnam, Robert D.: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games, in: 
International Organisation 42, No. 3/1988, pp. 427-459; Scharpf, Fritz W.: ‘Autonomieschonend und 
gemeinschaftsverträglich. Zur Logik einer europäischen Mehrebenen-Politik’, in: Weidenfeld, Wer-
ner (eds.): Reform der Europäischen Union. Materialien zur Revision des Maastrichter Vertrages 
1996, Gütersloh 1995, pp. 75-96; Scharpf,  Fritz W.: Community and Autonomy, Multilevel Policy-
Making in the European Union, EUI Working Paper 94/I, Florence 1994; Marks, Gary/ Scharpf, 
Fritz W./Schmitter, Philippe.C./Streeck, Wolfgang: Governance in the European Union, London: 
Sage 1996; Evans, Mark/Davies, Jonathan: ‘Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-
Disciplinary Perspective’, in: Public Administration, No. 2/1999, pp. 361-385. With regard to the is-
sue of national parliaments in two-level games see especially: Pahre, Robert: ‘Endogenous Domestic 
Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union’, in: Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, No. 1/1997, pp. 147-174.  
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As subsequent results of negotiations and compromises among the member states, each 
EC/EU treaty and the ensuing treaty amendments brought new competencies, empow-
erments and istruments. The scope and salience of policy areas of the Community has 
been amended, substantially widened and, as a consequence, challenged the policy 
frameworks of the member states. Today, the European Union amalgamates several 
national interests and a multitude of historical developments and readings of common 
historical beliefs. The success of this construction has perpetuated the effect of the 
EC/EU process, leading to a magnetic attraction for outside countries.
1  
The reasons to join the EC/EU integration process vary from country to country. We 
identified several approaches in the member states from the very beginning of their r e-
spective memberships in the EC/EU. While the three ‘smaller’ founding members (B, 
LUX, NL)
2 have drawn their conclusions from the failure of their neutrality policy, the 
engagement of Germany was accompanied by the struggle for more acceptance and 
regaining sovereignty after the disastrous effects of World War II.
1 A similar tendency 
towards multilateralism combined with the desire to overcome social fragmentation has 
been the main reason for the e ngagement of Italy in the integration process. The driving 
force of France’s  participation in the European integration process was based to a cer-
tain degree on the strategy that n ational interests with regard to Germany, the US and 
the USSR could be realised most efficiently within a European set-up. Denmark joined 
the EC for economic reasons and the fear of isolation vis-à-vis the UK and Germany. 
The key motives behind Irish membership can be summarised as the intention to 
achieve more independence from the UK. On the other hand, the countries of the EC 
first southern enlargement ( GR, E, P) linked their accession to the European project 
with the e xpectation of promoting the process of democratic consolidation after the 
demise of the authoritarian systems. The three latest newcomers (A, S, SF) were moti-
vated by economic and geopolitical reasons.  
Joining the EU is an instrument for domestic modernisation. Accordingly, the ‘reality’ 
of European integration and the subsequent domestic modernisation of public policy 
instruments, institutions and procedures affect national parliaments. Evidently, the evo-
lution of the EU system risks an erosion of traditional patterns of national parliamentary 
                                                 
1   For an overview on governmental motives to join and to participate in EU integration see: Maurer, 
Andreas/Grunert, Thomas: ‘Der Wandel in der Europapolitik der Mitgliedstaaten’, in: Jopp, Ma-
thias/Maurer, Andreas/Schneider, Heinrich (eds.): Europapolitische Grundverständnisse im Wandel, 
Bonn 1998, pp. 213-300; and Mittag, Jürgen/Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘The ‘One’ and the ‘Fifteen’? The 
member states between procedural adaptation and structural revolution’, in: Wessels, Wolf-
gang/Maurer, Andreas/Mittag, Jürgen (eds.): Fifteen into One? The European Union and its Member 
States (Manchester: MUP forthcoming). 
2   We use the following abbreviations for the respective member states: A = Austria; B = Belgium; D = 
Germany; DK = Denmark, E = Spain; F = France; SF = Finland; GR = Greece; I = Italy; IR = Ire-
land; LUX= Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands; P = Portugal; S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.   
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systems. Hence, in several cases the challenges of the European level are highly wel-
come by the single member states’ elites. Some of them consider the integration process 
as a gateway for their national projects of administrative reform (A, GR, IR, NL), of 
economic liberalisation (SF, S), of structural reform (IR, P, E), or as a source and neces-
sary guidance for overcoming particular regional problems such as the bi-national sys-
tem of Belgium or the strong north-south cleavages in Italy.  
 
II. Patterns and Phases: The Challenges  
 
1. Staying Outside the Games: The Traditional Patterns of the Slow Adapter 
 
The EC/EU treaty provisions did not and do not  fix a specific role for national parlia-
ments.
2  The EU’s legal doctrine is unambiguous: National parliaments are not provided 
any role in the ‘top 10’ articles of the EU’s para-constitutional framework. The modali-
ties by which national parliaments are involved into the ratification of treaty amend-
ments and revisions, in transforming EC directives or in dealing with other constraints 
like fiscal discipline are a matter of national constitutions and specific arrangements of 
member states. This ‘blindness’ of t he treaties in view of national parliaments is the 
same for other constitutional bodies like regional states or second chambers and consti-
tutional courts. It reflects the original approach of the EC founding fathers that the 
EC/EU treaties are agreements b etween states. Consequently, they leave the internal 
arrangements for coping with EC/EU politics to the sovereign decisions of member 
states. In other words, the treaties manifest some kind of a ‘constitutional subsidiarity 
principle’. 
This principle had  - at least for some decades - its domestic equivalent: EC policy was 
considered to be part of ‘external’ affairs and as such an indisputable prerogative of the 
‘executive’  - outside the legitimate claim for parliamentary participation. In some cases 
European affairs were dealt with in committees for foreign affairs and thus within a 
confidential club of a few selected parliamentary insiders.
3  
However right from the beginning there was one exemption to this strict demarcation 
between these two games: a small group of national parliamentarians were delegated 
                                                                                                                                               
1   See Webber, Douglas: ‘Introduction: German European and Foreign Policy Before and After Unifi-
cation’, in: Webber, Douglas (ed.): New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?, London 2001, 
pp. 1-18. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume. 
3   See Cassese, Antonio (ed.): Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committees, The National Setting, Pado-
va 1982.  
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with a dual mandate to the European Parliament. Its powers were however minimal and 
its impact on national politics and policies marginal.
1 
 
2. Being Replaced by a European Player: The European Parliament as the Parliamen-
tary Body of the EU 
 
With the increase of the budgetary and legislative empowerments of the EC from the 
early 1970’s onwards national governments were confronted with another traditional 
doctrine of modern western societies: The claim for ‘ parliamentary government’ was 
also extended to the European level. Keeping EC affairs just as a matter of diplomats 
and few other ministries could not be kept as the rule. With direct elections from 1979 
onwards and with the increase of legal rights from t he Single European Act 1986 o n-
wards the EP developed towards a co-legislator
2 and co-elector. It evolved into some 
kind of a second chamber to the Council and as such towards a strong European Player.
3  
Since 1979 the EP expanded its role as a watchdog by  making intensive use of its right 
to ask questions, by keeping a closer eye on EU expenditure (through the Committee on 
Budgetary Control) and by setting up temporary committees of i nquiry. Since 1986/87, 
EC Treaty amendments have  introduced important changes concerning the role and 
position of the European Parliament. On the basis of the positive experiences gained 
with the co-operation procedure since the entry into force of the SEA (1987), the Maas-
tricht Treaty widened the procedure’s scope and in also c reated the so-called co-
decision procedure. Herewith, the Parliament o btained the right to block a proposed 
legislative act without the Council having the right to outvote Parliament at the end of 
the procedure. The conciliation committee was to be the nucleus of the co-decision pro-
cedure. Apart from co-decision,  Maastricht extended  the assent procedure to a wide 
range of international agreements and other sectors of  a  legislative and ‘para-
constitutional’ n ature.  As regards the implementation phase of the  EC/EU policy cycle, 
Parliament  was given the  formal  right to set up temporary Committees of Inquiry in 
order to investigate maladministration in the implementation of EC law. Finally, and 
with  a  view to the early stages of European decision-making, Parliament gained the 
right to request the European Commission to submit legislative proposals.  
                                                 
1   See Fitzmaurice, John: The European Parliament, Farnborough 1978; Herman, Valentine/Lodge, 
Juliet: ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Direct Elections to the European Parliament’, in: West European 
Politics, No. 2/1978, pp. 226-251; Herman, Valentine/Lodge, Juliet: The European Parliament and 
the European Community, London 1978; Herman, Valentine/Schendelen, Rinus van (eds.): The Eu-
ropean Parliament and the National Parliaments, Westmead 1979. Wallace, Helen: ‘The European 
Parliament: The Challenge of Political Responsibility’, in: Government and Opposition (special edi-
tion 1979), pp. 433-443. 
2   Maurer, Andreas: What next for the European Parliament?, London 1999. 
3   See Maurer/Wessels, 2001, op.cit.  
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Commentators on the Maastricht Treaty have argued that the European Parliament “was 
perhaps the largest net beneficiary of the institutional changes in the TEU”
1 and that the 
treaty “marks the point in the Community’s development at which the Parliament b e-
came the first chamber of a real legislature; and the Council is obliged to act from time 
to time like a second legislative chamber rather than a ministerial directorate”.
2 As for 
the roles provided by the treaties for the European Parliament, the relative proportion of 
its ‘exclusion’ from the EC/EU policy-making process has considerably diminished.  
For national parliaments this considerable gain in access and influence by the EP was 
seen quite often as the optimal form and level of parliamentary representation: Each 
level just has its proper form of parliamentary participation. However such a view 
would presuppose a neatly divided allocation and/or repartition of competencies ( Kom-
petenzabgrenzung) and, as a consequence, a clear-cut transfer of powers (empower-
ments) from the national to the EU level. However as member states continued to take 
significant steps which furthered the fusion process
3 this basic pace towards a ‘dual 
federal system’ was not taken. With some few exceptions public policy-making r e-
mained a matter of mixed, i.e. multi-level and multi-actor processes. Given their rather 
weak positions with regard to the performance in the daily business of EC/EU policy-
making, national parliaments were certainly not the champions for downgrading the 
EP’s role to a limited set of secondary level powers. 
 
III. National parliaments on Their Ways Towards National Players 
 
1. Public Opinion: From Permissive Consensus to Reluctant Acceptance  
 
All member states  - with the exception of the United Kingdom and to a certain degree 
Denmark and Sweden  - feature a long-standing affective and - to a lesser extent - utili-
tarian support for the European enterprise.
4 The integration  process has been tradition-
ally regarded as a positive sum game for many member states. However, since the end 
of the 1980’s and especially towards the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty this 
                                                 
1   Helen Wallace 1996, op.cit., p. 63. 
2   Andrew Duff: ‘Building a Parliamentary Europe’, in: Mario Télo, (ed.), Démocratie et Construction 
Européenne, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 253-254. 
3   See Wessels, 1997, op.cit. 
4   On the different aspects of popular support see Niedermayer, Oskar/Westle, Bettina: ‘A Typology of 
Orientations’, in: Niedermayer, Oskar/Sinnott, Richard (eds.): Public Opinion and Internationalized 
Governance, Vol. II, Oxford 1995, pp. 33-50; Inglehart, Ronald: ‘Long Term Trends in Mass Sup-
port for European Unification’, in: Government and Opposition, No. 12/1977, pp. 150-177, Lind-
berg, Leon N./Scheingold, Stuart A.: Europe’s Would-Be polity. Patterns of Change in the European 
Community, Engelwood Cliffs 1970, Handley, 1981, op.cit.; Hewstone, Miles: Understanding Atti-
tudes to the European Community, Cambridge 1986; Inglehart, Ronald/Rabier, Jacques René/Reif, 
Karlheinz: ‘The Evolution of Public Attitudes towards European Integration’, in: Journal of Euro-
pean Integration/Revue d’Intégration Européenne, No. 10/1987, pp. 135-155; Niedermayer, Oskar: 
‘Bevölkerungsorientierungen gegenüber dem politischen System der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, 
in: Wildenmann, Rudolf (ed.): Staatswerdung Europas?, Baden-Baden 1991, pp. 321-353.  
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overall trend has changed.
1 Attitudes within member states to t he European integration 
process get more multifaceted.
2 In several countries more and more signs of ‘Euro-
scepticism’ have surfaced, causing heated debates about the benefits and costs of mem-
bership (A, D, DK, S, UK). The new and more sensitive policy areas of the Maastricht 
Treaty (EMU, CFSP, CJHP) evoked sceptical views and serious concerns in the general 
public about the democratic deficits of the European Union.
3  
 
Graph 6: Evolution of Utilitarian Support for EU membership 1991-1997 
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Authors’ own calculation on the basis of European Commission, Eurobarometer 36. Luxembourg 1991, 
and European Commission, Eurobarometer 47.1., Luxembourg 1997. 
 
Given the greater salience of EC/EU policies in the daily life of citizens, the public 
frame of mind has changed from ‘permissive consensus’ or ‘positive indifference’
4 to 
                                                 
1   See Anderson, Christopher/Kaltenthaler, Karl: ‘The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European 
Integration, 1973-93’, in: European Journal of International Relations, No. 2/1996, pp. 175-200; 
Duwendag, Dieter: ‘Akzeptanzprobleme der Europäischen Währungsunion’, in: Jahrbuch fuer Wirt-
schaftswissenschaften, Göttingen, Vol. 47, No. 3/1996, pp. 241-264; Inglehart, Ronald/Rabier, Jac-
ques-Rene/Reif, Karlheinz: ‘The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward European Integration: 1970-
1986’, in: Journal of European Integration, No. 2-3/1987, pp. 135-155. 
2   See generally Westle, Bettina/Niedermayer, Oskar: ‘Die Europäische Gemeinschaft im Urteil der 
Bürger  - ein sozialwissenschaftlicher Untersuchungsansatz’, in: integration, No. 4/1994, pp. 177-
186. See as well the annual contributions of Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth: ‘Die öffentliche Meinung’, 
in: Weidenfeld, Werner Weidenfeld/Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integra-
tion 1998/99 ff, Bonn 1999ff., pp. 311-316.   
3   See especially van der Eijk, Cees et al. (eds.): Choosing Europe?, The European Electorate and 
National Politics in the Face of the Union, Ann Arbor 1996; Reif, Karl Heinz: ‘Ein Ende des ‘Per-
missive Consensu’’? Zum Wandel europapolitischer Einstellungen in der öffentlichen Meinung in 
den EG-Mitgliedstaaten’, in: Hrbek, Rudolf (ed.): Der Vertrag von Maastricht in der wissenschaftli-
chen Kontroverse, Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 23-33.  
4   See the contribution by Ben Hoetjes in this volume.  
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‘issue related voice’ - with considerable variations within a broad corridor. If we look at 
the evolution of the explicit utilitarian support (‘Country X benefited from EU member-
ship’) from 1991 to 1997, we can detect relatively high and stable rates in Greece, Lux-
embourg, Italy, Ireland, and Belgium. On the other hand, the lowest rates of support for 
European Union membership are expressed in the  Eurobarometer public opinion polls 
in some northern states (D, DK, NL, UK, S) and in Austria.
1 While the political and 
economic elites in these countries are still in favour of membership  - as they see the 
benefits from the Community  - the general public i s less positive. These member states 
feature ‘two discursive worlds’: the general public discourse evolves according to its 
own  - mainly national  - logic whereas the dynamics of the multi-level EU system gen-
erates a rather pro-European attitude on the side of socio-economic elites. However, the 
increasing controversies about specific EU policies have not put the EU system as such 
into question. Given the dramatic changes in the international and European system of 
1989 it is even more revealing that the fluctuations in public opinion did not reverse 
pre-existing trends with regard to the general attitude vis-à-vis EU membership. A cer-
tain ‘normalcy’ of getting and remaining involved is a key feature of all member coun-
tries. The participation of a considerable part of the political machinery in the daily 
business of EC/EU affairs has led to a broad acceptance of the EU polity. In this regard, 
the observed tendency towards more negative net rates in the utilitarian support reflects 
that the EU system is becoming an essential part of each national political system. And 
like any ‘national system’, the intertwined EU-member states systems are subject to a 
more rationalist  - utilitarian  - and critical attitudes. The resulting tendency of public 
opinion to the ‘accommodation with the inevitable’ is becoming an essential back-
ground for policy-making. The low voter turnout at the European Parliament elections 
in June 1999 confirm this trend. On the other hand, ‘questioning’ the usefulness of EU 
integration with regard t o a growing spectrum of policy areas also reinforces the pres-
sure for national parliaments to articulate their roles and features in the EU’s political 
system.  
With the upswing of Euro-sceptic attitudes  - similar to waves before in the 50 years of 
the EC/EU
2  - governments and parliaments in the 1990’s reinforced arguments in f a-
vour of defending and pursuing some of their ‘vital’ national interests. The post-
Maastricht process has increased this trend in a considerable number of states, espe-
cially in Germany, France and the Netherlands. The emergence of more robust national 
attitudes can be noted as an indirect consequence of the implementation of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, also in member states which are usually considered as traditional support-
ers of the integration process. 
                                                 
1   See for detailed empirical data the Eurobarometer 53 (Spring 2000).    
2   Handley, David: ‘Public Opinion and European Integration: The Crisis of the 1970s’, in: European 
Journal of Political Research, No. 9/1981, pp. 335-364.  
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We thus depict very heterogeneous policy interests, which are closely linked to the pe-
culiar structure and the geographical or organisational context of member states. D o-
mestic issues still prevail the generation of and the deliberation on  EC/EU policy issues. 
Thus, if we look at the ‘real’ actions of national governments and parliaments, the ‘re-
nationalisation’ appears quite often to be more a ‘public relations affair’ than a real 
change in the pursuit of European policies. We understand t his kind of ‘re-
nationalisation’ as a mechanism of digesting EC/EU policies in domestic arenas. In this 
context, the demands to reinforce the roles of national parliaments in European policy-
making also appear as a means for reorienting the ‘slow adapters’ towards ‘national 
players’ according to both the EU’s reality  and the national mechanisms of ‘selling’ EU 
affairs to the larger public.  
 
2. Shaping the National Level of the EU’s Policy-Cycle 
 
With the growth and differentiation of the EU system
1 national parliaments realised a 
loss in influence which was not just due to the Brussels bureaucracy and could not only 
be adequately substituted by the EP. By the end of 1980’s it became obvious that their 
‘own’ governments and administrations were using their c hannels to the EU institutions 
with the intended or unintended consequence to virtually reduce parliamentary powers 
and control. With some few exemptions like the Danish Folketing national parliamen-
tarians felt increasingly marginalized as slow adapters.  
The Maastricht treaty’s declaration No. 13 on the role of the national parliaments in the 
European Union generated some added powers for national parliaments within the 
framework of their national constitutions.
2 Although the declaration was only of politi-
cal importance, it contained some key indicators for measuring and comparing the par-
ticipation of national parliaments in the EU. Accordingly, our research design focused 
on the following indicators:
3  
-  The institutionalisation of parliamentary structures,  instruments and procedures 
for dealing with EU policy-making at the national level, 
-  The substantial scope of parliamentary control resulting from the extent of docu-
ments forwarded to parliaments by their governments, 
-  The basic orientation and methods of national parliaments with regard to the o r-
ganisation of filtering documents within the parliamentary bodies, 
-  The timing and management of parliamentary scrutiny, and 
-  The potential and real impact of parliamentary scrutiny on the Government’s 
room of manoeuvre within the EU Council of Ministers.  
                                                 
1   See Maurer/Wessels, 2001, op.cit; Wessels, 2001 op.cit. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 1.1. 
3   See the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume.  
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Following this research design
1, the country reports explored the post-Maastricht 
changes with regard to parliamentary participation in the legal constitution of member 
states and with regard to their impact on the real patterns of involvement in the living 
constitution. The results point at a considerable legal constitutionalisation
2 and institu-
tional adaptation, and at a modest impact with regard to the real patterns of participa-
tion.  
 
2.1. Institutionalisation and Institutional Adaptation: The Creation of Committees 
 
If we look at the EU’s present (2001) institutional structure, the role of the national par-
liaments in the decision-making process lies in ‘one-level’-scrutiny and advice within 
the model framework of g overnment-legislature relationships.
3 N ational parliaments 
exercise these roles according to the constitutional and political context of the country.  
Since the mid-1980s national parliaments have made important changes to their proce-
dures concerning the e xamination of EC/EU issues. The next chapters will deal with 
these attempts. We concentrate on institutional developments. Institutions are under-
stood as formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that 
structure the relationship  between individuals in various units of the polity and econ-
omy
4. Adopting this broader perspective, w e can identify three m ajor evolutions with 
regard to institutional adaptation of national parliaments in view of the EU system:  
-  A greater specialisation o f parliamentarians with regard to policy areas and func-
tions of parliaments,  
-  A greater activity of committees within the management of parliamentary busi-
ness, and - as a result of the two aforementioned changes, and  
-  A higher rate of segmentation and fragmentation of parliamentary bodies and 
groups.  
In some cases (DK, S, SF, D, A), EU Committees perform as key interlocutors for gov-
ernment representatives in order to voice a more or less binding opinion on a given 
document. Moreover, several of these committees function as transmission belts b e-
tween their parliaments and public opinion (DK, S, SF, F) by organising hearings and 
                                                 
1   See also Figure 2 in the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume. 
2   See Olsen, Johan P.: Organising European Institutions of Governance. A Prelude to an Institutional 
Account of Political Integraion, Arena Working Papers WP 00/2, Oslo 2000.  
3   Norton, Philip (ed.): National Parliaments and the European Union, Special Issue of The Journal of 
Legislative Studies, No. 1/1995.  
4   Hall, Peter: Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Cam-
bridge: 1986, p. 19. David R. North offers a similar definition. Institutions are ‘the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally […] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
See North, David R.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
1990, p. 3. See also March, James G./Olsen, Johan P.: Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisatio-
nal Basis of Politics, New York 1989, p. 167.  
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through the management of EU-related internet pages. Finally, all EU committees share 
the task to participate in COSAC as the main interparliamentary co-operation network.  
As a starting point, we observe some convergence in organisational adaptation, i.e. the 
set up of specific bodies within parliaments that deal with the incoming documentation 
of the EC/EU’s policy processes. 
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Table 27: Institutionalisation of EC/EU Committees 1957 to 1997 
  Parliament  Committee Name and Date 
The early days and founding experiments 
D  Bundesrat  Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1957) 
B  Chambre des Représentants  Commission des Affaires européennes (May 1962) 
D  Bundestag  Integrations-Ältestenrat (1963-1967); 6 meetings in 5 years 
I  Senato  Giunta consultativa per gli Affari Delle Comunità Europee 
(1968) 
NL  Eerste Kamer  Vaste Commissie voor Europese Samenwerkingsorganisaties 
(June 1970) 
DK  Folketing  Markedsudvalget (October 1972) 
I  Camera dei Deputati   Comitato permanente per gli affari comunitari (1973) 
IRE  Oireachtas  Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European 
Communities (August 1973) 
UK  House of Lords   Select Committee of the European Communities (April 1974) 
UK  House of Commons  Select Committee on European Legislation (May 1974) 
F  Assemblée nationale and 
Sénat 
Délégation (de l’Assemblée nationale / du Sénat) pour les Com-
munautés européennes (July 1979) 
European Parliament Direct Elections 1979 
UK  House of Commons  Standing Committee on European Community Documents (1980) 
D  Bundestag  Europakommission (1983) 
B  Chambre des Représentants  Comité d’Avis chargé de questions européennes (April 1985) 
E  Cortes Generales  Comisión Mixta para las Communidades Europeas (1985) 
Single European Act 1986 
NL  Tweede Kamer  Vaste Commissie voor EG-Zaken (October 1986) 
D  Bundestag  Unterausschuss des Auswärtigen Ausschusses für Fragen der EG 
(June 1987) 
I  Camera dei Deputati  Commissione Affari Esteri et Comunitari (July 1987) 
P  Assembléia da Republica  Comissao de Assuntos Europeus (October 1987) 
D  Bundesrat  Kammer für Vorlagen der EG (June 1988) 
LUX  Chambre des Députés  Commission des Affaires étrangères et communautaires (1989) 
B  Sénat  Comité d’Avis chargé de questions européennes (March 1990) 
GR  Vouli Ton Ellinon  Epitropi Evropaikon Ypothesseon (June 1990) 
I  Camera dei Deputati  Commissione speciale per le politiche comuniarie (1990) 
UK  House of Commons  Standing Committees A and B (1990) 
D  Bundestag  EG-Ausschuss (June 1991) 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union 1992 
IRE  Oireachtas  Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs mit dem Sub-Committee on 
E.C. Legislation (1992) 
DK  Folketing  Europaudvalget (November 1993)  
E  Cortes Generales  Comisión Mixta para la Unión Europea (May 1994) 
D  Bundestag  Ausschuss für Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (1994) 
NL  Tweede Kamer  Allgemene Commissie voor EU-Zaken (May 1994) 
A  Nationalrat  Hauptausschuss (December 1994) 
S  Riksdagen  EU-Nämden (December 1994) 
SF  Eduskunta  Suuri voliokunta / Stora utekottet (January 1995) 
IRE  Oireachtas  Joint Committee on European Affairs (March 1995) 
B  Chambre and Sénat  Comité d’avis fédéral chargé des questions européennes (1995) 
I  Camera dei Deputati  Commissione politiche dell’Unione europea (August 1996) 
Source: Maurer 2001, based on: European Parliament 1995 and own research. 
 
The growing salience of EC/EU affairs would suggest that parliaments would a djust 
their existing resources accordingly. In institutional terms, one could expect that parlia- 
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ments would revise the composition and the relative strength of EU Committees. How-
ever, table 28 indicates a rather stable share composition of EU Committees.  
 
Table 28: Ratio of EU Committee Members in Relation to the Strength of Parliament  
In per cent  1987/88  1992/93  1995/96  1999 
Belgium   Chambre 
Senate 
9.43  9.43 
20.75 
15.79  13.57 
Denmark  Folketing  9.71  9.71  9.71  9.50 
Germany   Bundestag 
Bundesrat 
2.5 
37.77 
6.45 
31.88 
7.44 
33.33 
5.9 
33.33 
Finland  Eduskunta  -  -  12.5  12.5 
France   Assemblée 
Senate 
3.13 
5.60 
6.23 
11.24 
6.23 
11.24 
6.23 
11.24 
Greece  Voulí  -  10.33  10.33  10.33 
UK   Commons 
Lords 
2.46 
1.87 
2.46 
1.87 
2.46 
1.87 
2.43 
3.00 
Italy   Camera 
Senate 
n.a. 
7.92 
8.1 
7.92 
7.94 
7.36 
7.62 
7.36 
Ireland  Dail /Senate  11.06  11.06  7.52  8.41 
Luxembourg   Chambre.  n.a.  18,33  18,33  18,33 
Netherlands   Tweede Kamer 
Eerste Kamer 
17.33 
n.a. 
17.33 
n.a. 
17.33 
17.33 
16.66 
14.66 
Austria   Nationalrat 
Bundesrat 
-  -  14.75 
11.48 
15.85 
25.0 
Portugal  Assembleia  10,0  10,0  11,74  11,74 
Sweden   Riksdag  -  -  4.87  4.87 
Spain   Camera /Senate  n.a.  6.63  6.63  6.44 
Source: Maurer 2001; Raunio/Wiberg 1999; WWW-Pages of the IPU and of the national parliaments. 
 
The information recorded in t able  28 does not allow to deduce an overall immunity of 
parliaments vis-à-vis EU integration. EU Committees can be seen as but one specific 
translation of institutional adjustment, but we should not restrict our view to the devel-
opment of bodies and their membership. The creation of EU Committees is thus one 
specific focus of parliaments for getting involved through special institutional provi-
sions.  Some of the parliaments turned to be more active on EU affairs, especially after 
the Single European Act  and the Maastricht Treaty. As the country studies show, not 
only the Committee of the Danish Folketing, but also those of the French Parliament, 
the German Parliament, the Dutch Second Chamber, the Austrian Nationalrat and the 
Finnish Eduskunta have developed their formal position and potential leverage on EC 
and EU affairs. They are not only dependant on filtered EU information of their gov-
ernments, but generate their own  - additional  - information about the EU’s daily busi-
ness. They are not only allowed to deliberate on incoming EU draft legislation, but pro-
duce and pass resolutions, voice their opinion on a given issue, and ask their govern-
ments to act in the Council of Ministers according to their opinion.  
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2.2. The Scope of Information and the Sift of Documentation 
 
Information is the ultimate basis for participating in public policy-making. The self-
made loss of original legislative powers in the upstream process of EC/EU policy-
making may be compensated by an increase in the national parliament’s control func-
tion vis-à-vis their governments.
1 Since the German Bundesrat’s decision of 1957 to 
create a special EC affairs committee, national parliaments established institutions, gen-
eral norms and procedures in order to scrutinise their governments in the EC decision-
making process. The degree of effective parliamentary scrutiny varies a lot, ranging 
from simple ex-post i nformation rules to mandatory procedures.
2 The Maastricht Treaty 
lead to a limited range of new provisions affecting the role of national parliaments in 
monitoring their governments’ activity in EC/EU affairs. According to Declaration No. 
13 of the Maastricht TEU version, member states government agreed that “it is impor-
tant to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the 
European U nion”. In this context, they committed themselves to “ensure, inter alia, that 
national parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time for i n-
formation or possible examination”.
3  
The scope of parliamentary participation in EC/EU affairs results from the extent of 
documents forwarded to parliaments by their governments. The country reports e x-
plored the extent to which national parliaments receive draft proposals of EC legislative 
acts and other EU acts, i.e. white and green papers, recommendations, declarations, 
documents produced by COREPER, the Council working groups, the European Parlia-
ment and its committees etc. Table 29 shows how national systems responded to the 
growing space of information, which can be forwarded to parliaments. 
As the study on France shows, the extend of information forwarded to national parlia-
ments may be restricted according to national hierarchies of norms.
4 The concept of 
proposals containing provisions of a legislative  nature implies that Parliament only r e-
ceives those draft acts, which, if they were to be adopted in France would form part of 
the law within the meaning of Article 34 of the Constitution. Thus, Article 88-4 leaves 
to the ‘Conseil d’État’ and the Government the decision whether draft proposals consti-
tute legislative acts. The supply with information is much more comprehensive in Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
These parliaments do not only have access to the overall amount of incoming docu-
ments of the European Commission, the Council, the EP and the other EU institutions, 
                                                 
1   See Schüttemeyer, Suzanne: ‘Funktionsverluste des Bundestages durch die europäische Integra-
tion?’, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, No. 2/1979, p. 261. 
2   Laprat, Gerard: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Community Legislation: An Evolving Idea’, in: Laursen, 
Finn/Pappas, Spyros A. (eds.): The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union, Maas-
tricht, European Institute of Public Administration 4-10, 1995; Norton, 1995, op.cit. 
3   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 1.1. 
4   See the contribution by Andrea Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg in this volume.  
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but succeeded to bound their governments to provide comprehensive explanatory i n-
formations in order to facilitate the sift of documents between MP’s and committees. 
These government ‘translations’ of EU information are of high political relevance, since 
they allow MP not only to discuss the documents as such, but also their government’s 
perspective on a given issue. Explanatory informations  orient national debates with 
regards to the issue of competencies (B, D, A) and the respect of the subsidiarity princi-
ple (DK, D, F), the financial implications of a proposed act (D, DK, NL, S, SF, UK), the 
state of the art on a given policy issue as well  as the - perceived - progress of negotia-
tions (DK, D, F, S, UK).  
Table 29: Evolution of the Scope of Information for National Parliaments 1987 to 1998 
  1987-1992 (SEA-Period)  1992-1997 (Maastricht-Period)  Since 1997 
(Amsterdam-
Period) 
B  Draft EC acts, explanatory 
information of the Government. 
No systematic transfer. 
Unchanged  Unchanged 
 
DK 
Systematic transfer of all EC-
Documents and explanatory 
information by the Government 
on each forwarded document.  
All Commission documents (COM and SEC), impor-
tant documents of the Council, factual notes of the 
Government. Extension to pillars II and III and other - 
non-legislative - documents.  
More system-
atic transfer of 
pre-legislative 
documents. 
 
D 
Systematic transfer of draft EC 
acts.  
All EC/EU proposals, progress reports prepared by 
Council Working groups, views of the Government. 
Unchanged 
E  All EC proposals of the Com-
mission, reports of the Govern-
ment.  
Since 1994 information on all EC draft acts.  Unchanged 
 
F 
No systematic transfer of legisla-
tive COM documents. 
All EC draft acts including provisions of a legislative 
nature according to Art. 88-4 and 34 of the Constitu-
tion, Agendas of the Council, at irregular intervals 
notes of the Government on the French position. Since 
1994 also documents of the EU. 
All EC and EU 
documents of 
legislative 
nature 
 
GR 
Reports on developments of EC 
affairs and the end of each par-
liamentary session.  
Unchanged  Unchanged 
I  No systematic transfer of legisla-
tive COM documents. 
All Commission draft proposals, fact sheets of the 
Government.  
Unchanged. 
 
IRE 
EC draft acts at the Govern-
ment’s discretion. 
Drafts acts falling under Art. 249 ECT, Council docu-
ments, programmes, guidelines of the Commission, 
explanatory memoranda of the Government. 
Unchanged 
LUX  No systematic transfer of EC 
documents.  
Draft regulations and directives, documents arising out 
of the ‘Comitology’, decisions of the Commission. 
Additional information of the Government.  
Unchanged 
NL  Tweede Kamer receives a 
monthly table of new COM-
proposals.  
Eerste Kamer only deals with 
implementation of EC law. 
Tweede Kamer: Binding responsibility o governmen-
tal transfer of documents only for III pillar proposals. 
Unchanged 
A  Not yet member of the EC  All EU proposals. Explanatory memoranda by the 
Government.  
Unchanged 
P  No systematic transfer of EC 
draft acts. 
Since 15 June 1994 systematic transfer of EC draft 
proposals. 
Unchanged 
SF  Not yet member of the EC  All EC and EU-documents.   Unchanged 
S  Not yet member of the EC  Transfer of all EC and EU draft acts, explanatory 
memoranda by the Government. 
Unchanged 
UK  EC draft acts and explanatory 
memoranda.  
All legislative documents except II. and III. pillar 
documents. 
All EC and EU 
documents. 
Source: Maurer 2001, p. 254; and country reports in this volume. 
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Still after Maastricht, the scrutiny power of many parliaments was strictly limited to 
simple ex-post information. Consequently, closer examination had any effect on the 
Government’s European policy management. Given their ‘late’ awakening with regard 
to the effects of the EU’s reality, parliamentarians realised in the middle of the 1990’s 
that they need to convince their governments to shift from one-sequential information 
towards more continuous cycles of self-generated information and ‘national’ forecasts 
about the consequences of EU law. A growing part of national legislatures and their EU 
committees revised their rules of procedure and opened up new ways for obtaining i n-
formation on EC/EU draft legislation. As r egards the initial phases of t he EU’s policy 
cycle, parliaments and governments in Denmark, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands 
fine-tuned the mechanisms for drafting short commentary sheets on incoming draft acts 
of the European Commission. 
Table 30: Evolution of Supplementary Information Practices 1992-1998 
  1992/1993  1995  1997/1998 
  Initial   Continuous  Initial  Continuous  Initial  Continuous 
B  -  -  Unchanged  On demand  R  Unchanged 
DK  R  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
D  R  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
E  -  ￿  R  On demand  R  Unchanged 
F  ￿  -  R  R  ￿  ￿ 
GR  -  -  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
I  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  On demand  Unchanged  Unchanged 
IRL  ￿  -  ￿  On demand  R  Unchanged 
LUX  -  On demand  Unchanged  Unchanged  R  Unchanged 
NL  ￿  R  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged 
A  n.a.  n.a.  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged 
P  -  -  R  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged 
S  n.a.  n.a.  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged 
SF  n.a.  n.a.  ￿  ￿  Unchanged  Unchanged 
UK  ￿  R  Unchanged  Unchanged  Unchanged  ￿ 
Legend for initial phases of the EU’s policy cycles (‘Initial’): - : No supplementing information, ￿: Some supple-
menting informations like summaries of the draft: R: document summaries, agendas and minutes of Council of 
Ministers, ￿: substantial supplementing information like financial forecasts, analyses on constitutional implications, 
subsidiarity/environmental impact assessment/social affairs forecast sheets etc. Legend for the decision-making phase 
of the EU’s policy cycles: (‘Continuous’): -: No information at all; ￿: Short hand information about the envisaged 
dates of the decision-making process; R Commented information about the stance of other EU actors in the decision-
making process; ￿: Complete and timely information about each stage in the decision-making process; On demand: 
New information on the decision-making process only on specific demand by MP or committees. 
 
A continuing source of dissatisfaction of both the EP and the national parliaments is the 
fact that new  - post-SEA  - policy fields and new modes of governance
1 evade any par-
                                                 
1   See Wallace, Helen: ‘Analysing and Explaining Policies’, in: Wallace, Helen/Wallace, William 
(eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, Fourth edition, Oxford, 2000, pp. 65-81; Kohler-
Koch, Beate: ‘The Evolution and Transformation of European Governance’, in: Kohler-Koch, 
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liamentary guidance o r control.
1 Some of these fields have evolved recently, i.e. foreign 
policy and common security, justice and home affairs, economic and monetary policy in 
the context of the EMU, the Euro 12-nucleus’ policies within the framework of the 
growth and stability pact and the so-called ‘open method of co-ordination’ policies. In 
these areas both the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty reforms have not made any pro-
gress towards an inclusion of at least one level of parliamentary participation, whilst 
they have sanctioned particularly innovative decisions, at strictly intergovernmental 
level, such as those concerning the introduction of a political and military structure for 
common crisis reaction forces or the setting up of new intergovernmental committees in 
the fields  of EMU and employment. New modes of governance have thus created new 
democratic deficits on both levels. The recent tendency to replace the ‘Community 
method’ has become obvious with the recent heads of state and governments’ decisions 
on ESDP, where the i ntergovernmental dimension in steering the Union has been 
strengthened, as expressed most clearly in the emphasis given to the role of the Euro-
pean Council. The serious limits, as regards both transparency, ‘tracebility’ and ‘moni-
torability’, of the Council’s activities, were merely touched upon in a few provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty.
2  
                                                                                                                                               
Beate/Eising, Rainer (eds.): The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, Lon-
don/New York 1999, pp. 14-35; Wessels, Wolfgang/Linsenmann, Ingo: ‘EMU’s impact on national 
institutions: Fusion towards a Gouverance économique or fragmentation?’, in: Dyson, Kenneth 
(eds.): European States and the Euro: Playing the semi-serinity game, Oxford 2001 (forthcoming). 
1   See also the European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428, 27. 
July 2001, pp. 21-22.  
2   See Maurer, 2001, op.cit., pp. 345-361.  
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Table 31: Scope of Information in two specific policy areas (as in 1997) 
Member State  CFSP (Second pillar)  CJHA/Police and Judicial Co-operation in 
Criminal matters (Third pillar) 
B  Traditional instruments: Hearings, written 
and oral questions 
Traditional instruments: Hearings, written 
and oral questions 
DK  Analogous to the EC pillar, internal co-
operation between EU affairs and Foreign 
affairs committees 
Analogous to the EC pillar, internal co-
operation between EU affairs and Internal 
affairs committees 
D Bundestag  Through the Committee for Foreign affairs  Analogous to the EC pillar  
D Bundesrat  No  Analogous to the EC pillar, special consulta-
tion procedure for ‘framework decisions’. 
GR  At the Government’s discretion  No. 
E  At the Government’s discretion  At the Government’s discretion  
F (both houses)  Comprehensive information since October 
1995 
Comprehensive information since June 1994 
IRE  All documents which are legally binding 
for Ireland 
All documents which are legally binding for 
Ireland 
I Camera  At the Government’s discretion  At the Government’s discretion, but specific 
procedure for the Schengen Committee 
I Senate  At the Government’s discretion   At the Government’s discretion 
LUX  No  At the Government’s discretion 
NL 
Tweede Kamer 
Yes, through the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs 
Yes, because of the parliament’s assent 
required 
 
NL Eerste Kamer  No  No 
A Nationalrat  Similar to the EC pillar  Similar to the EC pillar 
A Bundesrat  Only if the competencies of the Bunde-
sländer are affected 
Only if the competencies of the Bundesländer 
are affected 
P  At the Government’s discretion  At the Government’s discretion 
SF  Similar to the EC  pillar but executed 
through the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
Similar to the EC pillar 
S  Similar to the EC pillar  Similar to the EC pillar 
UK  All texts of CFSP statements, declarations, 
common positions and joint actions once 
they are agreed, CFSP documents submit-
ted be one Community institution to an-
other, other documents at the Govern-
ment’s discretion. 
Restricted: The first full text of any conven-
tion requiring, if agreed, later primary 
legislation in the UK, other documents at the 
Government’s discretion. 
 
Source: Maurer 2001, p. 254; and country reports in this volume. 
 
The scope of information in these areas was and remains particularly low in the South-
ern European parliaments (GR, E, P) and in Ireland. The parliaments of France and the 
UK had to fight for the application of existing information routines in the EC area to the 
intergovernmental policy areas. Comparing their relative positioning in 1991/1992 and 
1997/1998, both parliaments developed from a ‘weak adapter’s’ to a ‘national player’s’ 
role.  
While conquering ground in the classic areas of EC policy-making, national parliaments 
lost influence in other ‘vital’ policy areas: Also after the Treaty of Amsterdam, parlia-
mentary involvement in CFSP and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
depends on the willingness of governments to keep their legislatures informed on inter-
governmental events. It is not unusual for parliaments to be made aware of international 
agreements only at the time of their presentation to the legislature for ratification. As 
both areas feature co-operation that remain officially outside the EC arena, the tradi- 
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tional domestic scrutiny procedures for Community legislation do not automatically 
apply. Information remains a vital tool for processes of scrutiny and accountability and 
parliaments depend heavily on executives and/or interest groups for this key resource.  
 
2.3. An Indicative example: The Third Pillar on Justice, Home Affairs, Police and Judi-
cial Co-operation 
 
The third pillar on co-operation in Justice,  Home Affairs, Police and Judicial Co-
operation provides a clear example of intergovernmental activity excluding parliamen-
tary actors and thus bypassing traditional scrutiny and accountability controls. Most of 
the national parliaments proved incapable of b ypassing and/or controlling national gate-
keepers through a lack of resources, knowledge and occasionally interest. As well as 
creating an ambiguous situation for the EU’s supranational institutions, the formalisa-
tion of the Justice and Home affairs sector  under the Maastricht Treaty caused signifi-
cant difficulties for domestic parliamentary actors seeking to exercise power in the scru-
tiny/accountability process. In particular the failure to mainstream Justice and Home 
affairs co-operation in the EC legislative process undermined the role of national par-
liaments as well as that of the European Parliament. As the Third Pillar was not consid-
ered ‘normal’ EC decision-making, governments had much greater leeway in deciding 
what information should be released to n ational parliaments and when. The issue of 
information provision was key, as national parliaments were unable to debate national 
strategies early enough in the process to influence the final p ositions adopted in the 
Council. The absence of a transparent decision-making process also hampered efforts of 
parliaments to follow the Third Pillar’s activities, as issues were passed up and down 
the five decision-making tiers (decision-preparation, deliberation, decision-taking, i m-
plementation, and control), with little rhyme or reason. Many national parliaments 
found themselves informed as late as necessary rather than as early as possible.
1  
However, the case of France shows that at least the scope of information forwarded to 
national parliaments can be extended if the latter claim a specific interest.
2 In order to 
enlarge the scope of information, both houses of the French Parliament modified Article 
‘6bis de l’ordonnance du 17 novembre 1958’ by the law of 10 juin 1994 which changed 
the name of the ‘délegations de l’Assemblée nationale et du Sénat pour les Communau-
tés européennes’ into ‘délégations pour l’Union e uropéenne’. Concomitantly they asked 
the Government to obtain all legislative acts of the European Union established on the 
basis of Title V (CFSP) and VI  (CJHA) of the Maastricht Treaty. In reaction the then 
                                                 
1   Including France, Italy, Spain and the UK. In Denmark, the general mandating procedure applies to 
the Third Pillar. The Dutch Parliament had to agree to provisions before the Government agreed in 
the Council. Similarly, the German Bundestag and Bundesrat had to formulate an opinion before the 
Government could agree to anything in the Council. 
2   See the contribution by Andrea Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg in this volume.  
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Prime Minister Juppé agreed to transmit to Parliament all draft acts relevant to Title VI 
provided they contain measures of ‘legislative nature’.
1  
Other governments reserved the right to withhold confidential and sensitive documents, 
although there was no formal common agreement of what this constituted. National 
parliaments should not however escape criticism entirely. Many parliaments initially 
suffered from the effects of internal rivalries between f oreign a ffairs, EU and internal 
affairs committees. The struggle to assert primacy over the Justice and Home affairs 
sector in the domestic arena has detracted attention away from the issues at hand. In 
addition many continued to lack the necessary time, resources and expertise to deal with 
the issues they are faced with. Ironically in the case of the UK it is the entirely undemo-
cratically ‘elected’ House of Lords that has made the most impact in this area, produc-
ing a series of well-documented reports on the development of the Third Pillar.
2 
An additional problem for the exercise of democracy in the Justice and Home affairs co-
operation was caused by the ambiguity surrounding the legal bases of the Third Pillar’s 
instruments. As with many of the other problematic elements of the Third Pillar, which 
eluded agreement during the Maastricht IGC, the period of implementation that fol-
lowed showed little evidence of agreement being reached among Member States. The 
knowledge that a further  - Amsterdam  - IGC was rapidly approaching ensured that any 
potentially precedent setting activities were rigorously avoided and Member States fol-
lowed the most uncontroversial path possible. Finally, it should be noted that the busi-
ness of the Third Pillar was conducted almost entirely behind closed doors with negotia-
tions and voting records kept s ecret. Documentation was rarely made available to the 
public and/or interest groups (unless leaked) and requesting documents from the Coun-
cil Secretariat proved a cumbersome process.  
The  supply with information about intergovermental policy-making in the second and 
third pillars of the EU is much more comprehensive in Denmark,
3 Germany,
4 Finland,
5 
the Netherlands
6 and Austria
7. In Denmark, parliamentary scrutiny over the second and 
the third pillars is similar to the examination of European Community draft law. In 
Germany, both chambers are kept informed on the Commission’s and the Member 
States’ proposals for Council decisions. As regards the cases of Austria, Finland and the 
Netherlands, the lower houses are kept informed comprehensively on draft acts, minutes 
and the Government’s stance in both the EC and the two intergovernmental pillars.  
 
                                                 
1   See Maurer, 2001, op.cit., pp. 252-269. 
2   See the contribution by Caitriona Carter in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Finn Laursen in this volume. 
4   See the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume. 
5   See the contribution by Tapio Raunio in this volume. 
6   See the contribution by Ben Hoetjes in this volume. 
7   See the contribution by Christine Neuhold and Barbara Bluemel in this volume.  
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2.4. Timing and Management: Key Instruments of National Players 
 
Parliamentary involvement in EU affairs is also a product of efficient procedures. Par-
liaments are confronted with the growing diversity of inter-institutional deliberation and 
decision-making processes at the Brussels/Strasbourg level of the Council and the EP. A 
closer look at the EC/EU treaties reveals a clear trend t owards procedural ambiguity 
over time.
1 Whereas the original treaties foresaw a restricted set of rules for each policy 
field, subsequent treaty amendments have led to a procedural differentiation with a vari-
ety of rule opportunities. As a result, the treaty provisions do not dictate a clear nomen-
clature of rules to be applied to specific sectors. Instead, since the SEA, member states 
and supranational institutions can, in an increasing number of policy fields, select 
whether a given piece of secondary legislation  - a regulation, a directive or another type 
of legal act  - should be decided by unanimity or qualified majority in the Council; a c-
cording to the consultation, co-operation or (after Maastricht) the co-decision proce-
dure; without any participation of the European Parliament or with or without consulta-
tion of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions or similar 
institutions. In other words, different procedural blueprints and inter-institutional codes 
compete for application and raise the potential for conflict between the actors involved.
2  
From a national government’s perspective, this growing variation of institutions and 
procedures means a mixed set of opportunity structures and “engrenage-like”
3 network-
ing systems for access and participation in the EC/EU policy cycle.
4 Assuming that the 
resulting bureaucracy
5 is not just an accidental product of personal mismanagement, 
national parliaments are confronted with an ever-growing realm of policy-making infra-
structures, which are less open to parliamentary oversight than bodies bringing together 
politicians. Unlike the component units of the Council (governmental administrations 
and services, and the Council Secretariat), national parliaments need  to employ a more 
limited set of resources according to the variety of institutional-procedural codes. 
                                                 
1   See Maurer/Wessels, 2001, op.cit. 
2   See for a detailed analysis: Maurer/Wessels, 2001, op.cit. 
3   See Sasse, Christoph/Poullet, Edouard/Coombes, David/Deprez, Gérard: Decision-Making in the 
European Community, New York/London, 1977 ; see also the contribution by Andreas Maurer in 
this volume. 
4   See van der Knaap, Peter: ‘Government by Committee: Legal Typology, Quantitative Assessment 
and Institutional Repercussions of Committees in the European Union’, in: Pedler, Robert/Schäfer, 
Günther (eds.): Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the 
Political Process, Maastricht 1996, pp. 83-116. The Council itself notes that some two thirds of its 
rolling agenda is closed by COREPER, out of which 70 % are agreed at the working groups level. 
See Rat der EG, Der Rat der EG, Luxembourg: Amt für amtliche Veröffentlichungen, 1990, p. 22; 
See also Wessels 2000, op.cit., pp. 228-229.  
5   See Peters, Guy: ‘Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community’, in: Sbra-
gia, Alberta (ed.): Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European Community 
Washington: 1992, pp. 75-122; Wessels, Wolfgang: The Growth and Differentiation of Multi-Level 
Networks: A Corporatist Mega-Bureaucracy or an Open City?, in: Wallace, Helen/Young, Alaisdair 
R. (eds.), Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford 1997, pp. 17-41.  
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Some member states facilitate the management of parliamentary EU business, b ecause 
the efficient sift of EC/EU draft legislation is in their own interest: Given that ministers 
are bound by decisions of their parliament in Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Ger-
many and Finland, the respective governments must forward the relevant documents 
within a certain period of time, which allows parliamentarians the  examination before 
the meeting of the Council of Ministers. As graph 7 clearly indicates, the parliaments in 
these countries receive relevant EC/EU information in sufficient time. 
 
Graph 7: Average Duration for the Transfer of EC/EU Documents 
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Source: Maurer 2001, p. 295. Note: Duration is the difference between the arrival of a document at the parliaments’ 
chancellery (or another comparable recipient) and the publication of this document by the relevant source (for COM 
documents the Commission, for Council documents the Council’s General Secretariat).  
  
Today, about half of the parliaments are able to run with their governments in EC/EU 
affairs. Theoretically, parliaments could manage the problem of timely i nformation by 
referring to the documentary bases, which are already open to each citizen in the Union. 
Today, Commission initiatives and EP draft reports are available the day after their 
adoption. However, parliaments claim to get relevant information o fficially, i.e. trans-
lated in their official language, stamped by their governmental service etc. In this r e-
gard, parliaments hamper themselves for, however, understandable reasons. Since they 
are constitutionally entitled to act on behalf of their electorates, in co-operation or vis-à-
vis a constitutionally delimited set of institutions, they hardly start to deliberate on i n-
formation that is not ‘officialised’ within their realm of competencies.   
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Graph 8: Frequency of EU Committee Meetings Per Year 
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Source: Maurer 2001, p. 296. 
 
The information in graph  8 recounts a dilemma of national parliaments in relation to 
EC/EU affairs: On the one hand, parliamentarians wish to get involved in the EU policy 
cycle. To facilitate the digestion of incoming draft acts, they have created specific bod-
ies, which are entitled to sift documents, to elaborate reports and to prepare resolutions 
for the plenary. The activity of EU Committees varies not only according to the amount 
of documents to be dealt with, but also depending on the general orientation of their 
work and the intra-parliamentary focus on committee and plenary meetings (Table 32).  
Hence, whereas EU Committees in Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ireland and the UK 
House of Commons deal with incoming EC/EU documentation as  the Committee-in-
charge of the whole scrutiny process, other EU Committees (D, NL, S, I) are simply 
regarded as the first  - sifting  - institution within parliament in order to facilitate the fur-
ther consideration of the relevant documents within specialised Standing Committees. 
EU Committees in these countries specialise themselves on some European issues like 
IGC’s, Enlargement and other  - horizontal  - themes of the EU’s long-term agenda, 
whereas the first group of EU Committees-in-charge need to digest each incoming EU 
dossier on behalf of their parliament. These EU Committees need much more time to 
deliberate EU issues. Necessarily, they meet more frequently than EU Committees of 
the second group (Table 32, Column/Variable (1)).  
The basic orientation of parliaments in EU affairs also differs with regard to the  - ide-
ally constructed  - nature of the scrutiny process (Table 3 2, Variable (2)). Hence, the  
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parliaments of Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and France focus their EU-related activity on 
the formulation and issuing of voting instructions for their respective government mem-
bers in the Council of Ministers. These parliaments build on an ideal bipolar legislature-
government scenario. The other parliaments follow a more open and consensual (NL, D, 
SF), or supportive (IR, I, B, LUX, P, E, GR) a pproach vis-à-vis their governments. 
Their main rationale is to ensure that interested parliamentarians can track the EU pol-
icy cycles according to the constitutional rules.  
Finally, the consideration of the different steps in the EU policy cycle also generates 
different time constraints for parliamentarians and their EU Committees (Table 3 2, 
Variable (3)). If parliaments anticipate EC/EU legislation, their scrutiny process starts 
earlier and the involved committees meet more frequently. If parliaments adopt a more 
reactive stand by focusing on already adopted EU legislation, their timing and manage-
ment of EU scrutiny processes is less intensive and frequent. 
 
Table 32: Basic Orientation of Parliamentary Scrutiny EC/EU affairs 
 (2) Nature of Scrutiny processes  (3) Consideration of phases in EU 
policy cycles 
 
 
(1) 
 
Parliament’s 
Working style 
Orientation t o-
wards supportive 
Scrutiny  
 
 
 
 
Orientation 
towards for-
mulating 
and/or voting 
instructions  
Anticipative, ex-
ante examination of 
EC/EU draft 
legislation 
  Reactive, ex-post 
consideration of 
EC/EU legislation 
Main Focus on 
EU Committee   
SF, IR 
 
DK, A  
 
DK, SF, A, 
UK 
 
IR 
 
Strong involve-
ment of Special-
ised Standing 
Committees 
D, NL, SF, I  
 
F,  
UK 
  S  D, F, NL, S    I 
Focus on Plenary 
sessions 
B, GR, LUX, 
P, E      B, LUX   P, E  GR 
Authors’ own classification. Sources: Country studies in this volume; Maurer 2001, p. 353; Raunio/Wiberg 1999.  
 
If we only consider the time-frame from 1994 to 1998, the Belgian Parliament dealt 
with 136 selected ‘summaries of the Secretariat for EU affairs’,
1 the Finish Eduskunta 
with 678 so-called ‘U’- and ‘E’-matters,
2 the German Bundestag with 2387 ‘EU docu-
ments’,
3 the UK House of Commons with 2635 ‘scrutiny events’,
1 the Swedish Parlia-
                                                 
1   Answer to the questionnaire of Andreas Maurer and Astrid Krekelberg by Hugo D’Hollander, Secre-
tary of the Advisory Committee on European Affairs in the Belgian House of Representatives, Brus-
sels 29 June 2000. 
2   See the contribution by Tapio Raunio in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume.  
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ment with 3563,
2 the French Parliament with 10.415,
3 and the Austrian Nationalrat with 
93.926 EC/EU documents.
4 The difference of submitted EC/EU documents is due to the 
variety of selection criteria.  
The productivity of EU Committees also varies according to the different orientations of 
their scrutiny mechanisms. To illustrate: The Belgian EU Committee i ssued only 22 
reports from 1993-1997.
5 The Spanish Parliament’s Plenary adopted 44 resolutions, the 
Parliament’s EU Committee 32 resolutions and 2 reports (1993-2000).
6 The French 
National Assembly issued 83 and the French Senate 47 resolutions (1994-1998).
7 The 
German Bundestag selected 981 out of 2387 i ncoming documents as ‘printed EU items’ 
(1994-1998). Of these, only 111 were subject to a recommendation for a plenary deci-
sion.
8 In contrast, the Finish Parliament’s Standing Committees issued 620 opinions 
(1995-1998).
9 As regards the Main Committee of the Austrian N ationalrat, 18 binding 
instructions were passed during the XIX. legislative period (1995-1/1996), and 13 dur-
ing the XX. (1/1996-10/1999). In addition, the Standing Sub-Committee on European 
Affairs passed two opinions until June 2001.
10  
Given the self-made multitude of  portfolios, EU Committees face the problem of r e-
maining locked in the national organisation of parliamentary business. The ‘one-level-
only’-problem becomes visible in the fact that the handling of EU a ffairs does certainly 
not influence the rolling agenda  of national parliaments. Compared to the governments’ 
ministerial administrations, parliamentarians need to allot their c apacities for several 
agendas. Members of EU committees get not re-elected by f ocusing their campaign 
towards the handling of EU affairs. In addition  - and partly of the same reason  -, the 
parliaments’ agendas remain oriented towards national debates. With few exceptions
11, 
the EU committees stay ‘outsiders’ in their parliaments, perceived as ‘EU-ised Trojan 
horses’, which challenge the competencies and  - more important  - the reputation of 
other committees.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
1   See: House of Commons: 27th Report on the Scrutiny of European Business, 18 July 1996, pp. 18, 
21, and 24; and: Cygan, Adam: The United Kingdom Parliament and EU Legislation, The H a-
gue/London 1998, pp. 79-81. 
2   See the contribution by Hans Hegeland in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Andrea Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg in this volume. 
4   See the contribution by Christine Neuhold and Barbara Bluemel in this volume. 
5   See the contribution by Claire Vandevivere in this volume. 
6   See the contribution by Felibe Basabe and Maria Teresa González Escudero in this volume. 
7   See the contribution by Andreas Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg in this volume. 
8   See the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume. 
9   See the contribution by Tapio Raunio in this volume. 
10   See the contribution by Christine Neuhold and Barbara Bluemel in this volume. 
11   See the contributions by Finn Laursen on the Danish Parliament and by Tapio Raunio on the Finnish 
Parliament.  
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2.5. Influence and Impact: Parliaments as ‘Supportive Scrutinizers’  
 
The impact of parliamentary scrutiny differs between those parliaments which are l e-
gally able to mandate their government’s representative before a Council decision takes 
place (DK, D: Bundesrat, NL: Tweede Kamer for CJHA, A: Nationalrat, and SF) and 
parliaments which simply do not have any means for effectively influencing their gov-
ernment’s standpoint in the Council of Ministers (GR, I, IRL, P). Note in this context 
that the legal provisions might differ from the real patterns: Whereas the Danish, Fin-
nish and Dutch parliamentarians use the practice of formulating mandates for, or of 
assenting draft mandates of their governments, their counterparts in Germany and Aus-
tria use this possibility less frequently.  
The other ‘northern European’ parliaments are able to express their views on a certain 
proposal (F, LUX, B, E, UK), but their governments decide whether to integrate them or 
not.  
Since Maastricht, we can observe a tendency of some parliaments to contribute to their 
governments’ position in the Council by imposing the so-called parliamentary scrutiny 
reserve. However, whereas these scrutiny reserve mechanisms apply to all three pillars 
in Denmark, Austria, France and the United Kingdom, it only applies to the third pillar 
in the Netherlands.  
Parliamentary scrutiny reserves are an ambiguous instrument for influencing govern-
ments. Provided a government is politically dependent on the day-to-day acceptance of 
parliament, scrutiny reserve mechanisms might help to render the Government ‘online’ 
with its parliamentarians. However, Montesquieu’s repartition of powers remains a 
model and apart from Denmark, governments are not juxtaposed to their parliament. In 
this regard, it is worthy to note that scrutiny reserves may be instrumentalised by gov-
ernments in order to scapegoat their veto in the Council of Ministers. As a civil servant 
of the House of Commons holds: “From a tactical viewpoint, it can be useful to Minis-
ters to be able to go into Council in the knowledge that Parliament has approved the 
stance they wish to take - or even to be able to say, ‘Parliament would not tolerate my 
agreeing to this’.”
1 Moreover, parliamentary scrutiny reserves are formulated as a d e-
mand and not as a legally binding ‘ruling’. Such a demand “is not a mandate. If the 
Government agrees, the resolution may be a trump for it in European negotiations. If it 
disagrees, the Government is not bound by the resolution”.
2 Thus, the scrutiny reserve 
facilitates parliaments to strengthen their potential for worst-case-situations. But the 
                                                 
1   Flood, Elizabeth: ‘Interaction between the Government and Parliament in the Scrutiny of EU Deci-
sion-Making’, in: Finnish Parliament/COSAC Presidency (ed.): National Parliaments and the EU: 
Stock-taking for the post-Amsterdam era, Eduskunnan Kanslian Julkaisu, No. 1/2000, p. 63. 
2   Dubois, Louis: ‘The European Union: An Opportunity for the French Parliament to Recover Po-
wers?’, in: Smith, Eivind (ed.): National Parliaments as Cornerstones of European Integration, Den 
Haag/London 1996, p. 60.  
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logic behind the reserve mechanism is a parliament, which acts as a ‘supportive scruti-
nizer’
1 of and not - systematically - against its government.  
In the Netherlands, where consociotional policy-making delimits open confrontation 
between parliament and government
2, a special procedure for parliament’s participation 
in CJHA was established: Any draft decision falling w ithin the scope of Title VI TEU 
that is intended to bind the Netherlands is subject to the consent of the States-General. 
In practice, ministers for home and justice affairs send Parliament the annotated agendas 
together with the background documents. This agenda states which decisions are in the 
Government’s view binding the Netherlands and thus require the assent of Parliament. 
In conclusion then, Parliament’s approval right is dependent to Government’s power in 
the framework of agenda-setting on the third pillar. The Standing Committees on Justice 
and Home Affairs of the Dutch States-General may hold consultations on these subjects 
with the ministers before the Council meeting takes place, after which the Chambers 
may give a formal ruling in plenary sitting on draft decisions for which the assent of 
parliament is required. However, tacit consent is deemed to have been given in case the 
desire to give explicit approval has not been expressed by or in the name of one of the 
Chambers within 15 days of the draft being submitted to the States-General.
3  
A similar consent procedure applies in Austria, where the Government is bound by a 
decision of the Nationalrat, if the draft act to which the decision relates must be trans-
posed by means of a Federal law or it is designed to provide for the adoption of a di-
rectly applicable act concerning a matter which would otherwise have been regulated by 
a Federal law.
4  
In Germany, the Government is required to ‘base its position in the Council of Minis-
ters’ on a proposal of the Bundestag provided that the latter expressed its views. On the 
other hand, the Government’s position in the Council is not subject to the assent of the 
Bundestag. Yet assent is required in the Bundesrat, where Government under certain 
conditions is  legally bound by the decision of the chamber in cases where a proposal 
requires approval pursuant to domestic law or in instances where the Länder have juris-
diction.
5 Moreover, where exclusive competencies of the Länder are involved, Germany 
might be represented in the Council of Ministers by a minister of the Länder nominated 
by the Bundesrat. 
                                                 
1   See the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume. 
2   See the contribuion by Ben Hoetjes in this volume; and Lijphart, 1999, op.cit., pp. 248 and 255-256. 
3   See the contribution by Ben Hoetjes in this volume. 
4   See the contribution by Christine Neuhold and Barbara Bluemel in this volume. 
5   See Hrbek, Rudolf: ‘The Effects of EU Integration on German Federalism’, in: Jeffery, Charlie (ed.): 
Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of Unification, (London: Pinter, 1999), p. 218; Knodt, 
Michèle: ‘Auswärtiges Handeln der deutschen Länder’, in: Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter./Kaiser, Karl. 
(eds.): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band 4 - Institutionen und Ressourcen, München 1998, pp. 
153-166; Maurer 2001, pp. 314-325.  
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The protagonists of the role of the national parliaments invoke the diffusion of the so-
called ‘Danish model’ of parliament oversight. The Danish model consists in t he deci-
sive  - though not formal  - power of the European Affairs Committee of the Folketing. 
The Committee gives the Government a mandate before important decisions are taken 
by the Council of Ministers. The Danish model can be explained “by the presence of 
minority governments which has made it imperative to current governments to inform 
and to take the opinion of the committee into careful consideration”
1. Beside this factor, 
the small size and the mono-cameral nature of the Danish Parliament must be taken into 
consideration to u nderstand why this model works rather well despite the complex and 
cumbersome EU decision-making process which discourages any regular exercise of 
mandate control of the parliament on the national government. Finally, both the Danish 
party system and public opinion provide a sufficient ‘critical mass’ for the Government 
to respect the Folketing’s views. The Danish system of parliamentary control has made 
Denmark good at implementing EU legislation. And the mandate-giving part of the 
process assures that post-decision political problems can usually be avoided even under 
minority governments. But is it possible to export this ‘success story’ of parliamentary 
oversight into other national systems? Hence, the essential framing factor  - minority 
governments, EU-sceptical parties and, as a result the Folketing as a Parliament which 
can perform as ‘one’ actor with or against ‘the’ government - would be difficult to find 
in any other Member state.  
 
IV. Building Links to the EU Level: Catching Up with Multi-level Governance  
 
Since the beginning of the European construction national parliamentarians were o f-
fered opportunity structures to get access to the EC/EU institutions. The end of the 
‘delegated parliament’ in 1979  - the abolishment of a p ermanent structure of national 
MP’s placed between two legislatures - did not result in a direct adaptation of interpar-
liamentary contacts. Still after the Amsterdam Treaty, the overall record of their partici-
pation patterns within the Brussels/Strasbourg  arena is bleak. Though several and dif-
ferent procedures were tested over the last 40 years, none of them has led to a suffi-
ciently intensive and efficient working relationship. The 1990’s Conference of parlia-
ments (Assizes) in Rome remained a one event institution. Instead, the 1999 convention 
to draft the charter for fundamental rights was generally assessed as a more successful 
link between parliamentarians of several levels.
2 Other activities of national parliaments 
                                                 
1   Sidenius, Nils C./Einersen, Bjorn/Sorensen, Jens A.: ‘The European Affairs committee and Danish 
European Union Politics’, in: Wiberg, Matti, ( ed.): Trying to make democracy work. The Nordic 
parliaments and the European Union, Stockholm 1997, pp. 9-28, here p. 27. 
2   See Stechele, Cornelia: Der Konvent zur Erarbeitung der EU-Charta der Grundrechte: Modell eines 
deliberativen Supranationalismus?,  Diploma Thesis, Cologne 2001; Pernice, Ingolf: ‘Europäische 
Grundrechte-Charta und Konventsverfahren: Zehn Thesen zum Prozess der europäischen Verfassung 
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and the European Parliament - like COSAC, the regular meetings of their Speakers and 
joint sessions of specialised committees - seem to attract greater interest.
1  
 
1. The Consequences of 1979 and the Abolition of Dual Mandates 
 
With the original ECSC and EEC treaties the Members of the EP occupied a seat in 
their national parliaments and  - at least to the extent that re-election was a matter of 
national performance  - a national orientation. The voices of engaged MEP were how-
ever not heard in the national politics. The implied assumptions of linking both arenas 
by a dual mandate however proved to be difficult: With the i ncreased work of the EP 
the political attention had to be focused on one level only. Already the difficulties of 
presence in parliamentary sessions urge parliamentarians to make a choice for a national 
or a European career. Direct elections of the MEP from 1979 onwards manifested this 
level dilemma: Few MEP kept their national seat. Those members who had ambitions 
within their national parliaments and parties were rather absent from Brussels and 
Strasbourg. Most national careers were not made in the EP.
2 
 
2. The Presence at the National Level 
  
The ‘one-level-only’ activity of MEP’s is documented in the weak presence in those 
committees of national parliaments which are specialised on EU affairs.
3 Since 1979, 
parliaments began to open up their committees by integrating MEP’s into EC/EU-
related activities (see box 2). This process was strengthened by the more recent - post-
Maastricht  - set up of ‘liaison officers’ within the European Parliament (Italian Cham-
ber, French Senate, Danish Folketing, Finnish Eduskunta, Swedish Riksdagen, UK 
House of Commons).  
Thus, most of the parliaments developed some institutional devices in order to perform 
as multi-level players between their countries and the EU institutions, although the Ital-
ian perception is still valid for most legislatures: “Really effective contacts between 
parliamentary groups at the two levels have not yet been established. In the administra-
                                                                                                                                               
nach Nizza’, in: Integration, No. 2/2001, pp.194-198. Däubler-Gmelin, Herta: ‘Eine europäische 
Charta der Grundrechte-Beitrag zur gemeinsamen Identität’, in: Europäische Zeitung für Wirtschaft-
srecht, No. 1/2000. 
1   See European Parliament/Andreas Maurer: Perspectives for co-operation between the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments, Working document: Political Series W -19, Brus-
sels/Luxembourg 1996, pp. 37-67. 
2   See the recent findings by Stolz, Klaus: Parliamentary Careers in Europe. Between the Regional, 
National and Supranational Level, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 
April 2001, Grenoble, Workshop No. 17: Political Careers in a Multi-Level Europe, pp. 22-25; See 
also Scarrow, Susan: ‘Political Career Paths and the European Parliament’, in: Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, No. 2/1997, pp. 253-263. 
3   See e.g. the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume.  
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tive bodies of the national parties t here is usually someone responsible for relationship 
with the federations and European political unions, so that the political circuit is closed: 
European groups-national parties-national parliamentary groups”.
1 
    Box 2: Participation of MEP’s in National Parliaments’ Meetings 
Specific cases of de-facto ‘Joint MP/MEP Committees’ 
 
1.  The EU Committee of the Belgian Parliament is composed by 10 members of the Chamber of 
Representatives, 10 Senators and 10 Belgian MEP’s. The latter’s’ rights and obligations do not 
differ from the MP’s ones. 
2.  The EU Committee of the Greek Parliament is composed by 16 MP’s and 15 Greek MEP’s. The 
latter’s’ rights and obligations do not differ from the MP’s ones.  
3.  The EU Committee of the German Bundestag is composed by 36 MP’s and 14 German MEP’s. 
The latter’s’ have a right to speak, but not to vote. 
Participation of MEP’s 
4.  ossibility to attend EU Committee meetings for all MEP’s from the respective member state: 
-  With a right to speak and consultative voting rights: 
Assemblée nationale (F) 
Sénat (F) 
-  With a right to speak: 
Chambre des Députés (LUX) 
Bundesrat (D) 
Senado (E) 
Camera del Deputati (I) 
Senato della Repubblica (I) 
Eerste Kamer (NL) 
Tweede Kamer (NL) 
Nationalrat (A) 
Bundesrat (A) 
5.  Possibility for all MEP’s having a double mandate in the EP and their respective member state 
Folketing (DK)  
Dail Eireann (IR) 
Seannad Eireann (IR) 
House of Commons (UK) 
House of Lords (UK) 
6.  No regular participation of MEP’s  
Eduskunta (SF) 
Riksdagen (S) 
Assembleia da Republica (P) 
Source: Maurer 2001, p. 281. 
 
As the country reports on Denmark
2, Belgium
3 and France
4 note, the offer to participate 
in the work of national parliaments is used to a growing extent. Also within the bodies 
of European parties, parliamentarians of both levels have not evolved at any set of regu-
                                                 
1   See the contribution by Federiga Bindi and Stefano Grassi in this volume; and Guizzi, Vincenzo: 
‘Italy’, in: Morgan, Roger, Tame, Clare, (eds.): Parliament and Parties. The European Parliament in 
the Political Life of Europe, New York 1996, p. 135 and p.141. 
2   See the contribution by Finn Laursen in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Clair Vandevivere in this volume. 
4   See the contribution by Andrea Szukala and Olivier Rozenberg in this volume.  
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lar interactions. Yet the Finnish
1, Dutch
2 and Swedish
3 case studies observe a growing 
recognition of intra-party links in order to facilitate informal contacts between members 
of both sides of parliament.  
 
4. First Attempts at the Interparliamentary Level: The Conference of Speakers of Par-
liaments 
 
The Conference of Speakers of Parliaments of the European Union is due to an initia-
tive by Gaetano Martino, a former President of the European Parliament. The first con-
ference took place in January 1963. It was to be 1975, however, before arrangements 
could be made for these meetings to be held at regular (two-year) intervals.
4 Formally, 
the conference may adopt resolutions. This has hitherto been done by consensus through 
the publication of a final communiqué at the end of the conference.
5 The regularisation 
of these contacts resulted from the anticipated consequences of the first direct elections 
to the European Parliament and the separation of parliamentary mandates that became 
necessary in some member states. The discussion of initiatives to maintain the indirect 
and visible involvement of national parliamentarians in EC policy cycles began at a 
rather early stage. The Spenale report
6 submitted to the conference held in  Rome in 
1975 proposed the establishment of an interparliamentary secretariat located in Luxem-
bourg. It also called for the formation of interparliamentary bodies at the level of the 
parliamentary committees and parliamentary groups. To arrange these contacts and e n-
sure their continuity, it was proposed that a joint committee for relations with the n a-
tional parliaments should be set up in the European Parliament.
7  
The Conference of Speakers faces a problem of representativity. The presidents and 
speakers of the parliaments of Spain, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden and the Lower House in the Netherlands are not entitled to speak or to take 
decisions on behalf of their parliaments at interparliamentary meetings. However, the 
other parliamentary presidents (B, F, GR, I, LUX, P, A, D) are only allowed to take part 
in votes that have no direct organizational or political implications for the parliament 
they represent. The Conference of Speakers undoubtedly suffers through having very 
                                                 
1   See the contribution by Tapio Raunio in this volume. 
2   See the contribution by Ben Hoetjes in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Hans Hegeland in this volume. 
4  Agence Europe, No 1830, 2 October 1975; Thöne-Wille, Eva-Maria: Die Parlamente der EG  - Das 
Europäische Parlament und die nationalen Parlamente, Kehl am Rhein 1984, p. 184; Bieber, Roland: 
Organe der erweiterten Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Das Parlament, Baden-Baden 1974, p. 209. 
5  See Pöhle, Klaus: ‘Parlamente in der EG  - Formen der praktischen Beteiligung’, in: Integration, No. 
2/1992, pp. 73-76. 
6  See Europäisches Parlament: Bericht Spènale zur Konferenz der Präsidenten der europäischen Par-
lamentarischen Versammlungen vom 26.-27. September 1975 in Rom über die Beziehungen zwis-
chen dem Europäischen Parlement und den nationalen Parlamenten, DOC PE 42.070 Bur. 
7  Ibid., p. 13.  
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limited powers in substantive and political questions. Those presidents and speakers 
who attach considerable importance to interparliamentary work are hampered in the 
pursuit of this interest by their other responsibilities. The Conference is hardly a suitable 
vehicle for the efficient assertion of the joint interests of national parliaments and the 
European Parliament. 
 
5. The Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC) 
 
Also COSAC as the only interparliamentary body mentioned in the Amsterdam treaty’s 
Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU (PNP) has not developed into a 
real institution for ‘multi-level-scrutiny’.
1 Since the first COSAC was held in 1989, the 
meetings have been timed to coincide with those of the European Council. The empha-
sis of COSAC concentrated on general political topics and some kind of an introspec-
tion with regard to the roles of national parliaments in the EC/EU system. COSAC con-
tinues to face major problems with the exchange of practical information on specific 
policy areas in addition to discussing general i ssues for three reasons: First the MP are 
members of the ‘horizontal’ EC/EU affairs committees, i.e. committees that consider 
general policy matters. Secondly, the EC/EU affairs committees differ significantly as 
regards their importance and function in the overall work process in the various parlia-
ments, as do their powers compared with those of the specialized committees. Finally, 
the composition of COSAC is not representative; COSAC delegates do not systemati-
cally speak in the name of their parliaments.
2 As the European Parliament sees it, a cau-
tious attitude still needs to be taken towards the substantive form of COSAC. It should 
be emphasized in this context that since 1991 the European Parliament’s participation in 
the preparation and holding of COSAC meetings has extended beyond the i nvolvement 
of its Committee on Institutional Affairs (since 1999 the Committee for Constitutional 
Affairs). Since the 1994 elections its delegation has usually consisted of the t wo Vice-
Presidents responsible for relations with the national parliaments, interested members of 
the specialized committees and further members of the Committee on Institutional A f-
fairs. The composition of the EP delegation also makes it clear that it is in the EP’s i n-
terests to discuss matters which relate more to specific policy issues and therefore fall 
within the terms of reference of specialized committees rather than general issues.  
                                                 
1   On the evolution of COSAC, see the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume. See also Euro-
pean Parliament/Andreas Maurer: Perspectives for co-operation between the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments, Working document: Political Series W-19, Brussels/Luxembourg 1996, 
and Maurer 2001, op.cit., pp. 276-290. 
2   See Laprat, Gérard: ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Community Legislation: An Evolving Idea’, in: 
Laursen, Finn/Pappas, Spyros A., (eds.): The Changing Role of Parliaments in the European Union, 
Maastricht 1995, pp. 1-19; Maurer, Andreas: Les implications du Traité de Maastricht sur la coopé-
ration interparlementaire  - le cas du Parlement européen et du Parlement français, Brussels 1996; 
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Yet, COSAC performs as a ‚central’ tool for communicating institutional issues in rela-
tion to the EU. But if we turn to the daily EC/EU business of national parliaments and 
the EP, i.e. the control of or the participation in policy-making, the two COSAC ses-
sions per year do not really affect the day-to-day work of national parliaments nor that 
of the EP.
1 Instead, “COSAC is seen as a channel for keeping […] parliamentarians 
informed about Europe.“
2 The COSAC meetings provide an arena for Members of EU 
Affairs Committees in national Parliaments and MEP’s to discuss general  developments 
of the Union. Due to the regularity of the COSAC meetings, the involved MP’s develop 
a personal network, which also involves the applicant countries. The size of the delega-
tions at COSAC (Six MP’s per national parliament and Six MEP’s) ensures that differ-
ent political views from each country are represented. However, the effects of COSAC 
meetings do not go beyond the core network of its constituent members. Yet, most of 
the national parliaments see the Amsterdam Treaty’s provisions on COSAC as a prag-
matic approach to an exchange of opinions and experience. COSAC facilitates informal 
exchange, but the overall majority of parliaments oppose any further institutionalisa-
tion.
3 
 
6. Joint and Bilateral Committee Meetings: Informal Tools for Playing the Multi-level 
Game 
  
The involvement of the national parliaments’ standing specialised committees repre-
sented another option for a more policy-oriented interparliamentary co-operation. 
Moreover, this kind of multi-level co-operation seemed to be conducive both to making 
EC/EU legislative processes more effective and to democratising the European Union 
while preserving and strengthening the European Parliament’s legislative powers. 
Hence, so-called joint committee meetings have attracted much more interest i n both the 
national parliaments and the EP. To i ncrease the effectiveness of all legislative activities 
and make them a parliamentary responsibility, the EP took numerous initiatives in the 
context of the establishment and implementation of the EU’s annual legislative pro-
gramme. In 1991, a special division for relations with the parliaments of the member 
states was established within the EP’s Directorate General for committees and delega-
tions. Besides assisting the MEP in C OSAC meetings, this division started to co-
ordinate joint committee meetings, bilateral meetings between corresponding commit-
tees of the EP and national parliaments, and meetings of Rapporteurs and higher civil 
servants.  
                                                                                                                                               
Delmas-Derroze, Sabine: ‘Le traité d’Amsterdam et le déficit démocratique de l’Union européenne’, 
in: Revue du Marché Unique européen, No. 4/1999, pp. 143-182. 
1   See Maurer, 2001, op.cit, pp. 276-291. 
2   See the contribution by Brigid Laffan in this volume. 
3   See the contribution by Sven Hölscheidt in this volume.  
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The quality of joint committee and bilateral meetings differs in several respects: At joint 
committee meetings national parliamentarians receive information not only on the posi-
tion of the European Parliament’s committee on the items concerned (as a rule, an as-
pect of current or foreseeable legislation is discussed) but also on the position of other 
national parliamentary committees and, where appropriate, the views of the Member 
States’ governments. Since 1991, European Parliament rapporteurs have been appointed 
to prepare these meetings. They send to the national parliamentary committees ques-
tionnaires on specific areas of policy to help them with the drafting of their reports and 
gear the agenda of joint committee meetings to the lists of questions. Since 1992, joint 
committee meetings have often been seen as an opportunity for determining the Euro-
pean Parliament’s position during the Community’s legislative procedures in the light of 
national parliamentarians’ reactions on relevant draft proposals. They thus implicitly 
help to fulfil the European Parliament’s efficiency c riterion in that rapporteurs are i n-
formed of possible and foreseeable problems with the implementation of planned 
Community legal acts and are able to take them into account when drafting their pro-
posed amendments. Conversely, national parliamentarians receive background informa-
tion on the possible negotiating strategies and positions of the Member States’ govern-
ments and parliaments in specific areas of Community legislation. Also since 1992 
members of the European Commission started to attend joint committee meetings.
1 
Both joint committee and bilateral meetings promote the programming and systematisa-
tion of interparliamentary contacts. Ideally, joint committee meetings are held to discuss 
specific issues emerging from the EU’s legislative programme. They  precede bilateral 
meetings with the committees of national parliaments which intend to express national 
concerns about specific draft legislation. In certain cases (F, UK) such systematisation 
is optimised by the organization of meetings between corresponding rapporteurs or 
committee chairs (DK, SF). A systematized co-operation between rapporteurs is impos-
sible, however, since the institution of Rapporteurs is unknown in the vast majority of 
the national parliaments. 
 
                                                 
1  A high point in this respect was the joint meeting of the committees for economic and monetary 
affairs and industrial policy that was held on 25 and 26 January 1995, when the then Commissioners 
Kinnock, Bangemann, Papoutsis and Monti made introductory statements on the various items on 
the agenda and joined in the ensuing discussion. See European Parliament: Meeting between the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committees of the national parliaments and the European Parlia-
ment, 25 and 26 January 1995, Programme, PE 211.143/fin.; European Parliament: Info-Memo, No 
13, 26 January 1995 and Info-Memo, No 15, 27 January 1995.  
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Graph 9: Repartition of Joint Committee Meetings 1987-1998 
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  Source: Maurer, 2001, p. 289. 
 
Compared with COSAC and the Conference of Speakers, these types of informal co-
operation are geared to specific areas of public policies rather than i nstitutional ques-
tions. As graph 9  indicates, 59% of the joint committee meetings are organised by six 
EP Committees. Apart from the Committee on Civil Rights, this kind of interparliamen-
tary co-operation is mainly covered by committees dealing with socio-economic and 
monetary issues.  
Joint committee meetings certainly represent a more practical implementation strategy 
for reducing the democratic deficit and making Community legislation more effective, a 
task which cannot be performed by COSAC or the Conference of Speakers because of 
their participant structures. Compared with COSAC and the Conference of Speakers, 
informal Co-operation is more closely geared to the preparation and implementation of 
the legislative programme. Joint committee meetings are g eared to issues of Community 
rather than national interest b ecause of their participant structure and the matters they 
consider.   
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Table 33: Bilateral meetings between corresponding committees of the EP and national parlia-
ments 1987-1998 
 
Years 
B  DK  D  GR  E  F  IR  I  LUX  NL  A  P  SF  S  UK 
1987  0  0  1  0  2  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1988  0  0  3  1  2  2  0  1  0  0  0  3  0  0  1 
1989  0  1  0  0  3  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1990  0  1  2  0  0  1  3  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
1991  0  1  1  0  0  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1992  0  0  3  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1993  0  1  2  0  0  8  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3 
1994  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  2 
1995  1  3  4  1  2  6  1  1  0  2  0  1  8  3  6 
1996  1  0  0  0  0  6  1  4  0  1  0  0  4  8  7 
1997  0  2  3  1  1  6  0  0  0  0  2  0  1  1  2 
1998  1  2  3  0  0  9  1  2  0  0  1  2  4  3  3 
Sum   3  11  22  3  10  50  7  10  0  4  4  7  17  15  25 
Source: Maurer, 2001, p. 290, based on the internal data basis of the EP’s Division for relations with national parlia-
ments. 
 
Bilateral contacts between the European Parliament and the national parliaments and 
their committees tend to favour some national parliaments. As table 33 shows, meetings 
between the European Parliament’s committees and the national parliamentary commit-
tees of France (50), the United Kingdom (25), and Germany (22) accounted for the bulk 
- nearly 52% - of all bilateral meetings. This is not, however, due to the European Par-
liament’s preference for the committees of these parliaments since most bilateral meet-
ings are held on the initiative of the national parliaments.  
 
V. Conclusions: Beyond Slow Adaptation? 
 
1. On the Record: One-level Players? 
 
Over the evolution of the EU system in the last fifty years national parliaments have 
been slow and retarding adapters. Only during the 1990’s t hey increased their role on 
the national level and, to a limited extend, on the European  - European Parliament  - 
level, too. The country reports tested how far the opportunity structures offered to par-
liaments by national constitutions were really used. The overall majority of studies indi-
cate that the real patterns of access and influence were below the potential participation 
offered by the EU’s and the national ‘legal constitutions’
1. Only the Maastricht Treaty 
generated a revision of participation rights in the majority of parliaments. The Amster-
                                                 
1   See Olsen, 2000, op.cit and the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume.  
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dam Treaty and its Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
did not engender a similar effect.  
In sum, the Danish case remains a unique archetype of a parliament, which is apt to 
formulate its own political assumptions about the daily EU business effectively. The 
parliaments of Finland, Austria and Sweden followed this line, although their scrutiny 
systems are less binding for their governments. As to the scheme for measuring parlia-
mentary participation in EC/EU affairs (see  Table 34), these parliaments certainly fulfil 
the criteria of strong policy-making, and thus ‘national players’. Their performance is 
based on a certain veto power, the possibility of making modifications and of steering 
compromises in the course of the national policy process.  
 
Table 34: The Scheme for Measuring Parliamentary Participation in EC/EU Affairs 
Scrutiny Variables 
Scope  Timing and Man-
agement 
Impact 
 
 
Raw Categories of Parliaments 
 
Weak parliaments  Rather low  Reactive and Acci-
dental  None 
Modest p olicy influencing par-
liaments able to modify or to 
reject government proposals 
Low – High  Reactive but For-
malised  Low 
Strong policy-making parlia-
ments able to substitute govern-
ment proposals 
High 
Anticipative, Proac-
tive and Institution-
alised 
High 
 
 
The E C/EU-related policy-making strength of the parliaments of Germany and the 
Netherlands is similar to the first group. However, the consensual policy-making style 
and the  - still existing  - pro-European consensus among the political parties in these 
countries prevents parliamentarians from a systematic confrontation with their govern-
ments. They thus perform as potential or latent ‘national players’. The French and the 
UK Parliament are both cases of modest policy-making legislatures, who wish to act the 
games of the ‘national players’. Both parliaments are able to comment on incoming 
EC/EU information and to voice their opinions by reports, resolutions and the so-called 
parliamentary scrutiny reserves. But they are not able to effectively change a govern-
mental draft reaction to EC/EU input. The r emaining parliaments (IR, B, LUX, I, E, P, 
GR) should be categorised as ‘slow adapting’ parliaments, which are not willing or able 
to affect their government’s stance in EU negotiations. If we turn our view to the real 
performance of parliaments in interparliamentary co-operation, we can identify an 
emerging group of multi-level players in the Nordic countries as well as in Germany, 
the UK and France. Parliamentarians of these countries use the informal networking  
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arenas for joint consultation through committees, committee chairs, parliamentary staff 
and, to a limited extent, through rapporteurs. 
 
Figure 11: ‘Real’ Types for Actors in the EU’s Two-Level Game 
  Participation in the National Arena 
                Strong          ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿            Weak 
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In some limited cases, the role of the ‘national players’ was strengthened to a certain 
degree. At the same time the EP developed into a more efficient European player - with 
a strong trend to become a ‘real’ second chamber in the EU’s institutional set-up. 
This record also highlights that the majority of MP’s have not become strong multi-
level players. In comparison with national governments and administrations, with i n-
termediary bodies as lobbies and NGO’s parliamentarians are less competitive espe-
cially in cases where the participation in the EC/EU policy cycle on both levels is of a 
major importance. In this sense the national parliaments of the last two categories are 
still ‘losers’ in the evolution of the EU system. Their late e fforts of the 1990’s did not 
lead to a fundamental upgrade of their relative role vis-à-vis their governments. 
 
2. Explanations on the Negative Balance Sheet: A Misguided Role Attribution? 
 
If we take our original paradox regarding on  the one hand the self-made losses of par-
liaments and the demands for parliamentary involvement on the other, the record of the 
slow adapters and reluctant multi-level players needs further explanation. We suggest to 
start from the role attribution normally given to national parliaments as major  actors.
1 
The demand for participation of  the  parliament as such does presuppose that parlia-
                                                 
1   See the contribution by Andreas Maurer in this volume.  
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ments are more than an arena but an autonomous institution in its own right. If we how-
ever accept that within the EU parliamentary democracies most national legislatures are 
clearly divided into factions of majority and opposition, the dominating cleavage b e-
tween a pro-government group and anti-government one is also determining the behav-
iour towards EU issues.
1 Thus the parliamentary majority feels represented by the Gov-
ernment of the day - and not by some few of its members in COSAC or even by some of 
their party members in the EP. Parliamentary scrutiny is then a matter of participation 
and getting or remaining involved without developing a systematic anti-governmental 
stance. Even more in consensual democracies opposition parties and their parliamentary 
groups might follow the Government’s politics as ‘supportive scrutinisers’.
2 This role 
applies both to the typical parliamentary systems in most of the EU countries as well as 
to the semi-presidential system of France. The ‘classic’ parliament-versus-government 
style of scrutiny applies only in the UK majoritarian system and the Danish parliamen-
tary system, which is stamped by minority governments.   
If we take the ‘real’ parliamentary evolution over the last two centuries serious, then the 
slow and weak adaptation of national parliaments in EC/EU affairs is not just the prod-
uct of benign neglect of governments or mismanagement o f the i nvolved MP’s, but the 
unavoidable consequence of the fundamental trends in our parliamentary systems. This 
set of arguments differs from the original doctrine on the non-intervention of parlia-
ments in external affairs. It is not part of a state-centric view but follows the logic of 
party government. 
To turn the argument around - also in view of the concepts and post-Nice debates on the 
future of the Union: Given the increased importance of EC/EU affairs any stronger and 
direct participation of national parliaments on the EU level would affect the basic way 
national governments and parliaments function in general. A stronger  - more direct and 
less delegated  - involvement of parliaments would thus erode traditional patterns of 
policy-making in our polities - for better or for worse.  
Such a causal link between the virtues of the political system in general and EU activi-
ties in specific could be derived from the empirical studies in our work: The more a 
national system belongs to the category of a close u nity between majority party and 
government the less its parliament is directly and independently e ngaged both on the 
EU as on the national level. Our assessment that many parliaments are slow adapters or 
weak performers is thus a depending variable on the  roles which national systems i m-
plicitly attribute to their parliaments.  
On the other hand, the evolution of the parliamentary multi-level players seems to be a 
more dependent variable of government-parliament relationships. Hence, both the slow 
                                                 
1   See Lijphart, 1999, op.cit., pp. 62-89. 
2   See in this regard the analysis by Ben Hoetjes on the Dutch system and Sven Hölscheidt on the 
German system in this volume.  
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adapters a nd the national players invest time and personal into the different interparlia-
mentary co-operation regimes, which are offered and managed by the European Parlia-
ment. The difference here is the formality of these regimes. The French Parliament 
could be classified as  the protagonist for more institutionalised co-operation mecha-
nisms. The reason is to be found in the French political system and the rather weak role 
of parliament in both national and European policy-making. Playing the multi-level 
game from a  French parliamentary perspective is a compensation for missing links in 
the national system. A second fundamental reason is based on the EU’s own fusion dy-
namics: Institutional and procedural differentiation, the contineous trend of merging 
public policy i nstruments and actors at the European, national and sub-national levels of 
governance urges each actor to generate effective and efficient means for participation 
and influence. Unless national parliaments turn into efficient multi-level players they 
remain structurally handicapped to become competitive. Both factors  - the parliament-
government logics and the EU’s fusion dynamics
1  - create an antagonist environment 
for national parliaments and reinforce a significant tension between the aim to partici-
pate i n EU policy-making and the realities of the EU’s multi-level and multi-actor n a-
ture. 
 
3. Traps, Trends and Options for the Future 
 
The role of national parliaments in European integration has  - again  - become an issue 
for two reasons at least. The 2000 Nice European Council, in the Declaration No. 23 on 
the future of the Union annexed to the Treaty
2, stated that it was one of the four topics 
to be placed at the center of a rather vast and ambiguous debate, destined to result in a 
new Intergovernmental Conference being held in 2004. The European Council’s decla-
ration can be read in different ways: Hence it mirrors a set of views which were not 
clearly defined by the Heads of State and Government among themselves and which 
diverge as regards the institutional  architecture and overall development of the larger 
Union which is about to come into being.  
The declaration raises the general question how democratic the integration process is, 
and whether the European Union could be democratised by modified institutional and/or 
para-constitutional rules. It would be a mistake to imagine that the EU’s citizenry is not 
aware of the problem. The Irish ‘No’ to the Nice Treaty might have several reasons, 
which are not directly linked to ‘knowledge’ about and an objective ‘evaluation’ of the 
Treaty’s text. However, the reaction of the Irish citizens indicates the EU’s major prob-
lem of building legitimate links b etween the multi-level playing actors and the citizens. 
As the chairman of the EP’s Committee for Constitutional Affairs put it:  
                                                 
1   See chapter I of our contribution. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 3.  
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“The loss of consensus in public opinion and the growing disaffection, disappointment and 
distrust regarding the EU’s development can not be explained solely by the shortcomings 
or unconvincing actions of the Union in its tangible policies and its responses to major de-
mands and expectations as regards the life and future of citizens. The spread of such feel-
ings is also due to a sense of alienation, the serious difficulties encountered in understand-
ing and participating, a fear of helplessness in the face of imposed decisions which cannot 
be influenced or controlled.”
1  
Both the European and the national actors are therefore called to elaborate new or re-
newed options for organising the enlarged Union in a democratic, efficient and effective 
way.  
 
3.1. The Scope of Options 
 
The actual  - 2001 - post-Nice reflection on the role of national parliaments concentrates 
on two options: The creation of another parliamentary chamber at the EU level, and the 
organisation of interparliamentary exchanges at a  larger scale than the already existing 
regimes of COSAC and committee meetings.  
A ‘new’ European Parliament (Figure 12): The most spectacular proposal aims at the 
‘re-creation’ of a ‘European Parliament’ as a bicameral body  - one of which would be 
composed by elected national parliamentarians. The second chamber would then be 
composed either by directly-elected senators from the member states (US Senate 
model), or by delegated ‘senators-MEP’s’ from each member state with weighted vot-
ing rights (German Bundesrat model).
2  
                                                 
1   See: European Parliament/Committee on Constitutional Affairs: Working Document on Relations 
between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments in European Integration. Rapporteur: 
Giorgio Napolitano, Doc. No. DT/436579EN.doc, Brussels, 7 June 2001. 
2   See Joschka Fischer: ‘From Confederacy to Federation-Thoughts on the finality of European integra-
tion’, Speech held at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, German Foreign Ministry’s 
translation, p. 8. Similar ideas have been proposed by Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the UK, at his 
Polish Stock Exchange speech on 6 October 2000, pp. 9-10. Note that the ideas of Fischer were indi-
rectly opposed not only by the German SPD draft programme for the party’s National Conference in 
Nuremberg, 19-23 November 2001, See: Keynote proposal: Responsibility for Europe, Draft (Status 
30 April 2001). Hence, also the Foreign Minister’s own party, Greens/Bündnis 90, do not reflect his 
ideas. Instead the party’s draft programme puts forward the idea to simply replace the Council of 
Ministers by a second chamber of n ational parliamentarians. See: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen-
Grundsatzprogrammkommission: Grün 2020  - Entwurf für das Grundsatzprogramm von Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen, 16 July 2001, Chapter ‘Aufbruch nach Europa und in die Eine Welt’, pp. 66-67.   
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Figure 12: Model for a ‘New European Parliament’ 
 
The proposal of such a bi-cameral parliament is based on the conviction that this could 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union and respond to the concern among 
national parliaments that their influence over the decision-making process at European 
level and developments in European integration is being further reduced. However, it 
should be noted that this concept would result in a new Brussels-based institution not 
directly and uniformly elected by the citizens (like the actual EP), and not indirectly 
elected (like the Council). The actual legitimacy of the directly elected European Par-
liament would be replaced by a body, whose legitimacy would be rooted in a purely 
national oriented selection procedure, where the electorate should choose candidates on 
an entirely national dimension. Moreover, it is not clear whether the first and the second 
chambers’ powers would cover only (a.) legislative or constitutive consultation, or (b.) 
legislative deliberation and co-decision, or (c.) only scrutiny. Should both chambers 
share the same rights, or should one chamber get a more ‘important’ design than its 
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matching body?
1 If the powers of the two chambers were restricted to scrutiny, they 
would eventually withdraw those existing rights and powers of the national parliaments 
vis-à-vis the respective governments. If they would receive powers of legislative co-
decision, they would either overlap in a confusing way with  those assigned to the exist-
ing European Parliament or  - if the EP would wither away and be r eplaced by a new 
‘first chamber’ of national double mandate holders  - with those of the second cham-
ber/Senate. Even if the competences of this Senate were confined  to the second and 
third pillars, the institutional architecture of Europe would be further complicated.
2 U l-
timately this would not be the answer to the frustrations and tensions currently felt by 
the national parliaments. 
A Permanent Conference of Parliaments (Figure 13): The suggestion to create a ‘per-
manent conference of parliaments or a congress’, which would meet periodically to 
monitor the respect of the principle of subsidiarity and to debate the ‘State of the Union’ 
each year, as well as exercising powers to ratify certain amendments to the Treaty,
3 also 
raises a number of questions which should be dealt with in greater depth.  
Hence, the proposal seems to be inspired by the 1990 ‘Assizes’ in Rome, where dele-
gates of both the EP and the national parliaments issued a resolution to the IGC that 
culminated in the Maastricht Treaty.
4  The final declaration adopted by 150 votes to 13 
(with 26 abstentions, including 18 French parliamentarians) recommended the holding 
of further conferences of the Rome-Assizes type whenever a debate to determine the 
line to be taken in essential parliamentary questions seemed necessary. The Rome A s-
sizes revealed that a minority of  - at that time French and Belgian  - national parliamen-
tarians differed from MEP’s and the majority of MP’s in that they wanted greater insti-
tutionalisation of parliamentary conferences. The French Senate in particular pressed for 
conferences in the form of Assizes to be held at regular, predetermined intervals.  
 
                                                 
1   See also the speech of Michel Barnier, Commissioner for Regional policy and Institutional reform, at 
the meeting of the European Parliament with members of the national parliaments, Brussels, 20 
March 2001: The Future of the Union and the National Parliaments of the Member States. 
2   See the speech of Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland, at the European University Institute, 
Florence, 9 April 2001: The Future of the European Union after Nice, Speech Text, p. 4. 
3   See the speech of Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister of the French Republic: On the Future of an Enlar-
ged Europe, Paris, 28 May 2001, Speech Text, p. 6. 
4  Parlement européen (27-30 novembre 1990)  
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Figure 13: Model for a Permanent Conference of Parliaments - Congres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The European Parliament and the vast majority of national parliaments rejected such 
institutionalised regularity on the following grounds: First, the EP’s experience before 
its members were directly elected had revealed the practical procedural and interinstitu-
tional limits to a parliamentary body composed of delegates who were involved in the 
work of at least two parliaments. Secondly, the EU a lready knows institutions which 
represent the interests of the member states (Council, European Council) and the r e-
gions (Committee of the Regions, and again the Council in the case of Belgium, Ger-
many and Austria) and whose members are accountable to the national and regional 
parliaments. Thirdly, t he EU's decision-making procedures would be complicated and 
made less transparent by the addition of other bodies whose members represented simi-
lar interests in more than one Community body. The rejection was also endorsed b e-
cause any institutionalised form of interparliamentary Assizes would delay institutional 
relations and procedures, increase their complexity and, possibly develop a momentum 
of their own, leading to conflicts between national and European parliamentarians to the 
benefit of the institutional position of the Commission and Council.
1 Looking ahead to 
the 1996/1997 Amsterdam IGC, some parliaments supported the revival of the A ssizes 
in the form of the conference held in 1990. On several occasions the then President of 
the EP, Klaus Hänsch, c alled on the national parliaments to prepare and hold further 
congresses according to the Rome exercise.
2 And like the actual 2001 proposal, the 
                                                 
1  Assemblée nationale, 4 octobre 1990, p. 27. 
2  See the inaugural address by the President of the European Parliament, Dr Klaus Hänsch, on 20 July 
1994. See also his statement at the meeting of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of 5/6 Septem-
ber 1994 and the speech of the former President of the European Parliament, Dr Egon Klepsch, to 
the European Council in Birmingham on 16 October 1992. 
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European Parliament suggested to convene congresses only when the subject matter to 
be discussed was clearly defined: Congresses focusing on specific subjects should take 
account of the role of joint committee meetings and not result in any duplication of de-
liberations; the specialised committees and the parliamentary bodies proposing meetings 
of another congress s hould therefore coordinate their activities and join in defining the 
subjects to be considered at these meetings. Practically, interparliamentary congresses 
could be organised when EC/EU legal acts require ratification and the approval by n a-
tional parliaments. Such kind of conferences could be held for the purposes of a larger 
parliamentary deliberation before the ratification procedures begin in the national par-
liaments and - if required by the Treaty - the European Parliament takes its decisions. 
 
3.2. Three Alternatives 
 
Most supporters of the idea of a ‘second chamber’ have backtracked, and now suggest 
that a new body should only have a limited role. Three options appear to be taking 
shape.  
A Chamber of Subsidiarity: The first is that a new joint body o f MEP’s and MP’s 
should be a “chamber of subsidiarity”
1 policing the borders of EU competence.
2 How-
ever, this option faces some serious difficulties:
3 If the parliamentarians were to exam-
ine Commission proposals to check that they were within the EU’s field of competence, 
leaving them then to the Council and Parliament to deal with according to normal pro-
cedures, this would be too soon in the procedure, as questions about ‘invasive legisla-
tion’ are usually about the final outcome of the legislation, rather  than the initial pro-
posal. Commission proposals get substantially amended by the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, so pronouncing on the ‘first draft’ is premature.
4 If the chamber is to 
intervene at the end of the procedure, it would be invited for a second guess to the posi-
tion adopted by the ministers in the Council, each of whom enjoys the confidence of a 
majority in his/her national Parliament. Either they will endorse their ministers’ actions, 
or there will be a European level repetition of national political conflicts. 
                                                 
1   See the speech of Tony Blair, 2000, op.cit., p. 10. 
2   The proposal to create a specific body for checking EC/EU legislation against the principle of subsi-
diarity dates back to a report by French Senator Michel Poniatowski on the principle of subsidiarity 
in 1992. See Rapport d’information no. 45 du 12 novembre 1992 sur le principe de la subsidiarité, 
par M. Michel Poniatowski, pp. 37-46. As to the recent, i.e. post-Amsterdam British proposals to 
create such a body, see ‘Cook on making Europe accountable to the people’, Interview by Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook, BBC Radio 4, London, Thursday, 13 August 1998. 
3   See Corbett, Richard: ‘An EU Senate is superfluous’, in: Centre for European Reform - Online, CER 
Bulletin, No. 17, April/May 2001; at: www.cer.org.uk. 
4   See in this regard the European Commission’s White paper on Governance, op.cit., pp. 15-18.  
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A joint body to control CFSP and ESDP policies (Figure 14): The second concept is that 
the chamber could be charged with scrutiny of second pillar matters, taking over from 
the WEU assembly regarding security matters.
1 Hence, the year old rivalry between the 
WEU assembly and the EP on parliamentary oversight in security and defence matters 
needs to be resolved by both sides of parliaments. The EP invited the national parlia-
mentarians to establish a “European interparliamentary body o n security and defence 
[…] comprising European and national MP’s responsible for security and defence issues 
[…designed] on the basis of the COSAC’s experience”.
2 At the invitation of the Bel-
gium Parliament MP’s of the EU member states, the European Parliament and the 
WEU-Assembly met on 2 and 3 July 2001 to discuss their jostling.  
 
Figure 14: Model for a Joint Body for Scrutinising CFSP and ESDP 
 
 
 
 
The conference agreed on a declaration, in which it calls for the creation of an  “ad hoc 
security and defence assembly” with members from both the EP’s and the national par-
liaments’ standing committees for defence and foreign affairs. This body should organ-
                                                 
1   See the speech of Tony Blair, 2000, op.cit., p. 10. On the issue of parliamentary scrutiny in ESDP 
see especially: Gourlay, Catriona: ‘The European Parliament’s Role in Scrutinising Defence and Se-
curity: An Uncertain Future’, in: ISIS Briefing Paper, No. 21, Brussels1999; and Jensen, Frederick: 
‘Filling the accountability gap in ESDP’, in: European Security Review, No. 2/2000, pp. 4-5. 
2   European Parliament, Resolution on the establishment of a common European Security and Defence 
Policy with a view to the European Council in Feira, Doc. No. PE 291.8882, of 15 June 2000. 
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ise “two sessions at least per year”.
1 During the conference’s debate most of the com-
mittee chairpersons of the national parliaments recognised that the European Parliament 
disposes of parliamentary power in defining and monitoring the civil instruments for 
crisis management as well as of conflict prevention. On the other hand, they s tressed 
that parliamentary control of military missions remains the responsibility of their a s-
semblies. Yet, parliaments do not take most decisions regarding foreign policy and s e-
curity: They question, debate and scrutinise the decisions of executives. Thus, a new 
interparliamentary body restricted to these issues would be open to the charge of being 
an expensive talking shop, since CFSP and ESDP matters will in any case continue to 
be debated in the national parliaments and in the European Parliament. Note in this re-
gard that the latter already questions the High Representative and the Council Presi-
dency, adopts resolutions, conducts inter-parliamentary relations with third countries 
and adopts the non-military part of the budget for the two areas under consideration.  
A Convention on the future of the European Union (Figure 15): The third option consid-
ers the role of national parliaments with regard to the further development of the EU’s 
para-constitutional nature and the very process towards the IGC in 2004. The participa-
tion of national parliaments in the body responsible for drawing up the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the Union was an original experience, which might open the way for 
another innovation as regards the role of parliaments in the development of the EU. The 
Convention was marked by the recognition, on an equal footing, of the contribution of 
four institutions  - alongside the parliaments, national governments and the Commission 
were also i nvolved  - in drawing up the Charter of Fundamental R ights. This exercise 
symbolised the recognition of shared responsibility in the exercise of ‘para-constituent 
power’, which had hitherto been reserved for governments alone.  
In the Declaration on the future of the Union, the Heads of State and Government out-
lined the process which should lead to the next IGC being held by 2004, without a repe-
tition of the method for preparing the 2000 IGC, which seems to have outlived its use-
fulness. The European Parliament and the COSAC Stockholm meeting in May 2001
2 
already proposed a process of this kind that should be focused on a body such as the 
tried and tested Convention. Of course, the actors involved should take into account the 
fact that the task is different from that of drawing up the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Moreover Article 48 TEU necessitates for a definitive version of texts entailing any 
revision of the existing EC/EU Treaties a ‘traditional’ conference of representatives of 
the governments of the member states. In this context, the Convention could be seen as 
a move towards assigning to the n ational parliaments and the European Parliament a 
specific kind of joint ‘para-constituent power’, i.e. a power to be shared with the n a-
                                                 
1   See Federal Parliament of Belgium: Parliamentary Conference on the European Security and D e-
fence Policy and Related Parliamentary Scrutiny, Declaration, Brussels, 2-3 July 2001, p. 3. 
2   See the documentation by Astrid Krekelberg in this volume, document No. 4.3.6.  
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tional governments. This development would mark a new chapter in the role of  parlia-
ments in European integration followig the fusion dynamics.  
 
Figure 15: Model for the Convention on the Future of the European Union 
 
 
 
Of course, to build on this outline and to give national parliaments access to the policy 
process of the European Union level makes such a process fully dependent on the veto 
of the single unit. However, the Nice declaration on the future of the Union reflects the 
need to strengthen the role of all collective actors of popular representation and to make 
the institutions of the different levels of the Union co-operate with each other. In such a 
perspective, it might not be wrong to call upon national parliaments to strengthen their 
role as multi-level players in the European Union, to strengthen COSAC according its 
own proposals
1 and to invite national parliaments to open ‘their’ offices in the EP build-
ings.  
                                                 
1   See the conclusions of the Versailles COSAC meeting in 2000 in the documentation by Astrid Kre-
kelberg in this volume, document No. 4.3.5. 
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Figure 16: Role Attributions for the European Parliament and the National Parliaments in the EU Policy Cycle 
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However, the right attribution of roles and functions must be made: The fusion trend 
points at a typical merging of powers and responsibilities, which is also valid for shap-
ing the ‘interparliamentary sphere’ or European governance (see Figure 16).  
In this context, ‘joint parliamentary bodies’ for sectoral issues might take up the heri-
tage of already existing network of joint parliamentary committee meetings. This r e-
newed network could parallel the Council of Ministers in its various formats; the former 
WEU assembly and the EP’s Committee for Foreign Affairs might mutate into a spe-
cific case. Finally, a para-constitutional assembly might generate the parliamentary 
backbone of the Union’s further evolution with regard to Treaty developments. COSAC 
would remain the main locus for interparliamentary Co-operation with regard to institu-
tional issues.  
The realisation of such a multi-dimensional net of interparliamentary contacts might 
help to reduce the democratic deficit in institutional  - parliamentary  - terms. On the 
other hand, one should bear in mind that institutional mechanics are not self-evident for 
the end-users of public policy outcomes: Do these improvements also provide new 
ground for enhancing the legitimacy and proximity of European governance towards the 
citizens of the Union? It remains in the hands of the actors involved to offer appropriate 
means for the involvement of the Union’s Demoi in shaping the conditions for their way 
of living. More precisely, the n ational parliaments will face the difficult task to prove 
that they are able and willing to provide channels for communication across the bounda-
ries of the EU’s member states.  
The greater involvement of national parliaments in the EU’s policy cycles may help  to 
render governments more accountable for what they decide in the Council of Ministers 
and its subordinated working mechanisms. However, the simple formalisation of 
COSAC or any other joint body incorporating MEP’s and MP’s within the realm of a 
new Treaty or constitution also renders the EU more complex and less understandable. 
The ‘ordinary’  - hopefully interested  - citizen may ask: If the (directly elected) Euro-
pean Parliament represents the peoples of the Union, the Council of Ministers the mem-
ber states through (elected) governments, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee the “economic and social components of civil society”
1, and the Committee of the 
Regions the (elected) representatives of some of the Union’s regional and local commu-
nities, what  is the surplus of a group of bodies bringing together some members of the 
European Parliament with some members of the national parliaments? The next Treaty 
reform should discuss appropriate ways for a more coherent and clear-cut organisation 
of interest r epresentation and mediation in an enlarged European Union. There are no 
easy solutions and one should be aware of naïve myths and simplistic parliament -
versus-government designs. 
 
                                                 
1   See for this definition Article 257 ECT as amended by the Treaty of Nice.  477  
The Reticent Acknowledgement of National Parliaments in the European 
Treaties: A Documentation 
 
Astrid Krekelberg 
 
When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 neither the European architects nor the 
ratifying members of national parliaments themselves paid much attention to the role of 
national legislatures in the European context. This attitude changed with the increasing 
transfer of national competencies towards the EC/EU. The growing scope of EC/EU 
activities more and more affected and undermined the traditional legislative function of 
national parliaments in public policy-making. With the d evelopment of the European 
Communities towards a European Union, some governments and parliaments raised the 
question by which means the national parliaments’ role could be enforced in the treat-
ment of European issues and in how far the loss o f their original legislative functions 
could be compensated for example by control functions in the European decision-
making process. The first national answer to the lack of national parliaments’ involve-
ment in the EU policy-cycle was the creation of ‘European Affairs Committees’ and the 
establishment of specific parliamentary procedures which should help scrutinizing the 
governments’ actions on the European level. But besides these national arrangements, 
until the Treaty of Maastricht there was no common  and legally fixed European basis 
for the national parliaments’ functions in the European policy-cycle.  
The TEU’s  Declaration No. 13 is the first European document that in particular treats 
the role of the national parliaments in the EU by encouraging “greater i nvolvement of 
national parliaments in the activities of the European Union”. According to the Declara-
tion, which was set up following proposals by the United Kingdom and France, the 
governments should ensure "that national parliaments receive Commission proposals for 
legislation in good time for information or possible examination". Though not being 
legally binding the Declaration had political consequences. Above all it intensified the 
debate between national parliaments and the European Parliament o n the effectiveness 
of parliamentary accountability in EU affairs. 
The TEU’s  Declaration No. 14 is the attempt to strengthen the collective role of the 
national parliaments on the European level. It invited both the European and n ational 
parliaments to “meet as necessary as a Conference of the Parliaments”, which had taken 
place in Rome in June 1990 and had brought together 173 MP’s and 85 MEP’s in order 
to adopt a resolution on the intergovernmental conference on the EMU and on the Po-
litical Union. Declaration No. 14 grants the Conference with a consultative role in the 
discussion of the “main features of the European Union”. But since the overall majority 
of national parliaments did not want to r epeat the ‘Rome exercise’, Declaration No. 14 
has never been activated.  
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Altogether the TEU Declarations No. 13 and 14 were the catalysts for a wider European 
debate in the 1996/97 IGC on the appropriate positioning of the national parliaments in 
the European policy-cycle. The discussion mainly focussed on two issues: firstly the 
potential common European basis for the unilateral control mechanisms of each parlia-
ment  - the scope, timing and management of parliamentary scrutiny  - and secondly the 
form of interparliamentary co-operation within the Conference of European Affairs 
Committees  - COSAC. The COSAC, a body, which comprises six MP’s per member 
state and six MEP’s, was established in Paris in November 1989. It meets twice a year 
in the country holding the Presidency of the Council and offers a forum of regular e x-
change among the member delegations. On the one hand general institutional questions 
are on COSAC’s agenda. On the other hand the Conference is used as channel for i n-
formation about special national features in the parliamentary process, for example 
about the role of the EC/EU affairs committees concerning specific policy areas.  
The results of the 1996/97 IGC’s debate on the role of national parliaments are fixed in 
the Protocol on the role of the national parliaments in the European Union (PNP), which 
is p art of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Regarding the strengthening of unilateral control 
mechanisms the PNP holds that national parliaments shall receive all Commission con-
sultation documents such as green and white papers or communications. Addressing the 
Commission and the Council of the EU the PNP demands that the Commission’s legis-
lative proposals should be “made available in good time” and that a six-week period has 
to elapse between issuing a “legislative proposal or a measure to be adopted under Title 
VI” o f TEU and its discussion or adoption by the Council. Concerning the form of i n-
terparliamentary co-operation the PNP formally recognizes COSAC as a body that may 
make “any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the EU institutions”. 
Given COSAC’s activity and the shortcomings of the PNP, the COSAC meeting in Ver-
sailles on 16/17 October 2000 proposed to amend the PNP without ‘upgrading’ the offi-
cial status of COSAC. However, during the final IGC meeting at the European Council 
of Nice on 7/11  December 2000 national delegations were not interested in opening up 
another topic of the EU’s institutional reform agenda. In e xchange, France and Belgium 
succeeded in mandating the ‘post-Nice-reflection process’ on the future of the European 
Union with t he question about the role of national parliaments in the European architec-
ture.  
Altogether the latest COSAC conclusions  - beginning with the COSAC in Dublin in 
1996  - show an increasing will of a - still  - small number of national parlamentarians to 
express their views jointly vis-à-vis the institutions of the European Union. 
Today MP’s in all the EU member states share the view that stronger involvement of 
national parliaments in EU issues is a key feature of the further ‘parlamentarisation’ of 
the EU decision-making system. Above all they aim at increasing the parliamentary 
scrutiny towards the governments’ actions within the Council. Parliamentarisation in 
general shall help reducing the “democratic deficit” by strengthening the input-
legitimacy and on  this way making the public feel that it is properly represented at the  
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European level. The question how a stronger involvement of national parliaments can 
be brought about is still an open one. Possible answers range from strengthening once 
again the unilateral mechanisms of each national parliament to the idea of establishing a 
second chamber, composed of representatives of the national parliaments. 
 
 
*   *   * 
*   * 
* 
 
1. Treaty on European Union 1993 
 
1.1 Declaration No. 13 on the role of the national parliaments in the European Union 
 
The Conference considers that it is important to encourage greater involvement of national par-
liaments in the activities of the European Union. 
To this end, the exchange of information between national parliaments and the European Par-
liament should be stepped up. In this context, the governments of the member states will ensure, 
inter alia that national parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time 
for information or possible examination. 
Similarly, the Conference considers that it is important for contacts between the national par-
liaments and the European Parliament to be stepped up, in particular through the granting of 
appropriate reciprocal facilities and regular meetings between members of Parliament interested 
in the same issues. 
 
1.2 Declaration No. 14 on the Conference of the Parliaments (Assizes) 
 
The Conference invites the European Parliament and the national parliaments to meet as neces-
sary as a Conference of the Parliaments (or 'assizes'). 
The Conference of the Parliaments will be consulted on the main features of the European Un-
ion, without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the rights of the national 
parliaments. The President of the European Council and the President of the Commission will 
report to each session of the Conference of the Parliaments on the state of the Union. 
 
 
2. Treaty of Amsterdam 1999: Protocol on the role of the national parliaments in the 
European Union  
 
The high contracting parties recalling that scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their 
own government in relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitu-
tional organisation and practice of each Member State, 
Desiring, however, to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of 
the European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on matters which may be 
of particular interest to them,  
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Have agreed upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union: 
 
I. Information for national parliaments of member states 
1. All Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and communications) shall 
be promptly forwarded to national parliaments of the Member States.  
2. Commission proposals f or legislation as defined by the Council in accordance with Article 
151.3 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, shall be made available in good time 
so that the Government of each Member State may ensure that its own national parliament re-
ceives them as appropriate.  
3. A six-week period shall elapse between a legislative proposal or a proposal for a measure to 
be adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union being made available in all lan-
guages to the European Parliament and the Council by the Commission and the date when it is 
placed on a Council agenda for decision either for the adoption of an act or for adoption of a 
common position pursuant to article 189b or 189c, subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency, 
the reasons for which shall be stated in the act or common position. 
 
II. The Conference of European Affairs Committees 
4. The Conference of European Affairs Committees, hereinafter referred to as COSAC, estab-
lished in Paris on 16-17 November 1989, may make any contribution it deems appropriate for 
the attention of the EU institutions, in particular on the basis of draft legal texts which 
Representatives of Governments of the Member States may decide by common accord to 
forward to it, in view of the nature of its subject matter. 
5. COSAC may examine any legislative proposal or initiative in relation to the establishment of 
an area of freedom, security and justice which might have a direct bearing on the rights and 
freedoms of individuals. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall be 
informed of any contribution made by COSAC under this paragraph.  
6. COSAC may address to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission any con-
tribution which it deems appropriate on the legislative activities of the Union, notably in relation 
to the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the area of freedom, security and justice as 
well as questions regarding fundamental rights. 
7. Contributions made by COSAC shall in no way bind national parliaments or prejudge their 
position. 
 
3. Treaty of Nice 2001: Declararation No. 23 on the Future of the European Union  
 
1.  Important reforms have been decided in Nice. The Conference welcomes the successful 
conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the governments of the Member States and 
commits the Member States to pursue the early and successful ratification of the Treaty of Nice. 
2.  It agrees that the conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the governments of the 
Member States opens the way for enlargement of the European Union and underlines that, with 
ratification of the Nice Treaty, the European Union will have completed the institutional chan-
ges necessary for the accession of new Member States. 
3.  Having opened the way to enlargement, the Conference calls for a deeper and wider debate 
about the future development of the European Union. In 2001, the Swedish and Belgian Presi-
dencies, in cooperation with the Commission and involving the European Parliament, will en-
courage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties; representatives of national Parlia- 
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ments and all those reflecting public opinion; political, economic and university circles, repre-
sentatives of civil society, etc. The candidate States will be associated with this process in ways 
to be defined. 
4.  Following a report to Göteborg in June 2001, the European Council, at its meeting at Lae-
ken/Brussels in December 2001, will agree on a declaration containing appropriate initiatives 
for the continuation of this process. 
5.  The process should address, inter alia, the following questions: 
-  how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of competencies between the Euro-
pean Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity;  
-  the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice, 
in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne; 
-  a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better u nderstood 
without changing their meaning; 
-  the role of national Parliaments in the European architecture. 
Addressing the above-mentioned issues, the Conference recognises the need to improve and to 
monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, to bring 
them closer to the citizens of the Member States. 
6.  After these preparatory steps, the Conference agrees that a new Conference of the Represen-
tatives of the governments of the Member States will be convened in 2004, to treat the above-
mentioned items in view of the related Treaty changes. 
7.  The Conference of Member States shall not constitute any form of obstacle or pre-condition 
to the enlargement process. Moreover, those candidate States which have concluded accession 
negotiations with the Union shall be invited to participate in the Conference. Those candidate 
States which have not concluded their accession negotiations shall be invited as observers. 
 
 
4. Documents of the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC) 
 
4.1 COSAC rules of procedure 
 
Rules of procedure of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Comittees of Par-
liaments of the European Union 
 
The present rules of procedure are designed 
to facilitate and improve the work of the 
Conference of Community and European 
Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the 
European Union, h ereinafter referred to as 
COSAC, established in Paris 16-17 N o-
vember 1989. 
COSAC enables a regular exchange of 
views, without prejudicing the competences 
of the parliamentary bodies of the European 
Union. The Protocol on the Role of N a-
tional Parliaments in the European Union to 
the Amsterdam Treaty amending the Treaty 
on the European Union, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and 
certain related acts, empowers COSAC to 
make any contribution it deems appropriate 
for the attention of the institutions of the 
European Union and to e xamine Union 
legislative activities, proposals and initia-
tives. Contributions made by COSAC shall 
in no way bind national parliaments or 
prejudge their position.  
These rules of procedure are adopted in the 
XXI COSAC of Helsinki on 11 and 12 
October 1999. They replace the rules elabo-
rated on 6 and 7 May 1991 in the IV 
COSAC of Luxembourg, adopted on 4 and 
5 November 1991 in the V COSAC of The 
Hague and modified on 9 and 10 May 1994 
in the X COSAC of Athens and 24 and 25 
June 1996 in the XIV COSAC of Rome.  
1. Freqency and dates of meetings  
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1.1 Ordinary meetings 
One ordinary meeting of COSAC shall be 
held during each Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union taking account of 
different parliamentary practices of Mem-
ber States, of election periods and of the 
dates of public holidays in Member States. 
The date of the next meeting shall be fixed 
and announced by the date of the preceding 
meeting at the latest. 
1.2 Extraordinary meetings 
Extraordinary meetings of COSAC shall be 
held, if deemed necessary, by an absolute 
majority of the Chairpersons of the Euro-
pean Affairs Commit-tees of the national 
Parliaments and of the appropriate body of 
the European Parliament. 
 
 
1.3 Preparatory meetings of the Chairper-
sons 
A preparatory meeting of the Chairpersons 
of the European Affairs Committees and of 
the representative of the European Parlia-
ment shall be held prior to meetings of 
COSAC, if proposed by the Parliament of 
the Member State holding the Presidency, 
after consulting the Presidential Troika. The 
Presidential Troika of COSAC consists of 
the Presidency, the preceding Presidency, 
the next Presidency, and the European Par-
liament . 
1.4 Extraordinary meetings of the Chairper-
sons 
Extraordinary meetings of the Chairpersons 
of the  European Affairs Committees and 
the appropriate body of the European Par-
liament shall be held, if proposed, by the 
Presidency, after consulting the Presidential 
Troika, or, if deemed necessary, by an 
absolute majority of the Chairpersons of the 
European Affairs Committees of the n a-
tional Parliaments and of the appropriate 
body of the European Parliament.  
1.5 Working groups 
COSAC may decide to set up a working 
group to study a particular issue linked with 
the activities of the European Union. Such a 
working group shall also be set up, if 
deemed necessary, by an absolute majority 
of the Chairpersons of the European Affairs 
Committees of the national Parliaments and 
of the appropriate body of the European 
Parliament. The Chairperson of the Euro-
pean Affairs Committee of the Parliament 
of the Member State holding the Presidency 
shall act as the Chairperson of the working 
group. The Secretariat of the Parliament of 
the Member State holding the Presidency 
shall provide secretariat for the working 
group.  
2. Place of meetings 
Meetings shall take place in the Member 
State holding the Presidency, al though 
extraordinary meetings, meetings of the 
Chairpersons and of Working Groups may 
be held elsewhere. 
3. Duration of meetings 
The duration of ordinary and extraordinary 
meetings of COSAC shall be one and a half 
days. 
4. Composition 
4.1 Ordinary and extraordinary meetings 
Each National Parliament shall be repre-
sented by a maximum of six members -of 
its European Affairs Committee(s). The 
European Parliament shall be represented 
by six Members. Each Parliament shall 
determine the composition of its own dele-
gation.  
4.2 Observers from the Parliaments of ap-
plicant countries 
Three observers from the Parliaments of 
each applicant country shall be invited to 
ordinary meetings, and may be invited to 
extraordinary meetings, provided that the 
European Union has officially opened dis-
cussions and/or negotiations aimed at a c-
cession with the country concerned and that 
the Parliament concerned has made an offi-
cial request to participate in COSAC. These 
observers shall have the right to participate 
in debates on specific items on the agenda 
determined by the meeting. 
4.3. Other observers, specialists and special 
guests  
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The Presidency shall invite observers from 
the General Secretariat of the Council of the 
European Union and the European Com-
mission, and it may invite observers from 
the embassies of the Member States of the 
European Union, and, after consulting the 
Presidential Troika, specialists and special 
guests. 
4.4. Public access to meetings 
Meetings of COSAC shall be public, unless 
otherwise determined. 
5. Convocation 
Ordinary meetings and meetings of the 
Chairpersons and of Working Groups shall 
be convened by the Secretariat of the Par-
liament of the Member State holding the 
Presidency. Extraordinary meetings shall be 
convened by the Secretariat of the Parlia-
ment of the Member State where the meet-
ing takes place.  
6. Designation of meetings 
The designation of ordinary and extraordi-
nary meetings shall be "Conference of the 
European Affairs Committees (of the Euro-
pean Union's National Parliaments and the 
European Parliament) - COSAC" - with the 
name preceded by the number of the meet-
ing in sequence, followed by the date and 
place of the meeting.  
7. Agenda 
7.1 Before the last ordinary meeting of each 
year the delegations will indicate the sub-
jects they propose to be dealt with the fol-
lowing year. This matter shall be discussed 
at the end of the meeting. The Presidential 
Troika, paying due account to the provi-
sions of Part II of the Protocol to the Am-
sterdam Treaty on the Role of National 
Parliaments in the European Union, pro-
poses, at the beginning of each Presidency, 
one or several subjects drawn from the 
working programme of the Council of the 
European Union, the European Parliament, 
and the European Commission, or from 
proposals made during the meeting referred 
to above. 
7.2 A draft agenda shall be drawn up by the 
Chairperson of the European Affairs Com-
mittee of the host Parliament, after consult-
ing Chairpersons of the European Affairs 
Committees and the representative of the 
European Parliament. N ational delegations 
may propose to the Presidency that a spe-
cific item is put on the agenda. 
7.3 The meeting itself shall decide on its 
final agenda. 
8. Preparation of meetings 
8.1 The national delegations may send 
documents relating to items on the agenda 
to the Secretariat of the host Parliament.  
8.2 The national delegation of the Member 
State holding the Presidency may draw up 
discussion documents for the Conference.  
9. Languages 
9.1 Each delegation is responsible for trans-
lating any document which it submits into 
English or French.  
9.2 Participating Parliaments will r eceive 
conference documents in French or English. 
Each Parliament is responsible for transla-
tion into its national language. 
9.3  Simultaneous translation is provided 
into the official languages of the EU in the 
meetings. 
9.4 The contributions of COSAC are drawn 
up in a single original in French and Eng-
lish, each of these texts being equally au-
thentic. 
10. Cosac Contributions 
10.1 COSAC may address contributions to 
the institutions of the European Union pur-
suant to the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol on 
the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union. 
10.2 Each national delegation may propose 
that a contribution is adopted by COSAC. 
A draft contribution shall be drawn up if 
proposed by the Presidency, after consult-
ing the Presidential Troika, or if deemed 
necessary by an absolute majority of the 
Chairpersons of the European Affairs 
Commit-tees of the national Parliaments 
and of the appropriate body of the Euro-
pean Parliament, or if decided in a meeting 
of COSAC.  
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10.3 The draft of a contribution shall be 
communicated to the delegations in good 
time before the relevant meeting of COSAC 
to avail them with a reasonable period for 
scrutiny and remarks.  
10.4 The final draft of a contribution shall 
be prepared at the preparatory meeting of 
the Chairpersons preceding the relevant 
meeting of COSAC. It shall embrace the 
observations and remarks by all delega-
tions, including possible declarations con-
cerning the vote.  
10.5 Adoption of the contribution requires 
unanimity between the delegations present 
at the meeting. Abstentions by delegations 
shall not prevent the adoption of the contri-
bution. 
11. Role of the Presidency 
11.1 The European Affairs Committee of 
the Member State holding the Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union shall 
hold the Presidency of COSAC during that 
Presidency. 
11.2 The Secretariat of the host Parliament 
shall prepare the documents for the meet-
ing. 
11.3 The Chairperson of the European Af-
fairs Committee of the host Parliament shall 
open the debate.  
11.4 The Chairperson of the European Af-
fairs Committee of the host Parliament shall 
propose a timetable for the meeting and the 
length of speeches which shall be four min-
utes, unless the meeting determines other-
wise. 
11.5 The Secretariat of the host Parliament 
shall draw up brief minutes of the meeting.  
11.6 The Chairperson of the European Af-
fairs Committee of the host Parliament shall 
present the debate's conclusions, as drawn 
up by the Presidential Troika. 
11.7 The Secretariat of the Parliament hold-
ing the Presidency shall provide secretariat 
for the activities of COSAC during its term. 
The Secretariats of national Parliaments and 
of the European Parliament shall provide 
assistance.  
12. Debate Conclusion 
If the meeting decides to issue a commu-
niqué, a draft, annexed with possible con-
tributions adopted, is drawn up by the 
Presidential Troika. 
13. Recipients of Communiques 
Communiqués are sent to the Parliaments 
of the Member States and the European 
Parliament, to the Council of the European 
Union, and to the European Commission by 
the Secretariat of the host Parliament. 
14. Revision of the rules of procedure 
14.1 Proposals for a revision of the Rules of 
Procedure must be sent, in writing, from 
one or several delegations of one or several 
Parliaments to all national Parliaments of 
the Member States and to the European 
Parliament, at least one month before the 
meeting of COSAC. 
14.2 Any proposals for a revision of the 
rules should be put on the agenda of the 
first meeting of COSAC following the 
presentation of the proposal. 
14.3 Adoption of the proposal requires 
unanimity between the delegations present 
at the meeting. Abstentions by delegations 
shall not prevent the adoption o f the pro-
posal. 
15. Entry into force 
These Rules of Procedure shall enter into 
force on 1 January 2000. They are drawn up 
in a single original in English and French, 
each of these texts being equally authentic. 
The text of these Rules of Procedure shall, 
for the authentication thereof, be drawn up 
in Danish, Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, 
Portuguese, Spanish, Finnish and Swedish. 
The translations shall be agreed between 
the national Parliaments using those lan-
guages and the European Parliament. In any 
question relating to the interpretation of 
these Rules only the English and French 
versions shall have official status. 
Annex 
Declaration by the European Parliament on 
Rule 10.5 of the Rules of Procedure: The 
European Parliament shall abstain in the 
vote of a c ontribution which is also a d-
dressed to it. 485  
4.2 Dublin COSAC Conclusions adopted by the XV COSAC in October 1996 
 
1. Within the European Union, National Parliaments have their own role to play to strengthen 
democracy and improve the efficiency of the Union. COSAC, through its work, will give a high 
priority to the pursuit of these aims. COSAC can assist individual National Parliaments by mak-
ing available to them the experience and information of other Parliaments. 
2. It is the view of COSAC that, to further the useful work of parliamentary Co-operation, the 
organisation should be strengthened and its meetings should be organised to maximise its poten-
tial. A number of National Parliaments are in the course of considering sending official repre-
sentatives to Brussels who could in time come together to offer a support service for COSAC. 
3. It is appropriate that the flow of information from Union Institutions to the National Parlia-
ments be improved and that National Parliaments should have control over the decisions of their 
respective Governments as set out in the constitutional arrangements of the Member States. To 
this end, COSAC believes that Declaration 13 should be reinforced by the Inter-Governmental 
Conference, by including it in the Treaty, to insure that Governments follow through on their 
commitments under the Declaration and that the National Parliaments have a period of at least 
four weeks for examining all proposals of relevance to the legislative process. 
4. There is a desire to improve the working of COSAC. The following are among the ways in 
which this can be brought about: the dates of COSAC should be set at the conclusion of the 
previous COSAC, each delegation should have, within reason, the opportunity to include items 
on the agenda for COSAC, each delegation should be allowed to distribute, before the COSAC, 
documentation and proposals relevant to the agenda, a meeting of officials should be called to 
preview COSAC, to allow each delegation and each delegate an opportunity to speak on an 
agenda item; time limits of, say, five minutes should be imposed on speakers from the floor and 
to arrange during COSAC meetings for time for i nformal association and dialogue between 
delegates.  
5. COSAC may pursue certain specific issues, e.g. subsidiarity, 2nd  and 3rd Pillar items and 
questions relating to the fundamental rights of European Union citizens, with a view to arriving 
at some ideas as to the way forward for these items. However, its conclusions will be offered as 
suggestions and would not seek to bind any delegate or delegations. The communiqués on the 
above will be forwarded by the President of COSAC to the Institutions of the European Union 
and to the governments of Member States. 
 
 
4.3 COSAC documents from 1997 to 2001 
 
4.3.1 XVI COSAC, The Hague, June 1997:Declaration on transparency  
 
Considering that it is necessary to bring Europe closer to the citizens; that the democratic le-
gitimacy must be reinforced; that the transparency of the decision-making process in the Euro-
pean Union must be improved; Is of the opinion: that proposed legislation and the legislative 
acts of the Union should be accessible; that when the Council acts in its legislative capacity the 
results of votes and explanation of votes as well as statements in the minutes shall be made 
public; that a reinforced Declaration 13, as described in the conclusions of the COSAC in Octo-
ber 1996 in Dublin, and which the Dutch Presidency has included in its final proposals to the 
IGC should be given treaty force; that the six weeks delay mentioned in these proposals should 
be applicable to all Commission acts of a legislative nature.  
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4.3.2 XIX COSAC, Vienna, November 1998:Solidarity with Italy 
 
The XIX COSAC meeting, assembled in Vienna on 23-24 November 1998, expresses its soli-
darity with Italy, which has faced the Ocalan affair in full compliance with the principles of 
Italian and European legislation.  
 
 
4.3.3 XX COSAC, Berlin, Mai-June 1999:Appeal to voters in the European elections 
 
The participants in the XX Conference of European Affairs Committees of the National Parlia-
ments of EU Member States and the European Parliament, gathered in Berlin on 31 May and 1 
June 1999, appeal to all voters in the European Union to participate in the fifth direct elections 
to the European Parliament which will take place between 10 and 13 June 1999. 
Twenty years have passed since the first direct elections to the European Parliament. As a di-
rectly elected body, the European Parliament can contribute to the necessary strengthening of 
democratic decision-making within the institutions of the European Union. 
All those who call for more democracy, more transparency and greater closeness to the citizen 
within the European Union, are urged to cast their vote in the elections to the European Parlia-
ment. 
 
 
4.3.4 XXII COSAC, Lisbon, Mai 2000: Contribution 
 
1. In view of the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on employment, economic 
reforms and social cohesion, COSAC expresses its support for the Union's new strategic aim of 
basing its economy and society of knowledge. 
2. COSAC recognises the importance of commitment to a European research area, in which 
information technologies can develop as a form of modernisation, of combating social exclusion 
and of promoting economic and social cohesion. 
3. COSAC calls on the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament to adopt a Euro-
pean agenda which promotes economic modernisation and growth, employment, improvements 
in education and vocational training and which combats all form of exclusion and discrimina-
tion. 
4. COSAC believes that all Member States of the Union should adhere in the latter and spirit of 
the Treaties, with particular reference to the single European market. 
5. COSAC considers that the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights presents an im-
portant opportunity to give citizens greater protection in relation to the European Union legal 
order, and to make fundamental rights more visible to the citizens of the Union and to the Euro-
pean institutions. The creation of the Charter might have broader implications in the future of 
the Union, and its connection with the European Convention on Human Rights should be safe-
guarded, through respect for the case law of the Courts of both Luxembourg and Strasbourg. 
6. COSAC invites the European institutions and the IGC to take into account the efforts of the 
Convention responsible for drawing up the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
7. COSAC asks the Convention responsible for drawing up the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
to take the opinion of applicant countries and their parliaments on this question into account.  
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8. COSAC expresses its strong support for the enlargement process of the EU and urges the 
governments participating in the IGC to proceed with their work in order to make it possible to 
start the ratification procedures of the Treaty amendments early next year. 
 
 
4.3.5 XXIII COSAC, Versailles, October 2000 
 
4.3.5.1 Contribution addressed to the institutions of the European Union 
 
1. COSAC calls on the member states to reach an agreement, at the Nice European Council, on 
institutional reform, in the light of enlargement, that would ensure, from now on, efficient, 
transparent and legitimate institutions and allow the accession of new member states from Janu-
ary, 1st 2003. It expresses its strong support for the enlargement process and recommends the 
intergovernmental conference in its global agreement on the revision of the Treaties to safe-
guard the principles of solidarity, cohesion, subsidiarity and proportionality, which are neces-
sary for a true Union of people and states.  
2. COSAC takes note of the political agreement reached by the heads of state and government 
on the draft Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union as drafted by the Convention. 
It calls on the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament to proclaim this Charter. It 
considers that the chosen procedure, involving representatives chosen by the heads of states and 
government, the Commission, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments, could be 
useful in the future.  
3. COSAC stresses the Union's need to foster, in the spirit of the Lisbon European Council, the 
development of an economy of innovation and knowledge, ensuring policies actively promoting 
employment and combating unemployment and social exclusion. It calls on the European insti-
tutions to approve, during the French presidency, the "Social European Agenda" which will be a 
multi-annual framework for social measures with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity. 
This new strategic objective should enable t he reconciliation of the changes due to the new 
economy with the European social values and with the perspective of enlargement.  
4. COSAC, in the light of the Tampere conclusions, calls upon the Union and the member states 
to create in Co-operation with the candidate countries, an area of freedom, security and justice 
reinforcing fighting against terrorism and serious forms of transnational organised crime which, 
respecting the right to individual privacy, is based on practical measures in the fight against 
illegal immigration and common standards regarding external border checks as well as rein-
forced co-operation between the relevant enforcing authorities.  
5. Considering that national Parliaments, together with the European Parliament, are a constitu-
ent element of the democratic legitimacy of the European institutions, COSAC urges the Inter-
governmental Conference to modify part I of the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments as 
follows:  
-  All consultation documents and proposals for legislation from the European Commission, as 
well as proposals for measures under titles V and VI, should be transmitted by electronic 
means to each national Parliament as soon as they are adopted by the college of Commis-
sioners;  
-  The six-week time period provided by paragraph 3 should also apply, except in urgent cases, 
to proposals for measures to be adopted under titles V of the Treaty on European Union as 
well as to proposals regarding inter-institutional agreements to which the Council is a party;  
-  A minimum 15-day time period, or one week in urgent cases, should be observed between 
the final reading of a text by COREPER and the Council decision.   
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-  COSAC recalls that no provision of this protocol can jeopardise the competences and pre-
rogatives of each national Parliament as provided by its national constitutional arrangements. 
 
4.3.5.2 Declaration on Serbia 
 
COSAC salutes the courage shown by the Serbian people who have won an exemplary victory 
for democracy. It expresses the wish that the European Union should establish  a new Co-
operation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enable it to find its rightful place in 
Europe and that the European Union should help it to strengthen democracy and raise its stan-
dards of living. 
 
4.3.5.3 Declaration on terrorism 
 
COSAC most firmly condemns any terrorist action, in particular the one that plunged Spain into 
mourning. 
 
 
4.3.6 XXIV COSAC, Stockholm, May 2001: Contribution to the European Council 
 
The future development of the European Union 
 
1. COSAC expresses its strong support for the enlargement process of the EU and calls on the 
governments of the Member States to take appropriate measures so that the ratification process 
of the Treaty of Nice is completed by the beginning of 2002. COSAC urges the European Union 
and its Member States to admit a first group of new Member States in time for the European 
election in 2004.  
2. COSAC underlines the role of Parliaments in the debate about the future development of the 
European Union. Parliaments in the Member States are close to their voters, and can thus func-
tion as a link between the citizens and the debate at the European level. Along with the Euro-
pean Parliament, national Parliaments should therefore actively and continuously foster a public 
dialogue about the future of the EU. COSAC stresses the necessity to include the Parliaments in 
the candidate countries in the debate. One important aim of this debate is to ensure a well func-
tioning Union.  
3. COSAC in itself is a suitable forum for the debate. COSAC is recognised in the Treaty and is 
entitled to forward contributions to the EU institutions. COSAC will continue to meet during 
every presidency and there is already a practical framework in place for COSAC and a Troika 
that ensures continuity. At the same time the rotating Presidency of COSAC facilitates that 
attention is paid to different subjects. COSAC has the virtue of including national Parliaments 
of the Member States and the candidate countries, as well as the European Parliament. The size 
of the delegations at COSAC ensures that different political views from each country are repre-
sented. Thanks to the regularity of the COSAC meetings, personal networks develop between 
participant members. Everyone involved may bring ideas from COSAC discussions to their 
national debate.  
4. COSAC hereby declares its intention to actively follow and participate in the debate. COSAC 
intends to put the future development of the Union on its agenda at its meetings until the next 
IGC. A COSAC Working Group, which was set up during the Swedish Presidency, has dis- 
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cussed the role of national Parliaments and the European Union. COSAC has decided that the 
Working Group will continue its work and study the issues mentioned in the Nice Declaration. 
5. A Convention was used as a forum for drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Experi-
ences from this work should be taken into account, when the European Union enters the more 
structural phase of the debate on its future. As part of the preparations for the IGC 2004, a con-
ference based on this model should be convened in order to develop proposals for EU reform. 
As to the composition and working methods of such a body, COSAC stresses the necessity that 
national Parliaments are given a strong and early role. The Member States are after all the con-
tracting  parties to the Treaties and their national Parliaments are responsible for the eventual 
ratification of amendments to the Treaties. The parliaments of the candidate countries should be 
included in the preparations for the IGC 2004. 
Protocol on the role of the national Parliaments in the European Union 
6.COSAC recalls what is stated in the Protocol on the role of the national Parliaments in the 
European Union, that scrutiny by individual national parliaments of their own government in 
relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organization 
and practice of each Member State. This means that the EU should function in a way that allows 
every national Parliament to work with EU matters in the way it decides for itself. The handling 
of matters at the EU level should thus give time and room for scrutiny by Parliaments at the 
national level. 
7. COSAC draws the conclusion that the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments has not 
been fully implemented since some Parliaments claim that they do not receive the documents 
within the stated time limits. COSAC urges the institutions to ensure that the Protocol, which is 
an integral part of the Treaties, is followed. COSAC notes that the Protocol does not explicitly 
say by whom C ommission consultation documents (green and white papers and communica-
tions) “shall be promptly forwarded to national Parliaments of the Member States”. COSAC 
asks the Council of Ministers and the Commission to clarify the division of responsibility be-
tween them in this respect. COSAC also reaffirms its statement from the COSAC meeting in 
Versailles regarding modification of the Protocol in order to ensure that national parliaments 
have enough time to scrutinise EU matters. 
The new strategic objective of the European Union 
8. COSAC, in the spirit of the Lisbon European Council, welcomes the acceptance by the 
Stockholm European Council of the recommendations drawn up by the COSAC meetings in 
Lisbon and Versailles regarding the Union’s new strategic objective to become the most com-
petitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. COSAC recognises the impetus 
given to this process by the Swedish EU Presidency. 
Following-up of this Contribution 
9. COSAC urges the institutions to take this Contribution into account. COSAC looks forward 
to the report on the future of the European Union that, according to the Nice Declaration on the 
Future of the Union, shall be presented to the European Council in Göteborg in June 2001 and 
expects the report to consider this Contribution. COSAC also notes that the main theme for the 
meeting in Stockholm in September 2001 of the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments 
will be the role of national Parliaments in the European structure. 
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ADR  Aktiounskomite fir Demokratie an Rentegerechtegkeet (LUX) 
ARP  Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (NL) 
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BE  Berdak-Les Verds (E) 
BMPP 
 
Bundestag Minutes Primary Protocol (Bundestags-
Plenarprotokoll)  
(D) 
BOCG  Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales (E) 
BPP  Bundestag Printed Paper (Bundestags-Drucksache) (D) 
B-VG  Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (A) 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy 
CC  Coalición Canaria (E) 
CDA 
CDS 
Christen-Democratisch Appel (NL) 
Centro democratico social (P) 
CDU  Christlich-Demokratische Union (D) 
CEECs  Central and Eastern European Countries 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CHU  Christelijke Historische Unie (NL) 
CiU  Convergencia i Unió (E) 
CJHA  Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs 
CMO  Common Market Organisation 
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Communautaires / Conference of Community and European 
Affairs Comittees of Parliaments of the European Union 
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(GR) 
CSU  Christlich-Soziale Union (D) 
CSV  Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (LUX) 
D  Germany 
D ‘66  Demokraten 66 (NL) 
DAS  Athens Bar of Lawyers 
DC  Democrazia Cristiana (I) 
DD.LL.  Decreti legislativi 
DfEE  Department for Education and Employment (UK) 
DG  Directorate General  
DGEI  Directorate General “European Integration” (I) 
DK  Denmark 
DIRT  Deposit Interest Retention Tax 
DL  Démocratie libérale (F) 
DPCM  Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry (UK) 
E  Spain 
EA  Eusko Alkartasuna (E) 
EC  European Community 
ECB  European Central Bank 
ECJ  European Court of Justice  
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ECOFIN  Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
ECT  Treaty establishing the European Community 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EFTA  European Free Trade Association 
EKEM  Greek Center for European Studies 
EKEME  Greek Center for European Studies and Research 
ELA  Epanastatikós Laikós Agónas (GR) 
ELIAMEP  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
EM  Explanatory Memorandum (S/UK) 
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union 
ENA  École nationale d’administration 
EP  European Parliament 
ESC  Economic and Social Committee 
ESC  European Scrutiny Committee (UK) 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
EU  European Union 
EURATOM  European Atomic Energy Community 
EUROPOL  European Police Office 
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F  France 
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei (D) 
FLG  Federal Law Gazette (A) 
FPÖ  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (A) 
FYROM  Former Yougoslaw Republic of Macedonia 
GL  Groen Links (NL) 
GPV  Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (NL) 
GR  Greece 
GSEE  General Confederation of Greek Workers 
HMT  Her Majesty’s Treasury (UK) 
I  Italy 
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference 
IRL  Ireland 
IU  Izquierda Unida (E) 
JHA  Justice and Home Affairs 
KESK    Suomen Keskusta (SF) 
KKE  Kommonounistikó Kómma Elládas (GR) 
KOK  Kansallinen Kokoomus (SF) 
KVP  Katholieke Volkspartij 
Lib.Dem.  Liberal Democrats (UK) 
LIF  Liberales Forum (A) 
LUX  Luxembourg 
MAE  Ministerio die Affari Internazionali (I) 
MEP  Member of the European Parliament 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ND  Néa Dimokratía (GR) 
NGO  Nongovernmental organisation 
NL  Netherlands 
OECD  Organisation for economic Co-operation and development 
ÖVP  Österreichische Volkspartei (A)  
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PASOK  Panellinio Socialistiko Minima (GR) 
PCI  Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (I) 
PCP  Partido Communista Portugues (P) 
PD  Demokratesch Partei (LUX) 
PD  Progressive Democrats (IRL) 
PDS  Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus (D) 
PECO  Pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale  
PeVL  Perustuslakivaliokunnan lausunto (SF) 
PNP  Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union  
PNV  Partido Nacionalista Vasco (E) 
POSL 
 
Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois/ Lëtzebuerger  
Sozialistesch Arbëschterpartei (LUX) 
PP  Partido Popular (E) 
PR  Proportional Representation 
PS  Parti Socialiste (B/F) 
PSD  Social Democratic Party (P) 
PSI  Partito Socialista Italiana (I) 
PSOE  Partido Socialista Obrero Español (E) 
PvdA  Partij van de Arbeid (NL) 
QMV  Qualified Majority Voting 
RKP  Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue/Svenska Volkpartiet I Finland (SF) 
RPF  Rassemblement pour la France (F) 
RPR  Rassemblement Pour la République (F) 
RSE  Research Section Europe  
S  Sweden 
SCEU  Select Committee on the European Union (UK) 
SC  Statutory Committee (IRL/SF) 
SDP  Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SF) 
SEA  Single European Act 
SEC  Documents of the European Commission Secretary General 
SEV  Greek Industries Association 
SF  Finland 
SGCI 
 
Sécrétariat general du Comité interministériel pour les ques-
tions de  
coopérations économiques européennes 
SGG 
 
Sécrétariat général du Gouvernement/General secretary of  
Government 
SGP  Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (NL) 
SI  Statutory Instrument (IRL) 
SMP  Single Market Programme 
SNP  Scottish Nationalist Party (UK) 
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (D) 
SPÖ  Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (A) 
STV  Single Transferable Vote  
SuVL  Suuren valiokunnan lausunto (SF)  
SWG  Südtiroler Wählergemeinschaft (I) 
TACIS  Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States 
TD  Tachta Dala (IRL) 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
UDF  Union Pour la Démocratie Française (F)  
 
517
UK  United Kingdom 
VAS  Vasemmistoliitto (SF) 
VIHR  Vihreä Liitto (SF) 
VNS  Valtioneuvoston selonteko (SF) 
VVD  Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (NL) 
WEU  Western European Union 
WTO  World Trade Organisation 
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